Sovereignty and the event in John D. Caputo’s radical theology by Ullrich, Calvin Dieter
Sovereignty and The Event 
in 
John D. Caputo’s Radical Theology 
Calvin Dieter Ullrich 
Dissertation presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University 
Supervisor: Prof Robert Vosloo 
April 2019
ii 
Declaration 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained 
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly 
otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will 
not infringe any third-party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part 
submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
Calvin Dieter Ullrich 
April 2019
Copyright © 2019 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
iii 
Acknowledgements 
To my supervisor, Prof Robert Vosloo, thank you for journeying with me for a second time. 
Your unwavering support and generous feedback have improved this thesis beyond any 
effort of my own. I am proud to be among those who can call themselves Voslonians! To my 
family, thank you for making the many kilometers that separate four continents feel like 
nothing more than a short walk into the next room. Your precious phone calls are the lifeblood 
of this thesis. To all the friends who have endured the travails and kept me from falling into 
the abyss, I am in your debt. To those involved in making my time at the University of 
Tübingen possible (including the Evangelisches Stift), my sincerest thanks. I will remember 
with fondness those evenings on the Neckar River; a good Swabian beer in one hand and a 
thickly buttered Bretzel in the other. To Prof Graham Ward, thank you for your kindness and 
hospitality shown to me during the Trinity term of 2018 at Christ Church, Oxford. The 
summer strolls in the meadow and the sublime echoes of evensong will be memories not 
easily forgotten. To Prof Rebekka Klein, thank you for granting me both flexibility and 
freedom to complete this thesis on time—I look forward to working with you in Bochum. I 
would also like to acknowledge the following institutions, administrative bodies, bursary 
funds and the people behind them, and register my sincere thanks for their varied support in 
the completion of this project: The Department of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology at 
the Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch, The Stellenbosch University International Office, The 
HB & MJ Thom Scholarship Fund, The Baden-Württemberg Stipendium and The Giovanni 
Omodeo Stiftung.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 iv 
Abstract 
 
The notion of sovereignty is the fundamental idea informing democratic society insofar as it 
defines the principle that a nation or a people have the ‘right’ or ‘force’ to decide their own 
actions without external coercion. Indeed, thanks to the ‘political theology’ of the influential 
German theorist, Carl Schmitt, this definition is said to derive its meaning both historically 
and theologically from the idea of a ‘sovereign God.’ In the context of the contemporary ‘crisis 
of democracy,’ it is the idea of sovereignty that continues to be either undermined or abused 
and, therefore, raises the question of the ‘theological foundations’—or the political theology—
of sovereignty. Political-theological reflection on the concept of sovereignty, particularly in 
South Africa, often articulates that the sovereignty of God is to be affirmed not to prop-up 
theocratic abuses of power, but precisely to relativize all claimants to absolute power. 
Accordingly, it maintains the theological claim that God is sovereign but distances itself from 
any vision that would legitimize the state. This study offers a different approach to both the 
‘old’ political theology—where God’s sovereignty is used to prop-up the state—as well as to 
‘new’ political theology—where God’s sovereignty always exceeds and thus keeps the state 
in check. It seeks, rather, to raise the question of the foundations of political sovereignty not 
by out-rightly affirming that God is sovereign, but by exploring the implications and 
possibilities of thinking about God without sovereignty. It therefore determines to articulate 
what is called a ‘radical political theology.’ To arrive at a radical political theology, the study 
considers the contributions of the American philosopher of religion, John D. Caputo. It begins 
with the origins of Caputo’s philosophical development in the thought of Martin Heidegger, 
before turning to his creative theological appropriation of the French philosopher, Jacques 
Derrida. Through Derrida, Caputo develops an original approach to theology that emphasizes 
a God who is ‘weak,’ not a divine omnipotent Being and without sovereignty. He formulates 
a ‘theology of event’ or ‘radical theology’ where God is devoid of all authoritarian power, 
strength, and authority, and instead is better thought of as a ‘weak force,’ a name for what he 
calls an ‘event.’ The event is an interruption into the order of things for which one cannot be 
prepared. God, as a name for an event is an unexpected and disruptive force, which calls on 
us to be expectant for the infinite possibility of transformation and hope for a world that could 
always be otherwise. A God without sovereignty, therefore, is not simply a God without 
power, but rather God’s power is re-inscribed as a ‘weak force’ that lays claim on us. The 
study then considers what Caputo calls radical theology’s theo-poetics, offered as an alternative 
to classical theo-logic. The latter describes a mode of theological reflection that is still keyed 
into the logics of divine Being, while the former is a poetical discourse that gives voice to 
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‘events.’ Finally, as a conclusion and an answer to the challenge of articulating a radical 
political theology, the study proposes that the discourse of theo-poetics provides the 
discursive resources of a radical political theology that can imagine God without sovereignty. 
With this answer the study will have made a novel contribution in two important ways: first 
it will have provided an original alternative to contemporary political-theological reflection 
with respect to the democratic question of theological foundations. Secondly, since Caputo’s 
thought generally operates in the fields of theology and continental philosophy of religion, 
this study will have made a significant claim for the status of his work to be considered as a 
‘political theology.’ 
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Opsomming 
Soewereiniteit is ‘n begrip wat die grondslag lê vir die vorming van ‘n demokratiese 
samelewing in sover as wat dit die beginsel omskryf dat ‘n nasie of ‘n volk die ‘reg’ of die 
‘mag’ het om te besluit oor hulle eie aksies sonder dwang. Dit is te danke aan die ‘politieke 
teologie’ van die invloedryke Duitse teoretikus, Carl Schmitt, dat hierdie definisie beide 
histories en teologies afgelei word van die idee van ‘n ‘soewereine God’. Binne die konteks van 
die kontemporêre ‘krisis van demokrasie,’ word die idee van soewereiniteit steeds óf geminag 
óf misbruik, en gevolglik is dit nodig om die ‘teologiese grondslag’—of die politieke 
teologie—van soewereiniteit te bevraagteken. Politieke-teologiese refleksie oor die konsep 
van soewereiniteit, veral in Suid-Afrika, gee gehoor daaraan dat die soewereiniteit van God 
bevestig moet word, nie om ‘n teokratiese misbruik van mag te regverdig nie, maar juis om 
alle eisers van absolute mag te relativeer. Dit volstaan dus by die teologiese siening dat God 
soewerein is, sonder om noodwendig legitimiteit aan die staat te gee. Hierdie studie bied ‘n 
andersoortige benadering tot ‘ou’ politieke teologie—waar God se soewereiniteit gebruik 
word om die staat te bekragtig—sowel as ‘nuwe’ politieke teologie—waar God se 
soewereiniteit altyd die mag van die staat oorskrei en dus staatsmag kan reguleer. Die studie 
poog eerder om die grondslag van politieke soewereiniteit te bevraagteken deur nie God se 
soewereiniteit as gegewe te aanvaar nie, maar deur die implikasies en moontlikhede te 
probeer ontgin van ‘n besinning van God sonder soewereiniteit.  Dit is dus ‘n poging om ‘n 
‘radikale politieke teologie’ te omskryf. Om by so ‘n radikale  politieke teologie uit te kom, 
weeg die studie die bydraes op van die Amerikaanse filosoof van godsdiens, John D. Caputo. 
Dit begin met die oorsprong van Caputo se filosofiese ontwikkeling in Martin Heidegger se 
werk, en fokus dan op sy kreatiewe teologiese bewilliging van die Franse filosoof, Jacques 
Derrida. Deur Derrida, ontwikkel Caputo ‘n oorspronklike benadering tot teologie wat klem 
lê op ‘n ‘swak’ God, en nie ‘n alomteenwoordige goddelike Wese nie, een sonder 
soewereiniteit. Hy omskryf ‘n ‘teologie van gebeurtenis’ of ‘radikale teologie’ waar God 
sonder enige outoritêre mag, krag, of outoriteit is, en eerder aan gedink kan word as ‘n ‘swak 
krag,’ die naam wat hy toeskryf aan ‘n ‘gebeurtenis’. Die gebeurtenis is ‘n onverwagse 
onderbreking waaroor ‘n mens nie voorbereid kan wees nie. God, as ‘n naam vir ‘n 
gebeurtenis is ‘n onverwagse en ontwrigtende mag, wat ons oproep om met verwagting 
gereed te staan vir die oneindige moontlikheid van transformasie en hoop vir ‘n wêreld wat 
altyd anders kan wees. ‘n God sonder soewereiniteit is dus nie ‘n God sonder mag nie, maar 
eerder God se mag wat herskryf word as ‘n ‘swak krag’ en aan ons ‘n eis stel. Hierdie studie 
bestudeer dan wat Caputo noem radikale teologie se theo-poetics, wat as ‘n alternatief gebied 
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word vir ‘n klassieke theo-logic. Die laasgenoemde beskryf ‘n wyse van teologiese refleksie 
wat steeds getoonset is op die logika van ‘n goddelike Wese, terwyl die eersgenoemde ‘n 
digterlike diskoers is wat uitdrukking gee aan ‘gebeurtenisse’. Ten slotte, om saam te vat en 
‘n antwoord te bied op die uitdaging om ‘n radikale politieke teologie te omskryf, stel die 
studie voor dat die diskoerse van theo-poetics die nodige gesprek-gerigte hulpbronne bied 
van ‘n radikale politieke teologie wat God kan voorstel sonder soewereiniteit. Met hierdie 
gevolgtrekking sou die studie ‘n nuwe bydra gelewer het op twee belangrike terreine: eerstens 
sou dit ‘n oorspronklike alternatief gebied het tot kontemporêre  politieke-teologiese refleksie 
met betrekking tot die demokratiese vraag na ‘n teologiese grondslag. Tweedens, aangesien 
Caputo se werk in die algemeen  binne teologie en kontinentale filosofie van 
godsdiensfilosofie bestudeer word, sou hierdie studie ‘n wesenlike aanspraak gemaak het op 
die status van sy werk om as ‘politieke teologie’ beskou te kon word.   
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Chapter One  
Introduction  
 
 
What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a master. You will get one. 
— Jacques Lacan1 
 
The question of the master that the psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, raises here, or the 
‘sovereign’ in the work of the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, as we will see shortly, is 
the fundamental political-theological question which motivates the present study. On the one 
hand, the master or sovereign figure is a political one, not only because it has to do with power 
and authority, but also because it raises questions of political legitimacy, autonomy, freedom 
and democracy. On the other hand, the concept of the master/sovereign has also a particular 
theological resonance, and to that extent will require theological reflection. The point of 
departure for this theological resonance is obtained from the political theorist Carl Schmitt, 
who can be credited with bringing the concept of political theology back into twentieth and 
twenty-first century debate. In its most basic form, Schmitt’s hypothesis was that the political 
sovereign receives its conceptual force from the sovereign omnipotent God. It is this God, it 
will be argued, which will need to be reflected upon, lest we acquire a new master that we 
neither want nor deserve.  
 
The importance of Jacques Derrida for this study lies not only in the connections he makes 
with Carl Schmitt, but also in his influence on its central interlocutor, the American 
philosopher and theologian, John D. Caputo.2 While Derrida’s writing contains a number of 
theological characteristics, it is Caputo’s work which has become most well-known for its 
theological interpretation of Derrida. Since the political-theological concept of sovereignty 
requires theological reflection, and because Derrida does not engage this systematically 
himself, the aim of this study can be said to be an exploration of John D. Caputo’s ‘radical 
theology of the event,’ as an exemplary site in which this reflection takes place. It will be 
argued, more specifically, that Caputo’s radical theology presents resources to reimagine the 
                                                      
1 Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.), Russell Grigg (trans.) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis, Book XVII (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), pg. 207. 
2 John D. Caputo is presently the Thomas J. Watson Professor of Religion Emeritus at Syracuse University and the 
David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Villanova University. 
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sovereign and thus aims to contribute to resolving the ongoing quandary of the status of 
theological sovereignty and its relation not only to the political, but also to ethics and religion. 
 
To this end, the scope of this study consists in a systematic theoretical and philosophical-
theological reflection on the work of John D. Caputo. While taking its point of departure from 
the theological-political sense of sovereignty given by Carl Schmitt, the study traces this 
concept through Caputo’s oeuvre as it specifically interacts in the various domains of his 
thought with what is called ‘the event.’ The event in this study functions heuristically as an 
organizing concept that demarcates the unique contributions of Caputo’s philosophical and 
theological project. From the philosophical influence of Jacque Derrida’s deconstructive 
approach, Caputo incorporates the concept of the ‘event’ into a ‘radical theology’ that not only 
challenges dominant modes of theological discourse, but also offers an alternative and novel 
mode of theological reflection. This mode of reflection, which Caputo calls ‘theopoetics,’ 
undermines traditional notions of God and theology insofar as the latter is a ‘logical’ discourse 
which mediates on the former as both an omnipotent and sovereign Being. Theopoetics, on 
the other hand, suggests a mode of reflection which tries to think of God without sovereignty. 
To think of God without sovereignty is to think of a ‘weak’ God beyond the order of a Supreme 
Being or Infinite Entity. The study will show, however, that ‘God’s weakness’ does not mean 
‘God’s impotence’ but rather alludes to a ‘weak force’ of God which lays claim on us. 
Theopoetics is the discourse that attempts to articulate this weak force and, therefore, will be 
central to the project of imagining a God without sovereignty.  
 
As the study hopes to demonstrate, to think or imagine a God without sovereignty is not just 
a cerebral exercise, but is an urgent and necessary task requiring sustained theological 
reflection. Reasons for this reside in the conviction that modern democratic life is not a value-
free zone, but is rather imbued with theological concepts. To the extent that sovereignty is one 
of these central concepts that continues to influence the way in which democracy is both 
conceived and carried out, it cannot be left to the realm of political or legal theory. As will 
become clearer below, much theological reflection has already sought to interrogate the 
dangers of a political theology of sovereignty which might serve as justification for potentially 
violent political ambitions. To this extent, theological reflection has usually consisted in 
submitting alternative political theologies that conceive God’s sovereignty as a transcending 
force that is able to critique ‘this-worldly’ projects of statecraft. While this study affirms such 
political-theological approaches, it would argue that maintaining this connection to God’s 
sovereignty is always a risk, no matter how transcendent it is of the political realm. Therefore, 
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by running together this political-theological notion of sovereignty and Caputo’s theopoetics 
of radical theology — which imagines a God without sovereignty — the study attempts to 
formulate a ‘radical political theology’ that might not only be more prepared to manage this 
risk, but which also offers an original and ‘constructive’ mode of theological discourse with 
which to engage political challenges. 
 
I. Introduction, Rationale, Delimitation 
 
At the genesis of this project, universities across South Africa were emerging from a wave of 
student protests. What started at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg 
in January 2015 as a small demonstration relating to defaulting fee payments, soon took a 
dramatic turn far exceeding the critical failures of South Africa’s National Student Financial 
Aid Scheme (NSFAS) — the purported source of the tension at the time. The defining moment 
occurred on Monday, the 9th of March 2015, when Chumani Maxwele, a student of the 
University of Cape Town (UCT), hurled human excrement onto a large concrete statue located 
in the center of UCT’s campus. The statue was that of the notorious British mining magnate, 
former prime minister of the Cape Colony, and veritable symbol of colonial imperialism, Cecil 
John Rhodes. The hashtag #RhodesMustFall began trending across the country and beyond, 
even igniting protests at Rhodes’ alma mater at Oriel College, Oxford.3 Exactly one month 
later the statue had been removed from UCT’s campus.  
 
But Pandora’s box had been proverbially opened. Catalyzed by the resistance of university 
executive bodies to amend tuition fee policies, as well those events at UCT, activist groups 
and self-styled ‘movements’ began forming across campuses. It became quickly clear, 
however, given the diversity of issues being raised,4 that what was at stake did not simply 
reside in university access or the presence of colonial statues. Two underlying but 
significantly inter-related objects of discontent could be identified. The first was the perceived 
failure of the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), to make good on its 
promises of a ‘post-apartheid’ era that would inaugurate a new dispensation of prosperity, at 
least, that is, for a generation of ‘born-free’ black youth — those born after the formal end of 
                                                      
3 Alex Waygood, “Rhodes Must Fall: A Timeline,” The Poor Print: Oriel College Newspaper, 
www.thepoorprint.com/2017//04/28/rhodes-must-fall-a-timeline/ (27 April, 2017).  
4 At Stellenbosch University, for example, a historically white Afrikaans institution, the ‘Open Stellenbosch’ 
movement that mobilized in April, called for greater inclusion by means of adjusting the university language 
policy, which, they argued, ultimately excluded students whose first language was not Afrikaans. See Tammy 
Peterson, “Students protest in Stellenbosch over language,” News24, 
www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Students-protest-in-Stellenbosch-over-language-20150727 (27 July, 2015).  
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the apartheid regime. Along with the devastation caused by the pillaging of state resources, 
cronyism, and corruption across the echelons of government, which marked and culminated 
in the demise of Jacob Zuma and parts of his administration, there was also the claim that the 
ANC had simply not pursued a more progressive social economic agenda. The problem was 
an old one. With the loss of its principle support after the collapse of the Soviet Union, here 
was a new political power without money, while old money (the Apartheid government) was 
left without power. In the midst of the compromises with white-owned business, the majority 
of black people, it was argued, were left behind.5  
 
The second object of discontent underpinning the latter, was perhaps the more pernicious 
meta-historical narrative of colonialism. At the university but also in wider public discourse, 
this was variously referred to as the persistence of ‘white privilege.’ This phenomenon was 
not only to be found in the celebratory symbolic status accorded to colonial statues or even in 
acts of overt racism, but more invasively in an experience of ‘coloniality,’6 or what the Peruvian 
sociologist Aníbal Quijano called, ‘the coloniality of power.’7 This experience is best defined 
in a structurally and often shrewdly-maintained cycle of white superiority, informing 
everything from university policies, economic models, private sector workspace, classroom 
teaching, to knowledge production. In short, South Africa’s colonial history perpetuated in 
structural forms of oppression and exclusion, ANC negligence and commitment to liberal 
models for economic growth — which not only covered over these oppressions but 
exacerbated them — as well as the effects of government corruption, were all combined to 
loosely define a nebulous edifice which, it was argued, needed exposing in order to 
fundamentally influence a truly transformed post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
Whatever is to be made of this abridged assessment of the present South African situation, 
which is still to say nothing of the highly-contested solution proposals, one need only conduct 
a rudimentary survey to observe a subsequent proliferation of analysis seeking to vigorously 
interrogate this colonial legacy, whether in public forums or the academy. Indeed, through 
                                                      
5 See Roger Southall, “How ANC’s path to corruption was set in South Africa’s 1994 transition,” The Conversation, 
https://theconversation.com/how-ancs-path-to-corruption-was-set-in-south-africas-1994-transition-64774 (6 Sep, 
2016); see also Roger Southall, “The ANC for Sale? Money, Morality and Business in South Africa,” Review of African 
Political Economy 35. 116 (Oct, 2008), pp. 281-299. 
6 It is perhaps worth drawing a distinction following Ramón Grosfoguel between colonialism and coloniality: the 
latter is the “continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by 
colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system.” See Ramón 
Grosfoguel, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond political-economy paradigms” in Cultural Studies 21. 2-3 
(March/May, 2007), pp. 211-223, pg. 219. 
7 See Aníbal Quijano, Michael Ennis (trans.), “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America” in Nepantla: 
Views from South 1.3 (Sep, 2000), pp. 533-580. 
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the sea of online articles, academic publications, workshops, public conversations and books, 
it would be difficult to deny a shift in tone and sense of urgency in public and academic 
reflection initiated by those protests almost four years ago.8 It is in this context that the 
motivations for this study and the epigraph from Lacan coincide.  
 
Lacan’s famous remarks to disgruntled students on the third of December 1969, at the newly 
established ‘experimental’ Université de Paris VIII at Vincennes (included at the end of 
Seminar XVII: ‘The Other Side of Psychoanalysis’) follow the widely commented on revolts 
of May 1968. In the gathering from where these comments were recorded, Lacan was faced 
with a series of heckling students who wanted him to perform a ‘self-criticism,’ since they 
were disgusted at the formalized inclusion of psychoanalysis in the university.9 
Psychoanalysis, they thought, was the discourse which provided the means by which the 
bureaucratization of the university could be undermined. Instead, by creating a department 
of psychoanalysis, the disruptive and non-formalizable nature of the discourse, they argued, 
was now being coopted into the university itself. Though sympathetic with the students, 
Lacan’s tone toward them, as his biographer Élisabeth Roudinesco noted, was more of a ‘stern 
father,’ perhaps even a little authoritarian.10 Paradoxically, the question could be asked, was 
the threat of psychoanalysis to the university not found in its marginal status but rather in the 
inherent anti-egalitarianism of its master-slave/analyst-analysand dialectic? As one of the 
hecklers put it, “[w]e already have priests, but since that was no longer working, we now have 
psychoanalysts.”11  
 
As Stephen Frosh points out, in the aftermath of ‘68 Lacan was certainly convinced of the 
radical potential of psychoanalysis, as the distinction between the famous ‘four discourses’ 
(Master, Hysteric, University and the Analyst) makes clear. In university discourse 
“knowledge loses its capacity to radicalize,” since it is ‘flattened’ and ‘bureaucratized,’ 
                                                      
8 No doubt, thinking through the effects of colonialism has existed since the very beginnings of colonialism itself. 
Indeed, a ‘decolonial turn’ (a term now frequently invoked in the literature and discourse) as an active project was 
announced already in the twentieth century in a line of thinkers stemming from W.E.B. Du Bois, Aimée Césaire 
and Franz Fanon. See Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental 
Interventions in Theory, Philosophy and Critique — An Introduction” in Transmodernity 1. 2 (Fall, 2011). Retrieved 
from: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/59w8j02x . The claim being made here, simply, is that the protests ignited 
something of an urgency to an already ongoing discussion.  
9 The Department of Psychoanalysis would be the first of its kind in the French university system and would fall 
under the umbrella of the Department of Philosophy, headed by Michel Foucault. It boasted a fresh list of 
admirable young philosophers, including: Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, and Jean-François 
Lyotard. See Stephen Frosh, “Everyone Longs for a Master: Lacan and 1968” in Gurminder K. Bhambra and Ipek 
Demir (eds.) 1968 in Retrospect: History, Theory, Alterity (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 100-112; pp. 100-
101. 
10 Élisabeth Roudinesco, Barbara Bray (trans.) Jacques Lacan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pg. 343. 
11 Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, pg. 200. 
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whereas psychoanalysis “calls this kind of knowledge into question.” Consequently, “what 
happens ‘in’ the university is at odds with psychoanalysis, even when psychoanalysis appears 
in the university itself, and even when what happens in the university is a rebellion against 
the university.”12 Lacan’s point to the students was that it does not matter whether you are 
‘inside’ or ‘outside’ rebelling against the system, you are always ‘stamped’ by the mode of 
university knowledge. Another student’s interjection, saying that they did not understand 
Lacan’s usage of the word ‘aphasic,’ illustrates his point:13 revolutionary display from 
‘outside’ of the university is nothing more than just that, a display of ignorance (the student 
doesn’t understand basic Greek) which is, itself, put on display. With condescension, Lacan 
replied: “for you fulfil the role of helots of this regime. You don’t know what that means 
either? The regime is putting you on display. It says, ‘Look at them enjoying!’”14 Thus, the 
revolutionary impulse of the students is ultimately a search for a more totalizing university 
discourse and “this search for unity produces totalitarianism in the form of a master — and 
in hunting for revolutionary upheaval in the way that they do, that is where the students will 
end up.”15 The new master which the students got in the end one recalls, was an even stronger 
Gaullist party.  
 
With prescient insight, as the renowned Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, has been 
variously elaborating for the last couple of decades, Lacan’s words about the master’s return 
continue to haunt movements which agitate against the dominant global-economic and 
western-democratic apparatus, including the likes of Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados in 
Spain or Syriza in Greece. Referring to Occupy, Žižek describes the art of politics as the 
insistence on a demand that is ‘realistic’ insofar as it disturbs the hegemonic order, but which 
is also de facto impossible. The paradox, therefore, is that “we should indeed endeavor to 
mobilize people around such demands — however, it is no less important to remain 
simultaneously subtracted from the pragmatic field of negotiations and ‘concrete’ proposals.”16 
Žižek’s political analysis here is an expansion on the central Lacanian insight that a true 
revolution is the Freudian revolution, according to which the desire for total knowledge is 
suspended in the process of ‘transference’ when the analysand comes to realize that the 
analyst is not ‘the one who knows.’ The subject is thus left to fall upon its divided-self or what 
                                                      
12 Frosh, “Everyone Longs for a Master,” pp. 102-103. 
13 “But outside what? Because when you leave here you become aphasic? When you leave here you continue to 
speak, consequently you continue to be inside. INTERVENTION: I do not know what aphasic is. You do not know 
what aphasic is? That’s extremely revolting. You don’t what an aphasic is? There is a minimum one has to know, 
nevertheless.” Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, pp. 205-206. 
14 Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, pg. 208. 
15 Frosh, “Everyone Longs for a Master,” pg. 106. 
16 Slavoj Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (London: Verso, 2012), pg. 84. 
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Lacan called the pas-tout (non-all/non-whole): “without this pas-tout, there will always be a 
demand for a master.”17  
 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and especially the conceptualization of Freudian subjectivity allows 
one to view the student protests through a helpful critical framework. Reflecting on the recent 
protests in South Africa, the philosopher, Achille Mbembe remarks, “the winds blowing from 
our campuses can be felt afar…it goes by the name ‘decolonization’ — in truth a psychic state 
more than a political project.”18 While Mbembe is categorical, “this is not ’68,”19 it is not 
difficult to discern and consequently evaluate the protests through the Lacanian lens as others 
have done at length.20 We will not, however, pursue this line any further. Instead, this 
contextual heuristic and in particular the reference to the ‘master’ functions as a pivot for 
introducing the central concerns of this study.  
 
In its most basic form, the consequence of ’68 was the decline of the old (authoritarian) master 
and the emergence of the new master-figure in the form of the ‘expert’ (university discourse). 
The problem, as Žižek points out, is that these experts show themselves not to be experts or 
masters at all and hence we have the unsurprising return of the strong-man authoritarian who 
inspires the populist alternative.21 Much of this can be mapped onto the South African 
situation — the decline of the old colonial master or the Apartheid state, only to be replaced 
by a new regime of experts that are struggling to consolidate a positive social vision in the 
context of a young and vulnerable democracy. The students require a master. But the question 
that emerges is what will the precise character of this new master be? It can neither be the 
return of the authoritarian nor the depoliticizing neutrality of ‘university discourse.’ This 
                                                      
17 Frosh, “Everyone Longs for a Master,” pg. 100. 
18 Achille Mbembe, “The State of South African Political Life,” Africa Is A Country, 
www.africaisacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics (19 Sep, 2015). 
Although short, this concise essay provided an accessible statement of the state of South African politics during 
2015, it was also widely disseminated.  
19 This is taken from an excerpt of Mbembe’s “Diary of My South African Years” that was published online: see 
Achille Mbembe, “Theodor Adorno vs Herbert Marcuse on student protests, violence and democracy,” First Thing 
– Daily Maverick, http://firstthing.dailymaverick.co.za/article?id=73620 (accessed on: 27 Oct, 2018). This psychic 
state can be understood as characteristic of a larger phenomenon that is shaping the twenty-first century, what 
Mbembe as recently called a ‘politics of enmity.’ See Achille Mbembe, Giovanni Menegalle (trans.) “The Society of 
Enmity” in Radical Philosophy 200 (Nov/Dec, 2016), pp. 23-35. This article is a translation of chapter two of Achille 
Mbembe, Politiques de l’inimitié (Paris: La Découverte, 2016).  
20 See Bert Olivier for example, “Protests, ‘acting out’, group psychology, surplus enjoyment and neo-liberal 
capitalism” in Psychology in Society, 53 (2017), pp. 30-50. 
21 As Žižek recently comments, “recall how the experts in Brussels acted in negotiations with Greece’s Syriza 
government during the euro crisis in 2014: no debate, this has to be done. I think today’s populism reacts to the 
fact that experts are not really masters, that their expertise doesn’t work.” See Slavoj Žižek, “Are liberals and 
populists just searching for a new master? A book excerpt and interview with Slavoj Žižek,” The Economist, 
https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/10/08/are-liberals-and-populists-just-searching-for-a-new-
master (8 Oct, 2018).   
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question, therefore, raises the issue of the complex relationship between mastery or the 
analogous notion of sovereignty and the (theological) foundations that constitute democratic 
life. To pursue this question further, this study will draw on the insights of Jacques Derrida 
as they are specifically taken up in the work of John D. Caputo and his radical theology. 
 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we introduce the ‘two axes’ taken from the title 
i.e. ‘sovereignty and the event.’ With respect to the former, we will discuss the conditions in 
which sovereignty emerges as both a political and theological concept, and which finds its 
modern articulation in Carl Schmitt. This will allow us to reflect on the reception of Schmitt’s 
thought, as well as to make further remarks regarding his contribution to the study. With 
respect to the latter, we will refer to Caputo’s radical theology of event. We will distinguish 
Caputo’s radical theology from other radical theological projects before further situating his 
own work and introducing his core theological contribution. The introduction concludes by 
presenting the problem statement, question, method, and thesis, followed by the chapter 
outlines.   
 
I. Of Sovereignty 
 
On the way to formulating an answer to the question of the master figure in politics, it is useful 
to refer to it with another figure, namely, that of the sovereign. The French philosopher, 
Jacques Derrida (a contemporary of Lacan), in his last seminars conducted before his death 
explicitly links the master to the sovereign: “the master (and what is said of the master is easily 
transferable to the first of all, the prince, the sovereign), the master is he who is said to be, and 
who can say ‘himself’ to be, the (self-)same, ‘myself.’”22 Derrida continues, expanding on this 
definition: 
 
The concept of sovereignty will always imply the possibility of this 
positionality, this thesis, this self-thesis, this autoposition of him who 
posits or posits himself as ipse, the (self-)same, oneself. And that will be just 
as much the case for all the ‘firsts,’ for the sovereign as princely person, 
the monarch or the emperor or the dictator, as for the people in a 
democracy, or even for the citizen-subject in the exercise of his sovereign 
liberty (for example, when he votes or places his secret ballot in the box, 
                                                      
22 Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington (trans.), Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet and Ginette Michaud (eds.) The 
Beast and The Sovereign (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [2009] 2011), pg. 67. 
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sovereignly). In sum, wherever there is a decision worthy of the name, in 
the classical sense of the term.  
 
In this description of the master/sovereign Derrida consciously implicates a wide scope of the 
tradition of liberal modernity in the semantic field of a certain political theology. Despite early-
modern efforts to imagine an immanent account of human nature (Bodin, Hobbes, Vico, 
Machiavelli) — exemplified in Vico’s famous aphorism, verum esse ipsum factum (‘what is true 
is precisely what is made’)23 — Derrida concludes, nonetheless, that these attempts at 
‘anthropologization, modernization and secularization’ remain “essentially attached by the 
skein of a double umbilical cord.”24 On the one side of this double connection Derrida refers 
to imitation, which describes the ‘human’ institution of the state as “copies of the work of God.” 
On the other side, he speaks of a (Christian) logic of lieutenance — of the human sovereign as 
the taking-place of God (tient lieu de Dieu) and as place-taking (lieu-tenant): “the place standing 
in for the absolute sovereign: God.”25 To those unfamiliar with Derrida, such comments might 
be jolting for modern sensibilities. How is it that such language of God and Christianity, or 
even religion, could be spoken in such proximity to the political order?  
 
The possibility for such claims arise in what is now a well-documented phenomenon; viz. the 
crisis of secular-liberal modernity in which religion once banished from the public sphere has 
made a tremendous comeback.26 This (re)turn or ‘resurgence’ is not merely private religiosity 
but in a number of particular ways quite public and therefore political.27 The crucial move of 
modernity was to maintain the link between classical liberalism and secularism: the value-free 
space of the former in which the market could operate untethered, combined with the 
ideological assumption of the latter that religion could be separated from public life. However, 
                                                      
23 See Victoria Kahn, The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2014), pp. 6-9.  
24 Ibid., pg. 53. 
25 Ibid.  
26 See for example; Hans Joas, Faith as Option: Possible Futures for Christianity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2014), Charles Taylor’s, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), Peter L. Berger, “The 
Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview", in Peter L. Berger (ed). The Desecularization of the World: 
Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), Sharpe, M. and Nickelson, D. (eds.), 
Secularisations and Their Debates: Perspectives on the Return of Religion in the Contemporary West, (Springer, 2014), 
William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), and Talal 
Assad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
27 Graham Ward, for example, speaks of ‘resurgence’ or ‘the new visibility of religion,’ rather than ‘return.’ For him 
return implies continuity with the past, but the ‘postsecular’ phenomenon has very little to do with old forms of 
religiosity he claims. For example, he indicates that mainline church attendance has declined, or if anything, has 
remained stagnant. Ward posits a threefold typology for describing this new visibility: Fundamentalism, 
Deprivatization, and Religion and Culture (in terms of its commodification). See Graham Ward, The Politics of 
Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), especially see chapter three, pp. 
117-158. 
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the maintenance of this link has failed and the boundaries between the religious and the 
secular — and indeed, many of the modern distinctions: subject/object, faith/reason, 
theology/philosophy etc., —  have become ever-more porous, leading some to wonder how 
modern we even were to begin with.28 One important consequence of this ‘post-secular’ 
environment for this study, is that the resources of theology (or religion) used to interrogate 
questions of politics cannot be confined only to classical theological reflection, insofar as the 
very distinction between (political) theology and (political) philosophy is no longer secure. 
While further reasons and implications of the ‘post-modern’ or ‘post-secular’ will become 
clearer as the study progresses, it is in this context one can understand the recent fascination 
of a number of predominantly ‘secular’ thinkers who have begun to show interest in precisely 
the intellectual offerings of religion and theology. These include, among others, Slavoj Žižek, 
Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Jean-Luc Nancy, Gianni 
Vattimo, and indeed, Jacques Derrida.   
 
One of the first to consider this complex entanglement of ‘the political’ and ‘the theological’ in 
the twentieth century was the controversial conservative German political theorist, Carl 
Schmitt (1888-1985), most famously in his short book, Political Theology (1922).29 Indeed, it is 
thanks to Schmitt that the term ‘political theology’ has re-entered the modern lexicon, which 
he most likely gathered from Baruch Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670).30 As a part 
of his incisive critique of Weimar liberalism, parliamentarianism, and cosmopolitanism, 
Schmitt put political theology to work through the concept of sovereignty by defining it as “he 
who decides on the exception”31 with respect to the juridical-legal order. This understanding 
of sovereignty for his formulation of political theology was not an appeal to religious tradition 
for political legitimacy, but rather involved the claim that the political order is structurally 
analogous to a metaphysical reality. The primary analogue for this claim was to be found in 
the sovereign God, insofar as God is that which both founds the political order and 
simultaneously remains a part of and external to it. Schmitt’s argument went on to define the 
                                                      
28 See Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1991] 1993). While 
this book had to do with the false distinction that modernity made between nature and society, it nonetheless 
captures well the general mood of the times.  
29 Carl Schmitt, George Schwab (trans). Political Theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2005), originally published as Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humboldt, 1932).  
30 Despite the frequent reference to Schmitt as the originator of the phrase ‘political theology,’ he has no role in 
conceiving it. Indeed, apart from Spinoza, whom he certainly had read, the phrase also shows up in other literature, 
for example, Simon van Heenvliedt’s Theologico-Politica Dissertatio (Utrecht: Jacob Waterman, 1662). The earliest 
usage seems to date back to Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 B.C.E.), see Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan 
(eds.) Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press), pp. 25-26. 
31 Ibid., pg. 5. 
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concept of politics in a circumscription that referred to an irreducible conflict between ‘friend 
and enemy,’ which he detailed in his second most-often cited book, The Concept of the Political 
(1932).32 From these definitions, Schmitt derived the normative conclusion that the theological-
political element of politics needed to be reclaimed. Infamously, he later became a member of 
the Nazi Party, with the after-effects generally casting political theology as a long anti-
democratic and authoritarian shadow over the twentieth century.33 In chapter two of this 
study, Schmitt’s political theology and concept of sovereignty will be further elaborated and 
will be shown to culminate in what will be called a ‘politics of presence.’ This desire for 
presence, which is the desire of sovereignty itself, will be placed in consistent tension with the 
second axis of the study, i.e. the event. Given Schmitt’s contributions to political theology and 
the concept of sovereignty in particular, some further comments about his reception are 
necessary in order to situate and justify his inclusion into the present study.  
 
After Schmitt’s defense of the political-theological heritage which must be reclaimed for 
modern politics, a number of critical responses were generated arising both before and after 
the Second World War. Some of these responses were historical-theological in nature, while 
others focused on secularization and the use of theological concepts in politics. To the former, 
the neo-Kantian legal scholar, Hans Kelsen, and the conservative theologian, Erik Peterson, 
both argued in different ways that Schmitt’s theory evaded the crucial Trinitarian aspect of 
theology.34 Many years later, in Political Theology  II (1969),35 Schmitt responded to these 
criticisms arguing that they were based on theological dogma, whereas his interests were 
epistemological and had to do with the history of ideas.36 Another series of critical responses 
to Schmitt, including Eric Voegelin, Jacob Taubes and Karl Löwith,37 for example, were 
                                                      
32 Carl Schmitt, George Schwab (trans.) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of the Political (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2005), originally published as Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der 
Souveränität (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1922). 
33 See Annika Thiem, “Schmittian Shadows and Contemporary Theological-Political Constellations,” Social 
Research 80. 1 (Spring, 2013), pp. 1-33. Thiem details a comprehensive reception history of Schmitt in this valuable 
essay. 
34 For Kelsen, a Trinitarian incarnational model restricts divine omnipotence implied by Schmitt’s concept of 
sovereignty, and rather forces the political order to bind itself to the concrete limitations of law. See Hens Kelsen, 
“Gott und Staat,” Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift Für Philosophie Der Kultur 11 (1922), pp. 261-284, pg. 275. For 
Peterson, the combination of Trinitarian theology and Augustinian eschatology, refutes the claim of hierarchal 
sovereignty on the one hand, and on the other, necessarily requires the provisional nature of any political order 
and at the same time disallows such a thing as Christian political theology. See Erik Peterson, “Monotheism as a 
Political Problem: A Contribution to the History of Political Theology in the Roman Empire” in Erik Peterson, 
Michael J. Hollerich (ed.) Theological Tractatus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, [1953] 2011), pp. 68-105. 
35 Carl Schmitt, Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (trans.) Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of and Political 
Theology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
36 Thiem, “Schmittian Shadows,” pg. 7. 
37 For Taubes’ relationship with Schmitt see the appendices, including two letters, in Jacob Taubes, Dana Hollander 
(trans.), Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann (eds.) The Political Theology of Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004), pp. 97-113. See also Jacob Taubes, Keith Tribe (trans.) with introduction by Mike Grimshaw, To Carl Schmitt. 
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concerned about the negative influences of theological concepts on philosophies of history. 
Walter Benjamin, in his The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1925), drew particular attention to 
the fact that sovereignty was not the structural analogue to an omnipotent God, but rather 
emerged as an imagined consequence of a changed sense of history, namely, the possibility of 
an eschatological destruction of the world.38 In another vein, Hans Blumenberg criticized 
Schmitt’s theory of secularization, arguing that it did not allow for the rearrangement of 
theological concepts but instead arrested them in such a way that they were always 
unchanging. In Blumenberg’s view, while modernity is indebted to its theological roots, it does 
not require transcendental norms for its self-assertion.39 As the discussion above about the 
porosity of the sacred and secular alludes, this study opposes itself to this view on the basis 
that it implicitly assumes modernity’s superiority, which is itself an ideological construal.40  
 
On more explicitly theological grounds, a number of theologians inspired in large part by the 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School, as well as the developing Latin American liberation 
theologies, responded to Schmitt’s ‘old’ political theology by arguing for a ‘new’ political 
theology.41 These thinkers, including Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, Dorothee Sölle, 
                                                      
Letters and Reflections (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). Taubes defends a radically ‘negative political 
theology’ where the future may not be appropriated by worldly power. See Marin Tepstra and Theo de Wit, “’No 
Spiritual Investment in the World as it is.’ Jacob Taubes’ Negative Political Theology,” in Ilse N. Bulhof and 
Laurens ten Kate (eds.) Flight of the Gods. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Political Theology (New York: Fordham 
University Press), pp. 320-353. Löwith also directly engages Schmitt in an early essay, where he argued that after 
the First World War, the decline of modern philosophies of history, and therefore the loss of criteria for truth or 
action, led Schmitt to defend the sovereign decision as the only means with which to respond to the ‘actual’ 
(faktische) situation. See Karl Löwith, “The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt” in Karl Löwith, Richard Wolin 
(ed.) and Gary Steiner (trans.), Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995). 
38 Benjamin’s cynical view seems to have been, in a way, affirmed by Schmitt, when he later drew on the New 
Testament figure of the katechon who acts with decisiveness in order to stave off the end of history. But their 
differences, nonetheless, remained stark. Benjamin believed that Schmitt’s assertion of the sovereign was an 
imaginative act in the midst of radical contingency, and that the justification for decisiveness based on a political 
theology of omnipotent sovereignty, is a symptom of nostalgia for a concept of political theology that longer exists. 
See Walter Benjamin, John Osborne (trans.) The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 2003), pg. 66, and 
Carl Schmitt, G. L. Ulman (trans.) The Nomos of the Earth: in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New 
York: Telos, 2006). Benjamin’s approach to political-theological questions through the aesthetics of Baroque drama, 
bears similarities also with Ernst Kantorowicz’s study in The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1957] 2016). There, the aesthetic production of images, specifically the 
image of the king’s body, which harbors both the corporeal body and the mystical unity of the polity together, 
illustrates how, according to Thiem, “the unity and imperishable continuity of sovereignty are supported and 
enabled by the theological production of images that allow for the mediation of transience and persistence.” See 
Thiem, “Schmittian Shadows,” pg. 7. 
39 Hans Blumenberg, Robert M. Wallace (trans.) The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
[1966] 1985). Following Blumenberg, Victoria Kahn has recently argued that current debates about political 
theology are indeed about the ‘legitimacy of the modern project of self-assertion.’ See Victoria Kahn, The Future of 
Illusion, pp. 5-6. 
40 See Kathleen Davis’ critique in Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the 
Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 85-87. 
41 For the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ political theology, although this is not a precise demarcation, see the 
important volume Francis Schlüssler Fiorenza, Klaus Tanner and Michael Welker (eds.), Political Theology: 
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Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino, were united with Schmitt only in their criticism of 
liberalism. They thought that the critique of liberalism did not require a reassertion of decisive 
action, as Schmitt thought, but rather should issue from the inherently emancipatory potential 
of theology itself. Under liberalism, theology and religion were confined to the private, and 
this, the new political theologians argued, was a betrayal of its mission to challenge structural 
systems of injustice, colonialism, racism and sexism. Drawing much from the work of Ernst 
Bloch and Walter Benjamin, they argued against apathy in light of the ethical and political 
implications of a Christian understanding of time.42 For example, the ‘dangerous memory’ as 
Metz put it, of past and present suffering admonishes us to strive for an emancipation for those 
disregarded by history.43 Despite their overtly Marxist orientations they encouraged mostly 
social-democratic styles of government. Moreover, their emphasis on those marginalized by 
society inspired a second wave of political theologies constructed in close proximity to critical 
theory, including, among others, feminist theology, black theologies, and queer theology.   
 
While the second half of the twentieth century saw debates about Schmitt’s political theology 
largely confined to theologians, sociologists and historians, the latter part, as well as the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, has seen a resurgence of interest from the quarters of 
political theory. This includes many of the names already mentioned above (Žižek, Badiou, 
Agamben) and other leading luminaries: Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau and Claude Lefort. 
Much of this interest, again, has to do with the crisis of liberalism, its more aggressive 
neoliberal iterations, the new public visibility of religion, and consequently, the continued and 
still unresolved ambiguity between theological concepts and what constitutes democratic 
political legitimacy.44  
 
As this brief reception history illustrates, Schmitt’s enduring significance and wide-ranging 
impact on twentieth-century thought, with respect to his critique of liberalism, his formulation 
of political theology, and concept of sovereignty, make him an important point of reference 
                                                      
Contemporary challenges and future directions (Louisville, CY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2013). The volume 
includes contributions from the editors as well as Moltmann, Metz and Michael Welker. 
42 See Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology (New York: 
Harper and Row, [1967] 1975). 
43 For Metz, this dangerous memory is tied to the particular memory of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection, and it is 
the Church which “acts as the public memory of the freedom of Jesus in the systems of our emancipative society.” 
See Johann Baptist Metz, D. Smith (trans.) Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology (New 
York: Seabury, 1980), pg. 91. 
44 A brief look at the varying contributions in the prodigious volume edited by Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. 
Sullivan, illustrates just how wide and contested political theology remains in the twenty-first century. See Hent 
de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.) Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: 
Fordham, 2006). 
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for the present study. In particular, it is Schmitt’s thesis of the theological origins of political 
sovereignty which motivates many of the later themes in Derrida’s (and therefore Caputo’s) 
work — especially as they pertain to deconstructing the ‘thesis of theogony’ present in modern 
concepts.45 The approach in what follows will not be to jettison political theology, but rather, 
insofar as Caputo is a preeminent interpreter of Derrida, the intent is to present a ‘radical’ 
reconfiguration of theology that might contribute toward re-thinking the concept of 
sovereignty, and thereby introduce a more radical political theology.  
 
This phrase, ‘radical political theology,’ is borrowed from the title of Clayton Crockett’s book, 
Radical Political Theology (2011).46 Crockett’s motivations are congenial to the present study, to 
the extent that he is also concerned with what alternatives can be thought at the breakdown of 
liberalism. For him, and which this study affirms, the answer is not to be sought in 
neoconservative forms of politics and theology, but rather in more radical forms that avoid the 
horrors of Marxism. This requires a political theology that is neither liberal, liberational, nor 
orthodox, but rather one that is inspired by a more radical philosophy of religion that directly 
treats political ideas. Crockett dedicates a short chapter to John Caputo and the theme of 
sovereignty and weakness, and argues that Caputo along with Derrida and Catherine Keller, 
offer resources in the direction of a radical political theology which conceives a non-sovereign 
God.47 His book is limited, however, only by the sheer breadth of its undertaking, enlisting a 
litany of thinkers; Deleuze, Agamben, Lacan, Malabou, Nancy, Spinoza, Strauss and others. 
Therefore, this study wishes to use Crockett’s chapter on Caputo as a springboard to take up 
the challenge of a more vigorous and ‘close’ reading of Caputo and the question of sovereignty 
and political theology. To put this succinctly: to arrive at a radical political theology the study 
determines the need for a radical theology, the resources for which, it will be argued, are to be 
found in the various stages and loci of the work of John D. Caputo and his radical theology of 
the ‘event.’ It should be further added here, that while Schmitt’s political theology provides 
the political context for sovereignty, the various stages in Caputo’s work will not necessarily 
be ‘political’ in the strict sense. This is precisely because, following Derrida who is following 
Schmitt, the concept of sovereignty relies on a ‘thesis’ of theogony, of the ‘auto-positioning’ of 
the self, and therefore implicates not only metaphysics, but also ethical subjectivity and the 
                                                      
45 See Michael Naas who demonstrates this in his Derrida From Now On (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008). He writes, “Whether one agrees or disagrees with Schmitt’s — and thus Derrida’s — diagnosis of 
sovereignty, it is hard to contest that it is this conjunction of sovereignty and theology in Schmitt that interests 
Derrida.” Pg. 65. 
46 Clayton Crockett, Radical Political Theology: Religion and Politics After Liberalism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011). Another book which is also in close proximity to Crockett and radical theological possibilities for 
politics is Jeffrey Robbins’, Radical Democracy and Political Theology (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
47 Crockett, Radical Political Theology, pp. 43-59. 
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‘exceptional’ discourse of theology or religion more generally. Indeed, because of the lack of 
an overt political character, Caputo’s thought is almost exclusively considered in philosophical 
and theological debates and is very rarely taken up with respect to politics. A part of this 
study’s novelty, then, will be in trying to read Caputo’s work with these more explicitly 
political questions in the background.48  
 
II. Of the Event 
 
If political theology and the concept of sovereignty remain enduring sites for reflection in the 
context of global political and economic challenges, then the task is to continue to think with 
these categories in the imagining and creation of new possibilities. One of the key assumptions 
here will be that in order to develop these new possibilities in the mode of a more radical 
political theology, we will need a more radical theology. The quest for a radical theology is not 
to undermine the valuable contributions of other theological projects. For example, the 
tradition of political and liberation theologies mentioned above has undoubtedly proved vital 
for challenging canonical forms of theology which have predominantly been skewed in favor 
of Western contexts. Moreover, these traditions of theological reflection have also presented 
valuable accounts of God’s sovereignty in the context of political oppression. In South Africa, 
this was especially important in the midst of the intra-church struggle to theologically justify 
the rejection of apartheid.49 While the ideology of apartheid is formally in the past, the different 
peoples of South Africa continue to grapple with its ongoing legacy (as the example of the 
student protests illustrates) and thus the sovereignty of God remains an active theological 
concept with respect to democracy. In this regard, theological reflection on God’s sovereignty 
in South Africa can be said to have its roots in the ‘new’ political theology mentioned above, 
where it is understood as a prophetic or liberative metaphor that ‘resists power.’50 In this line 
the Reformed theologian John de Gruchy comments: 
 
                                                      
48 Besides Crockett and Robbins, who as we have noted make only brief allusions to Caputo’s work for its political 
potentials, this author is aware of only one other book-length study that considers Caputo in a more political 
register. See Katherine Sarah Moody’s, Radical Theology and Emerging Christianity: Deconstruction, Materialism and 
Religious Practices (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).  
49 See John de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy: A theology for a just world order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) and John de Gruchy and Steve de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa: Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary Edition (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005). 
50 See Dirkie Smit, “For Allan Boesak: Resisting ‘Lordless Powers’” in Robert Vosloo (ed.) Remembering 
Theologians—Doing Theology: Collected essays Dirkie Smit, vol. 5 (Stellenbosch: SUN Media, 2013), pp. 77-95. See also 
Prince Dibeela, Puleng Lenka-Bula and Vuyani Vellem (eds.) Prophet from the South: Essays in honour of Allan Aubrey 
Boesak (Stellenbosch: SUN Media, 2014) and Tanya van Wyk, “Political Theology as critical theology” in HTS 
Teologisie Studies/Theological Studies 71. 3 (Aug, 2015), pp. 1-8. Accessed at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v71i3.3026.  
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Sovereignty is not only a royal metaphor which separated God from the 
world, thereby legitimising hierarchy and paving the way for a theocratic-
style tyranny; it is also a prophetic metaphor which, when applied to God, 
de-absolutizes and relativizes all other claimants to absolute 
power…Thus, whatever the inadequacy of sovereignty as a divine 
attribute we dare not surrender the theological claim that is being made.51 
 
De Gruchy continues by arguing that the sovereignty of God should be understood with 
respect to the doctrine of the trinity, since it is here that sovereignty can be the basis of both a 
“critique of authoritarian regimes, while at the same time providing theological grounds for 
the democratic social order.”52 Given the importance of ‘the future’ (or the ‘to come’ as Derrida 
calls it) for radical theology, this study would affirm theological approaches which emphasize 
prophetic and liberative potentials of God’s sovereignty, insofar as they also stress the always 
contingent element of worldly government and, therefore, the structural possibility of 
transformation toward a more just democratic society.53 However, because radical theology 
emerges out of a distinctly postmodern discourse, it departs from this mode of theology for 
philosophical reasons related to the metaphysical claims implied in Trinitarian doctrine. While 
an investigation into the continuities and discontinuities between prophetic/liberation 
theology and radical theology exceeds the scope of this study, it may very well be a site for 
further reflection given the relative silence in Caputo’s corpus regarding the rich aspects of 
Trinitarian theology.54 
 
To call upon a radical theology requires as a few further distinctions with other theological 
projects who go under the name ‘radical.’ Most recently, the theologian and philosopher of 
                                                      
51 De Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, pp. 257-258, quoted in Robert Vosloo, “’Democracy is coming to the RSA’: 
On democracy, theology, and futural history” in Verbum et Ecclesia 37. 1 (May, 2016), pg. 6. Accessed at: 
https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v37i1.1523.  
52 De Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy, pg. 258. 
53 See Robert Vosloo, “’Democracy is coming to the RSA,’” pp. 1-7, where he brings together some of the similarities 
between Derrida and de Gruchy’s respective approaches to the ‘open-endedness of democracy.’  
54 Caputo’s aversion to Trinitarian doctrine most likely emanates from two sources: the first deriving from Caputo’s 
early engagements with the negative theological tradition inspired by Meister Eckhart — the medieval 
metaphysician turned mystic — who argued that even to speak of God as a trinity based on revelation is too 
metaphysical. The second source comes from Derrida’s critical reading in Glas (1974) of the exclusive (Christian) 
Trinitarian structure of Hegel’s dialect. With respect to the former, Caputo writes “he [Eckhart] even rejects the 
adequacy of speaking of God in terms of the Trinity of persons, for whatever one can say of God even if one says 
it on the basis of divine revelation cannot be God.” See John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), pg. xviii. With respect to Derrida’s reading of Hegel with which 
Caputo is in agreement, see John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 237-243.  
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religion, Ingolf Dalferth, has laid out his own systematic account of Radical Theology (2016).55 
Dalferth defines his project explicitly from the starting point of faith: “Radical theology,” he 
writes, “not only addresses everything in the light of the presence of God, but it does so within 
a certain horizon and from a very specific point of view, that of the radical reorientation from 
nonfaith or unfaith (unbelief) to faith (belief).”56 He later contrasts Caputo’s position, whom 
he reads as ‘celebrating negative theology,’ and ‘as a mystical deepening…of a secular 
perspective,’ with his own radical theology that is “a radical shift in theological perspective.”57 
For Caputo, radical theology does not have this starting point and cannot begin from a 
‘theological perspective,’ but rather ‘begins’ from the radical hermeneutic perspective that we 
are always inextricably inserted into the flux of life. Given the influence of Martin Heidegger 
on Dalferth’s Radical Theology, he would not deny this, but for him this flux is to be interpreted 
coram deo,58 while for Caputo, the flux is what gives rise to faith (faith without faith), not before 
God, but before ‘I know not what.’  
 
A second form of radical theology and one that Caputo has engaged with in a number of places 
is that of Radical Orthodoxy, often associated with the figure of John Milbank and ‘originating’ 
in his bold study, Theology and Social Theory (1990).59 This movement has its parallels with 
Caputo but only to the extent that they both agree that modernity cannot be based on 
autonomous secular reason, and therefore that to be postmodern is also to be post-secular. 
Caputo, however, avoids the use of the ‘post-secular’ to speak of his own work, precisely 
because he believes it has been taken up by Radical Orthodoxy in a reactionary gesture.60 
While adopting postmodern insights and employing an incisive and rigorous theoretical 
critique of liberalism and capitalism, the ‘radicality’ of Radical Orthodoxy is, nonetheless, in 
stark contrast to Caputo’s sense of radical theology. For the thinkers of Radical Orthodoxy, the 
remedy for secular modernity is a distinctly Christian vision that is inspired by a neo-
                                                      
55 Ingolf Dalferth, Radical Theology: An Essay on Faith and Theology in the Twenty-First Century (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2016). 
56 Dalferth, Radical Theology, pg. xiii. 
57 Ibid., pg. 175. Emphasis added. 
58 Ibid., pg. xvii. 
59 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (London: Blackwell, 1990), and John Milbank, 
Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds.) Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London: Routledge, 1999). 
Strictly, as Ward and others have noted, Radical Orthodoxy did not originate with Milbank’s work, since there 
were already critiques of theological liberalism evident in other British theologians including Rowan Williams and 
Donald MacKinnon as well as the Yale School inspired by Stanley Hauerwas. See Graham Ward, “On Being Radical 
and Hopefully Orthodox” in Darren C. Marks (ed.) Shaping a Global Theological Mind (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 
pg. 183. 
60 John D. Caputo, On Religion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), pp. 60-61. Caputo’s main concern is Radical 
Orthodoxy’s caricature that Derrida is a nihilist. See Caputo’s engagement with Graham Ward in “What Do I Love 
When I Love My God? Deconstruction and Radical Orthodoxy” in John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. 
Scanlon (eds.) Questioning God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 291-317. 
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traditional Augustinianism and an analogical re-appropriation of Thomistic metaphysics.61 
For Caputo, such a vision of pre-modernity is not only fantastical but also incredibly exclusive 
and fails the test of passing through the modern to the postmodern. We do not need a pre-
Enlightenment, but a post-Enlightenment, or what Derrida calls ‘nouvelles Lumières’ — a new 
Enlightenment.62  
 
After these delimitations, we can now account for the second axis of this study, namely, John 
D. Caputo’s ‘radical theology of the event.’63 Chapters three, four, five and six, will pursue a 
detailed reading and examination of his thought and theology, so it will be necessary to make 
only a few preliminary remarks for this introduction.64 Parallel to the questions being raised 
over secularism and religion in the latter part of the twentieth century, there emerged at the 
same time new developments in continental philosophy: the so-called postmodern ‘turn to 
religion’ as well as radical death of God theology in the United States. Although they overlap 
significantly, the former was largely indebted to the tradition of Martin Heidegger and 
subsequent French phenomenology, hermeneutics and deconstruction, expressed in thinkers 
like Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Derrida, and was followed by a second 
generation of philosophers, including Jean-Luc Marion, Richard Kearney, Merold Westphal 
and John D. Caputo. Death of God theology was initially more inspired by Kant, Hegel and a 
certain reading of Paul Tillich, occupying thinkers in the 1960s such as Thomas J.J. Altizer, 
William Hamilton and Richard Rubenstein. A second wave of predominantly American 
theologians followed by integrating Derridian deconstruction, and was associated with Mark 
C. Taylor, Carl Raschke, Charles Winquist and Edith Wyschogrod. Broadly aligned with 
                                                      
61 For example, John Milbank, argued in Theology and Social Theory that the secular has taken on a pseudo-
theological form since it relies on the theological categories that gave birth to it in the first place. Contrary to the 
dominant narrative, according to Milbank, the process of secularization begins not with the Enlightenment or the 
Reformation, but goes back to the medieval theologian John Duns Scotus and his notion of the ‘univocity of being.’ 
This moment was the turning point in the destiny of the West, according to Milbank, for it is with this notion — 
where God and creation occupy the same space that differs only by degree — that what follows is a kind of proto-
modernity, the fruits of which are born in secularism. For an introduction to Milbank’s work and Radical 
Orthodoxy see James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2004). 
62 Jacques Derrida, Peggy Kamuf (trans.) Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International (New York: Routledge [1994] 2006), pg. 113. 
63 For a concise introduction to Caputo’s life, thought, and relationship to the wider field of ‘radical theology’ see 
Katherine Sarah Moody, “John D. Caputo” in Christopher D. Rodkey and Jordan E. Miller (eds.) The Palgrave 
Handbook of Radical Theology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 95-116. 
64 Caputo grew up in Pennsylvania in the Catholicism of pre-Vatican II. He became a member of a Catholic religious 
order after high-school, the Da LeSalle Brothers of the Christian Schools, where he spent three years in formation. 
He then left the order in 1962 to pursue philosophy and obtained his doctorate from Bryan Mawr College in 1968, 
with a thesis on Martin Heidegger. He taught at Villanova University for 36 years, later taking up the David R. 
Cook chair in philosophy in 1993. He retired early in 2004 and became the Thomas J. Watson Professor of Religion 
at Syracuse University in New York retiring in 2011. For his dissertation see John D. Caputo, The Way back into the 
ground: An interpretation of the path of Heidegger’s Thought (PhD diss., Bryan Mawr College, 1968). 
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postmodern thinking, both emphases followed Nietzsche and Heidegger in the 
pronouncement of the death of the God of onto-theology, although they would differ in their 
responses to the possibility of thinking theology or God after the death of God.65  
 
John Caputo’s approach to theology follows this initial Heideggerian delimitation of 
metaphysical theology (chapter three). In his early encounters with Heidegger and Meister 
Eckhart, Caputo remains deeply concerned with the possibilities that can still be thought after 
exposing the limitations of neo-Thomism. At a certain point in the 1980s, however, Caputo 
encountered a number of historical and philosophical criticisms of Heidegger, as well as the 
exciting philosophy coming out of France (Levinas, Lyotard and Derrida). In his first major 
work that propelled him internationally, Radical Hermeneutics (1987), Caputo wanted to push 
the limits of hermeneutics and ‘write philosophy from the edge’ by maintaining the ‘original 
difficulty of life.’66 In this philosophical exploration, Caputo begins to depart from Heidegger 
and draws nearer to Derrida as the philosopher who most radically expresses an openness and 
affirmation of this ‘factical’ difficulty of life. As Caputo increasingly engaged Derrida, he made 
the startling claim in his hugely influential book, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (1997), 
that deconstruction itself is structured ‘like a religion,’ but a ‘religion without religion.’ A crucial 
aspect of this ‘religion’ is the ‘event,’ which is like the coming Messiah that never actually 
arrives. Caputo claims that this reading of religion is a generalizable religious experience and, 
therefore, it describes a faith that is not only open to the faithless, but is also more faithful than 
traditional confessional religion because it can never be totally sure to whom, or in what, it 
places its faith (chapter four).67   
 
Caputo’s meticulous reading of Derrida proved profound for scholars of religion and 
theology. Critics had dismissed Derrida as a postmodern nihilist, playing endless games with 
words and chains of linguistic signifiers. In this detached realm of linguistic idealism, it 
seemed inconceivable that deconstruction had any ethical or political import, let alone the 
possibility that ‘God’ could be thought of in any rigorous way. But Caputo’s reading among 
others,68 changed this perception. Caputo then went further, claiming not only that 
                                                      
65 For a comprehensive historical introduction as well as a sampling of the major contributors to ‘Radical Theology’ 
see the recently published magisterial volume, The Palgrave Handbook of Radical Theology (2018). 
66 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), pp. 1-3. 
67 The ‘radicality’ of this religious experience lies in the fact that it’s root (radix) is not a common root. What is 
‘common’ or ‘generalizable’ is the recognition of the universality of multiple singularities. See John D. Caputo, 
Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013), pg. 70. 
68 See the important work of Simon Critchley in this regard, Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction 
(Edinburgh: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). 
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deconstruction is structured like a ‘certain’ religion without religion, both ethically and 
politically conscious, but also that theology itself could be read deconstructively (chapter five). 
Caputo subsequently developed a ‘theology of the event,’ where the event is that which is 
‘going on in the name of God.’ God is not a thing, an omnipotent sovereign Being, or even in 
the tradition of negative theology, the hyper-being we cannot name. Rather, God is structured 
like an event that may or may not occur on the horizon of possibility. Instead of a theo-logy as 
the discourse on the logos of God, he develops a theo-poetics which attends to the ‘events’ that 
are going on in the name of God and in the Scriptures. This ‘weak’ or ‘radical’ theology 
dramatically challenges God’s sovereignty in the conventional sense. In a theology of the event 
we do not know when or how the event will come, whether it will be a stranger or an enemy 
who knocks on the door looking for shelter. But like the coming of the Other, God is something 
that we pray for even while God is praying/calling on us to answer. The idea of the sovereign 
God that gets re-imagined in a theology without theology is a God or sovereign without 
sovereignty. Crucially, this ‘without’ (sans) does not mean radical negation or logical 
contradiction; the sovereign is not traditionally sovereign but it nonetheless exerts a force. This 
force is not a strong ‘decisive’ force like the one described by Schmitt which must enact a 
decision, but is rather a ‘weak force’ more like a call or prayer.  
 
The ‘weak theology’ which Caputo develops in Weakness of God (2006) is later recast in The 
Insistence of God (2013). As will be argued in chapter six, the transition that occurs between 
these two works leads Caputo to refer to his theology more as ‘radical’ than as ‘weak.’ It is for 
this reason that the study has adopted for its title ‘radical theology’ instead of ‘weak theology.’ 
Under both descriptions, Caputo develops a discourse on theopoetics as an exemplary 
discourse of a theology of the event. In ‘radical theology’ as opposed to a ‘weak theology,’ 
theopoetics undergoes a ‘materialist turn,’ which is partially a response to Caputo’s critics and 
partially a rekindling of his relationship with Hegel and the more ‘radical death of God’ 
theologies mentioned above. It will be at this point where the real ‘force’ of Caputo’s ‘radical 
theo-political-poetic’ contribution is felt. Having traced sovereignty initially in a political 
context with respect to Carl Schmitt, and then following its deconstructed iterations 
throughout the loci of Caputo’s thought, the study comes to the conclusion that in order to 
inaugurate a radical political theology it will be ineffectual to speak of the distinction between 
‘sovereignty and the event,’ as the title suggests. This construction implies that the one is 
working on the other, and misses the deconstructive point that such a binary relation ‘auto-
deconstructs.’ The preferred locution, the event of sovereignty, will be suggested to deliberately 
provoke the use of the double genitive: the event of sovereignty as the immanent possibility of 
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its force, and the event of sovereignty as the impossible possibility of its coming. This ‘event of 
sovereignty’ receives its theoretical force in the later work of Jacques Derrida, particularly in 
his discussions of law, justice, and a democracy ‘to come.’ Not only do these themes figure 
prominently in Caputo’s articulation of radical theology and therefore require their own 
attention, but they have also been criticized by other philosophies of event. The stakes 
involved in Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’ or what we are calling an ‘event of sovereignty’ is 
the relation between the ‘to come’ and ‘the present,’ arguably the enduring controversy of 
deconstruction. Caputo’s ‘re-casted theopoetics’ of radical theology it will be argued, assists 
in resolving this tension and allows one to comprehend a fully radical account of theopoetics 
that neither devolves into empiricism nor succumbs to the temptation of idealism. Caputo’s 
radical political theology, therefore, will be said to offer the discursive theological resources 
(theopoetics) that might articulate an original approach to sovereignty that harbors 
transformative potentials for more radically orientated modes of democratic politics. While 
the study does not investigate the nature of such radical-political modes, it does conclude by 
gesturing toward theopoetics as a discursive ‘practice’ that might be fostered within religious 
or non-religious communities.   
 
 
II. Problem Statement, Question, Thesis, Method 
 
This study will investigate the contemporary theological-political concept of sovereignty. It 
follows Jacques Derrida in the claim that this concept has its origins in a ‘thesis of theogony’ 
implicit in modern thinking, and which thus implicates not only political conceptions of 
authority, but also ethics and religion. The study attempts to interrogate this ‘theologeme’ 
through a detailed analysis of the work of John D. Caputo. Caputo’s influential religious and 
theological interpretation of Derrida claims not only to expose the limitations of sovereign 
thinking, ethical action, (Christian) theology, and ultimately the sovereignty of God, but also 
proposes a way to think beyond these limitations via the resources of a radical theology of the 
event. A radical theology of the event, therefore, may become the discourse with which to 
imagine a radical political theology which does not see the event as a way to jettison sovereignty, 
but rather considers sovereignty as an event itself — the event of sovereignty. Such an approach 
to sovereignty is offered as a novel theological alternative to the challenges surrounding the 
theological foundations of sovereignty and therefore of democracy.  
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The research question for this study is how do the intellectual resources offered by Caputo’s 
‘radical theology of event’ aid in re-conceiving the concept of sovereignty, and thus to what 
extent do they contribute toward thinking the possibility of a radical political theology?  
 
The secondary questions that this study will pursue include:  
 
- What is the nature of sovereignty conceived in the tradition of political theology with 
particular reference to Carl Schmitt?  
- How is this question of sovereignty reflected upon in the trajectory and development 
of John D. Caputo’s thought? 
- How does Caputo conceive a religious reading of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction? 
- To what extent is this religious reading an effective strategy to ‘re-think’ the concept 
of sovereignty, and therefore a radical political theology? 
 
The thesis of this study is that Caputo’s ‘theopoetics’ of radical theology becomes the 
discursive form which harbors the resources of a radical political theology, and thus ‘prepares’ 
the possibility to imagine a poetic-revolution of sovereignty — which is a god to come, a 
master without mastery, or a god without sovereignty. The novelty of this thesis lies in its 
contribution to the ongoing discussions and debates into the role of Caputo’s radical theology 
in the Christian imaginary more broadly, and in particular, to this radical theology’s 
effectiveness as a theoretical contribution to the political challenges of our time.  
 
To talk of a methodology in a study that espouses a deconstructive reading of texts is 
admittedly a difficult task, since it is precisely the resistance to the strictures of a method ‘to be 
applied,’ which forms part of what distinctly characterizes radical theology. Nonetheless, 
there are some preliminary features that can be identified. For example, the study can be said 
to proceed via a critical and qualitative set of readings of relevant literature pertaining to 
sovereignty, political theology and deconstruction, closely analyzing and placing them in 
critical-analytic tension with one another. It may also be conceived as a project in 
‘philosophical theology,’ insofar as it makes use of a philosophical approach to analyze 
theological concepts. In this case, the philosophical approach of Derridian deconstruction, as 
it presents itself in the thought of John D. Caputo, will be used to analyze the political-
theological concept of sovereignty. Stated in this way, however, a philosophically and 
theologically informed study that names its ‘object’ as also the source for its methodology, 
indeed, seems to suggest a chicken-and-egg-problem. Without seeing this problem as 
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necessarily a limitation, Graham Ward states, “the approach has to emerge through the 
theological emphases that create the organic coherence of the relationships of one topic with 
the others.”69 Without this integrity of coherence, he continues, “the approach, or method, is 
‘outside’ the system.”70 For Ward, there can be no ‘outside’ the system because everything is 
in the system (Truth or God).71 While this study does not have the kind of metaphysical 
framework that interests Ward, there is, nonetheless, a number of points of contact with what 
he has recently developed as an ‘engaged systematic’ methodology. Following Ward, then, 
we note three features that describe this study as a project in ‘engaged systematics.’  
 
In a first sense, the approach here can be seen as a ‘corrective’ to the ‘adversarial’ nature of 
much confessional theology which sees Christian doctrine as an end in itself. Under such an 
understanding, the conceptual content of theological reflection is elevated at the expense of 
the “way Christian life is lived” (lived doctrine).72 An engaged systematic approach, on the 
other hand, refuses the binary distinctions this implies between faith/reason, 
transcendence/immanence or philosophy/theology, because it recognizes that cognitive 
thinking or theological reflection is always-already embodied in the practices of everyday 
life.73 Thus, we can say that in this study’s creative participation in both the fields of 
philosophy and theology it endeavors to remain always open-ended to its other. It is neither 
just philosophical nor theological, but operates on the borders between the two.74  
 
Secondly, and following from this first sense is that an engaged systematics seeks to 
understand or take cognizance of the context in which beliefs are formed and communicated.75 
Christianity, the Church, and its theological language for example, are always involved in 
deeply interconnected networks of social relations and discursive practices. These 
                                                      
69 Graham Ward, How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
70 Ibid., pg. 115. 
71 “[S]ince we are talking Truth here (and God) then nothing can be outside the system.” Ibid. Ward’s statement 
here that ‘nothing can be outside the system,’ could easily be read as the theological version of Derrida’s 
memorable line from Of Grammatology, “There is nothing outside of the text” (il n’y a pas de hors-text). Jacques 
Derrida, Gayatri Spivak (trans.) Of Grammatology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pg. 158. 
See Caputo’s commentary in John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1997), pp. 79-80. 
72 Ward, How the Light Gets In, pg. 119.  
73 Ibid. pp. 119-120.  
74 See John D. Caputo, Philosophy and Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 2006), where he writes: “The distinction 
between philosophy and theology is not what we thought it was all along; it is not what has been classically 
described as the distinction between faith and reason, where reason sees and faith does not quite see. Rather, the 
distinction between philosophy and theology is drawn between two kinds of faith, by which I mean two kinds of ‘seeing 
as,’” pg. 78. Original emphasis. By ‘seeing-as’ Caputo is making the Heideggerian hermeneutical point that we 
cannot escape the circle of interpretation. Seeing-as strengthens theology if faith is understood as ‘seeing through 
a glass darkly,’ and weakens philosophy if reason is understood as pure-seeing. Ibid., pg. 77.  
75 Ward, How the Light Gets In, pp. 131-135. 
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‘variegated’ networks, and the series of interactions that they mediate have an effect on the 
way in which social, ecclesial and political life are organized. What this means for the 
language of Christian theology is that it is always to be understood as a process of creative 
circulation and deployment across languages, cultures, and other particular contexts. While 
this suggests an enterprise that is not static but always fluid and constantly changing, it does 
not simply reject the historical traditions from which it remains in continuity. To this extent, 
as a study which seeks novels ways in which to (re)deploy theological discourse (i.e. the 
theopoetics of radical theology), it can fully concur with Ward’s point that an engaged 
systematics “augments, even as it translates and recites these continuities, so that the 
imaginative dynamic of the tradition moves toward new appropriations and integrations of 
present experience with the past as it points continually, eschatologically, towards the 
future.”76  
 
Thirdly, while this study will no doubt make philosophical and theological claims that are 
propositional in nature, it does not intend to dogmatically police these claims in the service of 
what Ward calls a ‘functionalist approach to doctrine’ (or philosophical thinking). Rather, as 
an exercise in engaged systematics, this study acknowledges an epistemology that will never 
grasp the certainty of the truth that it seeks. Since cognition is embodied, “there can be no 
hard and fast distinction, from the human point of view, between revealed and natural 
theology.”77 An epistemological approach that limits or questions the distinction between 
philosophical (natural) and theological (revealed) reflection, further impacts the way in which 
we ‘speak, name and imagine’ both personally and collectively. These changes to speech, 
naming and imagination, which this epistemology engenders, should not be seen as 
limitations but as potentials or ‘promises’ for the capacity for change. An epistemology of an 
‘engaged systematic’ theology, therefore, is not simply about placing limits on what we can 
know but precisely about the imaginative effects it is able to generate and that have the ability 
to “change the way we act.” Such an approach, Ward says, “will issue into, foster and ferment 
ethical life.”78 This epistemological posture is what the present study wishes to embrace, not 
                                                      
76 Ibid., pg. 130. We can hear in this emphasis on continuity and eschatological futurity, a congruence with what 
Derrida called the ‘l’avenir’ (the to come) which is to be distinguished from ‘le futur.’ While the latter refers to the 
predictability of the future, the former is Derrida’s attempt to think an event that is unforeseeable and which might 
interrupt and transform the present. However, ‘l’avenir’ has often been misconstrued as placing too much 
emphasis on the ‘future’ without concern for the past. Following Samir Haddad’s corrective comments on the sense 
of ‘historicity’ in Derrida’s thinking of the ‘democracy to come,’ Robert Vosloo accurately describes what he calls 
Derrida’s ‘futural historicity’ as “a historicity that emphasizes an inheritance from the past and a repetition (which 
is always a reappropriation of the tradition) in the present.” See Vosloo, “’Democracy is coming to the RSA,’ pg. 6. 
77 Ward, How the Light Gets In, pg. 136. 
78 Ibid. 
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only because it is sensible methodological practice, but more importantly because it is 
constitutive of the generative theological effects the study seeks to cultivate in service of 
ethical, communal and political life. 
 
III. Chapter Outlines 
 
Chapter two expands on the first axis of this study by turning to Carl Schmitt, who is 
understood as the central reference point for contemporary continental philosophical and 
political thought with respect to sovereignty. It undertakes to expose the metaphysical nature 
of Schmitt’s political theology and use of the concept of sovereignty. The chapter begins with 
some preliminary remarks on the difficulties of approaching the concept of sovereignty and 
recommends a deconstructive hermeneutic which exposes its transcendental conditions. It 
then offers a diagnosis of the current ‘crisis of liberal democracy,’ in order to indicate the 
vacuum created by democracy’s tensions. Through historical analysis and illustrative 
examples, the chapter follows Graham Ward’s account of the fluctuations between micro-
political and macro-political trends in the twentieth century, culminating in today’s 
‘postdemocratic condition.’ The latter describes the ‘crisis’ referred to above, which is given 
specificity by the constitutive lack of democratic representation and a corresponding 
‘depoliticization,’ both of which are made manifest in the increasing authoritarianism of the 
neo-liberal democratic consensus. The crisis of democracy is thus a crisis of sovereignty. Out 
of this context, the trenchant critique of liberal parliamentarianism conducted by Schmitt 
shows its relevancy. The chapter then formally examines Schmitt’s political theology and his 
concept of sovereignty, which are positioned as a direct challenge to the depoliticizing nature 
of liberal democracy. To interpret Schmitt’s sovereign ‘political decision’ — the extra-legal 
and thus transcendent possibility to break political deadlock — the chapter argues that his 
theological analogue for the sovereign is justified by nostalgia for order, and rendered 
plausible by a Christian eschatology designed to promote what is called a ‘politics of 
presence.’ This is argued by examining Schmitt’s use of the notion of the katechon or ‘the 
restrainer.’ This examination, which exposes the transcendental theological conditions of 
sovereignty in the political theological tradition of Carl Schmitt, serves as a reference point 
for the nature of sovereignty in the study. The chapter, therefore, concludes by gesturing 
toward a ‘radical hermeneutical approach’ to be taken toward the concept of sovereignty, 
which will be adopted in the remaining chapters, albeit under different significations: 
metaphysics, ethical subjectivity, religion and God. 
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Chapter three takes up the ‘politics of presence’ implied by Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty 
into the idiom of metaphysical thought, or ‘metaphysics of presence,’ famously discussed by 
Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. The chapter begins the analysis of Caputo in his early 
work on Heidegger, since it is here that he develops his deep resistance to metaphysical 
thinking. However, in as much as this will illuminate Caputo’s early philosophical 
allegiances, the chapter also attempts to go beyond the simple historical task of tracing a 
thinker’s development. In Caputo’s case, the developments in his thought are not opaque, but 
involve conscious moves which are fundamental for understanding certain embraces as well 
as certain hesitancies that emerge in his later theological writing. The chapter demonstrates 
Caputo’s critique of metaphysics following Heidegger’s confrontation with the Neo-
Scholastic tradition of Catholic theology. It treats Caputo’s delimitation of Thomistic 
metaphysics as the ‘first gesture’ in ‘overcoming metaphysics.’ In an important second 
gesture, which Caputo learns from Heidegger, he attempts to re-read Thomism through the 
‘mystical element’ in Heidegger’s thought, namely Meister Eckhart. Importantly, it is this 
‘double-gesture’ the chapter claims, which allows Caputo to affect a delimitation and re-
reading of Heidegger himself. The latter is argued by way of what is called a ‘rhythmic 
impetus’ generated by the Heideggerian impulse to remain in fidelity to the ‘matter to be 
thought’ (Sache des Denkens). The chapter concludes by demonstrating how this impetus 
culminates in Caputo’s critical reappraisal of Heidegger and the largely ethical reasons for his 
Kehre to Jacques Derrida.    
 
Chapter four attends to what might be called Caputo’s ‘middle period.’ Here, Caputo further 
pursues the ethical dimension of his philosophy opened up by French continental philosophy, 
and then later re-frames it in terms of the religious dimension of deconstruction. In order to 
delineate Caputo’s approach to ethics and religion, the chapter pursues the deconstructive 
il/logic of the sans or the ‘without.’ This il/logic is to be understood not as a-logical (as in p is 
–p) but rather as the ‘positive’ consequence of the contingency of all logic. This ‘positive’, 
ethical, religious, or even political reading of deconstruction is central to Caputo’s reading of 
Derrida. The chapter follows its deployment in Caputo’s discussion of ethics (sans ethics) and 
Derrida’s religion (sans religion). The il/logic of the sans is a thinking of the ‘event,’ and thus, 
we see Caputo’s project emerging in a no simple confrontation with sovereignty (as ethical 
subjectivity, or monological religion), but as movement beyond both ethics and religion. At 
this point, we will have begun to engage the second axis of this study. The chapter begins by 
attending to some key historical moments in the developments leading up to postmodern 
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thought, as well as for the sake of conceptual clarity, provides a short description of Derrida’s 
notion of différance. Next, in an examination of Caputo’s Against Ethics, it traces a series of 
distinctions (i.e. heteronomism-heteromorphism) which Caputo deploys in service of a 
‘poetics of obligation’ in contradistinction to the modern conception of autonomous 
(sovereign) subjectivity. Caputo’s reading of ethics, however, presents some limitations 
insofar as it rhetorically collapses the distinction between différance and the Nietzschean tragic. 
The chapter suggests that Caputo’s auto-correction occurs only when ethics is understood 
within the purview of his religious reading of deconstruction. It concludes by beginning to 
address the latter through the il/logic of negative theology’s ‘wounded language.’ This final 
investigation into the apophatic leads to the radical delimitation of (sovereign Christian) 
Religion.  
 
Chapter five follows through with Caputo’s religious reading of deconstruction in his career 
defining book Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (1997). It examines three central religious 
motifs that constitute Derrida’s ‘religion’; the messianic, the apocalyptic and the gift. In each 
of these themes Caputo rehearses the animating gestures of a religion without religion; 
consistently resisting the nihilistic charge levelled against deconstruction and reemphasizing 
the experience of the event (messianic, apocalyptic, gift) as the quasi-transcendental possibility 
for faith. This experience is simultaneously the overcoming of determinate (confessional) 
religion, as well as an ethical-political, and therefore religious call to responsibility for the 
Other, which crucially lays its claim on us without force. On the basis of this affirmative 
reading of Derridian deconstruction, Caputo then attempts nothing less than an invasion of 
theology with a more radical ‘weak’ theology, ‘coming out as a theologian’ according to 
Catherine Keller. Following his rendering of the religious experience given in deconstruction, 
Caputo now introduces a ‘theopoetic’ experience given by the event in the name of God. The 
second half of the chapter sets out this ‘weak’ theology by illustrating the dynamics of the 
‘Name-Event’ quasi-structure. It then clarifies and distinguishes Caputo’s position with 
reference to the so-called radical death of God theologies in the tradition of Hegel, including 
two brief encounters with J.J. Altizer and Mark C. Taylor. The chapter concludes by 
unambiguously stating how God’s sovereignty is deconstructed by radical theology. This 
deconstruction does not deny sovereignty, but redistributes it as an unconditional claim 
without force, and thus relocating the order of theo-logy to the order of the event, or the order 
of theo-poetics.  
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The concluding chapter of the study seeks to bring the two axes, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘event,’ 
into productive and creative tension. This confluence is not a synthesizing gesture, but a 
deconstructive one, allowing us now to speak of the event of sovereignty and consequently a 
radical political theology. Given that Caputo draws much of his radical theology from Derrida’s 
later writing, the chapter begins by clarifying Derrida’s deconstruction of sovereignty vis-à-
vis Carl Schmitt. This is accompanied by a reading of his important book Politics of Friendship, 
together with the “Force of Law” and Rogues essays. Derrida’s political intervention of a 
sovereignty without sovereignty or a dream of ‘a god to come,’ is then placed into critical 
opposition with three broadly materialist approaches in continental philosophy, that of Alain 
Badiou, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek. These thinkers are generally dismissive of 
Derrida because they see his event as locked into the stasis of postmodern différance. Following 
the recent work of the theologian Jayne Svenungsson, the chapter argues that these thinkers’ 
own alternatives are not ultimately satisfying, since their thinking of the event harbors 
Schmittian tendencies that betray a desire for a ‘politics of presence.’ Given their critique of 
postmodernism, the task is then to examine to what extent such critique holds water with 
respect to Caputo’s interpretation of Derrida. To this end, the chapter traces the adaptions 
Caputo makes to the theopoetics of his ‘weak theology’ (a term he starts to use with less 
frequency), which it is argued, serves as an admission of a residual Kantianism imbedded in 
his philosophy of the event. The chapter suggests that Caputo’s turn to Hegel offers a more 
‘visceral’ or ‘material’ rendering of the event. Armed with this renewed theopoetics of radical 
theology, which circumvents vulgar materialism while at the same time avoiding idealist 
distance, it concludes by offering ‘three pills’ of a theopoetics for a radical political theology. 
These ‘pills’ constitute the ‘resources’ for a radical political theology. However, this loose 
thematization will need to be itself exposed to the risk of ‘perhaps’ lest it become a regime to 
be ‘applied.’ This argument is made in tandem with a discussion developed by Johann-
Albrecht Meylahn and what he calls the ‘third-way’ of theopoetics. The study concludes with 
a reading of Derrida’s reading of Paul Celan in his last seminars, The Beast and the Sovereign 
(2001-02). Here, it tentatively suggests that Celan’s ‘poetic sovereignty’ or what we are calling 
theopoetics, is the site or discourse which thinks the event of sovereignty as a poetic 
revolution.  
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Chapter Two 
Carl Schmitt, Sovereignty and Democracy 
 
 
Man, he went on to say, was the measure of things. His right to recognize 
and to distinguish between good and evil, reality and counterfeit, was 
indefeasible; woe to them who dared to lead him astray in his belief in this 
creative right. Better for them that a millstone be hanged about their necks 
and that they be drowned in the depth of the sea. 
 
- Thomas Mann79 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In Thomas Mann’s beautifully stylized masterpiece and comically serious Bildungsroman, The 
Magic Mountain (1924), the protagonist, Hans Castrop, is caught between the novel’s recurring 
dialectics: cold rationalism and ignorant passion, the enlightened and the romantic, the 
traditional and the reactionary, the decision and the passive, the medicinal and the 
sentimental. From a three-week visit, which becomes a seven-year stay, Castrop is the tragic 
hero of a cast of characters that inhabit a Swiss tuberculosis sanatorium in the alps, living in 
abstraction from the “Flatlands” below where political turmoil is about to unfold. He 
resembles the passive subject, swayed to and fro by the novel’s tensions on the one hand, and 
by the possibility of his imaginative self-(re)creation on the other.   
 
In a particular passage Castrop contemplates the nature of ‘actuality and dreams’ and the 
bottomlessness of the ‘mystery of life.’ The response from his rationalist interlocutor, Herr 
Settembrini, is to offer words of caution captured in the text quoted above. Here we see a 
dense but paradoxical ambiguity of informants, not only evident in the text of The Magic 
Mountain as a whole, but also within the formation of individual characters themselves. That 
humankind is the ‘measure’ to ‘distinguish between good and evil’ is certainly Nietzschean, 
contrasted with a Lockean capacity and right to do so. But even further, the religious depth 
                                                      
79 Thomas Mann, H.T. Lowe-Porter (trans.) The Magic Mountain (London: Vintage, 1999), pg. 667. 
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dimension of one’s ‘belief in this creative right’ (‘Glauben an dieses schöpferische Recht’)80 and the 
call for judgement (recalling the words of Jesus), if the right to this dimension is questioned, 
capitalizes and marks off this uncertain and contradictory structure.81 Indeed, this situation 
of metaphysical contradiction and confusion was prefigured by the First World War and the 
ensuing political and economic ambiguities that followed.   
  
Mann’s discursive allegory serves as a reference point for the multilevel conflicts of the early 
twentieth century and also for the sustained debates of the Enlightenment legacy in the 
present day. Étienne Balibar, citing Mann, centers these disputes around the theme of 
universalism, what he calls enlightenment modernity’s ‘theoretical commonplaces:’ progress, 
rationality, critical knowledge, prioritization of ‘secularization’ over forms of belief, the 
teleology of human rights and cosmopolitanism.82 What has become abundantly clear, 
however, from sources too numerous to admit here,83 is that ‘Enlightenment’ universalism 
possesses inherent contradictions that appear ultimately self-defeating, undoing the very 
things they wish to maintain. But as Balibar argues, we cannot dispose of universalism or its 
contradictions by way of principled inversion or negation. Indeed, the task is to ‘tarry’ within 
the contradiction itself ‘so as to clarify its terms,’ which “can happen only through continued 
efforts to deconstruct both the classical theoretical formulas and the apparatuses of power in 
which they have been invested.”84  
 
It is this setting and task which provoke the expression taken from the title of Balibar’s short 
essay: ‘Nouvelles Lumières’ or a ‘New Enlightenment.’ Borrowing explicitly from Jacques 
Derrida,85 Balibar teases out the enigmatic nature of Derrida’s formulation. On the one hand 
‘new’ speaks of radical otherness or alterity, something that would sever the received and 
                                                      
80 Thomas Mann, Der Zauberberg (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1989), pg. 839.  
81 See Michael Beddow, ‘The Magic Mountain,’ in Ritchie Robertson (ed.)  The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Mann 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 137-150; pg. 147, for comments in this regard.  
82 Étienne Balibar, Vivian Folkenflik (trans.) “Postscript: The Idea of ‘New Enlightenment’ [Nouvelles Lumières] 
and the Contradictions of Universalism,” in Graham Hammil & Julia Lupton (eds.) Political Theology & Early 
Modernity (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012), pp. 299-304; pg. 301. 
83 Though we might mention Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment as at least one of the major 
progenitors of this critical tradition. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (ed.) 
and Edmund Jephcott (trans.) Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, [1944] 2002).  
84 Balibar, “Postscript: The Idea of New Enlightenment,” pg. 303.   
85 Balibar cites Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2003). For the English translation see Jacques 
Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), specifically the second essay 
“The ‘World’ of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, and Sovereignty).” The essay was first read 
as a paper on August 27, 2002 at the opening of the twenty-ninth Congrès de l’Association des Sociétés de Philosophie 
de Langue française [ASPLF] at the University of Nice. The idea of a ‘New Enlightenment’ is also an important one 
for John D. Caputo in his formulation of the future of the religious. He calls for a more ‘enlightened Enlightenment,’ 
see John D. Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 60-61.   
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preconceived notions of ‘enlightenment.’ On the other hand, ‘new’ could be interpreted as a 
re-inscription onto the tradition, that is, as a ‘a renewal or return to sources.’ Finally, a ‘New 
Enlightenment’ might also consider the historical and philosophical contingency of the term 
itself, thus pointing toward the ‘contents covered’ and thus to the need to uncover that which 
is left behind or is left out. The moment of this ‘new event’ — for ‘enlightenment’ may no 
longer be the word one will still use in the future — is a contested moment, not only in terms 
of the move from singularity to plurality, but also in terms of the openness to the multitude 
of ways in which the very conception of enlightenment is approached or formulated.   
 
It is in this hermeneutical situation that the question of secularization and therefore also the 
specific role of religion come into view. The dominant account, as is now well-known, is that 
for much of the twentieth century it was believed that the Enlightenment successfully 
articulated and held together the distinction between private and public religious space. With 
special regard to politics, theology had no role to play and was vindictively ostracized to the 
realm of private intellectual speculation carried out by theologians. Such a view has since been 
challenged as a major reduction. In this respect, two important works may be worth 
mentioning; Mark Lilla’s The Stillborn God (2007) and Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007).86 
While coming to very different conclusions, their hugely significant contributions have 
opened up the field of political theology to the probing implications of theology’s role in 
contemporary politics. Both give their own accounts of the necessary theological resources at 
play in the developments surrounding early modernity. While Taylor finds theology as an 
absolute necessity for providing a thicker description to our contemporary politics, Lilla on 
the other hand, calls for its strict regulation by the state in political discourse. To leave religion 
unhinged, in his view, would be to risk serious consequences for a liberal polity. It is in the 
wake of the penetrating implications of thinking together theology and politics with reference 
to the present (post)-liberal state that this chapter is situated and toward which the rest of this 
study is dedicated.    
 
Here in chapter one, we bring into particular focus the first ‘axis’ of the investigation. At the 
outset, the word ‘sovereignty’ invokes a vast network of interrelated fields and terms — from 
notions of authority, power, legitimation and juridical-political jurisdiction, to the academic 
disciplines of political and legal theory as well as theology. To say that the concept of 
                                                      
86 See Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York: Vintage, 2007) and Charles 
Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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sovereignty is contested would be a considerable understatement.87 Indeed, this contestation 
underscores a range of differing perceptions as sites of struggle. In their introduction to a 
volume of essays revealingly titled Sovereignty in Fragments (2010), Hent Kalmo and Quentin 
Skinner remark: 
 
If sovereignty is made to accommodate the length and breadth of political theory 
and practice, how could it ever be unequivocal? Pinning it down one way or 
another turns out to be itself a politically contestable choice. Getting rid of it, on 
the other hand, would amount to renouncing politics altogether.88  
 
In a way that reaffirms the comments with respect to Balibar, Kalmo and Skinner indicate that 
the recent literature on sovereignty treat the topic in two general directions. On the one hand, 
there are those who seek to abandon the concept seeing it at best as arcane and at worst 
‘protean.’89 The proponents of this view would rather get ‘rid of it’ for its outdated references 
to absolutist forms of authority and government. Precisely given the international nature of 
governmentality and cross-border capital and technological information flows, the notion of 
sovereignty is stifling, they argue, and in fact masks ‘egoistical motives of nation-states.’90 On 
the other hand, the very obsession with eliminating sovereignty from the political-legal 
vocabulary seems only to instantiate it further and illuminates its persistent character. 
Negation, as we have seen, is often not a remedy but only produces effects in the opposite 
direction. It is important not merely to reassert sovereignty in any strong sense but to 
articulate and define its diffusion in an ‘era of ever growing fragmentation.’91 All of this is not 
to say that bold attempts have not been made to accommodate this ambiguity or indeed to 
define or account for it.92 However, given the discursive and contextual nature of questions 
like; ‘what is sovereignty?’ ‘where is it to be found?’ ‘where did it come from?’ and ‘who can 
claim it today?’, Kalmo and Skinner can only advise for a ‘parallax’ approach, which supports 
                                                      
87 The scholarly literature on sovereignty is voluminous and cannot be overstated. Apart from a proliferation of 
articles in legal, political and sociological journals, the staggering number of monographs is also enough to 
bewilder. Already in 2009, Panu Minkkinen noted that in the last ten years the British Library catalogue recorded 
approximately 330 monographs with ‘sovereignty’ in the title. See Panu Minkkinen, Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law 
(London: Routledge, 2009), pg. 6. 
88 Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner, Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present, and Future of a Contested Concept 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pg. 2.  
89 See Stanley Benn, “The Uses of ‘Sovereignty’,” in W. J. Stankiewicz (ed.) In Defense of Sovereignty (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), pg. 85.  
90 Kalmo & Skinner, Sovereignty in Fragments, pp. 1-2.   
91 Ibid., pg. 2. 
92 For a recent review, which tries to map some of these attempts, see Verena Erlenbusch, “The Concept of 
Sovereignty in Contemporary Continental Philosophy” in Philosophy Compass 7. 6 (2012), pp. 365-375. 
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their view that the chapters in their volume “as a whole seek to dispel the illusion that there 
is a single agreed-upon concept of sovereignty for which one could offer a clear definition.”93  
 
This introductory proviso obliges us to take into account a deeper level of complexity invoked 
by the discourse of sovereignty. As this study is not purported to be a work of explicit legal 
or political theory, adducing this complexity will not be a matter of rehearsing empirical 
arguments or engaging comprehensively with what is an enormous field of literature. This is 
precisely what is meant when Kalmo and Skinner write, “Pinning it [sovereignty] down one 
way or another turns out to be itself a politically contestable choice.” Nonetheless, as Paul 
Kahn comments, “Sovereignty is a political concept — indeed, it is the political concept.”94 For 
our purposes, we might begin by saying that sovereignty is a ‘palimpsest,’95 where the concern 
lies with treating what presently stands on the page, not sovereignty’s history but its 
contemporary usage and what that entails. This contemporary usage of sovereignty will take 
its point of departure from the work of the political theorist, Carl Schmitt, and will be treated 
deconstructively throughout this study.  
 
There are at least two further reasons for treating a discussion on sovereignty in this way. 
First, and far from being an original insight, the so-called postmodern moment has taught us 
that concepts, definitions and language are intertwined with power, authority and exclusion, 
contributing determinately to the construction of reality. This is to say that our modern 
‘discourses’ about certain ideas operate according to a set of assumptions and rules that we 
are not impervious to, and that the inherent biases and prejudices they conceal lend 
themselves to the idea that we can truly know reality. The corollary of this is to say that our 
concepts are always already contingent to specific historical sets of assumptions about 
knowledge, which ultimately determine how we conceive and shape the reality of the present 
and the past. In the postwar context of Europe in the middle of the twentieth century, 
following the developments in politics and the philosophies of thinkers such as Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Bataille and others, Michel Foucault came to these and similar conclusions about 
the contingency of our discourse: “discursive practice,” he wrote, “is a body of anonymous, 
historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, 
                                                      
93 Ibid., pg. 5. 
94 Paul W. Kahn, “The Question of Sovereignty” in Stanford Journal of International Law, 40 (2004), pg. 282. Kahn has 
also written an important book on sovereignty, see Paul W. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
95 Luke Bretherton, “Sovereignty” in Nicholas Adams, George Pattison and Graham Ward (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 255-276; pg. 256. 
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and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operations 
of the enunciative function.”96  
 
When talking of sovereignty, then, one must take into account the transcendental conditions 
that make the discourse possible. Failing this methodological step produces at least two 
consequences: first, it reifies the history of the concept by presupposing an essential form. The 
latter then assumes it can be objectively known as a unit of analysis through a clean 
representation of language. With this reification and the object as a givenness of reality, the 
conceptual field becomes closed. This is the way in which analysis typically proceeds followed 
by competing interpretations until there is consensus. But such a closure inevitably results in 
conflict over these competing interpretations that make use of differing vocabularies. Some of 
these conceptual difficulties with respect to sovereignty were already recognized and 
described by Schmitt in his often-cited Political Theology (1922). There he comments on the 
problematic distinction of sovereignty between the sociological and the legal: “It would be a 
distortion of the schematic disjunction between sociology and jurisprudence if one were to 
say that the exception has no juristic significance and is therefore ‘sociology.’”97 In this context 
Schmitt is arguing against a reading of sovereignty that would deny ‘the decision on the state 
of exception’ as existing within the realm of the juristic. Indeed, such a denial or refusal is 
symptomatic of what Schmitt conceived as the stilted neo-Kantian theories of the state which 
were equated with the legal order. Accordingly, sovereignty resists an either/or (purely 
sociological or juristic) distinction, it is “bound to the normally valid legal order but also 
transcended it.”98 These neo-Kantian schemes either try to repress sovereignty altogether or 
treat what are considered its two constitutive elements separately, namely, internality and 
externality. For Schmitt, the appropriate response entails a conservative move which re-
introduces transcendence into the political. This move entails the essentially ‘theo-political’ 
conception of sovereignty, a conception that continues the early-modern tradition from Jean 
Bodin and was revived by Schmitt in the twentieth century.  
 
Secondly, and following more directly from this first consequence is the nature of 
sovereignty’s historicity, or lack thereof, as a concept. The Swedish political philosopher, Jens 
Bartelson, in his first major work on this idea, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (1995), defends the 
                                                      
96 Michel Foucault, Alan Sheridan Smith (trans). The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, [1969] 
1972), pg. 117. 
97 Carl Schmitt, George Schwab (trans). Political Theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2005), pg. 13. See also chapter 2 where he engages Hans Kelson the emblematic neo-Kantian 
figure for Schmitt.  
98 See here George Schwab’s introduction, xliii-xliv. Emphasis added. 
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thesis that “sovereignty and knowledge implicate each other logically and produce each other 
historically.”99 From this point of departure, through a selection of texts from three periods — 
‘the Renaissance’, ‘the classic age’ and ‘modernity’ — he traces a genealogy of knowledge 
configurations. These configurations change through these periods and influence the way in 
which sovereignty was conceived and how such changes render the concept ever more elusive 
in the present day. Bartelson’s genealogy is a direct response to what he sees as the dead-end 
move of empirical analysis and the scientific approach described above, one that posits 
sovereignty as a given within an already predetermined framework and then seeks to simply 
define it. Such an approach for Bartelson does not tell us anything of how we got into such a 
situation, let alone provides an adequate account of sovereignty. The series of decisions that 
contemporary analysis makes implies a process of differentiation and is therefore political: “If 
knowledge is understood as a system for the formation of valid statements” he says, “all 
knowledge is knowledge by differentiation, and this differentiation is a political activity.”100 
It is to account for this differentiation that Bartelson takes up his Foucauldian genealogy. 
 
These consequences of failing to account for sovereignty’s transcendental conditions point to 
a second reason for beginning a discussion on sovereignty deconstructively. As we have seen, 
any attempt to claim to know the meaning of sovereignty implicitly commits us to a 
presupposed set of assumptions about what sovereignty is. A deconstructive approach 
alternatively aims at uncovering the uncontested foundations of sovereignty in modern 
political discourse and thus shifts the focus from a question of meaning to a question of 
function. Crucially, there is no objectively free zone from which to make such judgements. 
Jacques Derrida described these ‘movements of deconstruction’ as ones that do not “destroy 
structures from the outside,” and which “are not possible and effective, nor can they take 
accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way.”101 A 
deconstructive approach to sovereignty, therefore, reveals that it operates within the 
discourse of sovereignty itself and not from an abstracted zone of indifference.102  
 
With these considerations, then, this chapter proposes to expose the transcendental conditions 
of sovereignty as they are taken up in contemporary discourse. As alluded to in the previous 
chapter, this point of departure will focus on the theological claims about sovereignty’s 
                                                      
99 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pg. 5.  
100 Ibid, 6. 
101 Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (trans) Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997 [1967]), pg. 24. 
102 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context’ in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 
pg. 329. 
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relation to ‘the political’ in the work of Carl Schmitt. These claims assert that ‘the theological’ 
founds or is the diagnostic tool with which to understand the conceptual apparatus of the 
political. Sovereignty and the political are either sustained by the theological or at least cannot 
be understood independently of it. The nature of this relationship may be debated further, 
however, our goal here is to minimally affirm the general, if still ambiguous claim that 
theology and the political are involved in a nuanced set of legitimating causes and 
consequences. This view, therefore, does not see theology as a necessary superstructure which 
simply critiques the material-economic base, but rather sees theology and politics as both 
implicated in each other in the constitution of political communities. The corollary of this 
intermingling of sovereignty and theology, therefore, is the theme of ‘political theology’ and 
what Derrida calls with a broadened scope the “political theogony” of ipseity latent in the 
various discourses of modernity.103 These syntagmata coincide with a wider phenomenon in 
contemporary discussions of politics and philosophy, namely, the ‘religious turn’ in 
philosophy as well as in contemporary political theory, which we have alluded to above.104  
 
What we find in Schmitt’s political theology are two points which frame the content of this 
chapter. The first is located in an implicit claim we have already begun to describe, namely, 
that a view of political theology is taken which elucidates a bidirectional ‘transposition’ 
between theology and politics, seen as not only necessary but unavoidable: politics and 
theology cannot be separated. The second point, which is also the explicit and critical task of 
this chapter, is to show that Schmitt’s formulation of politics and sovereignty depend upon a 
conception of Christian eschatology that is conceived as a ‘politics of presence.’ The historical 
outcomes of a ‘politics of presence’ will not be assessed with respect to Schmitt, but rather the 
philosophical implications of sovereign ‘presence’ will be interrogated vis-à-vis the 
philosophical hermeneutics of John Caputo, beginning with his early investigations of Martin 
Heidegger and then later Jacques Derrida. The dual aim of this chapter, then, is to affirm the 
importance of political theology and sovereignty as it is conceived by Schmitt but also to draw 
                                                      
103 Jacques Derrida, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (trans.) Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), pg. 17. 
104 From a philosophical perspective, this turn was famously criticized by Dominique Janicaud, see Dominique 
Janicaud, Bernard G. Prusak (trans.) “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” in Phenomenology and the 
“Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, [1991] 2000), pp.3–103. For a 
contrasting position on this turn see, Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999). With respect to political theory, some of the prominent names that surface in the 
literature (and are usually of leftist orientation) include: Giorgio Agamben, Patricia Dailey (trans.) The Time That 
Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), Alain Badiou, Ray 
Brassier (trans.) Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), Slavoj Žižek, 
The Fragile Absolute; or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000) and Terry Eagleton, 
Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
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its limits so as to set-up the problematic of a political theology that might be read through the 
radical theology of John Caputo.  
 
Before attending to the claims of Schmitt and the implications for sovereignty and the political 
theology in question, the issue of context must be raised since it is only in the purview of the 
anxieties experienced in Weimar Germany and the succeeding years that one can make sense 
of Schmitt for our own political challenges. In this regard, the current situation can broadly 
be described as the crisis of liberal democracy and the concomitant disaster of twenty-first 
century global capitalism. In the midst of this crisis, there is the oft-spoken of paradoxical 
tension between liberalism’s political virtue of maximal freedom and the democratic social 
call for equality. The crisis itself emerges when either freedom or equality accumulate in an 
unbalanced way. This crisis is as much a crisis of government as it is a crisis of identity, 
because both rest, as is well-known, on different traditions of what it means to be human. 
Describing this paradox, the political theorist Chantal Mouffe writes, “On the one side we 
have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the defense of human rights and the 
respect of individual liberty; on the other, the democratic tradition whose main ideas are those 
of equality, identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty.”105 The crisis 
of liberal democracy fluctuates depending on which side of the scale this paradoxical polarity 
weighs. In the twenty-first century, we are still living with the after effects of a reassertion of 
the liberal principle over the democratic stemming from the Reagan-Thatcherite eras. What 
becomes apparent in this tussle is the question of sovereign foundations and the lack thereof, 
which both liberal and social forms of democracy circumvent under the conditions of 
secularization that they take for granted.  
 
With aggressive neo-liberal authoritarian market policies, which lead to outsourcing models 
that provide basic services and welfare, the lines between government and private interests 
have become increasingly blurred. Lack of accountability created in this environment has 
weakened public trust as the ‘democratic deficit’ continually widens. In short, liberal 
democracy has been experiencing an identity crisis to such an extent that theorists have begun 
to call our situation ‘post-democratic.’106 Discussions of political theology have arisen in 
precisely this context; with particular interest in Schmitt’s political theology and his concept 
of sovereignty.  
 
                                                      
105 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (New York: Verso, 2000), pp.2-3.  
106 See Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: it begins in section two with a description 
of the present liberal democratic or post-democratic condition of contemporary governance 
and illustrates how this raises the question of sovereignty and therefore political theology. 
This description will draw on the analysis produced by Graham Ward — in his Politics of 
Discipleship (2009)107 — who has been influential in articulating the subtleties of contemporary 
culture with respect to recent trends in philosophy and religion. In this analysis, we follow 
Ward’s outline of democracy’s crisis that first manifests itself in the nineteen-twenties and 
swings in variations directions up until our present ‘post-democratic’ context. We adopt the 
central argument of his analysis, namely, that liberal democracy is as slippery a term as it is 
unstable, since it revolves around a vacuumed center which it desires to fill, while at the same 
time itself denying that possibility. Ward’s project veers into what he calls a ‘renaissance of 
the metaphysical,’108 which seeks to fill this center with an updated metaphysics. While this is 
no doubt an important and provocative proposal (consolidated also by others from a 
predominantly orthodox Anglo-Catholic background), we are for now only interested in his 
account of the current democratic dilemma.109 At the conclusion of this description the 
question of sovereignty and political theology will have to be raised. This is taken up in the 
third section of the chapter which attends to the controversial figure of Carl Schmitt.  
 
In reading, arguably, two of Carl Schmitt’s most important texts already mentioned above, 
Political Theology (1922) and The Concept of the Political (1932), of interest will be the nature of 
Schmitt’s conservative response to parliamentary democracy in the climate of Weimar 
liberalism. Through his definition of sovereignty, grounded in a re-assertion of the 
theological, Schmitt attempts to properly define a ‘true’ concept of the political in terms of the 
infamous friend-enemy distinction. In direct contrast to the immanent tradition stemming 
from Baruch Spinoza and his Tractatus Theolgico-Politicus (1670)110 — which paved the way for 
the democratic order from his critique of religious authority — Schmitt wants to reaffirm the 
political in terms of a transcendent appeal for legitimation. This much is clear from the 
infamous opening line of the third chapter in Political Theology, “All significant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”111 In response to stifling 
                                                      
107 This was the third of a three-part book project see Graham Ward, Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial 
Citizens (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), Cities of God (London: Routledge, 2000) and Cultural Transformation 
and Religious Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
108 Ward, Politics of Discipleship, pg. 152. 
109 For a critique of Ward’s metaphysical approach see Daniel Miller, “Theocracy, Eschatology, and the Ephemeral 
Church: Graham Ward and the ‘Crisis of Democracy’ in Political Theology 17. 4 (July 2016), pp. 337-360.  
110 Baruch Spinoza, Jonathan Israel (ed.), Theological-Political Treatise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012).  
111 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 36. 
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political neutralization and depoliticization that occur in liberal democracies, a concept of 
sovereignty is delineated in the ‘state of exception.’ That is, according to Schmitt, a juridical 
justification for underived authority that founds the law but exists outside of it — a 
fundamentally undemocratic act; “The sovereign is he who decides on the state of 
exception.”112 Through the analogue of a transcendent and omnipotent God, Schmitt thinks 
he is able to provide both the rationale and critique of liberalism’s contradictions and lack of 
a singular decision-making capability.  
 
Beneath what Mark Lilla calls Schmitt’s “politics of theological despair”113 or what Derrida 
terms the “implacable logic of absolute hostility,”114 lies a certain nostalgia for a neatly 
organized and distinguished world before the “crisis of the modern problematic of 
church/state/society.”115 The latter, argued in section four, is ascribed to a modern reading of 
Christian eschatology, wherein the omnipotent and sempiternal nature of God is preserved 
in the unavoidability of the sovereign decision that makes politics possible. To sustain this 
claim, we turn to Schmitt’s concept of the katechon. This enigmatic figure, which appears in 
his writings during and after the Second World War, serves a key function in Schmitt’s 
concept of Christian history. Its deployment not only acts as an apologetic for Schmitt’s 
politics of the total state — as the restraining force against evil and disorder — but also 
provides the eschatological framework that makes his ‘politics of the present’ plausible. At 
this point in the chapter, we will have exposed the transcendental (theological) conditions of 
sovereignty as they occur in Schmitt, the dominant voice in contemporary discussions of 
sovereignty and political theology. The concluding section, then, continues the deconstructive 
gesture set out in the course of this chapter. It suggests a ‘radical hermeneutic of sovereignty’ 
based on Derrida’s notion of ‘non-identity repetition.’ In this regard, Derrida’s Rogues essay 
will be considered, since it is exemplary not only for its illustration of non-identical repetition 
but for doing so with specific reference to sovereignty. The ensuing discussion is not meant 
to be a comprehensive exploration of Derrida’s thinking of sovereignty, but rather serves as a 
transition to the radical approach taken in this study and to foreground some of the themes 
that will become evident in Caputo’s religious reading of Derrida and his subsequent radical 
theology.  
 
                                                      
112 Ibid., pg. 5. In Schwab’s footnote a “state of exception includes any kind of severe economic or political 
disturbance that requires the application of extraordinary measures.”  
113 Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: NYRB, 2001), pg. 76. 
114 Jacques Derrida, George Collins (trans.) The Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso, [1997] 2005), pg. 156. 
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II. The Crisis of Liberal Democracy 
 
In Politics of Discipleship, theologian Graham Ward116 sets out to prescribe a Christian 
worldview that can adequately respond to the transient conditions of the twenty-first century. 
He espouses a ‘postmaterialist agenda’ that intersects a ‘Christian imaginary’ opposed to the 
“purely material understanding of objects, activities, and values.”117 Before offering his ‘call 
to action,’ as Jamie Smith declares in the editor’s preface, Ward first examines in detail three 
dominant trends in contemporary Western society; the political (crisis of democracy), the 
economic (globalization) and the cultural (the new visibility of religion). Since our concern is 
with the concept of sovereignty, we shall concentrate only on the first chapter, “Democracy: 
Crisis and Transformation,” where Ward’s interest is not only with ‘the political’ but also with 
sovereignty in particular. Indeed, the theological reflections that follow his description of 
democracy’s crisis are motivated, he says, by a need to “revisit the theological foundations of 
sovereignty.”118 While Ward’s theological reflections are explored in a direction that we will 
not pursue in this study, it is worth noting that in his analysis he is thinking specifically of 
sovereignty with Carl Schmitt in the background. In this respect, not only has he translated 
together with Michael Hoelzl two of Carl Schmitt’s works, Political Theology II (1970) and 
Dictatorship (1921), he also begins this chapter with an epigraph taken from Schmitt’s Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form (1923), which aptly sets the stage for our discussion: “The 
domination of ‘capital’ behind the scenes is still no form, though it can undermine an existing 
political form and make it an empty façade. Should it succeed, it will have ‘depoliticized’ the 
state completely.”119  
 
Ward’s analysis of the crisis of democracy is framed as a historical description. It aims to illicit 
liberal democracy’s fragility from its early modern inception up until the ‘postdemocratic’ 
condition visited upon us today. He locates the initial fragility in a tension that exists in the 
combination of two concepts: ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy.’ This tension is mapped onto a general 
trend that he detects between what he calls ‘micro’ and ‘macropolitics’ — the former drifting 
toward the latter. In the most basic self-understanding, modern governments perceive their 
                                                      
116 Ward has made numerous interventions across a number of fields including postmodern philosophy, critical 
theory, theology and more recently anthropology and neuroscience. See Graham Ward (ed.) The Blackwell 
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practices as ‘democratic,’ that is, as ‘rule by the people,’ despite the many variations that are 
evident (parliamentary, federal, constitutional etc). The first tension that emerges is that in 
reality most forms of democracy are simply not ‘rule by the people,’ but are only represented 
by elected officials to avoid the “tyranny of the majority”120 as Tocqueville had pointed out. 
To balance this tendency of democracy, the rights of the individual must be upheld at all costs. 
“This is why,” Ward writes, “democracy in these countries [the ‘West’] is called ‘liberal 
democracy,’ for ‘liberal’ here signals the withdrawal of state power so that individuals might 
exercise their maximal freedom as long as they do not injure or infringe the freedom of other 
individuals.”121 Liberal democracy is thus the tension between the micropolitics of liberal 
freedom and the macropolitics of a polity. For Rousseau, this was the ‘problem of politics’ — 
the relationship between freedom and equality, a problem that was like “squaring the circle 
in geometry.”122  
 
Ward shows that the distinction between micro and macropolitics can be directly mapped 
onto others — for example, a democratic polity and a democratic culture or ethos — which 
“exist as a complex interaction and at times call each other into question.”123 This difference 
(between a democratic ethos/culture which can question a democratic polity — by means of 
peaceful protest, for example — and a democratic polity — which can question a democratic 
ethos when laws are imposed by the state) — is equally related to another distinction which 
reflects the micro-to-macro trend, namely, private and public law. Following the Italian 
theorist, Norberto Bobbio, public law emerges only after the rise of the state, whereas before 
there were only private contracts.124 Ward states that while Bobbio is sensitive to the fact that 
there were times when the primacy of public and private law would oscillate, the reality is 
that liberal bourgeois society viewed government (democratic polity/ethos and public law) 
only as a necessary evil from which it only required security. The liberal state, which is older 
than democracy, therefore, reflects an ethic of humanism grounded on “natural 
rights…trumpeting both religious and economic freedom for self-expression and 
development.”125 The tension becomes most explicit when the democratic ethic, which 
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defined the individual as part of a greater whole — and thus requires a more extended notion 
of the state to ensure maximal equality — pushes against liberalism with an “implicit notion 
of socialism and a welfare state.”126 This move describes, in short, the trend toward 
macropolitical models of the twentieth century.  
 
I. Three Examples in Democracy’s Crisis 
 
The first part of Ward’s historical description highlights the inherent tension in the locution 
‘liberal democracy.’ In the second part, he turns to three examples in the 20th century that 
illustrate the ‘crisis of democracy’ at the point when these tensions are ‘subject to fluctuations 
of time and circumstance.’ The first arises from a set of lectures by the British political scientist, 
Harold Laski, given in 1931 at Yale University and subsequently published under the title 
Democracy in Crisis in 1933.127 The context of Laski’s lectures was the period leading up to and 
after the stock market crash of 1929; Britain was at an all-time economic low, Weimer 
Germany was experiencing the after-effects of America’s depression, and the arrival of the 
Nazi Party in the Reichstag heightened political uncertainty. “The lexicon of crisis 
characterized European culture in the interwar years,”128 and it was to this that Laski 
responded.   
 
The primary concern for Laski in democracy’s crisis — significantly parliamentary democracy 
as it unfolded in the nineteen twenties — was the fictitious claim that public representatives 
truly embodied the will of ‘the people.’ For him, the falsity of this claim lies in the sheer 
disproportionality of representation that issues from limited suffrage and which therefore is 
able to mask the connection between parliamentary democracy and capitalism.129 As 
parliamentary democracy developed, “there was not universal suffrage such that the people 
could register their opinion, and therefore the sovereignty of the people — and the legitimacy 
of that sovereignty — was based on a narrow class of those who constituted ‘the people.’”130 
With the rise of socialism, various working class movements, and the ascent of the Labour 
Party in Britain, Laski witnessed an emerging consciousness that questioned the liberal 
tendency in parliamentary democracies, namely, that tendency which relied on free debate, 
discussion and deliberation at the expense of an embodied will of the masses. The connection 
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between liberalism and capitalism, as we will see below, was part of what drove Schmitt’s 
critique. Although, whereas Schmitt’s response would be an assertion of decisive action, Laski 
on the other hand, attempted to “create a myth out of socialism.”131 Significant here, then, is 
that the crisis of liberal democracy is a crisis of liberalism itself and its rationality, which 
subsequently drives models of government into more social or even authoritarian forms.   
 
Continuing the theme of crisis, Ward’s second example follows the arguments made by the 
French sociologist, Michael Crozier and the renowned American political scientist, Samuel P. 
Huntingon, in their report-back for the Trilateral Commission, published as The Crisis of 
Democracy (1975).132 While giving different reasons, Crozier and Huntington broadly diagnose 
the period after World War II until the 1970’s as marked by another cycle of liberal erosion in 
favor of the democratic principle. It was in the context of the Cold War, the rise of 
communism, social democracies (who were creating enormous deficits to pay for social 
welfare), spiraling inflation and unemployment among other things, that by the end of the 
seventies social-democratic leaders were on the chopping block. Concurrently, since social 
democratic states were spending so much more on education, there emerged a new class of 
youthful intelligentsia that inaugurated a “new egalitarianism.” By this Ward means that 
while the mass movements of the sixties were a form of egalitarian-liberalism — civil, black, 
gay, women’s rights, the protest of big government and in particular, American imperialism 
— they also produced the new but unintended consequence of an entire generation’s gradual 
withdrawal from the public. The turn to identity politics, consumerism, and the rhetoric of 
anti-communism meant that by the end of the seventies social-democracy was on the retreat. 
This would signal a new form of Right-wing politics of an explicit neoliberal kind. It was to 
be understood as ‘Neo-liberal’ to the extent that it upheld an apolitical individualism and 
laissez-faire approach to capitalism, although this time it would be neoliberal economics 
breeding “a capitalism without conscience,”133 as Ward remarks.  
 
If Ronald Raegan and Margaret Thatcher took up the baton of this new form of authoritarian 
politics, then it was surely passed on to Tony Blair’s New Labour and the presidency of 
George W. Bush, with their subsequent ideological positions ushering us into the twenty-first 
century. Ward’s final example of democracy’s crisis, which he titles “The Return of the 
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King,”134 considers this historical transition of political moods captured by Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Huntington’s The Clash of 
Civilizations (1996). In the former, Ward argues that despite the tensions in Fukuyama’s thesis 
(tensions that he was well aware of),135 liberal democracy as the triumphal form of 
government paradoxically develops into a strong-state mentality in order to preserve the neo-
liberal economic agenda. Fukuyama’s argument, Ward indicates, is rooted in the 
secularization thesis. The trans-historical standard he promotes to measure democracy is a 
liberal humanism grounded in “a universal and optimistic view of human nature.”136 But such 
a view collapses the nature of ‘desire-for-recognition,’ integral for human communities, into 
an economic modality that is ultimately imperialistic and thus conflictual. Contrary to 
Fukuyama, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations takes into account the resurgence of global 
religion. The importance of his analysis, Ward suggests, is to have recognized in the other 
major civilizations (Sinic, Orthodox and Islamic) a modernization that rejected liberalism and 
embraced authoritarian forms of government. The outcome of the ‘clash’ between the growing 
‘threat’ from the East, therefore, was to address the West’s decline by insisting on liberal-
democracy’s imperialistic program. Summarizing this situation, Ward writes, “Although, 
then, democracy seemed to recover from the crisis of the 1970s, it did so by morphing and 
bringing to power a range of new decisionist leaders who effectively reasserted the liberal 
principle over the democratic. A king returns. But he does so at a cost, and it is this cost with 
which we in the West are still living.”137 
 
II. The Postdemocratic Condition 
 
The cost of the triumph of liberal democracy is the goaded sense of public mistrust in the 
institutions which claim to represent it. This situation has become known in Europe as the 
‘democratic deficit,’ but seems equally relevant as a general description for the political 
conditions evident in many other nations in the West.138 Compounded by rhetoric and policy 
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evident of a ‘security-state’ in the United States following 9/11, and the discourse around 
refugees in Europe, Ward correctly cites the “well-known political platitude that if a 
citizenship feels insecure, then it demands more authoritarian forms of governance.”139 It is 
from this more subtle version of authoritarianism which masks itself as liberal democracy that 
public mistrust manifests and democratic deficits increase. The ‘postdemocratic’, according to 
the work of Colin Crouch, thus describes a context which erodes trust at its root. There are 
four indicators that bear witness to this trend, and although Ward published Politics of 
Discipleship in 2009 and drew on Crouch’s Post-Democracy published in 2004, it will not be 
difficult to find parallels in the present moment of contemporary politics.  
 
The first indicator points toward the ‘aestheticization of politics’ that goes back at least to 
Joseph Goebbels and the personality cult that developed behind Hitler. The dangers of 
political myth generation were recognized and rightly criticized very early on,140 but it seems 
that the increasing role of media in politics has reached new levels that we are still trying to 
understanding. Indeed, beyond insipid political campaigning paid for by lobbyists, it is the 
age of hyper-digitalization of information and its transfer through social media platforms that 
has raised the stakes, and evidently, plays now a determinate role in shaping constituencies. 
Indeed, the increasing importance played by the role of a politician’s media ‘image’ or media 
‘presence’ is such that it seems almost impossible to differentiate between a substantive 
political cause and an aggressive marketing campaign. 
  
This leads ostensibly to the next indicator of the post-democratic moment, namely, the 
collapse of ‘the social’ or ‘the political’ into the economic. And here we see again the tension 
inherent in liberal democracy, because under this schema the democratic principle will always 
be a hindrance to the logic of neoliberal economics. Equality of opportunity may signal a 
democratic vision, but this so-called equality under the auspices of a radically open market 
                                                      
constitutive force of the people, and therefore we should be defending a qualified sense of nation-state sovereignty. 
The latter is the position of the political scientist Dieter Grimm, and recalls a popularized debate he had with Jürgen 
Habermas on the nature of European constitutional identity. See Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe Need a 
Constitution?” in European Law Journal 1 (1995), pp. 282-302 and Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s 
‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’” in European Law Journal 1 (1995), pp. 303-307. See also See Dieter Grimm, “On 
the Status of the EU’s Democratic Legitimacy after Lisbon” in The Constitution of European Democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017) and Dieter Grimm, Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Thank-you to Dirkie Smit for pointing out that Grimm also 
consulted in the drafting of the new South African constitution. 
139 Ward, Politics of Discipleship, pg. 63. 
140 See Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations (London: 
Pimlico, 1999), pg. 241. See also Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Chris Turner (trans.) Heidegger, Art, and Politics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990). 
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based on competition is necessarily undermined if productivity is to win the day.141 The 
situation emerges where, ultimately, in order to keep up these economic principles, the 
intermediate democratic procedures that are characteristic of democracy have to be 
circumvented. We have, then, a slide into more authoritarian political forms that minimize 
accountability as they proceed to outsource services usually provided by the state. The spin-
off here is that the state loses its obligation to the electorate, and effectively the responsibility 
afforded to its citizens is replaced by the demands of its shareholders. Indeed, one might even 
speak of an entire sea-change in the public domain. Ward calls this the specificity of society 
“giving way to the amorphousness of the language of ‘culture’; the social becomes the 
cultural.”142 In a Foucauldian vein, this collapse manufactures an entirely different social 
milieu with its own subjectivities, “a conception of society as an enterprise made up of enterprises 
comprises a new subjective norm, which is no longer precisely that of the productive subject 
of industrial societies.”143 
 
The ‘postdemocratic,’ as conceived by Ward, beckons a crisis of representation on the one 
hand, and a corresponding ‘depoliticization’ on the other, the final two characteristics of the 
analysis. In the former, the alliance between capital and politics renders, at best, those elected 
into power sufficiently impotent, and at worst, indifferent to their own constituencies while 
fully occupied with self-serving curiosities, whether monetary or political. This self-referential 
system of politics and economic interests leaves those most vulnerable steadily behind, 
evoking a growing sense of disenfranchisement coupled with rage. The latter characteristic, 
that of depoliticization, seems to name the encompassing outcome of the ‘postdemocratic.’ As 
with Laski, who pointed out the fictitious nature of democracy with respect to representation 
and how this could lead to the clandestine connection between liberal parliamentarianism and 
capital, so too had Carl Schmitt referred to the ‘depoliticization’ cause by liberal politics of the 
Weimar government. Crucial for this argument, therefore, is that the crisis of democracy and 
the postdemocratic condition, as described by Ward, refer us back to the critical questions 
already being asked in the first half of the twentieth century; “Perhaps the West has made a 
circle back to the 1920s, where our analysis began.”144 And indeed, this is the main reason why 
there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Carl Schmitt. 
                                                      
141 Ward, Politics of Discipleship, pg. 68. 
142 Ibid., pg. 71.  
143 See Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Gregory Elliot (trans.) The New Way of the World: On Neo-Liberal Society 
(London: Verso, 2013), pg. 283. Emphasis added. See also, Michel Foucault, Graham Burchell (trans.), Michel 
Senellart (ed.) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979 (New York and London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
144 Ward, Politics of Discipleship, pg. 72. 
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III. Schmitt’s Political Theology 
 
Over the last three decades there has been a veritable explosion of scholarship on the work of 
Carl Schmitt.145 Controversy surrounding him abounds and not least for his membership to 
the Nazi party, which he joined in May 1933 (incidentally, the same month as did Martin 
Heidegger).146 His work is highly contested, with commentators from across the political 
spectrum expressing very little degree of consensus, labeling him everything from a 
traditional nineteenth-century liberal, an Italian-style fascist, an anti-liberal anti-Semite, a 
catholic conservative counterrevolutionary, and one of the most incisive theorists of 
parliamentary democracy.147 As one might anticipate, his work has influenced a diversity of 
thinkers from Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Franz Neumann, George Lukács, Alexander 
Kojève, Walter Benjamin and Jürgen Habermas,148 to name but a few. Whatever the difficulties 
are and the ensuing debates involved in pinning him down, his influence over the last three 
decades has been immense. Since the first English translation of The Concept of the Political 
(1976),149 Schmitt has left an indelible mark on Anglo-American scholarship (in particular) 
that notwithstanding his tainted biography, has probably secured his position in the annals 
of modern German intellectual history.  
                                                      
145 A preliminary list of significant texts might include: Jacob Taubes, Ad Carl Schmitt. Gegenstrebige Fügung (Berlin: 
Merve, 1987), George Schwab, Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 
1921 and 1936 (Wesport: Greenwood, 1989), Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist of the Reich (Princeton: 
University Press, 1983), Paul Edward Gottfried, Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory (Westport: Greenwood, 1990), 
Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), John McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of 
Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Heinrich Meier, Marcus 
Brainard (trans.) The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the distinction between Political Theology and Political 
Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [1998] 2011), Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait 
of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000) and Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2005). For more reflections on Carl Schmitt literature see Peter C. Caldwell, “Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A 
Review of Recent Literature” in The Journal of Modern History, 77.2 (June 2005), pp. 357-87. Even more recently 
another massive anthology from OUP has appeared, again reiterating the sustained interest of his thought, see 
Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
146 Footnoted in his forward to the Concept of the Political Tracy Strong records that “Around the time they both 
joined the Nazi Party, Schmitt initiated contact with Heidegger by sending him a copy The Concept of the Political. 
Heidegger responded warmly and indicated that he hoped Schmitt would assist him in ‘reconstituting the Law 
Faculty.’” Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. xii.   
147 Caldwell, “Controversies over Schmitt,” pg. 357. 
148 See Ellen Kennedy, “Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School,” Telos 71 (Spring 1987), pp. 37-66. Samuel Weber, 
“Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt,” Diacritics 22, nos. 2-4 (Fall-Winter 1992), pp. 5-
18. Jürgen Habermas, “The Horrors of Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English,” The New Conservatism (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1992), pp.128-139. 
149 Carl Schmitt, George Schwab (trans.) The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ, 1976). Before this 
translation, as Schwab notes in the preface to the 1985 edition, the only other full-length English study was his own 
The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt (Berlin: Dunker & Humboldt, 1970). 
Following this came Joseph Bendersky’s biography, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), as well three further translations from MIT Press in the 1980s, all contributing significantly 
to Schmitt’s reception in the English-speaking world: Political Theology (1985), The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 
(1986), and Political Romanticism (1986). 
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In the following section, we are concerned with (1) Schmitt’s critique of liberalism as it 
pertains to the contemporary crisis of democracy described above. (2) This cannot be 
understood without taking into account his infamous concept of ‘the political’ delineated by 
the ‘friend-enemy distinction’. (3) The latter is grounded on a description of the ‘political 
decision’ which is the essence of his definition of sovereignty elicited by the phrase, 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”150 This phrase constitutes “a general theory 
of the state” by introducing transcendence into politics (political theology), which it will be 
argued, is itself dependent on (4) a Christian eschatological vision that informs contemporary 
political-theological thought.151 Given the centrality of these nodal points in Schmitt’s thinking 
and their necessary interdependence, we cannot altogether treat them separately. Indeed, it is 
precisely naïve separations and hasty distinctions that are made by liberalism and modernity 
that are the target of Schmitt’s writings. Furthermore, although his writings are typically 
aphoristic, philosophical, and concise sets of arguments, which can be understood as self-
contained in a particular work, these arguments must be placed alongside one another in 
order to evoke the main thrusts of his thought. In doing so, it is possible to detect something 
of an argumentative outline, which we hope to reflect by the structure set forth below. To 
attain this necessarily limited description — of ‘the political’, political theology and 
sovereignty — we begin by attending to a consistent feature of disquiet for Schmitt to which 
his work is ultimately a reaction: summarily recognized here as the question of the State with 
respect to the age of ‘technology’152 within the overall decline of Western Europe.  
 
I. “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticization” 
 
What is ‘technology’ for Schmitt? As John McCormack’s important study Carl Schmitt’s 
Critique of Liberalism (1997) suggests, liberalism for Schmitt, and in particular parliamentary 
democracy and constitutional law, are “extensions, or even applications, of the more general 
                                                      
150 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 5. 
151 The ‘political-theological’ thought signaled here, does not take its orientation from the trajectory of political 
theology that was in many ways intended as a direct response to Carl Schmitt (Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen 
Moltmann – who themselves played a significant role in influencing Public and Liberation Theology) but rather as 
it has surfaced especially from the Left in political-legal and philosophical disciplines. The concerned here is with 
the ‘theological turn’ in contemporary politics and philosophy as opposed to the ‘political turn’ in theology.   
152 John McCormack, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pg. 4. As with any major thinker, the quest to systematize their thinking in pursuit of 
‘consistency’ is always a difficult and sometimes impossible task. Indeed, some like Jan-Werner Müller in his A 
Dangerous Mind (2003) have argued that there is no unifying thread in Schmitt’s oeuvre. In their introduction to 
the new Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (2016), Meierhenrich and Simons argue the contrary, by asserting a 
discernable ‘motif of order’ and ‘trinity’ “comprised of his political, legal, and cultural thought.” Pp. 3-70.   
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criticisms of modernity,” which is summoned by the infiltration of what he calls “technology.” 
Technology is not only and simply ‘applied science,’ it is also a “neutralizing technical force” 
that attempts to suppress ‘the political.’ Schmitt’s intellectual interests are not exhausted by 
the situation of Weimar Germany during the inter-war period (though this certainly gave his 
project its impetus), but are at base directed at a more general trend within modernity. While 
Schmitt’s cutting criticisms of liberalism in its political particularity appear in The Concept of 
the Political (1932), Political Theology (1922) and Constitutional Theory (1928), a useful departure 
point for our purposes covering the nature of this general critique of modern liberalism can be 
found in a lecture he gave in Barcelona, 1929, “The Age of Neutralizations and 
Depoliticizations.”153   
 
In the introduction to this lecture, Schmitt begins with his reactionary gesture.154 He describes 
his trepidation over the historical decline of the state of Europe, which is inversely depicted 
in the rise of Russia; “[w]e in Central Europe live ‘sous l’oeil des Russes.’”155 He then enters a 
mode of speculative historicizing which seeks to describe the ‘spirit of the present’ by ‘first 
becoming aware of our cultural and historical situation.’156 Schmitt’s thesis is that a general 
structure can be recognized and traced in the last five hundred years around loosely 
identifiable ‘central domains’ of thought.157  These domains, as ‘secular stages’ in history, 
share a common structure in that their change is brought about through their ‘shifting centers’ 
of intellectual influence. According to Schmitt, there have been five stages since the 
renaissance; the sixteenth century is structured around a theological center, the seventeenth 
around metaphysics and rationality, shunning the latter the eighteenth century was dominated 
by humanism in its notions of duty and virtue, the nineteenth was the era of the economic, and 
the present is marked by technicity. Essential to Schmitt’s argument is not to mistakenly read 
this history as a theory of historical progress, but rather to consider the structural affinities 
that are taking place in each epoch of Occidental history.  
                                                      
153 This text is reproduced at the end of the 2007 reprint of The Concept of the Political, pp. 80-96. It is also, of course, 
not the only place that Schmitt’s criticisms of modernity are carried out; see also Carl Schmitt, G. L. Ulmen (trans.), 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), Carl Schmitt, Guy Oaks (trans.) Political 
Romanticism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986).  
154 Schmitt’s work in this sense is deeply existential, he is always responding to and through the concrete conditions 
of human existence; “That all historical knowledge is knowledge of the present, that such knowledge obtains its 
light and intensity from the present and in the most profound sense only serves the present, because all spirit is 
only spirit of the present,” Schmitt, Concept of the Political, pg. 80. In Political Theology, it is well-known that his 
concept of sovereignty is written in response to modern developments in constitutionalism typified by the work 
of Hugo Krabbe and Hans Kelson. See Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 7.   
155 Ibid., pg. 80, the French translates ‘under the eyes [or gaze] of Russia.’ 
156 Ibid., pg. 80.  
157 Tracey Strong likens these ‘central domains’ to Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms” in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [1962] 2012). See Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. xxviii. 
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A central domain of thought is overtaken by another when its problems are solved through a 
new central domain. Common to each stage, for Schmitt, is the pursuit of a ‘neutrality’. 
Theology as the central domain for example, and therefore, the neutral domain of thought in 
the sixteenth century, was replaced by natural science and natural theology in the seventeenth 
century. Schmitt comments in this respect that “the essential point for me is that theology, the 
former central domain, was abandoned because it was controversial, in favor of another – 
neutral – domain.”158 The neutral domain, therefore, is a site of contestation when pressed 
against another claimant of neutrality: “Europeans always have wondered from a conflictual 
to a neutral domain, and always the newly won neutral domain has become immediately 
another arena of struggle, once again necessitating the search for a new neutral domain.”159  
 
Within this lexicon, one can see how Schmitt can problematize the naïve liberal assumption 
of the neutrality of technology by exposing the totalitarianism harbored by liberalism itself, 
that is, a ‘weapon’ and “irresistible power…as the domination of the spiritless over spirit.”160 
Technology is not neutral because it ‘serves all’ and is just another site of struggle for the next 
conflict. Schmitt is concerned ultimately with the human being, and he recognizes that the 
assumed neutrality of the age of technology places human beings in a precarious zone of 
domination. In what he later calls technology’s ‘religion’ or ‘spirit of technicity’, there resides 
“the belief in an activistic metaphysics — the belief in unlimited power and the domination 
of man over nature, even over human nature.”161 Schmitt’s critique of liberalism in terms of 
‘neutralization’ and ‘depoliticization’ circle back to our contemporary situation, in that the 
question again of legitimation and authority is raised when the State is run increasingly as “a 
huge industrial plant,”162 with the personalistic element completely lost. Schmitt’s answer to 
these questions will ultimately lead to a conception of the political that hastens liberalism’s 
end through a politics of enmity and sovereign decision. The latter, as Agamben has argued, 
harbors its own totalitarianism latent in the immanent “essential practices of contemporary 
states, including so-called [liberal] democratic ones.”163 
 
In the triumph of modern liberal democracy, Schmitt sees an obfuscation and negation of a 
‘true’ concept of the political. If the root of modern liberal democracy is ultimately a ‘political 
                                                      
158 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political., pg. 89. 
159 Ibid., pg. 90. 
160 Ibid., pg. 93.  
161 Ibid., pg. 94.  
162 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 65. 
163 Agamben, State of Exception, pg. 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  51 
romanticism’164 typified by a desire for a domain of neutrality and rational deliberation, then 
Schmitt’s argument to reclaim a true concept of the political is precisely to appeal to the 
irrationality of politics. Universal rationality to which we can appeal for legitimation is not 
only not possible for Schmitt, but also invokes a dangerous universalism that seeks to 
eliminate difference. The Concept of the Political is thus an attempt not to provide an ‘exhaustive 
definition’165 of politics, but rather to locate sufficient ‘limit concepts’ that make it possible, 
namely, a concept of the political that is delineated by a friend-enemy distinction — Schmitt’s 
quasi-transcendental condition.  
  
II. The Friend-Enemy Distinction 
 
Alongside the definition of sovereignty in Political Theology, Schmitt’s ‘friend-enemy’ 
distinction is among his most well-known and frequently-cited contributions to political 
theory. The distinction emerges as a counter-conception to the proceduralism that wants to 
‘keep politics safe.’ For Schmitt, politics and the nature of what it means to be human is 
marked by difficulty and danger, and thus is inherent in all political groupings. Politics can 
never be predetermined; events and situations arise for which a response is required that goes 
beyond simple deliberation. The relatively unpretentious criterion of friend and enemy, 
therefore, is the only source of consistency when unique events arise in concrete circumstances 
for which answers must be produced. What is the character of this distinction and what are 
its implications? 
 
If liberalism for Schmitt, as we have seen above, is characterized by a negation of the political, 
then a concept of the political must be polemically asserted against this depoliticized mode of 
discourse; “another system”166 of the political that brings a true concept into recognition. 
Schmitt takes his cue for the political from other domains of thought, “not equivalent and 
analogous” to them, however, and certainly not derived from them, but only structurally 
similar with respect to what he calls “ultimate distinctions.” Thus, in the domain of morality 
the criterion of good and evil is posited, in aesthetics ugly and beautiful and in economics 
profitable and unprofitable. With respect to politics, “[t]he specific political distinction to 
which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”167  
                                                      
164 Schmitt, Political Romanticism, especially chapter three, pp. 109-163. 
165 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. 26. See also Julien Freund’s preface to the French translation of The 
Concept of the Political. Carl Schmitt, La Notion de politique: Theorie du partisan (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1972), pp. 22-
27.  
166 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. 71. 
167 Ibid., pg. 26. 
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The friend-enemy criterion is not to be taken as a private vendetta between two people, but is 
in a specific sense a totality or collectivity (Gesamtheit von Menschen).168 Though public 
(öffentlich), the character of the friend-enemy distinction is still deeply existential because it 
involves the most extreme possibility of death. Schmitt writes, “The friend, enemy, and 
combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility 
of physical killing.”169 Here, as Leo Strauss noted, the priority of the enemy mode over the 
friend mode is made manifest, in that the latter is defined negatively in terms of the former. 
We can only know who our friends are because of the possibility that there are those who 
would kill us, and therefore, we are forced to look around for that which is same or other. 
Strauss comments, “’Enemy’ therefore takes precedence over ‘friend,’ because ‘the potential 
for a fight that exists in the region of the real’ belongs ‘to the concept of the enemy’ — and not 
altogether to the concept of the friend as such.”170 There is a perverse logic in Schmitt’s 
accounting of the political here that is identified by Derrida, in what he calls a “political crime 
against the political itself.”171 We shall return to Derrida’s critique in chapter six, but for now we 
can note simply that Schmitt requires an enemy for the existence of the political, and where 
no enemy exists it must be created. Indeed, with respect to a politics of enmity we have grown 
accustomed to a certain “Crypto-Schmittianism”172 in the twenty-first century, especially its 
emanations from US foreign policy during the administrations of George W. Bush and 
arguably again in the administration of Donald Trump.  
 
The possibility of enmity and thus the positing of an enemy in a true conception of the 
political, for Schmitt, is bound to a pessimistic “anthropological profession of faith.”173 By 
contrast, in liberalism’s optimistic view of human nature, the state has, at most, a limited role 
in government and is subordinate to society and culture. This subordination of the state to 
culture is not a radical denial of the state as such (as in the anarchism), but neither is it a 
positive theory; “it has produced a doctrine of the separation and balance of powers,” but 
                                                      
168 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt, 1932), pg. 16. 
169 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. 33. 
170 See Leo Strauss, J. Harvey Lomax (trans.) “Notes on The Concept of the Political” in Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political, pg. 104.  
171 Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, pg. 83. 
172 See Simon Critchley, “Appendix: Crypto-Schmittianism — the Logic of the Political in Bush’s America” in 
Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (London: Verso, 2008), pp. 133-148. This Crypto-
Schmittianism would have to be qualified however. While it is true that the Bush administration and neo-
conservatives would have employed the friend-enemy distinction, this would have operated under the horizon of 
American imperialistic interests, which Schmitt himself would have been critical of.  
173 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. 58. 
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“this cannot be characterized as either a theory of state or a basic political principle.”174 On the 
other hand, the tradition of human nature that is ‘evil’, ‘problematic’ and ‘dangerous,’175 bares 
a methodological connection to the theological notion of sin. Schmitt thinks that the 
distinction between sin and redemption shifts the political meaning to morality, which is why 
he considers Hobbes to be the truly ‘systematic political thinker’, because in Hobbes sin is 
taken as “the fundamental presupposition of a specific political philosophy.”176  
 
It is important for us to understand the fundamental sense of this political philosophy. If we 
recall that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism diagnoses as a failure the ability to think a true 
concept of the political, and that the distinction he makes between friend and enemy is the 
principle which affirms a true concept at a fundamental level, then he must show how 
liberalism’s a-political posture is of political significance — indeed, how it fails to elude the 
political that it seeks to oppose. Schmitt illustrates this in the realm of law. Firstly, in the 
domain of law (public or private), the law exists first and foremost to preserve the status quo. 
This preservation, however, benefits those who are maintained by this status — whether 
political, economic social or otherwise. Secondly, if the status quo is to be challenged, liberalism 
can appeal to “a higher or better law, a so-called natural law or law of reason.”177 There is, 
however, an inherent privilege for those who can make this appeal, a ‘sovereignty of men or 
groups’ who can determine its content and how it is to be applied. The law that appeals to a 
‘higher order’ is a pipe dream for Schmitt — ‘an empty phrase’ — because it pretends that a 
group is not always trying to assert itself over another, an enemy. Thus, in trying to obfuscate 
the political it only reinstates it and proves that a true concept of the political is found in the 
ability to distinguish friend and enemy.  
 
The state of affairs with which The Concept of the Political culminates is that liberalism has 
successfully produced a series of ‘dissolutions’ in every domain of thought, giving every 
political concept a ‘double face’ (verändertes Gesicht). Battle becomes competition in economics 
and the state loses its significance as it collapses into society: “on the ethical-intellectual side 
into an ideological humanitarian conception of humanity, and on the other into an economic-
technical system of production and traffic,” indeed, what appears is an “incredibly coherent 
                                                      
174 Ibid., 61. 
175 Schmitt cites Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bossuet, Fichte, de Maistre, Cortés, Taine and Hegel, ibid. 
176 Ibid., pg. 65. 
177 Ibid., pg. 67. The kind of neo-Kantian political legal theory that would have been represented by Hans Kelsen’s 
Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (1920). See also, Dan Diner and Michael Stollies (eds.) 
Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: A Juxtaposition (Tel Aviv: Schriftenreihen des Instituts für deutsche Geshichte, 
University of Tel Aviv, 1999).   
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systematics of liberal thought.”178 Opposed to this system, Schmitt has given his own which, 
as we have tried to show in his argument above, was always present but covered over by 
liberalism itself. Thus, the friend-enemy distinction on Schmitt’s accounting serves as the 
concept of the political which is presupposed by the concept of the state.179 The state is that 
entity which “decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction”180 and relativizes and 
encompasses other antitheses in other domains. It is the transcendent actor in “the order of 
human things,”181 for it decides who can be the enemy and who can be the friend. The question 
that is now raised is: if the concept of the political, delineated in the friend-enemy distinction, 
is that which is presupposed by a concept of the state, what precisely legitimates the state? 
From where does it obtain its sovereignty? 
 
III. Carl Schmitt’s Concept of Sovereignty 
 
Following the political turmoil and chaos after the First World War, what constituted politics 
could no longer be understood through neo-Kantian theories of the state. For Schmitt, the 
scene had shifted to the ever-present possibility of violence and thus a realism that affirmed 
the human quality behind all politics. Liberal normativism, as we have seen above, is simply 
unable to placate “the power of real life.”182 Political Theology (1922) is a short political tract, 
but undoubtedly Schmitt’s most important. It is his attempt to restore the human element in 
politics by locating a theory of sovereignty that contains a theory of the state. Again, a theory 
of the state is based on the possibility of making the distinction between friend and enemy. 
This distinction requires the ability to decide — who can make the “genuine decision”? 
Schmitt’s answer is that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.”183 He elaborates this 
sovereign according to a secularized understanding of theological power and a political 
theology that re-inscribes transcendence into immanentist theories of the state.  
 
To get to Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty as it is defined in the opening statement of Political 
Theology, we recall that the state is founded on a concept of the political that resists a legal 
                                                      
178 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
179 Schmitt reaffirms this position again much later in his career when he writes, “today one can no longer define 
politics in terms of the State; on the contrary what we can still call the State today must inversely be defined and 
understood from the political.” See Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie II (Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, [1969] 
1996), pg. 21. 
180 Ibid., pg. 30. 
181 Ibid., pg. 96.  
182 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 15. 
183 Ibid. pg. 5. The ambiguity of the German, “Soverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet,” is intentional 
according to Tracey Strong, see Ibid., pp. xi-xii.  
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order of universal norms. How then is a juridical or legal order established if not by an appeal 
to universal principles? From where does the state derive its authority and legitimation if not 
from the law? In this context Schmitt needs a theory of sovereign power that is able to both 
establish and maintain the juridical order when such an order is challenged or threatened with 
anarchy. To conceive the sovereign within the juridical order alone would not only render the 
sovereign impotent when that order falls into chaos, but it also crucially misses the essential 
point about the nature of sovereign power, namely, that sovereignty in deciding the exception 
to the rule also transcends the rule of law. One should be reminded that Schmitt is not setting 
out to normalize an exceptional state of affairs, but rather to locate where power resides when 
affairs are no longer normal. According to George Schwab, Schmitt’s “sovereign slumbers in 
normal times but suddenly awakens when a normal situation threatens to become an 
exception.”184 Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty is not interested in demolishing the juridical 
order in toto, as it has sometimes been caricatured, but rather in strengthening the state’s raison 
d’être 185 by locating the sovereign within, but also necessarily outside, the juridical order.186    
 
The definition of sovereignty that Schmitt elaborates is contained famously in his first chapter 
of Political Theology. There he shows that the exception is “more interesting than the rule” 
because “it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the 
exception.”187 The state for Schmitt, cannot be equated to the legal order, for it is only in times 
of crisis that the state’s character as sovereign can be made manifest through the express 
monopoly it has on all political decision-making. The liberal constitutional attempt to relegate 
the exception from the juridical order, therefore, also at the same time undermines the 
sovereign power relevant to the modern state. Based on this opposition to the depoliticization 
of the state caused by contemporary liberal constitutionalism, as well as the extreme elements 
                                                      
184 Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception, pg. 50. Of course, in the case of Hitler, this sovereign never went back to 
sleep.  
185 Indeed, to avoid misunderstandings of his theory of sovereignty, Schmitt had published in the year previous to 
Political Theology a comprehensive study on dictatorship, see Carl Schmitt, Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward 
(trans.) Dictatorship: From the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle (Cambridge: Polity, 
[1921] 2014). There Schmitt defined two forms of dictatorship: commissarial and sovereign. He argued that Article 
48 of the Weimar constitution sanctioned a ‘commissarial dictatorship’ because unlike a ‘sovereign dictatorship’ it 
sought to uphold the constitution while endeavoring to restore order. Sovereign dictatorship, on the other hand, 
would abrogate the constitution entirely, in order to bring about a new constitutional order. 
186 Agamben calls the paradox that sovereignty occupies the “zone of indifference.” He writes, “in truth, the state 
of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely 
a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each 
other.” See Agamben, State of Exception, pg. 23. Agamben also claims that to understand Schmitt’s concept of 
sovereignty (as the decision which exists both inside and outside the law) it must be read as a direct response to 
Walter Benjamin’s essay Critique of Violence (1921). Benjamin had argued that sovereign power — what he called 
“divine revolutionary violence” — was extant to the juridical order. For Agamben, Schmitt’s move in Political 
Theology to relocate this violence back into the juridical order was precisely in response to Benjamin. See Agamben’s 
insightful discussion in Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 52-55. 
187 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 15. 
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in domestic politics in the Weimar parliament, it is easier to see why Schmitt would have seen 
no alternative in 1932 than for Hindenburg to have asserted his sovereign powers in order to 
save the state.188 The extraordinary quality of these sovereign powers has its analogue in the 
theological image of the ‘miracle,’ and thus appertains to a political theology.  
  
IV. Political Theology 
 
In the second infamous line of Schmitt’s oeuvre that opens the third chapter of Political 
Theology, Schmitt states, “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts.” In order to not over-determine this phrase, it should be read 
in its full context: 
 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because of their historical development – in 
which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, 
whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent 
lawgiver – but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition 
of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. 
The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.189 
 
The introduction of ‘theology’ into Schmitt’s political considerations begins decisively with a 
qualification that should give the reader pause. At the outset, it is clear that he is participating 
in a version of the secularization thesis, which, having been a student of Max Weber, comes as 
no surprise. Schmitt asserts that these theological concepts are important for their “systematic 
structure” and “sociological consideration,” an example of which was seen in the juridical 
analogy between ‘exception’ and ‘miracle.’ In order to characterize Schmitt’s political 
theology, one needs to assess the quality and extent of this analogy and the transference 
(Umbesetzung) it implies. In other words, the first step in understanding the ‘theology’ in 
‘political theology,’ lies in determining how Schmitt conceives secularizing theological 
concepts. This is not the kind of secularization that is affirmed by modern liberal culture, a 
‘disenchantment’ of the world that leads to an increased rationality in communal life.190 Liberal 
                                                      
188 Infamously, this did not take place and Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler to the chancellery. See George 
Schwab’s introduction in, The Concept of the Political, pg. 13-16. 
189 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 36. 
190 Marcel Gauchet has more recently updated the Weberian thesis, arguing that secularization is a positive 
disenchantment that is intrinsic to the West. See Marcel Gauchet, Oscar Burge (trans.) The Disenchantment of the 
World: A Political History of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  
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culture in fact deprives life of the good under “the tyranny of [economic] values.”191 The 
secularization that is upheld by Schmitt occurs within the realm of the juristic but with a 
theological form and function. To be clear, Schmitt agrees with his teacher about the 
‘demagification’ of the world, but when he speaks of secularized concepts he means that these 
concepts have lost their theological ‘quality,’ which is precisely what needs to be restored.   
 
‘Political theology’ imposes a theoretical field on political concepts as they have developed in 
early-modern history in order to reestablish their hollowed-out meaning. Sovereignty is the 
guiding concept in this regard, because it determines the principle in the functional 
transference of theological and political concepts. As such, the sovereign appears structurally 
the same as the God who performs miracles that break with the natural order. This general 
hypothesis allows Schmitt to claim that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the 
state are secularized theological concepts.” There are four stages in the development of the 
state which demonstrate this structural analogy between God and sovereign. These four stages 
also show that “the metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same 
structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its 
political organization.”192 In the first stage, the sixteenth-century monarchies where 
understood within the context of God as the potentia absoluta. In the second stage, in the 
seventeenth century the State is assigned the role of God in the Cartesian system of 
metaphysics. In the third stage, the eighteenth century sees the State analogously to the deistic 
god in its disengaged machinery which “now runs by itself.” Fourth, and finally, the 
nineteenth century viewed the State immanently, “the theistic as well as the deistic concepts 
of God become thus unintelligible for political metaphysics.”193 Following this trajectory into 
the twentieth century does not imply a simple return to an earlier state of monarchical 
government for Schmitt. He understands that contrary to the counter-revolutionary thinkers 
(Maistre, Bonald and Cortes) with which he sympathizes,194 the introduction of transcendence 
into politics must be democratic (even if this is not the outcome of his political theories in 
general). He recognizes that while his counter-revolutionary exemplars were accurate in their 
critique of bourgeois liberalism, their solution was wrong: “in the face of radical evil the only 
solution is dictatorship, and the legitimist principle of succession becomes at such a moment 
empty dogmatism.”195 
                                                      
191 See Carl Schmitt, Simona Draghici (trans.) The Tyranny of Values (Washington: Plutarch Press, [1967] 1996).  
192 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 46.  
193 Ibid., pp. 46-49. 
194 Ibid., pp. 53-66. 
195 Ibid., pg. 66. 
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Schmitt’s response to Hans Blumenberg’s magisterial work Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (1966)196 
in Political Theology II (1970), adds another layer to what he understands by secularization. 
Blumenberg argued for the independence of modernity as a historical break and thus it has its 
own self legitimizing rationality. Intimating a secularized theology was for him misleading 
and impossible within the context of modernity. Schmitt replies that by ‘political theology’ he 
speaks from a “juridical point of view,” which is not concerned with questions about “diffuse 
metaphysics.” It is rather “the classical case of recasting by means of specific concepts that 
arise within the systematic thought of the two historically most highly developed and highly 
formed structures of ‘Western rationalism,’ namely a recasting between the Catholic Church 
with its entire juridical rationality and the state of the Jus Publicum Europaeum.”197 Schmitt’s 
secularization thesis seems to imply a functional utility of theological concepts for political 
ends. There is a transfer of roles broadly between God and the sovereign, but not a transfer of 
substance — God does not become the sovereign. However, even if God is not the sovereign in 
any substantial sense, the functional analogy does not obfuscate the possibility of a shared 
absoluteness of both political and theological phenomena. It therefore appears that while 
Schmitt claims a juristic point of view, there is more theologically at stake in this ‘recasting.’ 
 
Indeed, the status of Schmitt’s work as merely a juristic ‘recasting’ of theological concepts was 
challenged provocatively by Heinrich Meier, who asserted that Schmitt’s political theology is 
grounded in his “faith in divine revelation.”198 He goes as far as to say that “political theology 
stands and falls with faith in revelation. It presupposes the truth of revelation, which is a truth 
of faith.”199 It is this theological truth that underpins political theology, and which Meier 
argued, distinguishes it from the political philosophy of Schmitt’s student, Leo Strauss.200 With 
some irony, it was Strauss’s comments in Notes on the Concept of the Political which first made 
known the background of faith in Schmitt’s thought,201 even though this is not the path Strauss 
himself would follow.202 According to Strauss, the claim of man’s essential dangerousness is 
                                                      
196 Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966), English translation: Robert M. 
Wallace (trans.) The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985). 
197 Schmitt, Political Theology II, pg. 117. 
198 Heinrich Meier, Marcus Brainard (trans.) The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between 
Political Theology and Political Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [1998] 2011), pg. xi. 
199 Ibid., pg. 66.  
200 Meier had argued that the difference between political philosophy and political theology is what distinguished 
Strauss and Schmitt, respectively. See Heinrich Meier, J. Harvey Lomax (trans.) Carl Schmitt & Leo Strauss: The 
Hidden Dialogue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).    
201 Ibid., pp. 50-52. 
202 Meier writes that in Strauss’s Notes on The Concept of the Political, “Strauss induces Schmitt to give answers that 
make the background of faith, which is omitted by Strauss, emerge all the more clearly.” Ibid., pg. 50. 
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admitted by Schmitt to be a “confession of faith.” But if as Strauss comments, “man’s 
dangerousness is only supposed or believed in, not genuinely known, the opposite, too, can 
be regarded as possible.”203 Schmitt’s grounding of the political is, therefore, dependent on a 
theological scenario wherein human beings are found to be ‘by nature evil’.204 Denying the 
inherent sinfulness of human beings amounts to a denial of order, and thus “the political 
theologian dares to press ahead, up to an Either/Or that demands a decision: for faith or for 
chaos.”205 
 
The dialogue between Strauss and Schmitt, for Meier, ultimately converges on the question of 
how best to live: “political theology and political philosophy are bound together by the critique 
of the self-forgetful obfuscation or of the intentional bracketing of what is most important.”206 
But where political philosophy for Strauss pursues a rational justification for life, the political 
theology promoted by Schmitt is grounded in faith in revelation. Meier’s work on the theology 
of Schmitt is thorough and convincing. Indeed, it is for this reason that The Lesson of Carl 
Schmitt has been said to constitute the “theological turn” in Schmittian studies.207 Despite this, 
questions and debate remain; on the one hand, it seems impossible to determine to what extent 
Schmitt personally held the theological views that Meier commits him to. This is evident in 
numerous contradictory statements that Schmitt made throughout his career. On the other 
hand, whatever his personal convictions, how best to interpret Schmitt’s theology is also an 
ongoing cite of struggle.208 Although it will not be possible to solve these problems here, we 
are still able to foreground aspects of Schmitt’s thinking that are clearly theological in nature 
and which, importantly, offer a lens to interpret his political theology and its long shadow that 
has been cast onto the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries. In this regard, we turn to 
Schmitt’s understanding of history, which is conceived under a particular rendering of 
Christian eschatology. 
 
 
 
                                                      
203 Strauss, “Notes on the Concept of the Political” in The Concept of the Political, pg. 111. 
204 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp. 58-59. 
205 Meier, Carl Schmitt & Leo Strauss, pg. 54. 
206 Heinrich Meier, Marcus Brainard (trans.) Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pg. 84.  
207 See Gavin Rae, “The Theology of Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology” in Political Theology 17. 6 (Nov, 2016), pp. 
555-572. 
208 See Gavin Rae above.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  60 
IV. Schmitt’s Eschatology 
 
One way to approach Schmitt’s concept of history and the eschatology that it implies — which 
is far from systematic or self-evident — is to survey what he considers to be the false 
conceptions of time and meanings of history which undermine the possibility of political 
struggle and conflict (his concept of the political). As already mentioned, Schmitt’s work can 
be described as reactionary. To the extent that he considers the current state of Europe and 
the forces at work which de-politicize and ‘technify’ politics, one could claim on a “metalevel” 
that Schmitt’s entire oeuvre is aimed at defending the political. In defending the political, 
however, we have seen that he gives his own positive theory of politics and sovereignty. The 
same can be said with respect to his conception of time and history. For Schmitt, the meaning 
of history is an important device in giving content to the relation between friend and enemies, 
and since there were contending philosophies of history during his time, he could not leave 
this aspect of his political theology untouched. Though his writings on history and its 
meaning are scattered and often polemical, there are discernible consistencies with some more 
pronounced than others. We first consider briefly three thematic areas of Schmitt’s concept of 
history before turning finally to the enigmatic concept of the katechon, which, it will be argued, 
directly reflects his eschatological vision of decision and order. 
 
The political scientist, Matthias Lievens, has recently thematized four areas of Schmitt’s 
concept of history: 1) against the ideological notion of progress, 2) historical singularity, 3) 
plurality and 4) what he calls the Katechontic.209 Overall, he reads Schmitt sympathetically by 
arguing that a “metapolitical dimension” of the political “can be studied and endorsed even 
though one does not agree with Schmitt’s concrete political stances.”210 Schmitt’s more 
problematic ideas to which these stances refer, like the strong state, are for Lievens a result of 
a “territorialization” of the political, and therefore do not affect Schmitt’s advocacy for the 
political as such. This sympathy will ultimately press Lievens to an unconventional reading 
of Schmitt’s notion of the “katechontic view of history.” For our purposes, we refer to Lievens’ 
investigation of these thematic areas in order to catalogue some of the key moments in 
Schmitt’s thinking of time and history. Lievens’ discussion will also serve as a point of 
reference from which to diverge on his reading of the katechon, where he affirms that “it 
functions in such a way as to keep off the detrimental effects of eschatological ideas on human 
                                                      
209 Matthias Lievens, “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of History” in Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 401-425. 
210 Ibid., pg. 403. 
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political affairs.”211 By contrast, it will be argued that while Schmitt’s notion of the katechon 
may allow the contingency of the decision to respond to the “call of history,” it nonetheless 
remains an instrument to maintain the vision of eschatological enmity. The ‘end of history’ 
that the katechon is supposed to stave off effectively articulates a Christian eschatology of a 
‘politics of presence,’ which calls for the immediacy of the decision in order to maintain order. 
Instead of serving as a polemic against the tendency to ‘theologize history’ or promote the 
detrimental effects of eschatological ideas, as Lievens argues, the katechon in fact instantiates 
this history and eschatology in the present. Lievens writes as a political scientist, and thus 
whether deliberately or unconsciously is unable to give a fuller theological account of Schmitt’s 
use of the katechon. This is perhaps as it should be. However, since we are concerned explicitly 
with the quality and extent of Schmitt’s use of ‘secularized theological concepts,’ we are 
obliged to depart from Lievens’ reading of the katechon to consider its theological implications.      
 
I. Schmitt’s Concept(s) of History 
 
Recalling the discussion about the age of technicity — which Schmitt had criticized as 
depoliticizing — the major historical view he wants to resist is the ideological conception of 
history treated as an inevitable process. Under this symbolization people become products. 
They are discursively produced by intellectual and political elites and thus lose their 
recognized agency in the site of political struggle. Technical progress also inevitably leads to 
a notion of ‘political progress’ that Schmitt detests. Here, in the move toward ‘world politics’ 
and cosmopolitanism political enemies become criminals and not opponents. “The day world 
politics comes to earth,” Schmitt argues, “it will be transformed into a world police power.”212 
Lievens develops Schmitt’s attention to the enemy and ‘the defeated’ (Schmitt had in mind 
defeated Germany after the Treaty of Versailles) alongside some comments about Walter 
Benjamin. He argues that the latter’s dialectic of history and redemptive view of political 
action in the present (in order to rewrite the history of the past) bares strong resonance with 
Schmitt’s consternations about political progress.213 While Lievens takes advantage of this 
perceived proximity to Benjamin to emphasize Schmitt’s “concern for the defeated,” below 
we will see that Benjamin’s philosophy of history is deeply problematizing for the Christian 
eschatological vision upon which Schmitt depends.  
 
                                                      
211 Ibid., pg. 418. 
212 See Carl Schmitt, “The Legal World Revolution” in Telos 72 (1987), pg. 80, quoted in Lievens, “Carl Schmitt’s 
Concept of History,” pg. 407. 
213 Ibid., pp. 404-405.  
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The ideology of political progress that is supposedly realized in cosmopolitan steps like the 
Treaty of Versailles is for Schmitt merely an attempt at repeating history in a manner that is 
not attentive to the way politics is symbolized in the present. By the end of the nineteenth 
century and decisively after World War I, “[t]he early modern Eurocentric order of sovereign 
states (the jus publicum Europaem) had become obsolete.”214 It was no longer enough to revert 
to applications of previous political attempts at peace-making. What was rather needed was 
a reconfiguration of the political order around “the singularity of the historical moment.”215 
While the singularity of a concrete social or political formation does not necessarily mean that 
it is impossible to theorize history (which he enacted around the concept of ‘central domains’), 
it does mean that historical action must be a response to a concrete situation. Neo-Kantian 
deductions in moments of crisis are frivolous because history never unfolds in the same way; 
“my sense of history especially maintains itself by recalling to memory the unrepeatable 
uniqueness of all great historical events.”216 History is composed of events and not repeatable 
automatisms, political generalizations, historical necessity, utopian visions or essentially 
anything that would undermine the symbolization of the political as composed of a more or 
less equal struggle between entities. Drawing attention to the significance of conceiving 
history as a response to the present, Schmitt footnotes in The Concept of the Political that what 
Hegel rightly understood in this regard was “the philosophical truth that all spirit is present 
spirit.”217  
 
Accordingly, this stress of historical singularity leads Lievens to assert that Schmitt endorses 
a “plural and contingent view of history.”218 The latter is well captured in the essay surveyed 
above — ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’ — where a picture emerges not 
of a historical linear progress, but of a series of contingent struggles or conflicts over ‘central 
domains’ of thought. In the context of modernity’s fluid and contingent character, then, 
Schmitt’s response advocates a decisionism: “a genuinely political decision is an intervention 
in this multiplicity of temporalities, which ruptures the continuum of empty time.”219 This 
sovereign intervention is read as an opportunity for a radical disruption of the present 
political order which “opens the door for an entirely different conception of time.”220 
                                                      
214 Ibid., pg. 408. 
215 Ibid.  
216 Ibid. 
217 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pg. 62. 
218 Lievens, “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of History,” pp. 411-414. 
219 Ibid., pp. 415, 414. 
220 Lievens, “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of History,” pg. 414. Lievens draws on Panajotis Kondylis’s Konservativismus: 
Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang (Stuttgar: Klett-Cotta, 1986). There, Kondylis had argued, contrary to accepted 
belief, that conservatism was not a reaction to the French Revolution but had its roots in medieval society. 
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(Ironically, as a figure often associated with the Right, Schmitt’s decisionism on this reading 
is very close to the revolutionary leftism of Alain Badiou, where the transgressive event — the 
sovereign’s decision — ruptures the existing legal order producing a new order and new 
subjects.)221    
 
At this point, however, Lievens’ reading begins to run into problems. He himself admits that 
Schmitt’s reactionary decisionism appears anachronistic given the contemporary spirit of 
depoliticized and technical thinking. He asks, how can Schmitt “in an epoch whose 
metaphysics…is impregnated by a mechanical and technical way of thinking…take a distance 
from it and defend the political?”222 He claims that the need for effective decision seems to 
have ‘posited and ‘imposed’ itself. But this still does not explain the historical meaning from 
which this claim is deployed. Thus, the real answer presumably lies in the use of the 
theological notion of the katechon, in order “to reach the polemic intensity required to 
successfully combat the images of history [Schmitt] opposes.”223   
 
II. The Katechon  
 
The concept of the katechon first appears in biblical literature with two hapaxlegomena occurring 
in the second deutero-Pauline epistle to the Thessalonians: “And now you know what is now 
restraining him [τὸ κατέχον], so that he may be revealed when his time comes. For the mystery 
of lawlessness is already at work, but only until the one who now restrains [ὁ κατέχων] it is 
removed.”224 In the context of the apocalyptic literature, the function of the katechon is to 
constrain the eschatological enthusiasm of the Christian Thessalonian church who are eagerly 
awaiting the return of Christ. The restraint that the katechon enforces is directly related to the 
forces of evil — the evil one — who brings about disorder and lawlessness. God’s historical 
agent, the katechon, not only tempers the eschatological enthusiasm for the parousia of Christ, 
but also by doing so attempts to restore order in the midst of crisis and chaos. The image of 
                                                      
Crucially, he interpreted the counter-revolutionary Right, represented by Schmitt, as a genuine alternative to mass 
democracy, and indeed as a form of resistance. See Paul Gottfried, “Panajotis Kondylis and the obsoleteness of 
conservatism” in Modern Age 39.4 (Fall, 1997), pg. 408  
221 See Alain Badiou, Ray Brassier (trans.) Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). Indeed, it is Schmitt’s decisionism in Badiou’s work that has drawn criticism from others on the left, 
like Simon Critchley who calls this element in Badiou’s thought, the “heroism of the decision.” See Simon Critchley, 
“On the Ethics of Alain Badiou” in Gabriel Riera (ed.) Alain Badiou: Philosophy and Its Conditions (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), pg. 228.  
222 Lievens, “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of History,” pg. 412. 
223 Ibid., pg. 414. 
224 Thess. 2:6-7, New Revised Standard Version. For an accessible commentary on this epistle see Martin J.J. Menken, 
2 Thessalonians (London: Routledge, 1994).  
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the katechon is clearly situated within the context of the metaphysical conflict between the 
forces of good and evil. The period of the eschaton, wherein we wait for the heavenly kingdom 
to be instituted in our temporal reality is marked by evil forces. God, however, appoints the 
katechon to bring about the necessary stability in these last days. Thus, the deeply ambiguous 
figure of the katechon can be viewed both positively and negatively, restraining the forces of 
evil but also holding back the return of Christ. The symbolization of the katechon in Schmitt’s 
thought — in opposition to Lievens who argues that it “represent[s] the future in the present 
in a specific way, namely, as open and profane, while at the same time recalling the dangers 
of its closure”— is shown below not only to legitimize his concept of sovereignty, but also 
becomes the basic structural principle around which the totality of his conception of history 
is to be conceived.  
 
The figure of the katechon is not treated systematically by Schmitt, although it appears 
frequently between 1942 and 1944 and also in the postwar period between 1950 and 1957.225 
This later usage of the katechon is revealing. On the one hand, it begins to explain the defensive 
and apologetic tone of his work after the war,226 and on the other hand by way of this defense, 
evinces the first major reason for its deployment, viz. as a justification or legitimization of the 
sovereign decision: a defense of a concept of the political which would justify the option of 
the total state to prevent chaos and produce order. Nowhere more clearly is this defense and 
desire for order seen in an often-quoted piece of text from Jacob Taubes:  
  
Schmitt’s interest was in only one thing: that the party, that the chaos not 
rise to the top, that the state remain. No matter what the price. This is 
difficult for theologians and philosophers to follow, but as far as the jurist 
is concerned, as long as it is possible to find even one juridical, by 
                                                      
225 Felix Grossheutschi, who has provided a valuable study of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the katechon locates it in 
nine of Schmitt’s texts: ‘Beschleuniger wider Willen’ (1942); Land und Meer (1942); Die Lager der europäischen 
Rechtswissenschaft (1943/44); Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951; Ex Captivitate Salus (1950); ‘Drei Stufen 
historischer Sinngebung’ (1950); Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (1950) and ‘Die 
andere Hegel Linie’ (1957). See Felix Grossheutschi, Carl Schmitt und die Lehre vom Katechon (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humboldt, 1996). Though Schmitt seems to have been the first to re-introduce the term into modernity, it certainly 
has played a power influence in the history of political theology. By way of example, it is usually attributed to 
Tertullian in his Apologeticum (149 A.D.) for the revised role of the Roman Empire. Tertullian had argued that the 
Empire was not to be seen as the Anti-Christ but as the katechon, that force which should restrain lawlessness. 
Tertullian, of course had a pro-Roman agenda, but the effects of this reversal would provide the positive attitude 
toward institutionalized Christianity for the next one and a half millennia. See Eric Osborn, Tertullian: First 
Theologian of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Grossheutschi, Carl Schmitt und die Lehre 
vom Katechon, pg. 25. 
226 See Michael Hoelzl, “Before the Anti-Christ is Revealed: On the Katechontic Structure of Messianic Time” in 
Arthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher (eds.) The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic (London: 
Continuum, 2010), pg. 103. For a comprehensive overview of the debate around Schmitt’s engagement with the 
Nazi party, see Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward’s introduction to Political Theology II, pp. 1-29.  
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whatever hairsplitting ingenuity, this must absolutely be done, for 
otherwise chaos reigns. This is what he calls the katechon: The retainer [der 
Aufhalter] that holds down the chaos that pushes up from below.227 
 
For Schmitt the jurist, no matter the cost, chaos could not rise up (nach oben kommt) to the level 
of the state; the employment of the ‘restrainer’ is necessary, therefore, to suppress (niederhält) 
this chaos. As Michael Hoelzl comments, “The katechon is used here as a political and 
existential category to explain and justify Schmitt’s option for a total state in order to prevent 
the chaos that threatened the Weimar republic.”228 Despite Schmitt having joined the Nazi 
party and not having regretted this decision in the future, Taubes’ interpretation of Schmitt’s 
understanding of the katechon was apparently welcomed by the latter,229 which lends credence 
at least to the fact that it was meant to justify a conception of state — and the decision taken 
by its sovereign — to suppress whatever it saw as the source of evil or chaos.  
 
But more than an apology, the katechon is also the central eschatological principle which gives 
context to Schmitt’s entire concept of history. This is a Christian eschatology of the present 
that makes possible a “positive political theology”230 of a ‘politics of the present.’ In a 
remarkable passage from The Nomos of the Earth (1950) Schmitt confirms the centrality of the 
katechon for his understanding of history:  
  
I do not believe that any historical concept other than katechon would have 
been possible for the original Christian faith. The belief that a restrainer 
holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the 
notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a 
tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire.231  
 
Schmitt here establishes the katechon as both the condition for immanent politics and authentic 
Christian faith. Without the katechon which ‘holds back the end of the world’ (ein Aufhalter das 
                                                      
227 See Jacob Taubes, Dana Hollander (trans.), Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann (eds.) The Political Theology of Paul 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pg. 103. 
228 Hoelzl, “Before the Anti-Christ is Revealed,” pp. 103-104. 
229 Ibid., pg. 104. 
230 See Dirk J. Smit, “‘…on earth as it is in heaven’? On political potentials in theological metaphors” in Harald 
Lesch, Bernd Oberdorfer and Stephanie Waldow (eds.) Der Himmel als transkultureller ethischer Raum (V&R 
Unipress, 2016), pp. 49-76. Smit writes in contrast to the ‘negative political theology’ of Taubes and Walter 
Benjamin, “While Schmitt’s thought is a defence of positive political theology, in which power in the form of the 
state represents religious, theological authority, for Taubes and Benjamin the future (the eschaton, the Messiah, 
redemption) may not be appropriated by worldly powers. Rather, detachment, withdrawal and refusal are 
necessary to invest authority and trust in worldly politics.” Pg. 59, fn. 67.   
231 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, pg. 60. 
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Ende der Welt zurückhält) we enter into a ‘paralysis of all eschatological human effort’ 
(eschatologischen Lähmung alles menschlichen Geschehens)232 and lose the explanatory power of 
the Roman empire and its Christian continuation to maintain itself against the forces of evil 
and disorder. A similar conclusion with respect to history was reached in the posthumously 
published Glossarium: “Ich glaube an den Katechon; er ist für mich die einzige Möglichkeit, 
als Christ Geschichte zu verstehen und sinvoll zu finden.”233 Even though Schmitt was never 
explicit about where the katechon was to be found,234 the places where he does mention it all 
refer to its function as creating or maintaining order. In a profound irony, if read from a 
political and juristic point of view (which is what Schmitt claimed at most he was trying to 
do) the desire for order in the present that elicits a politics and eschatology required to 
maintain it, issues in a performative contradiction in Schmitt’s work. As Steven Ostovich has 
noted, “Schmitt developed his political theology as a criticism of legal positivism and its 
instrumental logic,” but “his concept of the restrainer reintroduces instrumentalism: politics 
is not substantive but a matter of doing whatever is necessary to maintain order.”235 The 
principle of the katechon in Schmitt’s eschatology is therefore about maintaining a political 
order, it is properly a ‘politics of the present.’ It defines “the space between the radically 
spiritual and the purely political. It is the time window, the mean-time, the in-between of the 
first and second coming of the Lord.”236  
 
It is in this sense — the desire for order and the maintenance of peace — that Schmitt’s 
eschatology can also be read through the lens of Walter Benjamin.237 In his Habilitation The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928),238 Benjamin studied the Trauerspiel (mourning play) in 
the German playwrights of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Through his depiction of 
the Baroque, which departed from classic notions of tragedy, Benjamin provides a reading of 
sovereign violence that directly interacts with Carl Schmitt. It is predominantly for this reason 
that he has been rediscovered in the last two decades especially in the fields of political theory, 
political theology and studies of secularism, with sovereignty being central to these theoretical 
                                                      
232 Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1974), 
pg. 29. 
233 Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951 (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1991), pg. 63. 
234 Schmitt speaks of concrete persons, empires, countries, the Church, the Jesuits and political entities. See, The 
Nomos of the Earth, pp. 59-62; Politische Theologie II, pg. 81; Glossarium, pg. 165.  
235 See Steven Ostovich, “Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, and Eschatology” in KronoScope 7 (2007), pg. 65. 
236 Hoelzl, “Before the Anti-Christ is Revealed,” pp. 108. 
237 The ‘exoteric debate’, as Agamben calls it, between Schmitt and Benjamin has been thoroughly investigated. See 
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 52-64; Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s-abilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008) and James Martel, Divine violence: Walter Benjamin and the eschatology of sovereignty (New 
York: Routledge, 2012).  
238 Walter Benjamin, John Osborne (trans.) The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 2003) 
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debates.239 For our purposes, we briefly note the way in which Benjamin characterizes 
Schmitt’s concept of history, which confirms the claim that it is based on an immanent politics 
of presence and order.  
 
According to Benjamin, the Baroque-era dramas frame their understanding of history 
perpetually in terms of a final catastrophe, and it is out of this state of urgency that political 
structures are formed in order to stave off impending doom. He writes with Schmitt in mind, 
“as an antithesis to the historical ideal of restoration it [the baroque] is haunted by the idea of 
catastrophe. And it is in response to this antithesis that the theory of the state of emergency is 
devised.”240 Thus, contrary to Schmitt, who supposedly devised his concept of sovereignty as 
the moment of decision on the exception, Benjamin argues that the sovereign is articulated 
through the task of averting impending eschatological destruction. Benjamin’s claim of the 
way in which the Baroque understands sovereignty — namely, as a political concept that 
emerges in the wake of the erosion of the ‘ideal of restoration’ or salvation history — thus 
situates Schmitt’s eschatology on the horizon of a nostalgia for an ordered and peaceful past. 
If the end and final annihilation of the world is now immanently conceived (as Benjamin 
claims for the baroque dramas), then we must defend its advent by embracing past utopias. 
Accordingly, Benjamin writes, “the baroque knows no eschatology,” that is, it has no hope in 
Christian salvation history. But as Annika Thiem has noted, Benjamin is not unambiguous 
and the idea of history remains uncertain; “This uncertainty is certain only in the sense that 
the catastrophe is certainly coming, but the catastrophic end remains uncertain with respect 
to its time of arrival.”241 For Thiem, the uncertain arrival of the certain catastrophic end creates 
a climate of urgency that the baroque consolidates in an escapist form of hope in a golden 
past. It is in this sense we can understand Schmitt’s desire to reinvigorate anachronistic tropes 
— indeed, what Theim calls the ‘theologial-political ruins’ of sovereignty. 
 
At this point, let us briefly recap the course of this chapter. Taking our cue from Balibar, the 
universalisms of modernity — progress, rationality, knowledge, the priority of the secular — 
cannot simply be discarded but must be disturbed from the inside by ‘tarrying’ with their 
contradictions. After Derrida, this situation raised the possibility of what he called a new 
“Enlightenment to Come,” one that in terms of the role of religion in the twenty-first century 
                                                      
239 See the 2010 issue of Law, Culture and the Humanities 6 (2), with essays from Charles Barbour, James Martel, Jill 
Stauffer, and Oscar Guardiola-Rivera. 
240 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, pg. 66.  
241 See Annika Thiem, “Theological-Political Ruins: Walter Benjamin, Sovereignty, and the Politics of Skeletal 
Eschatology” in Law Critique 24 (2013), pg. 299. 
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would have to be thought otherwise. In the present study, the concept of sovereignty takes 
center stage as the first analytic axis for such a task which conceives the role of religion in 
public life. However, it became clear that sovereignty is a slippery term. From the outset, 
sovereignty revealed itself as a salient yet highly contested concept, evidenced by the 
extremes of those who see it falling into archaic usage on the one hand, and on the other, by 
those who wish to vigorously re-instantiate it. What these ambiguities called for was a 
deconstructive approach that seeks first to expose the transcendental conditions which make 
the discourse on sovereignty possible. Following a historical-contextual analysis of 
democracy’s crisis as the context in which political theology becomes relevant, the chapter 
examined the contribution of Carl Schmitt, who is understood as the predominant point of 
reference with respect to contemporary discourse on sovereignty. Through this analysis, we 
were able to uncover the metaphysical presuppositions that inform Schmitt’s concept of 
politics, and through a reading of the figure of the katechon determine that his politics 
terminates in a ‘politics of presence.’ This analysis has confirmed, therefore, the aims set out 
in the introduction of the chapter, which was to affirm the importance of political theology 
vis-à-vis Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty, but also to draw its limits and thereby open up 
the possibilities for conceiving it otherwise.   
 
V. A Radical Hermeneutics of Sovereignty? 
 
Now in seeking to open avenues into thinking sovereignty and political theology differently, 
we continue the deconstructive approach in this chapter by suggesting a ‘radical hermeneutic 
of sovereignty.’242 This hermeneutic of sovereignty ‘tarries’ with its contradictions and 
ambiguities, and does not merely re-produce its basic structure. On the way to accomplishing 
this task, we enlist Jacques Derrida and his idea of ‘non-identical repetition.’ The theme of 
repetition goes to the heart of Derrida’s work, or rather, it is the performance of repetition which 
is Derrida’s work — that is, repetition with a difference. The vast majority of Derrida’s oeuvre 
enacts this performance. For the sake of this discussion, we need only focus on one of his later 
and particularly well-known texts, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005).243 The use of this text 
is deliberate not only because it clearly evinces the radical hermeneutic of non-identical 
                                                      
242 The reference to a ‘radical hermeneutic’ is deliberated used with John D. Caputo’s Radical Hermeneutics (1987) 
in mind and to which we shall turn in chapter 3.  
243 See pp. 161-162 of Jacques Derrida, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (trans.) Rogues: Two Essays on Reason 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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repetition we are pursuing, but also because it does so explicitly in terms of sovereignty.244 It 
serves, therefore, to foreground a cluster of themes that will be central and which are 
subsumed by the second analytical axis of this study, namely, the event.  
  
In Rogues, Derrida leads a discussion into understanding democracy in the present by 
approaching the question of sovereignty through the concept of the self or ipseity. He writes: 
 
Indeed, it seems difficult to think such a desire for or naming of democratic space 
without the rotary motion of some quasi-circular return or rotation toward the 
self, toward the origin itself, toward and upon the self of the origin, whenever it 
is a question, for example, of sovereign self-determination, of the autonomy of 
the self, of the ipse, namely, of the one-self that gives itself its own law, of 
autofinality, autotely, self-relation as being in view of the self…ipseity in 
general…the power that gives itself its own law, its force of law, its self-
representation.245 
 
Democracy cannot be thought apart from this circular logic, a logic of the self that only makes 
sense in terms of its own self-positing sovereign autonomy. The principle of ipseity, as the 
ultimate force of the self, is the same principle which governs monarchs, states, and 
democracies made up of popular sovereigns. Derrida goes on to say:  
 
Now, democracy would be precisely this, a force (kratos), a force in the form of 
a sovereign authority (sovereign, that is, kurios or kuros, having the power to 
decide, to be decisive, to prevail, to have reason over or win out over [avoir raison 
de] and to give the force of law, kuroō), and thus the power and ipseity of the 
people (dēmos).246 
 
The ipsocentric principle has been passed down in an ‘unavowed political theology’ from 
Plato and Aristotle, “that is at once paternalistic and patriarchal, and thus masculine, in the 
                                                      
244 There are many other of Derrida’s texts that also deal with sovereignty, some more explicitly than others, and 
some of which we will encounter later: see for example, Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation 
of Authority,’” in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 2-67; Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso Press, 1997); 
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International (New York: Routledge, 1994); 
Sovereignties in Question: the Poetics of Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); The Beast and the 
Sovereign (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009).  
245 Derrida, Rogues, pp. 10-11. 
246 Ibid., pg. 13. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  70 
filiation father-son-brother.”247 Once it is subsumed by democracy, however, it puts at risk the 
very concept of democracy itself. Its self-deconstruction (Derrida uses the term 
autoimmunity)248 becomes visible in the very fact that in order to assert the sovereignty of the 
people, the people’s own sovereignty must be usurped by those that are meant to represent 
it. This is the ‘threatening’ and ‘betrayal’ of sovereignty’s force. It is also in this sense that 
Derrida speaks of rogue states: “[a]s soon as there is sovereignty, there is abuse of power and 
a rogue state. Abuse is the law of use; it is the law itself...There are thus only rogue states.”249 
It would seem inevitable “to call into question and to limit a logic of nation state-
sovereignty,”250 but Derrida is cautious here of falling into false binary oppositions. By simply 
negating sovereignty one only repeats its identity (sovereign, ipsocentric, force) in the other 
direction. Wendy Brown comments that “Derrida does not pursue this dissolution of 
Westphalian sovereignty into its opposite,” but rather seeks “instead to recover something of 
sovereignty’s original promise.”251 Derrida’s deconstructive-hermeneutical approach toward 
sovereignty does not assume its demise or that it needs to be challenged without qualification. 
His answer to those like Negri, Hardt and Agamben who want to disqualify sovereignty as a 
necessary good for global justice, and to those like Foucault, Deleuze and Connolly who 
render it “philosophically untenable, historically outmoded [and] empirically false,”252 is to 
say: 
 
It would be imprudent and hasty, in truth hardly reasonable, to oppose 
unconditionally, that is, head-on, a sovereignty that is itself unconditional and 
indivisible. One cannot combat, head-on, sovereignty in general, without 
threatening at the same time, beyond the nation-state figure of sovereignty, the 
classical principles of freedom.253 
 
Derrida seeks not an identical repetition of sovereignty that would completely put into jeopardy 
all the ‘classical principles of freedom,’ but rather a radical hermeneutic that is based on a non-
identical repetition of sovereignty. The latter is motivated and underscored by his famous 
syntagma “democracy to come.” At this point, mis-readings of Derrida abound when 
                                                      
247 Ibid., pg. 17. 
248 Ibid., pg. 100. This is also more fully developed in his famous essay “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 
‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” Samuel Weber (trans.) in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.) 
Religion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-78.   
249 Ibid., pg. 102. 
250 Ibid., pg. 157.  
251 See Wendy Brown, “Sovereign Hesitations” in Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac (eds.) Derrida and the time of 
the political (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), pg. 116. 
252 Ibid., pg. 115. 
253 Derrida, Rogues, pg. 158.  
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‘democracy to come’ is understood within reach of a particular, definite future, a concept of 
time and temporality that Derrida calls a ‘future-present.’ Such a future “is not a course set in 
advance headed toward a telos…a foreseeable, plannable, programmable, anticipatable, 
masterable future.”254 Indeed, when reading the Rogues text with an understanding of time 
and history that interprets the ‘to come’ of democracy as an actual ‘event’ in history, there is 
only a short misstep in assuming that Derrida wants to think of democracy without 
sovereignty in toto. For example, when he begins to talk of “nonsovereignty”255 one is led to 
think that he conceives of a ‘future’ in which democracy no longer has sovereignty at all. But 
as indicated, this is to misunderstand the sense of temporality Derrida is advocating. Rather, 
a ‘democracy to come’ envisions ‘nonsovereignty’ as an ‘absolute future,’ that is, as another 
modality of time conceived as a ‘structural impossibility.’ Derrida’s thought is at once neither 
an affirmation of sovereignty, nor a wholesale rejection of it. It is a ‘hesitation’ as Brown calls 
it, which radically challenges our sense of time and functions as a kind of ‘genealogical 
fiction.’256 This fiction of ‘nonsovereignty’ in a ‘democracy to come’ is the ‘promise’ of 
democracy, the event harbored in the name democracy which is always structurally ‘to come.’  
 
A radical hermeneutic of sovereignty is one which relies on its necessary ‘iterability’ —  a non-
identical repetition. For Derrida, this kind of repetition involves a degree of remainder of its 
‘original’ identity, but also, at the same time, necessarily undergoes an alteration. In Signature 
Event Context (1982) Derrida develops this concept of ‘iterability’ as the condition of writing 
itself:  
 
A written sign…is therefore a mark which remains, which is not exhausted in 
the present of its inscription, which can give rise to an iteration both in the 
absence of and beyond the presence of an empirically determined subject …By 
the same token, a written sign carries with it a force of breaking with its context, 
that is, the set of presences which organize the moment of its inscription. This 
force of breaking is not an accidental predicate, but the very structure of the 
written.257 
 
                                                      
254 John D. Caputo (ed.), Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: Forham 
University Press, 1997), pg. 117.  
255 Derrida, Rogues, pg. 157. 
256 See James Martel, “Can There Be Politics Without Sovereignty? Arendt, Derrida and the Question of Sovereign 
Inevitability” in Law, Culture and the Humanities 6. 2. (2010), pg. 162. 
257 Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.), “Signature Event Context” in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1982), pg. 317. Emphasis added. 
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If we are to read this in terms of the discourse of sovereignty as a ‘democracy to come,’ it 
becomes a discourse that is not ‘exhausted in the present of its inscription’ — it retains marks 
which allow it to give rise to iteration. However, it also harbors a ‘force of breaking’ with its 
context, the possibility of thinking sovereignty otherwise as an alternate “space for 
democracy.”258 What has not been mentioned and which is often criticized by those who are 
skeptical of the language of hesitation is that by clinging to sovereignty we nonetheless remain 
susceptible, not to its promise, but to its betrayal. Indeed, it is the rise of new forms of non-
sovereign actors (who are actually supra-sovereigns) — transnational corporations, global 
terrorism and other exterior state entities — that are able to usurp ‘the people’s’ (demos) 
sovereignty. However, again, this critique is the result of a slippage in readings of Derrida’s 
argument. It is precisely as a result of these growing instantiations of sovereignty in-the-present 
that are the target of a ‘democracy to come.’ At this stage one may proceed to unpack more of 
this theme in relation to other well-known Derridianisms, for example, a ‘religion without 
religion’ or notions of the ‘messianic,’ ‘the gift,’ ‘hospitality,’ or indeed ‘the event.’ One might 
also critically engage in the politics of holding together a tension between sovereignty in the 
present and a ‘democracy to come’ (which may or may not involve sovereignty), as Brown 
and James Martel have done.259 However, while we will return again to Derrida’s treatment 
of sovereignty later in this study, the goal of this chapter has not been to evaluate his rich and 
far-reaching thought in particular. The concern has rather been to use his reflections on 
sovereignty in Rogues to begin to think toward a ‘radical hermeneutic of sovereignty’ that is 
able to tarry with its contradictions. Exploring the religious implications of this radical 
hermeneutic for sovereignty and political theology will be the task of the remaining chapters 
concerning John D. Caputo. 
  
In the introduction to this chapter, we began with the remark that we are treating sovereignty 
as a kind of ‘palimpsest.’ This word comes from the Greek palimpsēstos which means 
“rerubbed” or “rewiped” and refers to ancient manuscripts that were difficult to read because 
of the erasure of text to make room for new text.260 It denotes layered-ness, textual history, 
traces of the past, loss and erasure, and as a part of the very nature of the text. The word is 
also appropriate, therefore, when describing things that have been transformed or are 
transformable, covered and covered over, while at the same time still leaving traces of former 
                                                      
258 See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, pg. 169. 
259 See Wendy Brown, “Sovereign Hesitations,” pp. 114-132, and James R. Martel, Divine Violence: Walter Benjamin 
and the Eschatology of Sovereignty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
260 See Alfred Thomas, Prague Palimpsest: Writing, Memory, and the City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 
pg. 6. 
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layers or markers still visible in the present. In this metaphoric sense, perhaps one of the best 
examples of a palimpsest is the ‘Eternal City’ of Rome. Indeed, there is a famous description 
of the City of Rome in Sigmund Freud’s introduction to Civilization and its Discontents (1930), 
which perfectly captures the palimpsestic nature of its history. Freud tells us that a visitor of 
today will still see amidst the modern buildings the ‘Wall of Aurelian,’ parts of the old Roman 
Quadrata, and in other places only remains of temples and ruins of bygone eras. He concludes 
the passage: “There is certainly not a little that is ancient still buried in the soil of the city or 
beneath its modern buildings. This is the manner in which the past is preserved in historical 
sites like Rome.”261 Freud went on to make his now classic claim that religion can be explained 
in terms of a regression in psychic development. He observed that the nature of ‘religion’ as 
an ‘oceanic feeling’262 was in fact related to the “infant’s helplessness and the longing…for the 
father’s protection.”263 Crucially, this form of consciousness can persist and is still experienced 
in the present as “a shrunken residue of a much more — inclusive — indeed, an all-embracing-
feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world around 
it.”264 We might say here that the palimpsest of sovereignty, as we have seen in this chapter; 
layered, re-worked, rewiped — still contains Freudian residues of an all-embracing past. 
Indeed, this is a past that still wants to be remembered in the present as fullness, wholeness, 
limitless, and eternity. Maybe Freud’s traveler through Rome can’t help but look at the ancient 
ruins and remember the Great Roman Empire. It is these, still very visible remnants of a 
‘sovereignty in ruins,’ 265 which are taken up in the various loci of John D. Caputo’s thought, 
to which we now turn.   
                                                      
261 Sigmund Freud, James Stratchey (trans.) Civilization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1962), pp. 16-17. Emphasis added. 
262 In a famous letter from his friend Romain Rolland, Freud borrowed this coinage to describe the religious as the 
‘oceanic’. See Clayton Crockett, Interstices of the Sublime: Theology and Psychoanalytic Theory (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2007), pg. 20.  
263 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, pg. 19. 
264 Ibid., pg. 15. 
265 The palimpsestuous nature of sovereignty is also captured in the development of the word ‘ruin’ itself. The 
famous Oxford philologist, Owen Barfield, in one of his first published essays traces its history from the Latin ruo, 
denoting ‘fall’ or ‘rush’, following its transposition from French to English through the poetical writings of Chaucer 
and Gower, and finally culminating in Shakespeare, Milton and Wordsworth. It will be the changing nature of 
words and finding ‘their soul’ across many histories that would become Barfield’s life-long task. See Owen 
Barfield, “’Ruin: A Word and a History’” in The Living Age (20 Jan, 1923), pp. 164-169. This is also, incidentally, the 
title of a recent volume of important essays on this subject: See George Edmondson and Klaus Mladek (eds.) 
Sovereignty in Ruins: A Politics of Crisis (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017). 
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Chapter Three 
Overcoming Metaphysics 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we sought to describe sovereignty and political theology through the 
influence of Carl Schmitt. This presentation can be understood as representative of an 
inherited metaphysical and transcendental tradition of sovereignty discourse which continues 
to influence contemporary political-theological thought. Before moving onto the second axis 
of this study, which aims toward an evaluation of Caputo’s ‘weak’ or ‘radical’ theology as a 
possible mode to think beyond this sovereignty in relation to ‘the event,’ we must first step 
back to encounter the ‘early Caputo,’ since it is here in dialogue with Martin Heidegger that 
one begins to initiate a discussion of ‘overcoming’ (überwindung) metaphysics — or the desire 
for political presence à la Carl Schmitt.266  
 
An account of Caputo’s earlier writings as presented in this chapter accomplishes two primary 
purposes, the second following logically from the first. With respect to the latter, it is in his 
earlier works where we find a definitive attempt to think beyond metaphysics. Aided by his 
primary interlocutor, Martin Heidegger, and in particular the “late” Heidegger,267 Caputo’s 
interest in ‘overcoming metaphysics’ begins to bring into sharp relief the analysis of 
sovereignty and political theology carried out in the previous chapter. In the partly discursive 
reading that follows below, the hermeneutic-phenomenology of Heidegger and Caputo’s own 
radical hermeneutical approach challenge the metaphysical and transcendental notions that 
inform modern conceptions of sovereignty. A full and explicit confrontation and its 
                                                      
266 Caputo has argued, however, that the ‘proto-history’ of radical hermeneutics (and thus the overcoming of 
metaphysics) can already be found in Søren Kierkegaard, which Heidegger later ‘fused’ into Being and Time (1927). 
We will encounter this below in John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic 
Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).  
267 The discussion of the ‘early’ and ‘late’ Heidegger invokes an industry of Heidegger scholarship, as scholars 
debate the nature, timing and even veracity of such a distinction. Despite the disagreement and debate, for the 
sake of simplicity here, we follow Caputo’s designation that a shift occurs in Heidegger’s thinking after the 
Marburg period (1923-1928). What takes place before and up to Heidegger’s succession of Edmund Husserl in 
Freiburg (1928) is considered ‘early’ and after is considered ‘late.’ For a very lucid and helpful essay that traces 
Heidegger’s life and relationship to theology in this regard, see John D. Caputo’s “Heidegger and Theology” in 
Charles B. Guignon (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Martin Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 270-288. Caputo identifies the ‘crest’ of the ‘late’ Heidegger in the text Contributions to Philosophy (1936-
8) and the lecture course of 1935, Introduction to Metaphysics. 
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implications for sovereignty as described above, however, will be staged in subsequent 
chapters where the consummation of Caputo’s thought vis-à-vis Jacques Derrida is laid out. 
This first purpose, therefore, sets the parameters of the agenda for thinking beyond 
sovereignty in the mode of Caputo’s earlier readings of metaphysics, steeped as they are in 
the Heideggerian tradition and its confrontation with scholastic Thomism.   
 
Secondly, it will be seen that while the investigation of Caputo’s earlier work on Heidegger 
begins to demonstrate the limitations of modern conceptions of sovereignty in a philosophical 
problematic, it also leads to a critical and just as crucial appraisal of Heidegger himself. The 
critique of Heidegger that Caputo develops in the 1980’s while reading Emmanuel Levinas 
and Jacques Derrida, not only raises the stakes of the project of overcoming metaphysics, but 
also introduces an opening that is fundamental for understanding Caputo’s later theological 
reflections. Indeed, it is this opening, as argued in the present chapter that makes these 
reflections possible by way of what is called a ‘rhythmic impetus.’ As will become clear, this 
impetus that generates Caputo’s reading and subsequent critique of Heidegger is determined 
by a way of reading learned from Heidegger’s own hermeneutical method. This second 
purpose, therefore, serves our evaluation by elucidating the formation and influence of 
Caputo’s theological trajectory, and thereby deepening the understanding of what precisely 
is entailed in overcoming metaphysics and the ‘essence’ of a radical theology which conceives 
sovereignty otherwise.  
 
In light of these opening comments, the structure and content of the chapter are as follows. 
The chapter sets out to distill a ‘double gesture’ in Caputo’s reading of Martin Heidegger. This 
double gesture initially entails the critique of scholastic metaphysics associated with Thomas 
Aquinas and the Thomist schools of thought that was circulating in the 1950’s and 60’s. For 
the purposes of our argument, the first part of the chapter concentrates on Caputo’s second 
publication; Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay On Overcoming Metaphysics (1982). Here Caputo 
attempts to displace the neo-Thomist claim that Aquinas and scholastic metaphysics escape 
Heidegger’s charge of the “oblivion of being” or Seinsvergessenheit.268 Following his analysis, 
the chapter describes how Caputo’s reading of Heidegger displaces the Thomistic 
metaphysics of esse,269 which fails to think the Ereignis or Austrag which opens up the 
distinction between esse and ens. Tracing this critique through Caputo’s reading of the later 
                                                      
268 John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay On Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1982). 
269 In particular, Caputo took up this charge against the readings of the French Thomist Étienne Gilson, see his 
Being and Some Philosophers (1949).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  76 
Heidegger constitutes the first treatment and delimiting gesture of ‘onto-theo-logical’ 
metaphysics, and which crucially is bookmarked as a structural point of reference for his later 
theological reflections.    
 
The significance of Heidegger’s influence on Caputo does not stop here at the Destruktion 
(destruction) of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ however. Rather, as will be argued, the manner 
in which Heidegger reflects and seeks to restore authentic thinking of Being creates an 
opening or opportunity for thought that is appropriated and applied by Caputo in his own 
attempt to salvage an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. In this light, part two moves to 
explore the daring move made in the final chapter of Heidegger and Aquinas, wherein Caputo 
turns to the medieval mystic, Meister Eckhart, to rethink the possibilities of Thomistic 
metaphysics after Heidegger. Here Caputo reinvigorates a certain “mystical element” in 
Heidegger which offers a quite non-Heideggerian and religious way around Thomism. Thus, 
the investigation will reveal a particular conversation or way of reading270 that Caputo learns 
in his dialogues with Heidegger and the scholastics, which is formulated as a re-reading of 
the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. This re-reading as the second gesture is, therefore, 
already evident in the early Caputo before his own ‘Kehre’ to Jacques Derrida. 
 
When it has been made clear with respect to Heidegger and Aquinas that the double gesture 
does not ‘close down’ or ‘end thinking’ but opens up the matter (Sache) for thought in a new 
and productive way, we will be able to turn the analysis to Caputo’s own critique of 
Heidegger carried out in the late 80’s and the early 90’s. For Caputo, it is the Heideggerian 
impulse — the rhythmic impetus — generated by fidelity to the matter of thought (and also for 
historical-biographical reasons) which obliges him to move beyond the discussion with the 
scholastics and to delimit a ‘mythological’ Heidegger in pursuit of a ‘Heidegger 
demythologized.’ Hence, the third part of the chapter will follow Caputo’s re-reading of 
Heidegger that takes shape in his landmark study Radical Hermeneutics (1987)271 and his full-
blown reckoning in Demythologizing Heidegger (1993).272 According to Caputo, the later 
Heidegger became enamored by a mythological construal of Being that abandoned the 
impulse to resist a historical instantiation of Being (the early Greeks) for that which makes 
                                                      
270 This ‘way of reading’ is of course a foreshadowing of Derrida’s “d'une certaine manière,” that is, a movement or 
strategy of deconstruction, which is to emphasize: “the passage beyond philosophy does not consist in turning the 
page of philosophy (which usually amounts to philosophizing badly), but in continuing to read philosophers in a 
certain way [d'une certaine manière].” See Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.) Writing and Difference (London: 
Routledge, 2002), pg. 364, emphasis added. 
271 See John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987). 
272 See John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 
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Being possible as such. This critique is mounted in no small thanks to the developments of 
French continental philosophy; in particular, the thought of Jean-François Lyotard, Emmanuel 
Levinas and most prominently, Jacques Derrida.  
 
Beginning with Radical Hermeneutics, which is nothing short of Caputo’s full philosophical 
statement of what we have been calling the ‘double-gesture’ conceived in terms of a re-
working of hermeneutic phenomenology, we encounter inter-alia, a radical interpretation of 
Being and Time (1927).273 In his reading, Caputo argues that Heidegger was never concerned 
with another account of Being in terms of the ontological distinction between Being and 
beings. Rather, Heidegger’s deep concern was always with that which grants Being — the 
meaning of Being. Following Caputo’s identification of Heidegger’s radical hermeneutic claim 
on what is called the ‘upon-which’ (das Woraufin) — and which is later conceived in other 
terms like Austrag, Es Gibt, and Ereignis — he is able to stage an ‘interplay’ between Heidegger 
and Derrida, where the former is criticized with presenting an ‘onto-hermeneutics’ by the 
latter.   
 
As alluded to, for reasons that are not only related to history and biography (Heidegger’s 
dubious relationship to the Nationalist Socialists) but as a matter of philosophical importance, 
Caputo becomes disillusioned with the later Heidegger and decides to address this onto-
hermeneutics head-on. In the concluding chapters of Radical Hermeneutics one can already see 
Caputo struggling to maintain Heidegger in light of Derrida’s critique. However, if there is 
any uncertainty over his position, Caputo’s reservations are nailed to the door as it were, in 
his final confrontation in Demythologizing Heidegger (1993). In the final part of this chapter, 
then, we consider some of these elements which ultimately cause Caputo to depart from 
Heidegger’s thought — though not without wanting to maintain his best insights — in favor 
of Derrida and the other French continental philosophers. With this last move, the chapter 
will have hoped to accomplish (1) an account of Caputo’s attempt to overcome metaphysics 
(the first gesture) vis-à-vis Heidegger, (2) on this account by virtue of Heidegger’s own 
method, to expose a way of reading (second gesture) that is marked by a re-reading, and (3) 
that this re-reading not only informs a reconstituting of Thomistic metaphysics on the one 
hand, and a ‘demythologizing’ of Heidegger on the other, but motivates his move to Derrida 
who provides the springboard for the remainder of his more explicit theological writing.  
 
                                                      
273 Martin Heidegger, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.) Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
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The encounter between the early Caputo and the later Heidegger, therefore, will set the stage 
for the philosophical questions at stake in thinking about and through sovereignty. We could 
say here, preliminarily, that sovereignty will have moved from a thematization of ‘political 
presence’ (Schmitt) to a ‘mythical-eschatology’ or ‘originary presence’ (Heidegger) and finally 
to the ‘event’ (Derrida, Caputo).  
 
II. Heidegger’s Critique of Scholasticism according to Caputo 
 
Caputo announces that in 1927 “Everything had changed.”274 The preoccupations of the 
young Heidegger had moved from questions of logic and scholastic objectivism to 
phenomenological-existential investigations. Instead of the Being of meaning that occupied his 
early reflections,275 the concern was now the meaning of Being. The latter for the Heidegger of 
Being and Time, could only be determined by an existential analytic which, in Caputo’s words, 
would “work up the implicit understanding of Being embedded in the entirety of Dasein’s 
concrete life.”276 The well-known result of this existential inversion was that the meaning of the 
Being of Dasein and therefore the meaning of Being itself, was to be understood in terms of 
temporality and care. By means of the existential analytic and the temporal analysis that 
followed, Heidegger was able to radically challenge the history of Being and metaphysics as 
it had been presented in the West; the ‘onto-theo-logic’ that elevates presence (Vorhandensein, 
Anwesenheit, Präsenz) and construes true being as a stationary and static ‘now.’  
 
This challenge, while only alluded to in Being and Time, is later taken up more formerly with 
respect to medieval ontology277 in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (The Basic Problems of 
                                                      
274 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 63. 
275 Caputo’s first chapter, “Heidegger’s Beginnings and the Project of a Dialogue with Scholasticism,” which falls 
out of the scope of this study, is a detailed analysis of the young Heidegger before Being and Time. It traces both his 
biographical and philosophical developments, and is in its own right a significant piece of research in Heidegger 
studies. It covers his early relationship and concerns with Medieval scholasticism (in particular his 
Habilitationschrift on Duns Scotus), Neo-Kantianism, Medieval mysticism and South German Catholicism in the 
work of Carl Braig. The reader is referred to it here for additional insight into the early Heidegger. See Heidegger 
and Aquinas, pp. 15-61.  
276 Ibid, pg. 64. 
277 It is worth mentioning that according to Caputo, Heidegger’s critique of scholasticism is not isolated to Thomas 
Aquinas, but is rather scholasticism ‘writ large.’ In Die Grundprobleme he considers Aquinas, Soctus and Suárez, 
and speaks rather of a ‘Thomistic school.’ This is one of the few short-comings of Heidegger’s reading of Thomistic 
metaphysics, and it is this failing that Caputo exploits to read Aquinas in a way that Heidegger’s thought makes 
possible but itself never considers. Ibid., pp. 67-68.  
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Phenomenology, 1928)278 and in the Nietzsche lectures of 1943.279 In the former, both Greek and 
medieval ontology informing scholastic metaphysics essentially fail to think the origins of 
their own concepts, essentia and exstentia. These concepts are forgetful of the horizon in which 
they emerge, which is Dasein itself, the ‘uniquely existing individual,’ to quote Kierkegaard. 
Caputo writes, “Dasein has not existentia, but Existenz…Existenz signifies that which, being 
brought forth, stands outside of its causes.”280 In this way, Dasein was reduced by 
scholasticism to the vocabulary of the ‘present-at-hand’ (Hergestelltheit). It was construed in 
an ontological character of ‘production’ that does not consider the distinct Heideggerian sense 
of the horizon in which Being appears as such. For Caputo, the real radicality of Heidegger’s 
critique of Thomism, however, — which creates a fateful distance between the early Greeks 
and the medieval — is launched in the Nietzsche lectures of 1943, Identity and Difference 
(1957),281 the essay on “Language”282 and On Time and Being (1969).283 Caputo’s reading of this 
later Heidegger will be important on the one hand, for it elicits the central objects of 
metaphysical critique, and on the other hand, because these very texts provide not only the 
hermeneutic method — the way of reading — for Caputo’s re-writing of St. Thomas, but also 
because they harbor Heidegger’s problematic mythological-eschatological tendency. The 
latter is most clearly seen in his discussions of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides,284 
which Caputo later deconstructs in Radical Hermeneutics and Demythologizing Heidegger, 
respectively. We will take up each in turn.  
 
III. “Metaphysics as the History of Being” 
 
Heidegger’s critique of scholasticism as presented by Caputo in the Nietzsche lectures focuses 
on the essay “Metaphysics as the History of Being.”285 The emphasis of Heidegger’s later 
                                                      
278 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975). For the English 
translation see Martin Heidegger, Albert Hofstadter (trans.) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982). 
279 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol.1 and Vol. 2 (Pfullingen: Verlag Günter Neske, 1961). For the English translation 
see Martin Heidegger, David Farrell Krell (trans.) Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art (New York: Harper & Row, 
1979), Martin Heidegger, Joan Stambaugh (trans.) The End of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).  
280 Ibid, pg. 78.  
281 Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Verlag Günter Neske, 1957). For the English translation 
see Martin Heidegger, Joan Stambaugh (trans.) Identity and Difference (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969). 
282 Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965). For the English translation see Martin 
Heidegger, Albert Hofstadter (trans.) “Language” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 
pp. 185-208. 
283 Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkes (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969). For the English translation see Martin 
Heidegger, Joan Stambaugh (trans.) On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) 
284 Martin Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximander (1946)” in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963), Martin 
Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze 3rd edition (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1967). All the relevant chapters are found 
in the English translation by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western 
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 
285 Heidegger, Stambaugh (trans.), The End of Philosophy, pp. 1-19.  
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position has now taken on a Being-historical shape. Here, the historical nature of Being is 
determined by Being’s own withdrawal and therefore “What comes to presence in 
metaphysics, is a sequence of formations of Being, epochal shapes of Being in which we 
experience, not Being itself, but the ‘Beingness’ (Seiendheit) of beings.”286 Whatever 
metaphysical formations of Being we may experience — will, mind, spirit, etc — these 
progressive ‘histories of metaphysics’ are made possible not by our own reflections about 
reality, but by Beings own historical concealment of its truth. In the present, for example, the 
latest manifestation of metaphysics according to Heidegger is “actuality,” which is translated 
from Latin into German with “Wirklichkeit,” and as such denotes working, production and 
causality. The important development in Heidegger’s thought at this stage, is that the 
prescription of the essence of metaphysics in the distinction between ‘thatness’ (existentia) and 
‘whatness’ (essentia) is no longer traced to Dasein’s projective understanding of Being, but to 
the self-disclosure of Being in the early Greeks. We will discuss this in more detail below, but 
in short, the early Greeks (here still Plato and Aristotle) had a primordial experience of Being 
as pure presencing. For the Heidegger of the Nietzsche lectures, the sense of ενεργεια (work) in 
Aristotle, still retains what Caputo will call its ‘alethiological’ character, that is, its verbal-
sense before it contracts into the permanent presence of ουσια.   
 
As just mentioned, the medieval scholastic phase of Heidegger’s interpretation of the history 
of metaphysics involves the fateful translation of ενεργεια into actualis, where the Greek sense 
of primordial presencing is almost totally covered over. Being as actualis is that which is actual, 
what has been made, and therefore stands outside of its causes. It has the same connotation 
with ex-sistere, literally ‘stepping outside.’ Heidegger traces this manifestation of Being 
persisting in the modern period to the language of the Roman Empire. Caputo writes: 
 
The medieval Christian conception of Being in terms of making and what 
is made is articulated in a language which belongs to the people of making 
and doing. The ‘Roman Church’ is not just an historical appellation. It 
points to an inner harmony between Christian metaphysics and the 
metaphysics of making, which come together in the conception of Being 
as Wirklichkeit. Our tradition then is more Roman than Greek.287  
 
                                                      
286 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 81.  
287 Ibid., pg. 89.  
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With this comment, Caputo makes clear how he understands the continuity between 
scholastic thought and the (Roman) Christian tradition. Both are tied, according to Heidegger, 
to a rendering of reality that emphasizes actuality through the central feature of the principle 
of causality. Being is that which brings into permanence or into actuality and since nothing 
can bring God into presence, he is himself pure-presence, permanence itself. But, as Caputo 
writes, “this self-persisting being (für sich Bestehendes) is the summum ens [supreme being] and 
as such the summum bonum [supreme good], which makes Him the cause of causes.”288 The 
God of scholasticism for Heidegger and Caputo is a figure with causal meaning; it is a God 
who effects and as the ultimate Being it effectuates being. This Roman and later medieval 
scholastic legacy of metaphysics and the God that embodies it is always in the background of 
Caputo’s theological project, for example, he writes in Weakness of God (2006): “Suppose we 
imagine God, not as a prime mover unmoved, but as removed from the order of the cosmic 
movements of cosmological explanation, removed from the onto-causal order altogether, 
from being, presence, power, and causality?”289  
 
Before turning to Caputo’s reading of Identity and Difference, we must pause here to briefly 
highlight this ‘being-historical’ significance, which will be developed in what is labelled below 
as Heidegger’s ‘mythical-eschatology.’ Caputo draws us to two significant re-workings of 
Heidegger’s earlier position in the Grundprobleme of 1928 which appear in the Nietzsche 
lectures of 1941. Both point to a conception of history that is profoundly mythological and 
which desires an eschaton to inaugurate ‘the new.’ The first, as can be detected in our 
discussion above, is the sharpness of the scholastic critique that seems to outweigh that of the 
Greeks. Indeed, in the Nietzsche lectures Heidegger now sees a greater distance between the 
Greeks and the scholastics. The Greeks (Aristotle and Plato) are closer to a primordial 
experience of Being than the scholastics, they are the “great origin” of the West.290 Whereas 
before the scholastics were a continuation of this tradition, they are now seen as the distorters 
of it.291 There is, therefore, in 1941 an abyss starting to open up between these dispensations 
of Being.  
 
This historical sensitivity leads into the next significant re-working in the Nietzsche lectures, 
namely, the very nature of the history of metaphysics itself. In the Grundprobleme the 
conception of scholastic metaphysics was largely transcendental. The scholastic 
                                                      
288 Ibid., pg. 90.  
289 John D. Caputo, Weakness of God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pg. 36. 
290 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 93.  
291 Ibid., pg. 92. 
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understanding of Being was taken from Dasein’s projection of Being in terms of a certain 
hermeneutical horizon, and it was the categories of this horizon — essentia and existentia — 
which were too ‘narrow’ and thus unable to account for the Being of Dasein, viz. they lacked 
“an appreciation of the Being of Existenz.”292 Essentia and existentia have only a limited validity 
in the early Heidegger, but in 1941 they become a part of a history of Being that masks and 
covers over a more ‘original’ emergence and primordial experience in the early Greeks.293 In 
short, this covering over is a ‘forgetfulness’ of that which grants Being, it is an inauguration 
of Seinsvergessenheit. The accent will be placed no longer on the phenomenological in terms of 
a transcendental hermeneutic, but rather on the ‘history of Being’ as a movement of 
concealment and un-concealement (the a-lethic quality), which constitutes a ‘Destruktion’ of 
the history of ontology. As we will see, this will start to negatively crystalize in an 
eschatological desire for an originary experience of Being. It is into the fabric of this history 
that Caputo situates his most important insights of Heidegger, those that will terminate in the 
critique of scholasticism and begin the Caputoian critique of Heidegger. In order to address 
the emerging limitations that Caputo announces in the 1980s, we must first take up the further 
development of Heidegger’s critique which gives rise to it.  
 
IV. Identity and Difference  
 
Moving to the radical elements of Heidegger’s critique in Identity and Difference requires two 
preparatory steps that frame Caputo’s entire discussion; the first in relation to his presentation 
of the French Thomist, Ètienne Gilson and the second to his reading of Aquinas himself. As 
mentioned above, a part of Caputo’s motivation for Heidegger and Aquinas was to address an 
interpretation of Aquinas which, if accurate, would allow greater resonance between 
Heidegger and Aquinas and their respective conceptions of Being. The major work which 
created this possibility was Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers (1949).294 As a medieval 
historian, Gilson’s book was an attempt to distinguish between Thomism and scholasticism 
historically – “by a concrete hermeneutic of the history of Western metaphysics”295 — where 
                                                      
292 Ibid., pg. 94.  
293 While Heidegger is here, according to Caputo, dismissing the possibility of a Transcendental Thomism, or rather 
that Thomism is ‘naïve’ of the need to establish the question of Being from a transcendental standpoint, Caputo 
does note the scholarship that has tried to take up this challenge. For example, Joseph Maréchal’s Le point de depart 
de la métaphysique (1922-47), Karl Rahner “The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger” in Philosophy Today 
(1969), Johannes Baptist Lotz, Martin Heidegger and Thomas Aquinas (1975) and Emerich Coreth’s Metaphysics (1968). 
For Heidegger, however, it seems his critique has simply ‘moved on.’ He is now more concerned with scholasticism 
as a ‘species of Seinsvergessenheit.’ See, Ibid., pg. 95.  
294 Ètienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952).  
295 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 100. 
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scholasticism is taken pejoratively. For Gilson, there is a genuine “existential metaphysics” of 
Being in Aquinas that moves beyond being to Being, where Being is taken in its pure-act of 
Being (esse). Being draws non-being into Being, it is a being “in virtue of a rising up and 
emerging into Being which is the very act of Be-ing.”296 Such a conception of Being, for Gilson, 
is far removed accordingly, to the “essentialism” of much of contemporary Thomism that 
forecloses this existential act by turning it into a ‘whatness’ or an ‘essence.’  On this account, 
it would appear that Heidegger’s charge of Seinsvergessenheit is ill-conceived with respect to 
Aquinas’s thought, since Being is not taken for granted but thought in-itself.  
 
After generously staging Gilson’s interpretation of Aquinas,297 Caputo still asks whether 
Aquinas, despite giving special priority to the metaphysics of esse over ens — that is, an 
“existential” metaphysics as opposed to an “essentialist” one — is not simply conducting an 
inversion which takes place within metaphysics, and which does not truly take the 
Heideggerian ‘step-back.’ To test this, Caputo goes on to present his own reading of Aquinas’s 
metaphysics of esse.298 Through a delineation of Aquinas’s understanding of the metaphysics 
of participation, Caputo follows Gilson’s lead by outlining the primacy of esse over ens and 
demonstrates Aquinas’s deep awareness of the Heideggerian ontological distinction despite 
having been thought in Latinized terms which might suggest otherwise (actus and potentia). 
However, even if Aquinas language of esse — as esse subsistens in which the being, esse 
participata, participates —  does not accord, as is quite clearly evident with Heidegger’s sense 
of Being (Sein), where Being cannot ever emerge without beings, the question is still raised as 
to whether Aquinas ever thought what ‘gives’ this distinction. It is to this question that Caputo 
leads into Heidegger’s Identity and Difference, a crucial step in the displacement of the claim 
that Aquinas avoids a historical ‘naiveté’ in the history of Being.  
 
One of the most important themes in the later Heidegger which emerges in Identity and 
Difference, as the title suggests, is the notion of ‘dif-ference’ or Austrag.299 Austrag names a 
depth dimension to the history of the ontological difference. While this history consistently 
moves about and ‘thinks’ in the distinction (Being-being, Esse-ens), what is not ‘thought’ is the 
‘unthought thought’ of the difference which makes this distinction possible. The ‘naiveté’ of 
                                                      
296 Ibid., pp.115-116. 
297 See chapter three, “Gilson’s critique of metaphysics” in Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 100-121. 
298 See chapter four, “Esse and the Metaphysics of Participation in Thomas Aquinas” in Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 
122-146. 
299 Below we will continue to refer to Austrag in the original German as it retains the verbal sense of ‘austragen’ to 
literally ‘carry away from.’ It is the literal translation of the Latin ‘dif-ferre’ and ‘dif-ferens.’ See Caputo, Heidegger 
and Aquinas, pg. 151.  
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Aquinas was to have moved within the distinction and not to have attained its origin — “the 
‘essence’ (Wesen) of metaphysics in the verbal sense of its originative rising up.”300  
  
How does one attain this origin? What does it mean to take the ‘step back’ from Being and 
beings and from difference ‘to face’ (das Gegenüber) difference? Heidegger says that in this 
‘step back’ we can say, “the Being of beings means Being which is being”301 (Sein des Seinden 
heißt: Sein, welches das Seiende ist).302 Being as the genitive of the difference ‘being’, passes over 
to beings — it is in a ‘transition’ (übergehend). As Caputo describes, “Being gives itself over to 
being, comes to pass in and as beings, discloses itself, reveals itself, ‘unconceals’ itself in 
being.”303 But just as Being ‘is’ the process of “coming-over” (Überkommnis) to beings, beings 
are not pre-existing waiting for Being, they emerge in this coming over, they “arrive” (an-
kunft) in Being’s un-concealment of itself. Caputo commentates further, “[a]nd just as the 
coming-over of Being is the revelation of beings, so the arrival of beings is the concealment of 
Being.”304 This dynamism it but a single process that Heidegger calls the Unter-Schied, the 
‘differentiation’ between Being and beings. In this differentiating — the “coming-over” of 
Being and the concomitant “arrival” of beings — the two are held together and at the same 
time kept apart, which in German reads “auseinander-zueinander getragen.”305 The latter is what 
Heidegger refers to when he uses the word Austrag. Austrag, therefore, names the dif-ference 
in the difference between Being and beings, and as such moves the ontological difference to a 
depth dimension that Thomism simply doesn’t conceive. In the reading of Aquinas that sees 
a genuine metaphysics of esse (Gilson), metaphysics still operates at the level of the Differenz 
between Being and beings, and does not think that which provides the distinction opening up 
the nature of the difference.    
 
Important to ‘overcoming metaphysics,’ deconstructing it, and moving ‘beyond’ it in Caputo’s 
thought, is also to recognize the context of Heidegger’s text, namely, his discussion with 
reference to Hegel’s Science of Logic (1816). Part of Heidegger’s task in this text is to highlight 
the “Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics” in Hegel. Without being able to fully 
explore Heidegger’s argument, we can say precipitously that Heidegger reads the Being 
which is given over by the difference in Hegel’s Logic as a “ground.” Being comes over as 
                                                      
300 Ibid., pg. 150.  
301 Heidegger, Stambaugh (trans.), Identity and Difference, pg. 64. 
302 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe: I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1910-1976, Band 11: Identität und Differenz 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2006), pp. 70-71. 
303 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 151. 
304 Ibid.  
305 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Identität und Differenz, pg. 71. 
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ground to beings who, consequently, arrive as the “grounded.” On the one hand, the onto-
logical nature of metaphysics arises and is constituted because beings are thought with 
reference to Being as ground, and on the other, the theo-logical nature arises when 
metaphysics thinks being as a whole, that is, in reference to a highest being.306 It is not difficult 
to see how God enters metaphysics on these terms, namely, as the ground which grounds the 
grounded. The reference to the principle of causality is unmistakable here and is, therefore, 
just as applicable to Aquinas’s esse subsistens and esse participatum. It effectively mirrors 
Heidegger’s framing of Hegel.307 
 
Before moving to Caputo’s reading of Heidegger’s essay on “Language,” a remark is worth 
noting which expresses the implications of this critique of scholasticism for Caputo’s 
treatment of metaphysics in general and for his later theological project in particular. It serves 
a certain foreshadowing and at the same time lends credence to the profound influence of the 
later Heidegger for the early Caputo. In an oft quoted piece of text from Identity and Difference 
to which Caputo briefly alludes,308 Heidegger writes: 
 
the cause as causa sui. This is the right name for the god of philosophy. 
Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa sui, man 
can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before 
this god. The god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god 
as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God. Here this means only: 
god-less thinking is more open to Him than onto-theo-logic would like to 
admit.309 
 
What we see here in Heidegger, though it is something he will not pursue, is precisely the 
opening-up of thought about God that does not end with the ‘death of God.’ The end of the 
“god of philosophy” does not end talk about God, but indeed, may open us up to a thinking 
that is ‘closer to the divine God.’310 This is the essential task of Caputo’s later theology; to 
                                                      
306 Ibid. 
307 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 155, 157. 
308 Ibid., pg. 153. 
309 Heidegger, Stambaugh (trans.) Identity and Difference, pg. 72. Emphasis added. 
310 See also Johann-Albrecht Meylahn, ‘Beyond categories, proper names, types and norms toward a fragile 
openness (Offen-barkeit) of différance, but always from within the text,’ HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 
68:1 (2012), where he writes that Heidegger’s later critique “wounds metaphysical God-talk,” but that “Heidegger 
never believed this to be the end of God-talk, but the possibility of beginning - a beginning for a God-talk 
(metaphysics) that is fully aware of (awakened to) its limitations.” Pg. 2. See also Johann-Albrecht Meylahn, The 
limits and possibilities of post-metaphysical God-talk: A conversation between Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida, Studies in 
Philosophical Theology 52 (Leuven: Peeters, 2013).  
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respond to the ‘death’ of the onto-theological god of metaphysics by conceiving God not as a 
cause but as an event. It is this implicit move in Heidegger’s thought with respect to God that 
imprints profoundly on Caputo’s writing both here in Heidegger and Aquinas and throughout 
his corpus. We will come to describe it below as the ‘double-gesture’, ‘way of reading’ or in 
Heidegger’s terms the ‘step-back.’  
 
V. “Language” 
 
Of central importance to the critique of scholasticism has to do with the ‘linguistic character’ 
of the Austrag. Caputo writes in this vein that “the dif-fering in the difference which belongs 
to all metaphysics, including the metaphysics of St. Thomas, is an essentially linguistic 
event.”311 Pointing to another late-Heidegger text simply titled, “Language,”312 Caputo draws 
attention to the terms of scholasticism which are themselves confounded by the Latin language 
in which they appear. Heidegger’s critique now extends not only to metaphysical descriptions 
of Being, but more broadly to the Western tradition of language writ-large. Unlike traditional 
conceptions which determine meaning as an interiority and then simply communicated by 
means of language, Heidegger’s theory of language gives primacy to language itself, that is, to 
quote a famous phrase from The Letter on Humanism (1946): “Language is the house of being. 
In its home human beings dwell.”313 Meaning arises in and from language. Language is, 
therefore, not something we ‘do’ in the sense of simply communicating meaning, but rather 
something that happens to us in response to Being and which manifests itself in human speech.  
 
In relation to the discussion above about the Austrag or dif-ference, this ‘manifestative’ 
character of language needs to be further explored. If language for Heidegger is not about 
human speech but about that which gives rise to human speech, we can also say that it is that 
which brings into presence, “it does not represent beings but lets them emerge into presence.”314 
In this particular essay, what emerges into presence is read in terms of the distinction between 
“things” (sky, ground, moral, divine) and “world,” which taken together make up Heidegger’s 
famous notion of the “fourfold” (Geviert). The naming of these various elements in the poem 
by Georg Trakl — “A Winter Evening” — constitutes one and the same time “the way in which 
                                                      
311 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 158. 
312 Ibid., pp. 157-167. See Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965). English translation: 
Martin Heidegger, Albert Hofstadter (trans.) “Language” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2001), pp. 185-208.  
313 Martin Heidegger, “Brief über den Humanismus” in Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Vitorrio Klostermann GmbH, 1967). 
English translation: Martin Heidegger, William McNeil (ed.) “Letter on Humanism” in Pathmarks (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pg. 239.   
314 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 159. 
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things give birth to the world and the way in which the world makes it possible for things to 
be things.”315 This character of language in the poem, therefore, is structurally parallel to the 
Austrag: it is the holding together-apart (auseinander-zueinander tragen), the ‘coming over’ and 
the ‘arrival’ of Being (world) and beings (things). The poetic speech as Austrag is the dif-ference 
which gives rise to the difference. Or put another way, the dif-ference/Austrag requires the 
linguistic character of the poetic speech to bring the world into being. Crucially, the poetic 
speech does not strictly ‘say’ anything, it rather silently calls world and thing into the 
difference which is what they are in their presence as human language.  
 
Language for Heidegger summons/calls human speech as a pre-linguistic or originary 
linguistic event. It is linguistic not in the sense that it “happens in language but in the sense 
that it is the happening of language.”316 This pre-linguistic essence of language (dif-
ference/Austrag) structures and gives shape to the various epochs of language formation, 
whether Greek, Latin or German. What this means for Aquinas’s metaphysics of esse is simply 
that it is contained by its Latin language. It remains totally oblivious to the call of language to 
which it is a response. For Heidegger and Caputo, Aquinas the medieval grammarian, “takes 
the form of meaning which he articulates to be an eternal structure which itself reflects the 
eternal truths of metaphysics. He is oblivious of the historical character of all linguistic 
formation.”317  
 
VI. The ‘Ereignis’ in “Time and Being” 
 
One of the salient (fateful) shifts in Heidegger’s later writing is his move from the temporality 
of Dasein in Being and Time to the historical relation between Dasein and being; from “being 
and time” to “being and history.” At the end of Being and Time Heidegger implicitly states that 
the temporality of Dasein is perhaps the horizon of Being.318 This sets into motion the critique 
that Being is not the ground or cause of time. Thus, in the later Heidegger we see an increasing 
move to ‘overcome’, go ‘beyond’ or ‘step-back’ out from the metaphysics of Being, as well as 
from his own fundamental ontology of Being that he was seeking in Being and Time. In “Time 
and Being”, therefore, as Joan Stambaugh writes in the introduction to her translation of this 
essay, “Heidegger is groping his way out of metaphysics.”319 The galvanizing ‘concept’ around 
                                                      
315 Ibid., pg. 160. 
316 Ibid., pg. 161-162. 
317 Ibid., pg. 166. 
318 Martin Heidegger, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.) Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pg. 
488. 
319 Heidegger, On Time and Being, pg. x. 
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which this takes place, and which Caputo calls “The Archimedean point of every fundamental 
Heideggerian theme,”320 is the word Ereignis. Following the analysis of Caputo’s reading of 
Ereignis below, we will be in a position to see, first, the consummation of the critique of 
Thomistic scholasticism and secondly, the historical relation between being and history that is 
conceived in an ever increasing eschatological-mythological constellation.  
 
Heidegger begins his lecture by describing a constancy in the relationship between Being and 
time, namely, presence or presencing (Anwesen). Being in Western thought has always meant 
what ‘is’, what is present (Gegenwart) in time. The character of Being is determined by time. 
On the other hand, time is always passing away and does so constantly. Time constantly 
remains passing away. Therefore, “[t]o remain means: not to disappear, thus, to presence. 
Thus, time is determined by a kind of Being.”321 Being in terms of time and time in terms of 
Being are, as such, reciprocally determined, yet cannot be addressed by one another. Being is 
not a thing in time and therefore not temporal, and nor is time a being. In these “contradictory 
statements,” Heidegger is intent not on dialectical sublimation which unites in a higher truth, 
but rather in changing the accent of the middle term “presence” to “letting-presence” 
(Anwesenlassen). By this he means to think Being and time in terms of that which gives Being 
and time — ‘letting’ them be. He wants to think behind Being and time to the ‘It’ which ‘gives’.   
 
The sense of ‘granting’ (Geben) presence or ‘letting’ presence should not be understood, Caputo 
reminds, as a kind of ‘making’ or causality that we have seen above with respect to 
scholasticism. Indeed, “in Aquinas Being is not thought as un-concealing, the bestowal of 
presence, but — unlike in Heidegger — in terms of giving actuality, effecting actual status.”322 
The history of metaphysics is the history of the un-concealing of Being by virtue of the “It” 
which ‘sends’ (Schicken) or gives Being even as it, itself, is self-concealing.323 This history of 
metaphysics as an apportioned sense of Being in each historical epoch, has been traced by 
                                                      
320 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 167. The concept of Ereignis is notoriously difficult and as Daniela Vallega-
Neu writes, “the writings in which he [Heidegger] actually develops this concept were not meant for ‘the public 
ear’; they were texts written without didactic considerations in an attempt at an originary (poietic) language, a 
language one may call ‘experimental’ or ‘esoteric’ (in the literal sense)”. See Daniela Vallega-Neu, “Ereignis: the 
event of appropriation” in Bret W. Davis (ed.) Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts (Durham: Acumen, 2010), pg. 140, 
and pp.140-154 where Vallega-Neu traces the complete development of the concept that takes on various 
emphases. For other helpful explications see Daniel O. Dahlstrom, The Heidegger Dictionary (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), pp. 17-19, and J.L. Metha, Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 
1976), pp. 430-444. 
321 Heidegger, On Time and Being, pg. 3. 
322 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 169.  
323 “A giving which gives only its gifts, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws, such a giving we will 
call sending. According to the meaning of giving which is to be though in this way, Being – that which It gives – is 
what is sent.” Heidegger, On Time and Being, pg. 8.  
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Heidegger from the doctrine of ουσια in Plato and Aristotle, to actus in Aquinas, res cogitans in 
the Enlightenment, the will to power in Nietzsche and in the most extreme concealment in 
modern times the “stuff to be calculated and manipulated.”324  
 
If the “It” which gives Being clearly evinces a historical sending, then the question becomes: is 
it time which gives Being? Or to put it another way, what is time “in its peculiarity in the light 
of what was said about Being,” Being as presencing and ‘letting-be-present’?325 If we think 
about presence and what is present, Heidegger says, we think at the same time about the past 
and the future in relation to a now. This is the standard way in which we conceive time. 
However, if time were thought of in terms of presencing as opposed to a succession of ‘nows,’ 
it would need to be related to the way in which presence ‘approaches’ or is extended to the 
human being. There are three ways that this takes place according to Heidegger. First, presence 
is extended to us in the present. But, secondly, presence is also encountered outside of the 
present in the presence of the absence of the ‘having-been’ and, thirdly, the presence of the 
absence of the ‘not-yet.’ “The present then is not the now but the space which has been opened 
up between the having-been and the future; it is rife with the presence of what has been and 
is coming toward us.”326 In this threefold extending of presence, as a conception of time, an 
opening (Offene) is cleared (sich lichten) for presence, and it is this “mutual interplay” which 
Heidegger calls “the near.” The near holds these dimensions together while at the same time 
keeps them apart. It is, therefore, the near which gives time “for it holds the time-space open 
by preserving what is refused in the having-been and by preserving what is withheld in the 
arrival of the future.”327 What is concluded at this point in the lecture, then, is that both being 
and time ‘are’ not, they are given.  
 
The source of the giving of Being as presence and of the giving of time as the temporal opening 
is now called the Ereignis. Ereignis, as Daniela Vallega-Neu notes, in German usually means 
‘event’, but Heidegger is experimenting more with its semantic possibilities. The prefix er- 
“carries the sense of a beginning or of an achievement” and –eignis which comes from eigen, 
means “own.” There is also the sense of eigentlich translating the words “proper” or 
“authentic.” Given these semantic nuances the word is either left untranslated or most 
frequently rendered, “enowning,” “appropriation” or “the event of appropriation.”328 But 
                                                      
324 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 170. 
325 Heidegger, On Time and Being, pp. 10-12. 
326 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 171. 
327 Ibid., pg. 171. 
328 Daniela Vallega-Neu, “Ereignis: the event of appropriation” in Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts, pp. 140-41. 
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what is the Ereignis? The ereignis is strictly not a thing at all, not given as a proposition but as 
a dedication of Time and Being delivered into their own natures but also held together 
delivered over to each other. Caputo’s explication of Ereignis draws on the Indian philosopher 
Jarava Metha, who writes:  
 
In both these ways of granting, sending forth and extending, there is 
evident a dedicating, an entrusting – of Being as presence and of Time as 
the realm of the open – of each to the other in what is their very own. What 
thus determines both Time and Being, in their very own, that is, in their 
mutual belongingness, is the Ereignis. That which lets both matters 
(Sachen, Being and Time) belong together, which not only brings them into 
their own inmost nature but preserves and holds them in their 
togetherness, is the Ereignis, the relationship of the holding together of 
these two.329  
 
Caputo ends his discussion of “Time and Being” by once again returning to the historical 
character of the Ereignis and its bearing on the thought of Aquinas. For Caputo, it is clear that 
Aquinas does not make the “historical reduction” which thinks the tradition as a tradition. 
Instead, as a medieval thinker, he is caught in the history of the tradition delivered over to him 
by Ereignis. But it is not simply the ahistorical nature of metaphysics in scholasticism that is at 
issue, for even Hegel’s sense of history is metaphysical. What is at stake in these conceptions 
of history is the ability to see “that all metaphysical thought arises from a withdrawal, that 
every account of ‘Being’ has a deeper source.”330 In this way, the character of the 
Seinsvergessenheit becomes clearer. The ‘oblivion of Being’ is not the forgetfulness of Being, but 
the oblivion and forgetfulness of the dif-ference/Austrag/Ereignis that bestows and constitutes 
the history of metaphysics.  
 
To awaken to the oblivion of the dif-ference/Austrag/Ereignis would not mean to be 
unaffected by the withdrawal in each historical epoch, but precisely to preserve the oblivion: 
“this awakening, not an extinguishing of the oblivion of Being, but placing oneself in it and 
the standing within it. Thus, the awakening from the oblivion of Being to the oblivion of Being 
is the awakening into Appropriation [Ereignis].”331 To be awakened to the Ereignis is to be 
aware of the ineradicable withdrawal which belongs to its very structure. This kind of 
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historical sensitivity — the reduction, which sees the metaphysical giving of an epoch as a 
result of a withdrawal — is not thought in Aquinas. The best we can hope for in Aquinas, 
Caputo declares, is that perhaps there is a proximity to a primordial and pristine experience 
of presencing in the metaphysics of esse that is related to the way Being was granted to the 
Early Greeks before it congealed into steadfast actuality.332 
 
III. The Mystical Element in Thomas Aquinas 
 
In the encounter with Heidegger’s critique of scholasticism as portrayed by Caputo, we have 
attempted to sketch the character of the first gesture in Caputo’s reading of Martin Heidegger. 
In dialogue with Aquinas, this gesture is portrayed with increasing skepticism toward the 
tenants of ‘onto-theo-logic’ on display not only in Aquinas but also in the history of the 
Western philosophical tradition. In particular, we have seen the way in which Being as 
‘presencing’ experienced by the early Greeks is congealed into actualis in scholastic 
metaphysics, obscuring the origin of a primordial experience and thus inaugurating 
Seinsvergessenheit. In addition, we also saw in the discussion of the Austrag or dif-ference that 
the metaphysical distinction between Being and beings fails to think the dif-ference which 
gives rise to it. In the context of Heidegger’s discussion with Hegel, this led to the observation 
that God enters into metaphysics as the ground which grounds and thus marks the principle 
of causality as central to this critique. The discussion of the Austrag also assigned importance 
to its linguistic character as that which does not happen in language but is the happening of 
language — the ‘event’ of language. The metaphysics of esse is oblivious to the call of language 
to which it is a response. The project of overcoming metaphysics, therefore, has the history of 
Western language also in its purview. Finally, the critique of metaphysics terminates in the 
organizing concept of Ereignis, where the formal distinction between “being and history”— 
the underlying thematic of these later writings — becomes most acute. 
 
In the following section this critique comes full circle. Picking up from the withdrawal of 
Ereignis which constitutes the epochal sendings of Being, Caputo returns to the early Greeks 
in another set of late Heidegger texts. The early Greeks (the so-called ‘pre-Socratics’ or 
‘Eleatics’) though unaware and innocent of the Ereignis, nonetheless also have an experience 
of Being in its ‘original’ (anfänglich) quality before it is “victimized by Western ratio.”333 It is in 
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Heidegger’s ‘step back’ to the Greeks that an opening is created for Caputo in which to re-read 
the Thomistic metaphysics of esse. For, according to Caputo, if it is possible for the early Greeks 
to still have an experience of the gift of presence despite being innocent of the Ereignis, it might 
be just the same for the metaphysics of esse in Thomas Aquinas. 
 
The latter move will be seen not only as an opportunity to salvage a reading of scholastic 
metaphysics in general or Aquinas in particular, but also seen as a fundamental Heideggerian 
component of Caputo’s thought which elicits a way of reading that does not close down the 
matter for thought, but sees it as an opportunity to think thought anew. For, as deconstructive 
thought would have it, it is precisely these historical-mythological texts that provide the 
impetus both for re-reading Aquinas, and later initiating the project of re-reading Heidegger 
himself — producing a Heidegger that is ‘demythologized.’  
 
I. The Early Greeks: Anaximander 
 
The task for Caputo in reading Heidegger on the early Greeks is to consolidate the ways in 
which they experienced the primordial presencing of Being. Despite the fact that each of these 
infamous fragments make up not more than one or two sentences, they remain ‘truncated 
monuments of thinking’ in the history of Western thought and therefore contain, as David 
Krell writes, “a remnant of an exhilarating presence.”334 It is in search of this exhilarating 
presence that Heidegger conducts his historical retrieval and semantic inquiry.  
 
The fragment of Anaximander of Miletus (c. 610-546 B.C.E.) reads as follows: “But that from 
which things rise also gives rise to their passing away, according to what is necessary; for 
things render justice and pay penalty to one another for their injustice, according to the 
ordinance of time.”335 The focus for Heidegger here is the ‘rise’ and the ‘passing away’ (Auf-
und Untergehen), recalling the ‘coming-over’ (Überkommnis) of Being to beings and the ‘arrival’ 
(An-kunft) of beings that we saw above with respect to the Austrag. The lingering (ver-weilt) of 
this transitionary process (Übergang) and the emergence of presence into absence as a twofold 
movement is a juncture or joining that represents justice. “The juncture is the space which is 
cleared on the one end by rising up and on the other end by passing away and within which 
                                                      
334 Martin Heidegger, David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (trans.), Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western 
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pg. 5. 
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what is present emerges into presence.”336 In-justice is interpreted, therefore, as the persistence 
which resists the twofold movement of justice and tries to contain it. Heidegger writes, “It 
strikes a willful pose of persistence, no longer concerning itself with whatever else is 
present.”337  
 
The source of the lingering (justice) is found in the preceding phrase, “according to necessity” 
(kata ta crewn). Heidegger here interprets the preposition kata in conjunction with crewn as 
a depiction of the lower beings coming into Being. ‘According to crewn or necessity’ means 
that which “grants to beings their manner of arrival, names the matter to be thought, which is 
the Being of beings.”338 Crewn in the early Greeks names the distinction between Being and 
beings but does not name the difference as such. Like the comments made about Ereignis, the 
dif-ference remains in oblivion, but the originality of the early Greeks is that they experience 
Being ‘pristinely’ as presencing and beings as what is present. Crewn, according to Heidegger, 
leaves a ‘trace’ of the distinction, a trace of Ereignis, for which we have to closely listen before 
it fades into the history of Western metaphysics.   
 
II. Heraclitus and Parmenides 
 
The Greek word that receives the most scrutiny in the Heraclitian fragment339 is logos. In 
contrast to classical formulations of logos that look to notions of unity, necessity, and order, 
Heidegger proposes a subversive reading. Heidegger translates the fragment as follows: 
“When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning [logos], it is wise with the same 
Meaning [logos] to say: One is All.”340 Logos is the ‘One’ (en) which gathers together what is 
present and releases it into unconcealment.  
 
For Caputo, this interpretation of logos is brought in line with what was said about crewn; 
“the logoV is what gathers things together into the juncture, which selects things for 
appearance in the juncture and holds back the disjoined [injustice]. As such it is what sends 
each thing into its appointed place and lets it come to presence in its due and apportioned 
time.”341 However, this conception of logos Heidegger says, was experienced by Heraclitus as 
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339 See Heidegger, chapter two, “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)” in Early Greek Thinking, pp. 59-78. 
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a momentary flash of light. No sooner had Heraclitus experienced Being as a distinction 
between Being and being — the distinction qua distinction — did this light become darkness 
once again. Heraclitus, therefore, also leaves traces in logos of the originary presencing of 
presence but does not think what gives it as such. 
 
A similar argument is made with references to Parmenides.342 Heidegger is in the first instance 
interested in Parmenides use of the word eon. For him the word refers both and at the same 
time to the ‘duality’ (Zwiefalt) or ‘two-fold’ of Being and beings. Parmenides hints at this 
duality but does not state it explicitly, it thus falls into oblivion. But to what exactly does this 
duality in the word eon involve? Caputo explains that the coming to pass of this duality, for 
Parmenides, is connected in Heidegger’s interpretation to the ‘belonging together’ of Being 
and thought. Indeed, Being and thought are ‘the same’ (to auto) insofar as “thinking (noein) 
is grounded in and comes to presence from gathering (legein).”343 Eon thus refers to Being and 
thought as the gathering of what is present into presence, which means the ‘two-fold’ or 
duality is that which opens up the difference between presence and what is present.  
 
The second word which Heidegger hones in on in the Parmenides fragment is µoira, which 
Heidegger translates as the “apportioning” (Zuteilung); that which dispenses presence to that 
which is present. Caputo connects µoira with crewn in the Anaximander fragment, intimating 
that both refer to the dispensation of Being to beings, that is, the sense of fateful sending of 
each thing to its manner and measure of presence. Moira, thus, also speaks to the “it gives” 
which sends Being to being, unfolds the distinction (two-fold) but remains itself concealed. 
 
These series of essays, the semantic investigations and phenomenological descriptions they 
carry out, all share the similar process that describes a rising up of presence into what is present 
or the emergence of things into unconcealment (alhfeia) before receding into concealment 
(lhfeia). This originary process is particular heightened in the Early Greeks for Heidegger 
and replaces, according to Caputo, the earlier ‘phenomenological’ readings in Being and Time 
that Heidegger came to consider as too closely aligned with transcendental subjectivity. 
Caputo calls these readings ‘alethiological,’ “a more radical, non-subjectivist way of savoring 
the being in its Being, of allowing it to emerge on its own and from out of its own resources.”344 
Before we consider how these readings in particular become increasingly problematic for 
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Caputo, let us first turn to the opening they create for re-interpreting Aquinas and the 
metaphysics of esse.  
 
III. Re-reading the Metaphysics of Esse 
 
Caputo argues that Aquinas’s metaphysics of esse does not fit within the framework of 
Heideggerian alethiology due to its ‘realistic’ and ‘causal’ conceptualization. On the one hand, 
Thomistic realism refers esse to the act by which ens comes to be real and present. It is an 
abstraction that does not pick up the sense of ‘presencing’ in the early Greeks. It is imagined 
as an ‘objective presence’ (Vorhandensein) utterly unaffected by Dasein. On the other hand, 
Thomistic ‘actualism’ or causality also do not accord with Heideggerian alethiology. The 
metaphysics of esse which conceives God as actus purus takes being not as Being, but as 
something created and caused in terms of an act, efficiency or force. Thomism sees the artist 
as someone who makes something, not as someone who shows something, “Greek thought is 
epiphanic; Thomistic thought is causal.”345 In the final analysis, then, Caputo concludes that 
the metaphysics of esse is not granted a privileged experience of Being as presencing, and thus, 
Thomistic scholasticism is consigned to the tradition of metaphysics which falls into the 
oblivion of Being.  
 
Caputo’s final chapter in Heidegger and Aquinas is a response to this supposed dead-end for 
Thomistic scholasticism. There he makes a suggestion that draws on medieval mysticism and 
the apophatic tradition which is significant for the central claim of our argument in this 
chapter. Caputo attempts a retrieval of Thomistic metaphysics that draws its hermeneutic 
impetus from Heidegger, opening a re-reading of Aquinas and setting forth a distinct way of 
reading that will issue in a departure of Heidegger himself. As such, the concern is not so much 
with the accuracy of Caputo’s interpretation and re-reading of Aquinas per se, but rather with 
understanding the conceptual development of Caputo’s thinking and the commitment it 
illustrates to the ‘matter of thought’ which he learns from Heidegger. His prefacing comments 
to this section, therefore, are crucial for confirming this part of our study. 
 
Caputo claims that he will treat what is left ‘unsaid’ in Aquinas. One cannot hope to 
emancipate Aquinas from Heidegger’s charge if we attempt to think in terms of the historical 
reality of his thinking, that is, if we consider his thought in the context of the scholastic mode. 
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He asks us to consider Aquinas’s thought as a “constellation of possibilities,” where we find 
that some of these possibilities are necessarily left unsaid, transitioning our hermeneutic stance 
from a historical perspective to a philosophical one. This new potential for a philosophical 
dialogue between Aquinas and Heidegger Caputo explicitly attributes to Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical approach developed with respect to the Greek fragments: “[a]s Heidegger says, 
speaking of the interpretation of the Heraclitean fragments: ‘Wishing to pursue the ‘objectively 
correct’ teaching of Heraclitus means refusing to run the salutary risk of being confounded by 
the truth of a thinking.’”346 Heidegger’s instruction is to run the ‘risk of thinking’ for the sake 
of the ‘truth of thinking.’ And this is precisely what Caputo will attempt to do with Meister 
Eckhart’s mysticism and Aquinas, thus returning to his opening introductory statement of the 
book, “What interests me is the Sache, the matter which presents itself for thought.”347 Caputo 
is therefore mimicking Heidegger’s hermeneutical approach that disrupted the early Greek 
interpretations of being to re-produce them into something new but still latent within them.  
 
Caputo also revealingly prefaces this last chapter by saying he will commence in a retrieval 
or ‘deconstruction’ of Thomistic metaphysics. While he does indicate that he prefers Jacques 
Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ to Heidegger’s Destruktion, this is no more than a passing reference 
that alludes to his awareness of Derrida’s earlier work, since it receives no further explanation 
or even a footnote. Instead he refers us back again to the German sense of ‘Ab-bauen’: “the 
positive sense of taking a text apart in order to find its most essential and enlivening 
insights.”348 Caputo at this stage is still firmly positioned within the Heideggerian tradition of 
Destruktion first proclaimed in Being and Time, a tradition that famously recalls Luther’s 
destructio in the Heidelberg disputations. Caputo will later fully embrace the sense in which 
Derrida marks off the distinction between his use of deconstruction and that of Heidegger’s.349 
Here, however, there is still an affirmative preservation of Luther’s meaning in Heidegger’s 
recapitulation that Caputo is after.350  
                                                      
346 Ibid., pg. 246. 
347 Ibid., pg. 1. 
348 Ibid., pg. 247.  
349 For a summary of these distinctions see Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 173-175. See John D. Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, Jeffrey Robbins (ed.) After the Death of 
God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pg. 62, fn. 17.   
350 The argument for the continuity between Luther’s sense of destructio and Heidegger’s Destruktion can be found 
in Benjamin D. Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), pp. 47-48. One should also emphasize that Heidegger deliberately avoided using the German word 
for destruction (Zerstörung), and instead opted for the Latinate Destruktion and Abbau in order to avoid the 
confusion with Nietzsche’s “demolition”. Indeed, as Heidegger himself writes, “Destruction does not mean 
destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of 
philosophy.” See Martin Heidegger, J.T. Wilde and W. Kluback (trans.) What Is Philosophy? (New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 71-73.  
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In sum, the mystical element that Caputo develops vis-à-vis Eckhart as the unthought thought 
in Aquinas, is a deployment of a Heideggerian hermeneutic or way of reading that is in search 
of a non-Heideggerian, non-metaphysical, non-onto-theo-logical overcoming of metaphysics. 
It is also possible at this stage, then, given this hermeneutic trajectory, to see that Derridean 
deconstruction will almost inevitably be taken up by Caputo — ‘loosening my tongue’ as he 
has often written.351 Though we have insisted that the primary concern will not be with 
evaluating the conclusions of this re-reading, let us nonetheless consider its results, since they 
inform our discussion below pertaining to Caputo’s full philosophical description of this 
Heideggerian hermeneutic, indeed, a certain radical hermeneutics.  
 
Caputo suggests that Aquinas’s work must be seen in the context of a certain mystical 
experience he had at the end of his life.352 This religious-mystical experience — something of 
an experience of the divine (visio beautifica) — is held, according to Caputo, outside of the 
bounds of metaphysics and is at least analogous to Heidegger’s ‘step-back.’ However, Aquinas 
does not get far. For even if he implicitly escapes metaphysics through this mystical 
experience,353 it nonetheless remains a positive intuition of God articulated in the mode of 
presence. Accordingly, Caputo turns to Meister Eckhart’s negative mysticism, which expresses 
what Aquinas left unsaid, its ‘lethic’ dimension. The ‘lethic’ dimension is understood by 
Eckhart as the transcendent mystery of God within the Godhead. Everything we say of God is 
‘not’ God, the Godhead “remains behind, its essential Being untouched by this discourse.”354 
In the doctrine of Gelassenheit, as Eckhart articulates it, we surrender the soul to the divine 
Being without attempting to objectify it, resulting in the preservation of the lethic dimension. 
This is why, as Caputo has shown elsewhere, Heidegger took on this term from Eckhart in his 
own elaborations of being, taking it to mean an ‘openness to Mystery.’355 If Aquinas’s 
mysticism was a vision of divine union (of ascension into light) then Eckhart’s was the 
opposite, a mysticism into divine darkness. Eckhart, who drew much of his mystical 
formulations from what he saw as implicit within Aquinas, therefore, makes possible what 
was impossible for Aquinas to say himself. 
                                                      
351 Caputo, After the Death of God, pg. 135. 
352 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pp. 252-253. Caputo, quoting Aquinas from his personal secretary, Reginald of 
Piperno, writes, “’Everything which I have written seems like straw to me compared to what I have seen and what 
has been revealed to me’ (Omnia, quae scripsi, videntur mihi paleae respectu eorum, quae vidi et revelata sunt mihi).” 
353 Ibid., pg. 278.  
354 Ibid., pg. 276. Caputo’s most thorough statement on Meister Eckhart is found in his first work, The Mystical 
Element in Heidegger’s Thought (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978).  See also, John D. Caputo, “Fundamental 
Themes in Meister Eckhart’s Mysticism” in Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 42. 2 (April, 1972), pp. 197-225. 
355 See the footnote above and Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, pg. 278. 
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For Caputo and Heidegger, Eckhart himself is not free from the logic of metaphysics. The 
‘lethic’ dimension operates within the ‘alethic’; being withdraws but ultimately shows itself to 
itself in the end. The depths of God may be hidden from the religious mystic but they are not 
hidden from the Godhead, and thus we can place our trust in this impenetrable mystery. 
“Religious Gelassenheit,” Caputo writes, “is openness to the mystery, but the mystery is not 
concealed from itself. It is, and this is the believer’s faith, a sphere of self-openess, self-
presence.”356 Caputo’s re-reading of the metaphysics of esse culminates in this negative 
mysticism. It holds sway with respect to Heidegger only insofar as it is analogous to the ‘step 
back’. But where Heidegger imagines a source in a-lethia, from which the epochs of being are 
sent, Eckhart and Aquinas have in mind a perfect being at the end of the tunnel. God for 
Heidegger is a function of the Ereignis, not the reverse.  
 
In the end, Caputo re-reads the scholastic metaphysics of Aquinas in terms of the positive 
mysticism of Aquinas, which is subsequently read in terms of the negative mysticism of 
Eckhart, and finally re-read again in terms of what Thomas Sheen has called the negative 
mysticism of Caputo (Caputo mysticus) — “a negative natural religious mysticism that alone 
offers an alternative to Heidegger’s Ereignis.”357 What becomes apparent, as Sheen identifies, 
is that Caputo’s negative religious mysticism is, indeed, not so different to Heidegger’s own 
‘openness to mystery.’358  However, if Caputo’s investigation has brought together Heidegger 
and Aquinas in a fruitful philosophical dialogue providing higher insight into the possibilities 
of religious thinking, then what remains open to question is Caputo’s commitment to ‘the 
matter of thought.’ His negative natural religious outcome or the Heideggerian ‘openness to 
mystery’ will need to be itself interrogated. This will require a translation and delimitation 
from the openness to mystery to the openness to otherness.  
 
IV. Heidegger against Heidegger 
 
The elaboration of Caputo’s ‘double gesture’ or way of reading sketched in relation to Heidegger 
and Aquinas can be said to obtain its formal statement as a philosophical description in Radical 
Hermeneutics (1987). While drawing from several sources, including Kierkegaard and Husserl, 
Caputo champions Heidegger and Derrida in this, possibly his most important philosophical 
                                                      
356 Ibid., pg. 280. 
357 See Thomas Sheen, “A Way Out of Metaphysics?” in Research in Phenomenology 15.1 (1985), pp. 229-234. 
358 Sheen, “A Way Out of Metaphysics?”, pg. 233. 
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work, to argue for a ‘radical thinking’ that exposes us to the ‘ruptures and gaps’ of existence.359 
The ultimate aim of this project was to inaugurate a thinking that brought together 
supposedly extreme elements of postmodern thought and to weave them into a coherency 
that would not devolve into nihilism but rather foster a commitment to the singularity of truth 
and the Other. Given the mastery and fluidity with which Caputo reads, interprets and 
stitches together these sources, the book received critical acclaim and is considered a textbook 
in many philosophy and religious studies departments.  
 
For our purposes, Radical Hermeneutics stands at a crucial juncture in the development of 
Caputo’s thinking. Firstly, as just stated, it expounds the double gesture in a way that centers 
what we have been saying with respect to Heidegger. Highlighting the ‘radical tendencies’ 
that feed into Being and Time from Kierkegaard (repetition)360 and Husserl (constitution), 
Caputo produces a reading of Heidegger’s magnum opus that reveals radical elements of 
hermeneutics that Heidegger himself may not have been aware of, or that his interpreters seem 
to have later ignored. Secondly, and importantly, Caputo’s emancipatory interpretation on 
Heidegger’s behalf leads to a productive confrontation with the critique of Jacques Derrida. 
The latter — the real hero of Radical Hermeneutics — forces Caputo to reconsider Heidegger 
more critically than he had before. While it is clear that Caputo begins to find more conviviality 
with Derrida, his departure from Heidegger at this point is in no way clear or decisive, on the 
contrary, the latter is cast beside Derrida as a necessary dialogue partner in the project of 
‘radical thinking’. It is only in Demythologizing Heidegger (1993) that Caputo will systematically 
lay out his reasons for adopting a more ‘guarded’ approach to Heidegger and make clear what 
it is in Heidegger that should be saved and what should be let go. Nonetheless, one can see in 
Radical Hermeneutics Caputo beginning to find the voice that will make his work “blaze 
philosophical trails,”361 which can be attributed to the early formation of his phenomenology 
of religion in Radical Hermeneutic’s last three chapters.  
 
                                                      
359 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 6. 
360 Indeed, synonymous with what we are calling the ‘double gesture’ here is another way of saying ‘repetition’ in 
the Kierkegaardian sense. Caputo writes of this influence: “[f]or those who care about such things, it is not hard to 
tell that Radical Hermeneutics is a retelling of Constantine Constantinus’s Repetition.” See John D. Caputo, “An 
American and a Liberal: A Response to Michael Zimmerman” in Continental Philosophy Review 31:215–220 (New 
York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 215-220; p. 215. Repetition, however, should not be exclusively 
thought of in terms of methodology or style, for it goes to the heart of the two-fold operation of deconstructive 
thought.  
361 As Mark Dooley writes. See the dialogue between Caputo and Mark Dooley, Ian Leask (ed.) “From Radical 
Hermeneutics to the Weakness of God: John D. Caputo in Dialogue with Mark Dooley”, Philosophy Today 51. 2 
(Summer 2007), pg. 217. 
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In this final section, we shall sketch three phases of Caputo’s engagement with Heidegger 
culminating in the former’s own Kehre.362 In the first phase, beginning with Radical 
Hermeneutics, we demonstrate the lengths Caputo undergoes to re-read Heidegger’s Being and 
Time in order to set it into a productive relationship with the critique of Jacques Derrida. The 
latter will occasion the second phase, which addresses this critique head-on. This critique 
emerges in Radical Hermeneutics vis-à-vis Derrida but is also systematically laid bare in 
Caputo’s own way in Demythologizing Heidegger. In the third and final phase, then, we consider 
what of Heidegger is preserved and discarded and how this leads into Caputo’s ethical-
religious turn to French post-structuralism in general and Derrida in particular.  
 
I. The ‘upon-which’ in Being and Time 
 
In the late 80’s Caputo became increasingly disillusioned with Heidegger’s thought. Though 
it had not fully manifested itself, one can sense a confrontation emerging in Radical 
Hermeneutics. As we have seen above, Caputo’s earlier concerns with the late Heidegger were 
an attempt to find a point of extrication in Aquinas from ‘onto-theo-logic’ and the charge of 
Seinsvergessenheit. In Radical Hermeneutics, however, Caputo returns to Being and Time in 
anticipation of a critique that will arise from Jacques Derrida against the late Heidegger. This 
anticipatory reading argues, on the one hand, for an interpretation latent in the early 
Heidegger which equates not to an outright defense of the late Heidegger against Derrida, but 
rather seeks to establish a point of contact between them. On the other hand, it also 
demonstrates a continuity between the Heidegger of the Marburg period and the later 
Heidegger with respect to the driving question which animates his work, namely, the question 
not of Being itself but of that which grants and makes Being possible. This emerging 
confrontation, then, is framed in Radical Hermeneutics less as an antagonism and more as a 
productivity, with the added subtlety of a discreet Heideggerian apologia.  
                                                      
362 Caputo self-describes this Kehre in a number of places, see “An American and a liberal: John D. Caputo’s 
Response to Michael Zimmerman,” Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), pg. 220, and also, Mark Dooley (ed.) A 
Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo in Focus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pg. 72. To talk 
of “Kehre” is, of course, in itself philosophically and historically questionable. Caputo’s reading of Heidegger in 
Radical Hermeneutics, for example, seems to suggest much more of a continuation with the early and later 
Heidegger, especially in his discussions of the ‘upon-which’ (das Woraufin) we shall see below. This is also the case 
with Jacques Derrida, where some refer to his ‘political’ and ‘ethical’ Kehre, while others and Derrida included, 
have argued that deconstruction has always been ethical. See for example, Simon Critchley, The Ethics of 
Deconstruction (Edinburgh: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). While the themes of the religious, the ethical and 
theological are undeniable in Caputo’s later work (aided predominantly by the accents of Derrida and Levinas), 
the present chapter hopes to clarify that the seeds for these later themes are sown in the thought of Martin 
Heidegger, and indeed, cannot be understood with it.  
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What is the nature of Caputo’s reading of Being and Time that allows this productivity? In its 
simplest formulation, Caputo argues that Heidegger has always from the start been concerned 
not with Being, but with what goes on beyond Being. In the later Heidegger, this is confirmed 
when going beyond Being means that which grants Being and which ‘lets’ Being be — Ereignis, 
a-lethia etc. In Being and Time this point is made, according to Caputo, in a ‘meaning structure’ 
that consists in the movement of a two-fold projection of a being on its Being; an easily missed 
distinction between a primary and secondary projection which distinguishes Being and the 
meaning of Being in a unique sense. To understand this, Caputo indicates the context of the 
culmination of the text of Being and Time in §74, where the ontology of repetition is defined 
and defended. The context of this section depends on the elaboration of ‘temporality of Dasein’ 
in §65 and which is itself prefaced by another discussion of the importance of the ‘constancy’ 
of the self in §64. These three sections for Caputo are explicitly drawn from Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy of repetition,363 which Heidegger underplays to his own detriment.364 In order to 
issue the ontology of repetition which follows from the repetition of the existential analytic, 
Heidegger first determined the Being of Dasein as care in Division I. Now he must characterize 
care in terms of temporality to bring the existential analytic to its head.  
 
The discussion on temporality is prefaced (§64) by an argument that Dasein is not a unity in a 
Kantian sense, but rather a ‘constancy’ insofar as it stands ‘anticipatorily resolute’ in the flux 
of its inauthentic ‘they-self’. It is only a unity to the extent that it unifies itself in “the unity of 
a projection in which it binds itself to what it has been all along.”365 For it to “bind itself” Dasein 
needs a theory of temporality offered in §65 that moves from the ‘care-structure’ to the 
‘meaning-structure’ of care. This ‘meaning-structure’ is the central ‘radical’ hermeneutic point 
for Caputo, which will allow him to speak of Being as an “effect” — to use Derridian language. 
The ‘meaning-structure’ is described in accordance with the meaning of care as temporality. 
Everything hangs here on what is understood by meaning. Caputo writes:  
 
                                                      
363 “The treatment of the constancy of the self comes from the discussion of the ‘continuance of sin’ in The Sickness 
unto Death. The analysis of temporality is dependent upon the analysis of existential temporality in the second 
volume of Either/Or. And the all-important discussion of repetition [§74] is based quite directly upon Kierkegaard, 
as I have been arguing throughout.” Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 82-83. 
364 This is the difficulty, according to Caputo, for the Heidegger of the Marburg period when he produced Being 
and Time. Heidegger was still ‘under the spell’ of Husserl’s conviction that saw phenomenology as a universal 
science. Giving too much to the latter meant that Heidegger’s hermeneutics did not distrust the history of ontology 
enough, thus eliciting Derrida’s critique of ‘onto-hermeneutics’. Had Heidegger been more faithful to his 
Kierkegaardian influence he may have side stepped Derrida’s critique. See Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 83.  
365 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 84. 
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Meaning is not the object of understanding, what is understood by the 
understanding, but, more exactly, the organizing component in what is 
understood, that upon which the understandability depends, around 
which it is organized and “maintained” (sich halten) ...”’Meaning’ signifies 
the ‘upon-which’ [das Woraufhin] of a primary projection in terms of which 
something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is.”366 
 
The ‘upon-which’ or das Woraufhin is the prethematic operation that guides and organizes the 
projection of a being on its Being. Thus, if temporality is the ‘meaning’ of ontological care, then 
it is also that ‘upon-which’ something can be conceived in its possibilities of that which it is. 
The ‘upon-which’, therefore, describes a radical hermeneutic thrust in Being and Time, which 
not only regards this or that being or entity but is concerned with Being in general. Heidegger 
is, thus, engaged in a hermeneutic that is not so much interested in Being or beings but rather 
in what makes Being possible. Caputo writes, “To think Being is to remain within the first 
projective cut, but to think the meaning of Being is to make a hermeneutic determination of so 
radical sort that it leaves metaphysics and its ‘Being’ behind.”367 This ‘upon-which’ proves to 
be the existential structure of temporality, the projection of the Being of Dasein as care, which 
allows care, and therefore Dasein, to be what it is.  
 
Caputo’s point here is to draw a parallel between what he believes the early Heidegger has 
conceived, namely, the beings/Being/meaning structure and the beings/Being/Ereignis 
structure of the late Heidegger we saw above. If successful, Caputo will be able to preserve a 
coefficiency in Heidegger’s thought that divests it of transcendental remnants and lend 
credence to his claim that there is a productive point of contact between Heidegger and 
Derrida.  
 
II. “Cold Hermeneutics” 
 
After Being and Time, Caputo makes clear from texts such as Discourse on Thinking368 and On 
the Way to Language,369 respectively, that on the one hand, Heidegger himself became uncertain 
                                                      
366 Ibid., pg. 84. See Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 370-371. 
367 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 85. 
368 Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit, 2nd ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1960). English translation: Martin Heidegger, Hans 
Freund and John Anderson (trans.) Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
369 Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965). English translation: Martin Heidegger, Peter 
Hertz (trans.) On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 
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about ‘transcendental horizonal’ language,370 and on the other, he needed to enact a certain 
retrieval of hermeneutics. The language of Dasein and projection in Being and Time was too 
close to Nietzschean ‘willing’ (Vor-stellen) and thus needed to be delimited in favor of that 
which lets the horizon be without projecting onto it.371 Above, we saw this expressed variously 
by terms such as ‘the open,’ alēthia, Gelassenheit, Austrag and Ereignis. Subsequently, Caputo 
identifies a correspondence and continuity in this two-fold step from the language of willing 
to that of ‘the open,’ and the quest for ‘meaning’ beyond Being (the ‘upon-which’) in Being and 
Time. When compared to Being and Time, there is certainly something different going in the 
later Heidegger, for indeed he drops the term “hermeneutics” after Being and Time completely. 
However, Caputo notes that Heidegger, nonetheless, “never really drops anything,” but 
reworks or repeats his language in the interest of thought. The question now arises: with what 
in this repetition does Derrida take issue? And how — having established the continuity in 
Heidegger’s thinking — will this occasion a point of contact between Derrida and Heidegger 
allowing Caputo to set them together in what he calls a “Cold Hermeneutics”?  
 
Derrida’s critique of Heidegger initially issues from Spurs (1978),372 his essay “Of an 
Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy” (1982)373 and Margins of Philosophy 
(1982).374 In the former Heidegger is challenged by a synthesis between Nietzsche’s critique of 
truth and Derrida’s semiotic effect produced by différance. The problem according to Derrida 
is that Heidegger essentially misread Nietzsche insofar as he did not pick up the irony of 
Nietzsche’s woman — that she herself believes that she is a fiction; “indeed, if woman is truth, 
she at least knows that there is no truth.”375 Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche derides the 
sexual difference. For him, it is an enforced construction and a fiction unto itself, leaving those 
who believe in it to be fooled by it. Heidegger is the hermeneut that does not recognize this 
style in Nietzsche, he is fooled into believing truth, whether the ‘truth of Being’ or alēthia.376 
His is an ‘onto-hermeneutics’ which plumbs the depths for truth. However, as we have seen 
all along in this chapter, and as Caputo will repeatedly argue in Radical Hermeneutics, this does 
                                                      
370 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 98-115. 
371 “By projecting a horizon we shrink the open down to our size, so that it contains objects made to fit our 
subjective-human limitations.” Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 103. 
372 Jacques Derrida, Barbara Harlow (trans.) Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978). 
373 Jacques Derrida, John P. Leavey (trans.), “Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy”, Semeia 23 
(1982), pp.63-97. 
374 Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.) Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). 
375 Derrida, Spurs, pg. 53. 
376 Caputo’s argument here shows a clear development with respect to his reading of Derrida. In 1984 he published 
a short essay where he makes his skepticism of the Dionysian woman clear, “Derrida’s Dionysian strategies serve 
a purpose; but left to themselves the cut us off entirely from the things themselves, delivering us over to a surfeit 
of fictions and willful constructions.” See John D. Caputo, “’Supposing Truth To Be A Woman…’: Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Derrida” in Tulane Studies in Philosophy 32 (1984), pp. 15-21; pg. 21.  
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not tell the full story of Heidegger. Derrida himself recognized this in Spurs when he wrote, 
“[e]ach time that Heidegger refers the question of Being to the question of the property 
(propre), of propriate, of propriation (eigen, eignen, ereignen, Ereignis especially) this dehiscence 
bursts forth anew.”377 And again, when he comments on Ereignis, “Its irruption here does not 
mark a rupture or turning point in the order of Heidegger’s thought.”378 In citing these 
remarks, Caputo is pointing to a repetition and recognition of Heidegger’s early work by 
Derrida that opens space for intertwining their projects in support of his own. But before 
Caputo can present his ‘Cold Hermeneutics,’ he must address the second (and most important 
in this author’s opinion) thrust of Derrida’s critique — what was alluded to above as 
Heidegger’s ‘mythical-eschatological’ tendencies.  
 
If the beginning of Heidegger’s Kehre involved surrendering the hermeneutics of 
‘transcendental-horizonal’ language (jettisoning the fore-structures of Being and Time) then it 
ended by re-reading hermeneutics in terms of a more primordial experience of Being, indeed, 
a certain “message of destiny (Geschick)” that is heard from Being. This messaging introduces 
a portrait of the relationship between ‘Man’ and Being that emerges in the late Heidegger as 
more ascetic, insofar as we are always already in the possession of Being. What becomes of the 
hermeneut is akin to receiving messages from the Greek god Hermes, where the latter is the 
epochal sendings of Being, and the former is the hermeneut who can read and interpret 
them.379 Heidegger’s hermeneutics becomes not “a question of supplying an anticipatory 
projection of the Being of beings but of hearing a message (‘eine Botschaft zu hören’) that is 
not about supplying anticipatory horizons but about listening to what is sent our way.”380 
Thus, one observes the beginning of a certain mythical-eschatology in Heidegger 
encompassing, on the one hand, an almost mythological partiality for the early Greeks, and on 
the other, a so severe withdrawal of Being that we are now at the end waiting for the eschaton 
— the inauguration of the new. Indeed, this is the context in which Caputo locates Heidegger’s 
oft-quoted phrase at the end of the infamous Der Spiegel interview: “[o]nly a god can save us 
now.”381 It is with this mythical and eschatological ‘epistolary principle’ that Derrida takes 
issue.  
 
                                                      
377 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 172, quoted from Derrida, Spurs, pp. 115-117. Here in Radical Hermeneutics 
there is always a movement beyond Being in Heidegger’s writing for Caputo; “Although Heidegger is always 
talking about Being and Ereignis, he invariably ends up in a movement beyond Being, ground, presence, and truth, 
landing in an abyss (Ab-grund) of dis-propriation (Ent-eignis),” Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 158. 
378 Ibid.  
379 Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pg. 29.  
380 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 103.  
381 Ibid., pg. 160.  
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In the discussion concerning the early Greeks, we saw how those investigations sought to 
describe a process of the rising up of presence into what is present, or the emergence of things 
into un-concealment before receding again. We saw that for the late Heidegger this process is 
favored in the early Greeks because they experienced Being in a unique and pristine way 
before it congealed over. Now, at the height of congealment in the history of Being in the West, 
the task of thinking is to listen again to the messages of this primordial sending. In doing so, 
“The eschaton,” Caputo writes, “repeats the arche, retrieves the possible, saves us all just at that 
moment when all is dark, indeed darkest.”382 The capacity of the Seinsgeschick to ‘save us’ 
resides in the unity of its sending and in our ability to hear the unity of its message. According 
to Derrida, such a unity is a suspicious dream and a function of eschatological and apocalyptic 
thinking, where the deep essence of truth is presupposed even in the announcement of the 
apocalypse itself.383 The extent of this suspicion is heightened when considered under the re-
reading that Derrida undertook of Husserl against the possibilities of “effective 
communication.”384 In the postal system of sending and receiving there can never be a 
determinable message or recipient, only the play of the alterable chain of signifiers.  
 
However, there is again something in Heidegger that even Derrida recognizes does not fully 
accord with this reading. There is a Heidegger that can be read against Heidegger. Even while 
there is a reading of Heidegger which — thanks to Heidegger himself — Derrida’s work opens 
up (when he speaks of an ‘apocalypse without apocalypse’ for example), Caputo assumes 
responsibility to present and pursue this ‘radical’ reading. This will culminate in Caputo’s 
‘demythologized Heidegger.’ With Derrida’s critique and his equally important hesitation to 
resist ever closing down Heidegger’s text, therefore, Caputo is able to defend a version of 
Heidegger he has already begun formulating in his early work, while at the same time now 
bringing Derrida alongside his project of a radical or ‘Cold Hermeneutics.’ Cold hermeneutics 
is precisely this intertwining of both Heidegger and Derrida, a ‘cold hermeneutic shiver’ 
effectuated by the joining of a demythologized Heidegger and a disruptive Derrida.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
382 Ibid., pg. 165.  
383 Ibid., pp. 166-67. 
384 See Caputo’s chapter 5 “Repetition and the Emancipation of Signs,” Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 120-152, where he 
traces Derrida’s fascinating re-reading of Husserl and addresses much of Derrida’s early writings including: 
Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry (1962), Writing and Difference (1967), Speech and Phenomena (1967) and 
Dissemination (1972). We reserve a formal engagement with Caputo’s reading of Derrida for subsequent chapters. 
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III. Demythologized Heidegger and the turn to Derrida 
 
In Caputo’s ‘Cold Hermeneutics’ neither Heidegger nor Derrida get ahead of the other. When 
we think that Derrida has delimited Heidegger’s project as just another raised degree of 
metaphysics (onto-hermeneutics and belief in the truth of Being’s sending and receiving), 
“Heidegger infiltrates Derrida with a hermeneutic moment — an apophatic, not cataphatic, 
hermeneutics — a moment in which we concede the play in which we are caught up, a moment 
of openness to the mystery which everywhere invades us,”385 that is, the lethic quality in a 
hyphenated a-lēthia.  
 
For the remainder of Radical Hermeneutics and its last three chapters in particular, Caputo 
oscillates between the metaphorics of Derrida and Heidegger. For example, he explains how 
Derrida’s deconstruction is done in the ‘marketplace’ — it has an ethico-political and liberative 
effect.386 Whereas Heidegger, on the other hand, falls short of a political edge. His 
hermeneutics is carried out on a ‘country path,’ a metaphorics of ‘stillness and simplicity’ that 
emphasizes openness to the mystery of Being’s withdrawal. However, on the basis of Caputo’s 
demythologized Heidegger this does not necessarily mean inaction. Indeed, in the final 
chapters of Radical Hermeneutics, Caputo reaches to develop from the ontological and 
epistemological implications of this renewed Heidegger, an ‘Ethics of Gelassenheit’ where 
“Gelassenheit is a certain intervention in these power systems which releases their grip and lets 
things be.”387 But this is only a ‘reach,’ for in the final analysis this ethical-political ‘lack’ and 
its implications motivates Caputo to move beyond Heidegger to Derrida and French 
‘postmodernism.’ To understand this shift, we must consider more precisely what it is that 
caused Caputo to adopt a more critical and guarded view of Heidegger. We find this in the 
final book he publishes on Heidegger in the early nineties, Demythologizing Heidegger (1993). 
 
It should be noted that Derrida’s criticisms of Heidegger were not the origination of Caputo’s 
own critical concerns. Already in his first book, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought 
(1978), Caputo had raised questions over the status of ethics.388 However, it was Derrida above-
all that enhanced these concerns, making Caputo’s earlier reading of Heideggerian terms like 
Das Woraufin, Ereignis and alēthia that much more pertinent. A further shadow was also cast, 
                                                      
385 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 190.  
386 Ibid., pp. 192-198. 
387 Ibid., pg. 205 and pp. 264-267. Heidegger claims the term Gelassenheit from Meister Eckhart. Caputo devotes a 
number of pages to this in The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1986), pp. 118-127.  
388 See Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, pp. 254-258. 
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Caputo notes, when research began appearing that confirmed his own internal philosophical 
concerns, 389 as well as a growing body of literature that presented incontrovertible historical 
evidence of Heidegger’s nefarious political engagements.390 The tandem effect of this situation 
in the late 80’s lead to Caputo’s reappraisal of Heidegger that locates his fall from grace and 
traces its philosophical development in his later thought from the 1930’s onward.391  
 
Caputo argues that Heidegger was held captive by a myth of Being (“a sweeping 
metanarrative, a myth of monogenesis”)392 and a great Greek beginning. His earlier accents of 
Martin Luther, St. Paul, Aristotle and Søren Kierkegaard, faded into the background in favor 
of the Eleatics and the poetry of Hölderlin.393 As we have seen, the ‘mythological operation’ 
does not exists and is, in fact, opposed in Being and Time. The ‘meaning’ of Being does not have 
historical instantiation but is a theory about how that history is constructed and about the 
conditions that allow Being to have meaning. The ‘mythological operation’ comes to the fore 
explicitly in the Grundfrage der Philosophie (1937-38) lecture course, where the ‘meaning’ of 
Being takes on a historical role as opposed to a functional one. Instead of modernity being seen 
as a breakthrough with respect to its conception of time and the subject (Kant), it was now 
seen as the most extreme end (eschaton) in the history of ontology. Everything after the early 
Greeks is seen as a ‘falling away’ from the self-showing of Being (the Greek experience).394 The 
project of the Freiburg period culminating in Being and Time had now, according to Caputo, 
undergone a significant overhaul. The investigations into facticity from biblical sources and 
Aristotelian ethics (‘jewgreek’)395 that characterized that period of Heidegger’s thought were 
cut down to an exclusive Greek Anfang.  
                                                      
389 With respect to ethics and politics, Caputo cites Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s La fiction du politique (1987) and 
Lyotard’s Heidegger et “les juifs” (1988). 
390 For Heidegger’s relationship to the Nazism, see Victor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1989), Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 
1988) and for a summary see Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger and the Nazis,” The New York Review of Books, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1988/06/16/heidegger-and-the-nazis/,  (16 June, 1988).  
391 The debates around Heidegger’s Nazi involvement and the anti-Semitic undertones of his work have not 
subsided, see the recently published volumes of the so-called Black Notebooks edited by Peter Trawny: Martin 
Heidegger, Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938), GA 94 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014); Überlegungen 
VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39), GA 95 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014); and Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 
1939–1941), GA 96 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014). See also Paul Hockenos, “Release of Heidegger’s Black 
Notebooks Reignites Debate Over Nazi Ideology,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Release-of-Heidegger-s/144897, (February, 24, 2014). The publication of the 
Black Notebooks has also provoked theology to reevaluate its long-time romance with Heidegger. In this regard see 
Mårten Björk and Jayne Svenungsson (eds.) Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and the future of theology (Springer-Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017).    
392 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pg. 4.  
393 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 148-68.  
394 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 9-39. See also the article version of this chapter, “Demythologizing 
Heidegger: Aletheia and the History of Being,” The Review of Metaphysics, 41 (March 1988), pp. 519-46. 
395 The ‘jewgreek’ is a Derridianism Caputo uses in this context to refer to this dual influence in the early Heidegger. 
The expression is originally taken from James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) and was given its classic gloss by Derrida in 
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In short, Heidegger had ‘essentialized’ his project.396 The task of ‘demythologizing’, then, will 
not only consist in articulating the causes of this mythology, but also in ‘re-mythologizing’ 
differently. For, as we have argued throughout, Caputo is not exclusively concerned with 
matters of biography, but with die Sache des Denkes, which he learns from Heidegger.397 To re-
mythologize is to think the myth of the ‘jewgreek’ — a myth of justice. It is to reinstate what 
Heidegger excluded when he (mis)read the New Testament. In schematizing the categories of 
care and difficulty he left out the “whole thematics of the ethics of mercy, the cry for justice.”398 
It is at this moment that the turn is formally inaugurated in Caputo’s thought, first through 
Levinas and then Derrida. Indeed, the book that Caputo cites as a ‘companion’ to 
Demythologizing Heidegger is his Against Ethics published in the same year.399 In subsequent 
chapters we will address more precisely the character of Caputo’s relationship with Derrida 
and what is meant by ethics and religion. For now, we can say that before (in Radical 
Hermeneutics) Caputo was still reading Derrida in the narrow sense of ‘writing’, which is why 
he needed Heidegger and Kierkegaard to supplement an existential affirmation of life. There 
are, indeed, hints of an ‘ethics of dissemination’ in Radical Hermeneutics which point in the 
direction of a phenomenology of religion,400 but only when he has put Heidegger to rest can 
he effect the transition.401 To put this another way, radical hermeneutics has to do with an 
existential affirmation of life by ‘restoring life to its original difficulty,’ but this affirmation was 
not enough when met with the obligation of the other and his/her suffering. Radical 
                                                      
his essay “Violence and Metaphysics” which can be found in Writing and Difference (1978). In Caputo’s Against 
Ethics (1993) he comments on his own use of the phrase: “I will use the expression ‘jewgreek’ throughout this study 
to signify, emblematically, everything miscegenated and impure and hence subject to expulsion, decontamination, 
extermination. I also use it to say that whatever I say here is always already Greek, philosophical, metaphysical, 
that one cannot simply walk away from our inherited Greek conceptuality, now would one want to, as both 
Derrida and Levinas insist.” See John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant 
Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pg. 258, fn. 61.  
396 See chapter six “Heidegger’s Essentialism: The Logic of the Mythologic of Being” in Caputo, Demythologizing 
Heidegger, pp. 118-130. 
397 “The decisions I defend below depend upon the analyses of texts and the soundness of my views, not upon 
settling the affair of Heidegger’s biography. This is not a book about Heidegger’s Nazism, but about Heidegger’s 
thought.” However, biography and thought are never extricated from one another, which is precisely why a work 
of ‘demythologizing’ will also necessarily be “an operation of denazification.” Ibid., pg. 5.  
398 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pg. 57.  
399 See John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 
400 The religious hermeneutic for Caputo is connected to suffering, “Religion arises as an expression of solidarity 
with the suffering.” Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 280.  
401 As already noted, the dye is already being cast in the final chapters of Radical Hermeneutics, but also can be seen 
in chapter ten of Demythologizing Heidegger, “Hyperbolic Justice: Demythologizing differently with Derrida and 
Levinas”, pp. 186-208. An older version of this chapter was published in 1991: “Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, 
Myth and Politics,” Research in Phenomenology, 21 (1991), pp. 3-20. Following Levinas and Derrida Caputo begins 
here to start problematizing the relationship between ethics, politics and justice. Although he is still committed to 
‘mythologizing differently,’ from Against Ethics onward, he seems to have heeded Levinas’ call from Otherwise than 
Being for the “demythization of the myths,” and drops the vocabulary of myth completely. See Emmanuel Levinas, 
Alphonso Lingis (trans.) Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991), pg. 180.  
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Hermeneutics inaugurates the turn away from Heidegger (Demythologizing Heidegger), to ethics 
(Against Ethics), to religion without religion (The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 1997), and 
finally to theology (The Weakness of God, 2006), indeed, a radical theology (The Insistence of God, 
2013). Radical hermeneutics is replaced by radical theology. As mentioned, it will be the burden 
of later chapters to investigate what is going on in these later works. For now, we have been 
concerned with the voice of Heidegger in Caputo’s early work as it relates to the project of 
over-coming metaphysics and the impetus it generates for the trajectory of Caputo’s radical 
theological project.  
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Chapter Four 
The Il/logic of the Sans 
 
I. Introduction 
 
If we are to follow Caputo’s radically demythologized reading of Heidegger, then the 
metaphysical foundations of Schmitt’s politics of presence are left in ruin(s).402 But to leave 
something in ruins is not, as Caputo and Derrida will suggest, the final word of 
deconstruction. Indeed, ruins can be restored. And although, as in any restoration, the 
palimpsestuous vestiges from a past remain, there is always the enduring possibility that a 
restoration may fail or succeed, creating something, perhaps, wholly unrecognizable.  
 
In this chapter, we will read the developing character of Caputo’s work with respect to 
sovereignty in the domain of ethics and religion. Following the slightly gnomic analogy 
above, the question of whether these domains remain in ‘ruins’ will be answered according 
to the ‘strange il/logic of the sans’,403 where ethics becomes obligation, and religion a desire 
for something we cannot name. Here, the the il/logic of the sans is one of the organizing levers 
that cuts across the various idioms that characterize deconstruction. By investigating the 
unique manner in which some of these idioms are deployed, it will be shown that this logic 
remains a consistent feature of Caputo’s writing, but also exposes different inflections and re-
                                                      
402 See Laurence Hemming, “Heidegger’s claim ‘Carl Schmitt thinks as a Liberal’” in Journal for Cultural Research, 
20. 3 (2016), pp. 286-294. Hemming follows Heidegger’s lecture notes on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right where 
Heidegger argues that Schmitt thinks under the guise of Hegelian Liberalism: “[he] can only ground the being of 
the human being in the state, he is not able to think how the being of the human being is grounded in being itself.” 
Pg. 288.  
403 John D. Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to Radical Theology” in Journal for Cultural 
and Religious Theory 11.2 (Spring 2011), pg. 34. Caputo is referencing Derrida’s adoption of Blanchot’s syntax 
“according to which ‘X sans X,’ is not a simple negation, nullification, or destruction, but a reinscription of X, a 
certain reversal of the movement of X that still communicates with X.” See John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears 
of Jacques Derrida: religion without religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pg. 100. This phrase, then, 
the ‘il/logic of the sans’ is used here for its explanatory and organizing potential. It exerts a paradigmatic function 
that helps to explain Derrida’s literary enactment or performance as it is deployed in many contexts under different 
names. It is precisely due to the character of deconstruction that this il/logic can function similarly in different 
contexts, while at the same time using other figures to emphasize different valences within the text. For example, 
in his earlier work in philosophy of language he was playing with the writing, spelling and auditory ambiguity of 
differánce; when he is discussing Kantian aesthetics he speaks about the difficulty to distinguish the art work with 
the notion of the par-ergon; when the discussion revolves around political and religious tropes he uses messianicity 
in a ‘religion without religion,’ the impossible for a ‘gift without a gift’ and a democracy to come for a ‘community 
without community.’ We may also call these, as Caputo has alluded to elsewhere, the ‘axiologies’ of 
deconstruction. See John D. Caputo, “The Experience of God and the Axiology of the Impossible” in Mark A. 
Wrathall (ed.) Religion after Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 123-145.   
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conceptions of sovereignty, apropos ethics, religion, and theology. It will be important for our 
purposes to unpack this logic and its operations so central to deconstruction.  
 
Deconstruction for Derrida and Caputo has to do with a deeper affirmation, a yes, a desire for 
the impossible, a preparation for something or someone, an ‘other’ that is coming at a time we 
neither know nor can predict. It was with this fundamental ethical avowal (via Levinas)404 that 
Caputo opposed Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology with a more Derridian radical 
hermeneutics. As we saw in Radical Hermeneutics and Demythologizing Heidegger, Caputo 
begins to experiment with affirmation as an ‘ethics of dissemination’ in response to the 
suppression of the prophetic-jewish element in Heidegger’s narrative of a Greek Anfang. 
Caputo’s next publication, Against Ethics (1993), can be seen as a continuation but also 
systematic exploration of what in those two previous publications appeared as postscripts 
requiring thicker descriptions.  
 
This chapter, in part, elucidates and brings to the fore Caputo’s thinking of ethics and its 
relation to postmodernism and deconstruction. In the subsequent investigation, we consider 
a series of crucial distinctions that Caputo develops (Dionysus vs. the Rabbi, heteromorphism 
vs. heteronomism) in order to move beyond them to an ethical undecidability. Caputo argues 
for a ‘poetics of obligation’ which stands for an il/logical deconstructed ethics — an ethics 
sans ethics. This portion of the discussion goes to the heart of questions around sovereignty 
in its engagement with the modern and postmodern subject.  
 
As is often described, modern subjectivity conceives the human being as a sovereign 
autonomous self-determining agency. Ethics from Aristotle to Kant to Hegel and even 
Heidegger is too metaphysical for Caputo, and thus assumes an unbalanced prioritization of 
the subject in its capacity as an ethical agent. As an alternative, Caputo cultivates an ethics 
which arises from a deep encounter with the face of the other. Such an encounter is not 
dictated from the good, a categorical imperative, value theory or an originary ethics, but 
rather from a love of difference (Nietzsche and Deleuze) and from being held accountable to 
the law (nomos) of the other (hetero), which is justice (Levinas, Lyotard and Derrida). Caputo 
stages an ethics of obligation — stressing responsibility over metaphysics — on the scene of 
Kierkegaard’s re-telling of Abraham and Isaac in Fear and Trembling (1843). With postmodern 
                                                      
404 To understand deconstruction as ‘ethical’ is to recognize the undoubted, though complex, influence of 
Emmanuel Levinas on Derrida’s thought. For a landmark study in this regard, see Simon Critchley’s The Ethics of 
Deconstruction, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, [1992] 2014). 
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twists, poetic flare and irony, Caputo mimics Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author, Johannes 
de Silentio. In doing so, he attempts to re-articulate the semantics of sovereign autonomous 
individuality vis-à-vis the il/logical undecidability of platitudinous difference on the one 
hand, and the singularity of responsibility on the other.  
 
The manuscript for Against Ethics had just been completed when Derrida published his own 
reading of Kierkegaard’s story of Abraham in “Donner la mort” (1993).405 Somewhat 
fortuitously, Caputo’s portrayal of what a deconstructive reading of Kierkegaard might look 
like was affirmed by Derrida’s text. This confirmation received new energy in a slightly 
different direction, however, when astounding comments Derrida made emerged in his 
pseudo-autobiography, Circonfession (1991).406 There Derrida spoke for the first time of his 
own ‘religion.’ Was this an affirmation of Judaism (having been born a Jew in French speaking 
Algeria)? Or was it a ‘latinized’ Christianity or simply atheism (both were possibilities given 
his Western education in France)? Yes and no. Indeed, there was something religious about 
Derrida’s confession but it was not typically religious Caputo argued: “Derrida has a religion, 
a certain religion, his religion, and he speaks of God all the time…without religion and 
without religion’s God.”407 Derrida’s ‘confession’ seems to have been heard in a particularly 
providential way by Caputo, which culminated in a passionate, highly stylized, symbiotic 
performance of a certain Derridian religion and was presented in the meticulously detailed, 
and arguably career-defining book of his corpus, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida 
(1997).408 Although not yet explicating a ‘theology’ per se,409 but rather reflecting on the 
possibility of a ‘religious’ way to read deconstruction, Caputo’s Prayers and Tears it has been 
said “brought theology into Derrida.”410 Caputo’s startling and controversial claim took this 
a step even further. It was not simply that theology had resonances with deconstruction — 
                                                      
405 Caputo acknowledges this in the beginning of Against Ethics. See Jacques Derrida, David Willis (trans). The Gift 
of Death, 2nd Edition (London: University of Chicago Press, 2008).  
406 Jacques Derrida, Circonfession: cinquante-neuf periods et périphrases, in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, 
Jacques Derrida (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991). For the English translation see Jacques Derrida, Circumfession: Fifty-
nine Periods and Periphrases, in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1999 [1993]), pp. 153-155. 
407 See John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: religion without religion (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), pg. xviii. 
408 Capturing Caputo’s hybrid style in this work, Graham Ward writes: “Caputo performs Derrida. What he offers 
is not strictly exposition. It is as if Derrida’s texts were scores and Caputo’s task is to render the notation audible. 
Hence the style is, by turns, florid, playful, jubilant, and witty…As the book weaves into Derrida’s voice scriptural 
references and resonances…It performs a certain mysticism, a postmodern spirituality. It practices Derrida’s own 
inter- and intra-textuality.” See Graham Ward, “The Prayers And Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without 
Religion” in Modern Theology 15.4 (1999), pg. 505. 
409 Prayers and Tears does offer a series of what Caputo calls ‘Edifying Divertissements’ between chapters, however, 
which clearly point toward his later ‘radical’ theology. 
410 See Marko Zlomislić and Neal DeRoo (eds.) Cross and Khôra: Deconstruction and Christianity in the Work of John 
D. Caputo (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2010), pg. 1.  
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which other so-called ‘death of God’ theologians like Taylor, Altizer, Winquist and Raschke 
had already investigated411 — but rather that it was Derrida himself who was bringing 
theology into deconstruction all along.412 If the relationship between Derrida and theology 
was dominated by hermeneutics and a form of deconstructive writing from the 1960’s to the 
1990’s, Caputo’s book “blows this understanding of deconstruction and theology apart.”413 
What Caputo realizes is that there is something ‘more’ going on in deconstruction, something 
irreducible to writing, a faith and a religion that belong to Derrida even if he ‘rightly passes 
for an atheist,’ and the misunderstanding of which has led him to be read “less and less 
well.”414 A religion without religion, Derrida’s religion, points to a faith that exceeds the text. 
The force of this renewed reading of Derrida initiated a sea change in continental philosophy 
of religion studies. Indeed, its subsequent influence and impact can be seen in the numerous 
books and critical anthologies responding to it, as well as other publications on the 
relationship between Derrida and theology more generally. This was also thanks, in no small 
part, to the ‘Religion and Postmodernism’ conferences held at Villanova University, which 
Caputo helped organized from 1997 and in which Derrida participated until his death in 
2004.415 In the third part of the chapter, we begin an initial investigation into some of the 
religious themes deployed in Prayers and Tears, where a Derridian philosophy of religion sans 
religion starts to take shape.   
                                                      
411 See Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), Thomas J. J. 
Altizer, Deconstruction and Theology (Michigan: Crossroad, 1982) and Charles E. Winquist, Epiphanies of Darkness: 
Deconstruction in Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986). For a short but excellent review of so-called ‘Death 
of God’ theology, see Jeffrey Robbins editor’s introduction in John D. Caputo and Gianni Vatimo, After the Death 
of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 1-24.  
412 Zlomislić and DeRoo in Cross and Khôra write “If Taylor pioneered bringing Derrida into theology, it could be 
said that Caputo pioneered bringing theology into Derrida (although he adeptly shows that it was, in fact, Derrida 
who originally brought theology into Derrida).” Pg.1, fn.1.  
413 Clayton Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018), pg. 94. 
414 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. xxiii. 
415 First, with respect to the ‘Religion and Postmodernism’ conferences held at Villanova University, a number of 
volumes were published subsequent to each meeting. After the first conference in 1997, see John D. Caputo and 
Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); after the 
1999 conference, see John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael Scanlon (eds.), Questioning God (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001); for the third conference in 2001 see John D. Caputo and Michael Scanlon (eds.), 
Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); for the 
volume after the last conference held in 2003 just before Derrida’s death in 2004, see John D. Caputo and Michael 
Scanlon (eds.), Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). Two 
critical volumes worth mentioning which address Caputo directly; the first concerning his ‘religious’ reading of 
Derrida, see James H. Olthuis (ed.), Religion with/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo (London: 
Routledge, 2002) and the second, which looks at the impact of his oeuvre more generally, see Mark Dooley (ed.) A 
Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo in focus (Albany: State University of New York, 2003). For the most recent 
and fairly accessible introduction to Derrida and his relationship to theology see Steven Shakespeare, Derrida and 
Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009). It should also be noted that before the Villanova conferences a symposium 
was held on the small Italian island of Capri on February 28, 1994. This gathering is often thought of as the ‘return 
to religion’ in an otherwise unsympathetic climate of sentiments to religious themes held in the philosophical 
academy of continental Europe. Among those who convened to talk about religion were Jacques Derrida, Gianni 
Vattimo, Eugenio Trías and Hans-Georg Gadamer. See Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.) Religion 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) for the collection of important essays that were later translated and published.    
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Prayers and Tears opens a window to Derrida’s quasi-religion, an ir/religion or a religion sans 
religion that is structured more like a prayer or a confession. It lacks definitive content and 
utilizes strategies, imagery, tropes and religious texts to develop a ‘poetics of the human 
condition.’ In this work, Caputo is not interested in an attempt to assimilate theological texts 
into deconstruction.416 For example, when he reads Augustine’s question “What do I love 
when I love my God?”, he is reading Derrida’s repetition of Augustine in Circumfession with a 
poetic irony and humor to re-posit Augustine in a postmodern way. This is true of all the 
paradigmatic theological themes investigated in Prayers and Tears; from the God of apophatic 
theology, the Apocalyptic, the Messianic, the Gift and Circumcision — all are written under 
erasure, that is, by the il/logic of the sans. Since we are occupied with understanding this logic 
in the first place, it will be neither necessary nor possible to explore all of these religious 
tropes. In the next chapter, when we turn to Caputo’s ‘radical theology,’ some of these themes 
re-emerge as consistent points of reference when they are ‘organized’ under the name of God, 
or rather as ‘events’ that are ‘harbored by the name of God’ in Caputo’s vision of an anarchic 
kingdom. At that point they will require further comment and investigation. The concern for 
the discussion of Prayers and Tears in this particular chapter, then, is with deconstructing 
sovereign ‘Religion’ (in this case, Christianity) according to a very particular il/logic that does 
not terminate religion or its God(s), but brings to bear new possibilities and promises.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, the opportunity is taken to 
provide the reader with a short entry point into postmodernism and in particular 
deconstruction. Up to this point we have been invested in Caputo’s relationship with Martin 
Heidegger, with the appearance of Jacques Derrida functioning more or less as a kind of initial 
de-limiting effect on the discourse of Being. Since the majority of Caputo’s thinking about 
ethics, religion and theology (and indeed, all his subsequent writing) revolve around the 
erotics of the deconstructive style, it will be necessary to highlight a few key moments of 
historical and conceptual importance. Following this, we turn to Against Ethics, where Caputo 
fulfills his promise of providing an account of a postmodern ethics of obligation. This 
discussion unpacks a series of distinctions that replay the rhythms (il/logics) of 
deconstruction in the postmodern polemic par excellence — the sovereignty of the modern 
subject. The remainder of the chapter considers the category of the ‘apophatic’ or ‘negative 
theology’ as it is canvassed in Prayers and Tears. Here, negative theology’s ‘wounded 
                                                      
416 See his response to Martin Hägglund; Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion,” pg. 42. 
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language’ functions analogously to deconstruction’s il/logic of writing under erasure expressed 
by its desire for the wholly other. However, at the same time, negative theology still doesn’t 
quite understand that the wholly other is not found outside our experience of otherness, but 
must be located in the world of others. This leads to what Caputo calls ‘exemplarism’ and 
‘translatibility,’ two principle themes which ‘save’ the name ‘God’ by reminding that God as 
wholly other is also any other. These themes become crucial elements in re-writing the nature 
of authority (or sovereignty) in religious discourse, insofar as they alert the ‘determinable 
religions’ of their inability to claim the name of ‘God’ as their own.  
 
The main goal of this chapter, then, is to explore Caputo’s folding of the il/logic of the sans 
onto the discourses of ethics and religion. The extent to which the analyses below are correctly 
understood with respect to this il/logic will determine both the stakes involved in (and the 
efficacy of) Caputo’s contribution to continental philosophy of religion and theology in 
general. Simultaneously and just as important, these investigations continue to clarify the 
ethical-political implications for the theme of sovereignty in particular and, therefore, the 
gradual development of a radical theology that is politically conscious.  
 
II. Postmodernism, Derrida and Différance 
 
I. Postmodernism 
 
The story of the distinction between the modern and postmodern is variable, complex, and 
thus contested, with numerous attempts being made to articulate the kind of transformational 
epoch that we are experiencing.417 This transformation, can be characterized by either a 
radicalization of elements already seen within what we would call modernity, or could 
represent a radical disjuncture or break from the thinking of the past. For example, Jean-
François Lyotard, one of the first to recognize these changes, memorably extended Kant’s 
analysis of the sublime in Critique of Judgement.418 While Lyotard was narrating within the 
                                                      
417 For an account of how such a transformation takes place through the lens of a culturally sensitive hermeneutics, 
see Graham Ward, Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
see part two in particular, pp. 61-116. For classic texts in this regard, see Charles Taylor’s magnum opus, A Secular 
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Talal Assad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) and José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994).  
418 See Jean-François Lyotard, Geoffrey Bennington & Brian Masssumi (trans.) The Postmodern Condition: A Report 
on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). For his reading of Kant’s aesthetics see Jean-
François Lyotard, Elizabeth Rottenberg (trans.) Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime: Kant’s Critique of Judgement, 
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tradition in order to re-describe it, other thinkers saw the postmodern in terms that sought a 
far more diachronic disjuncture with the modern captured by words like “rupture,” “break” 
and “event.” The latter has often been associated with Michel de Certeau, Emmanuel Levinas 
and indeed, Jacques Derrida, though as we will see below this ‘anti-modern’ reading (at least 
in the case of Derrida) is a misreading of the employment of deconstruction. To keep the 
discussion of postmodernism within the bounds of a manageable scope, we must restrict it 
here to the realm of philosophy and religion, which is also to say one should recognize that 
what is called ‘postmodern’ ran itself into other (mostly aesthetic) fields too; architecture, art, 
literary studies, but also political theory and cultural studies.  
 
In relation to philosophy and religion, it can be said minimally that the postmodern was a 
reaction to the thinking that had at its roots the Newtonian-Cartesian humanism of the 
Enlightenment. Postmodernism charges the self-awareness in this tradition, which is 
supposedly obvious and evident, as being more a product of ideological construction than the 
humanist would like to admit. At the same time, internal to modernity itself, the Romanticism 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries understood this unqualified positivism not 
necessarily as an emancipation from religious medieval primitivism, but in fact as a hindrance 
to full human potential. Science and reason alone were unable to provide ‘something more.’ 
Romanticism, in its own reactionary gesture, looked to find transcendence in nature and art 
which could be linked with the transcendence of the beyond. This form of aesthetic 
trascendentalizing proved itself to be inadequate, for it required a teleo-logic — an end point 
or goal with which one could ultimately commune. Romanticism and the transcendental 
idealist tradition inaugurated by Kant reproduced the very thing that it had set out to reject, 
a logic of sameness mirrored on the image of the human being. The picture that Kant had left 
was one of abstraction and a priori thinking. Kantian ethics and morality had ‘form’ but lacked 
the content of concrete social and ethical life embedded in historical community. In response, 
Georg W. F. Hegel saw in Romanticism’s desire to transcend itself, the very act of 
transcending which allowed the realization of a truer-self. This could only occur, however, if 
Reason’s necessity was to unfold in time and historical circumstance, and in a continual 
dialectical process of self-transcendence — which is what he meant by ‘Absolute Spirit.’ All 
this was to work itself out within immanence, that is, within the implicit potentiality of human 
                                                      
23-29 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). See also, Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings 
on the Postmodern 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 1998).  
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life. The Hegelian dialectic had not only ‘immanentized’ the quest for transcendence, but it 
had also systematized it.419 
 
The “System” of historical unfolding of Reason had domesticated religious faith according to 
the protestations of the proto-postmodern prophet, Søren Kierkegaard.420 Christendom had 
neglected a more authentic faith of the ‘singular individual’ by reducing Christianity to the 
History of a relentless unfolding of rationality in time. Conversely, according to Kierkegaard, 
Christianity was to be understood as the suspension of time; not of time unfolding in an 
‘imaginative representation’ (Vorstellung) but of the Eternal breaking into time. If Hegel 
offered a solution to what he called ‘the unhappy consciousness’421 inherent in Romanticism’s 
reaction to modernity (through the immanent and continuous self-transcending of dialectic 
Spirit), and if Kierkegaard offered a ‘non-solution’ through the intensification of 
‘unhappiness’ — the leap of faith into the Absurd — then it was Martin Heidegger who 
formalized this non-solution for philosophy. Caputo observes: “What Heidegger’s ‘existential 
analytic’ did with Kierkegaard in Being and Time can be variously described as secularizing 
Kierkegaard’s Christian-existential analysis by dropping the religious element, formalizing it 
by dropping the Christian content and ontologizing it by turning existence or being-possible 
into a feature or structure of our Being.”422  
 
Heidegger, as we saw in the previous chapter, is one of the chief protagonists in the 
development of postmodernity for Jacques Derrida. If we recall, it was Heidegger’s 
ontological difference (Being-being) of which ‘the West’ had become forgetful. The 
forgetfulness of being, or rather, its difference constitutes the slippage of onto-theology, 
because it treats Being (God) as an object among beings. While the early Heidegger thought 
that we should return to the self-questionability of our own ‘being-toward-death’ 
                                                      
419 This rapid account being given runs along a widely accepted tradition of reception, which finds the seeds of 
nationalistic movements in Romanticism. For three accounts often cited, liberal, conservative and Marxist see, 
respectively, Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism: The A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts (1965); Eric Voegelin, 
Hitler and the Germans ([1933-38], 2003) and Georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason ([1952], 1980). For an analysis 
which contests aspects of this narrative, see Jayne Svenungsson, Stephen Donovan (trans.) Divining History: 
prophetism, messianism and the development of the spirit (New York: Berghahn, [2014] 2016), pp. 64-104, 108-117.   
420 I am here following parts of an account Caputo has given in multiple publications. We have already encountered 
Kierkegaard in Caputo’s more scholarly Radical Hermeneutics and we will see more below in Against Ethics. For 
some more popular examples see his On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 49-55 and How to Read Kierkegaard 
(London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). 
421 See “Chapter IV.B: Freedom of self-consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness” in 
Georg W. F. Hegel, A.V. Miller (trans.) Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 119-
138. 
422 John D. Caputo, Hermeneutics: Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information (London: Pelican, 2018), pg. 46, 
original emphasis. For the more scholarly account of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kierkegaard see chapter three 
of Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 60-92.  
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(Kierkegaard’s standing before God), or as Caputo says, ‘embracing the flux of existence,’ the 
late Heidegger would become himself forgetful of the so-called ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ by 
seeking Being in its originary coming to presence in the manner of the early Greeks. Derrida 
would see in the charge that western thought had collapsed into onto-theologic, the same 
hegemony over thinking in Heidegger’s mythology of originary Being.  
 
Alternatively, for Derrida, postmodernism (though he would strategically never use this word 
to describe his work) would not forge ahead naively, leaving modernity in the past, but 
neither could it be an iconoclastic explosion of modern categories into synthetic plenitudes. 
To put it in the language of Heidegger, postmodernism for Derrida would not consist in 
retrieving the originary Being of beings or the dissolution of being, but rather in the honoring 
of difference between them as such.423 Given this reading, which will be further clarified 
throughout the remainder of this study, Derrida would concur with Lyotard’s description of 
the postmodern: it “is not a new age, it is the rewriting of some features modernity had tried 
or pretended to gain … But such a re-writing, as has already been said, was for a long time 
active within modernity itself.”424 Conscientious readers of Derrida will notice that almost all 
his writings are a constant inter-pretation with figures of the philosophical and literary canon, 
they are never approached from the outside, as it were, but always re-worked from within.  
 
This brings us to the central contribution of Derrida to postmodern thought; deconstruction 
and that menacingly esoteric term, différance. It must be said, again, that these brief remarks 
are merely to prime the reader for the subsequent discussion that delves deeper into the 
various cites of Caputo’s religious reading of deconstruction. Indeed, there are many lucid 
accounts that are of far greater nuance than the sketch provided below.425  
 
 
                                                      
423 The distinction has not been made in the text, but it is worth mentioning the intentional use of the word 
‘postmodern’ or ‘postmodernism’ in opposition to ‘postmodernity.’ The former denotes the critical stance to the 
modern that has been described in this section and which constitutes not a hard break with modernity but is rather 
a continuous moment in contemporary thought. Postmodernity, however, might be described as the way to name 
certain cultural conditions in which postmodernism as a philosophical position becomes possible. As a ‘period 
concept’, Graham Ward suggests, there seem to be indications that it is no longer a cultural emphasis as it was, 
say, in the 1970’s and 1980’s. For more on the postmodern-postmodernity distinction see Ward in his editor’s 
“Introduction” to The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. xxii-xxvi. 
424 See Jean François Lyotard, “Rewriting Modernity” in Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel Bowlby (trans.), The 
Inhuman: Reflections on Time (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pg. 34. 
425 A sampling of introductions to Derrida’s thought might include: Caputo’s acclaimed, Deconstruction in a 
Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), where his extensive 
commentary follows a roundtable discussion with Derrida. See also, Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993) and Niall Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004).  
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II. Derrida 
 
Derrida’s earlier work was intimately involved in discussions related to structuralist theories 
of language and phenomenological accounts of meaning.426 In these early writings, Derrida 
controversially argued that the way meaning had traditionally been constituted assumed a 
realm of ‘ideality’ which could be found behind language or text.427 For him, this is expressed 
in the long Western tradition going back to Plato, where speech was given priority over 
writing.428 The former allows immediate access to meaning by virtue of its presence in actual 
present time, while writing, on the other hand, is susceptible to numerous interpretations, 
translation errors, and false contextual readings such that it could not be trusted to maintain 
the author’s original intention over the course of history. This preference afforded to 
immediacy of meaning, which Derrida called a ‘metaphysics of presence’ and ‘logocentricism’ 
(and which is essentially his chief debt to Heidegger),429 is to be understood as illusory. For 
even the claim itself — that ideal meaning exists in a pure realm of thought — would have to 
be constructed with a series of words and sentences that necessarily take time to construct 
and make intelligible. Deconstruction, therefore, involves a strategic reversal of the speech-
writing dyad. If the idea that pure meaning exists and can be communicated by speech, and 
that this very idea must be communicated by the construction of intelligible sentences, then it 
                                                      
426 The philosophy that was in vogue in Paris of the 1950’s and 60’s was phenomenology, and Derrida was deeply 
influenced by this way of doing philosophy. His Master’s thesis (Mémoire) from 1953-54, though only published in 
1990, was an intensive study of Husserl. See The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy (2003). See also his three 
early essays, originally published in French in 1967: Writing and Difference (1967), Of Grammatology (1967) and Speech 
and Phenomena (1967), as well as Dissemination (1972) and Margins of Philosophy (1972).  
427 The height of controversy over Derrida’s work culminated in the so-called ‘Cambridge Affair.’ On the occasion 
of awarding Derrida an honorary degree, 204 academics at Cambridge University attempted to block the award 
by signing a petition. After Derrida was eventually awarded the degree an interview was published in which he 
reflected on the events that took place: See Jacques Derrida, Christopher Johnson and Marian Jeanneret (trans.) 
“An ‘Interview’ with Jacques Derrida” in The Cambridge Review 113, no. 2318 (Oct, 1992), pp. 131-139. This reflection 
was also collected in Jacques Derrida, Elisabeth Weber (ed.) Points (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 
where he describes the various misrepresentations of his work, see pp. 422-54. 
428 There have been a number of critical voices directed toward Derrida’s reading of Plato, perhaps the most 
trenchant, yet deeply nuanced reading from a theological perspective is Catherine Pickstock, in her seminal 
publication, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (London: Blackwell, 1998). For a defense of 
Derrida from the critiques of Pickstock as well as John Milbank, see Guy Collins, “Defending Derrida: A Response 
to Milbank and Pickstock” in Scottish Journal of Philosophy 54.3 (Aug, 2001), pp. 344-365.  
429 The previous chapter noted the privileging of presence that required questioning within the Western tradition, 
which is what Heidegger meant by Destruktion. The sense of radical questioning of this metaphysics of presence is 
what Derrida borrows from Heidegger with his deployment of the word ‘deconstruction.’ However, Derrida 
would be less sympathetic toward the mythological operation in Heidegger, which enacts a logic of reversal that 
attempts to peel away history to get to a supposed kernel of originary thought. Deconstruction, rather, is not 
something to be ‘applied’ to the tradition, it is rather a function of it, an inherent dynamic in language that 
announces itself, and toward which are to be attentive. In a rare piece of lucid text, “A Letter to a Japanese Friend” 
(1983), Derrida clarifies what he means: “deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique … It is not an analysis 
in particular because the dismantling of a structure is not a regression toward a simple element, toward an 
indissoluble origin…No more is it a critique, in a general or in a Kantian sense. The instance of krinein or krisis 
(decision, choice, judgement, discernment) is itself, as is all the apparatus of transcendental critique, one of the 
essential ‘themes’ and ‘objects’ of deconstruction.” See Jacques Derrida “A Letter to a Japanese Friend” in David 
Wood and Robert Bernasconi, Derrida and Différance (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pg. 3.  
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is not speech contra writing that holds the key to understanding meaning, but rather writing 
itself. The only way to get at any unified meaning would be through language. But language 
itself is not a single thing, it arises out of a series of distinctions between letters, words and 
sentences, and only in relation to other letters, words or sentences, can it communicate any 
constructed sense or meaning. The implications of this are clear: if meaning does not exist 
‘ideally’ but is a construction, it can also be ‘deconstructed.’ Any assumed unity of meaning, 
therefore, is in fact an act of faith. Steven Shakespeare puts it well: “Even if a speaker feels 
absolutely sure of their meaning and the words chosen to express them, they are entering into 
a pact with language that preceded them, and with multiple future contexts they cannot 
control.”430  
 
The decisive (and divisive) move within deconstruction — which those who would charge 
Derrida for being an anti-modernist consistently neglect — is that this skepticism over 
presence or ideal meaning is not an arbitrary assertion as if his point was merely to disrupt 
for the sake of disruption. Rather, and here is announced something of the strange ‘logic’ of 
deconstruction, Derrida sees the possibility of disruption as constitutive of the very thing it is 
disrupting. In the example of speech and writing, we see that the seemingly displaced element 
(writing) is not only difficult to eradicate with respect to ideal speech, but in fact reappears at 
the very center of speech. This dyadic structure of that which perceives itself to be the center, 
only to be disrupted by the very thing that makes it possible, is what Derrida ‘performs’ 
throughout his writing, thereby demonstrating deconstruction as a process or performance 
rather than a ‘concept’ to be grasped or apprehended. One can also observe the tension that 
begins to emerge here with respect to Christianity and Judaism. The Greek preference for the 
Word (logos) that makes its way into Christianity, condemns the ‘dead-letter’ (St. Paul) of the 
Jewish tradition, and so the concern for hierarchies and the way power accumulates is one of 
the main concerns of deconstruction, as we will see especially with Caputo’s reading of 
religion.  
 
III. Différance 
 
But how does one name this ‘logic’ or performance where the center or hierarchal element 
(presence, logos) is invaded by the periphery, not simply to replace it but to exhibit its 
instability? Derrida turns to the misspelled word différance to signal this penetration of 
                                                      
430 Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology, pg. 24. Emphasis added. 
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sameness by difference without the latter simply replacing the former. The disruption of 
presence or ideal meaning, we have seen, has to do with time and space. The French terms to 
’differ’ and ‘defer,’ which we can also hear in English, Derrida combines into a newly coined 
word, différance. Through this coinage he is able to signal simultaneously the structure of 
temporal delay and spatial difference. However, it may be asked, is not the nomination of 
temporal delay and spatial difference by the word ‘différance’ committing itself to the danger 
of having named a new origin, transcendental idea, organizing principle or an Ursprache for 
deconstruction? The implications of this question are diverted by Derrida because he claims 
that the word différance itself resists ultimate phonic or semantic certainty. We are always 
uncertain of its pronunciation as well as if it is at any one time referring to the temporal act of 
‘deference’ or the spatiality of ‘difference’. Rather, we can say that it describes neither an 
origin nor a transcendental, but rather a process of time and change. Through this creative 
word-play, Derrida paradoxically offers a description of the periphery as the origin and 
writing as the speech.431  
 
As an important segue-way into Caputo’s argument in Against Ethics, a consideration of 
Derrida’s reading of Husserl, first from his introduction to the latter’s Origins of Geometry and 
then from Speech and Phenomena, will help to clarify the notion of différance and will begin to 
indicate it’s relation with autonomous subjectivity — arguably the apogee of tension between 
the modern and postmodern.432 However, although it is often said that the postmodern 
obliterates the autonomous subject, we will see that this is only half the story with respect to 
Caputo and Derrida.  
 
The place of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is fundamental to the development of continental 
philosophy in the twentieth century. His project of establishing phenomenology as a 
fundamental science can, in many ways, be considered as a major forerunner in the 
development of postmodern continental philosophy of religion. It was in this milieu of 
Husserl’s phenomenology that Derrida began his early investigations into language.433 
                                                      
431 Derrida elaborated this word in various places throughout his oeuvre, most notably see Jacques Derrida, Alan 
Bass (trans.) Positions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), Jacques Derrida, David B. Allison & Newton 
Garver (trans.) Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973) and “Différance” in Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.) Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1982). 
432 For the technical discussion from which the description below is drawn, see Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 
120-152. 
433 The influence of Husserl’s work is, of course, not limited to Derrida but includes many others: from Heidegger 
(a former student), to Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion, to name 
only a few prominent figures. 
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Husserl inaugurates a genuine attempt to move beyond the instability of Kant and Neo-
Kantianism that had dominated German philosophy for so long. The problem that Husserl 
wanted to attend to, which the tradition set out by Kant had left ultimately unresolved, was 
how to know the knowing self. Kant had sought to resolve the dilemma between experience 
(objectivity) and the knowing subject (subjectivity) by articulating that the former could only 
become known by means of the application of a priori principles by the latter. These principles 
were carried out by the transcendental ego in order to make objective knowledge possible, 
but crucially, the ego itself could not be known as such. To remedy the instability of these 
claims — like how the objective truth of mathematical theorems comes to be true for the 
transcendental ego — Husserl turned to phenomenology, that is, to the way in which 
‘phenomena’ appear to consciousness. This would entail turning the transcendental ego itself 
into the object of intuition.  
 
Husserl’s solution was that meaning and objective truth were constituted by an immediately 
self-present subjectivity. However, this still raised a tension within phenomenology, namely, 
the relationship between the self-present Self and time. If the Self is immediately present to 
itself then it would follow that the Self constitutes time without the need for the empirical 
phenomena of worldly time. Sensitive to this tension, Husserl says that within the concept of 
the Self there still remains an experience of ‘protention’ and ‘retention’, future and past, so 
that the Self can still articulate ideal truth to itself. Geometric truth, for example, which is an 
objective ideal, needs to be discovered in historical time and then can be communicated by 
language and continually rediscovered by the reactivation of its ideal meaning. But, as we 
saw above, Derrida’s understanding of language would betray the stability of communicated 
meaning in Husserl’s theory of constitution. In these initial observations from his introduction 
to the Origin of Geometry, Derrida is hesitant about the possibility of pure ideality that requires 
time and language. This is because time and language are also precisely pure ideality’s 
‘condition of impossibility’ — they make ideal meaning but also, because of différance, they 
exceed and therefore also ‘unmake’ it. Consequently, Derrida subjects Husserl’s desire for a 
transcendental history with what Caputo calls a “grammatological reduction”— the necessary 
work of language in the communication of ideal meaning.434    
 
                                                      
434 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pg. 123 and for the rest of Derrida’s reading of the Origin of Geometry see pp. 123-
130. 
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To extend this initial critique of phenomenology, Derrida turns more explicitly to Husserl’s 
theory of signs in Speech and Phenomena, but now having satisfied a delimitation of 
transcendental a priori history, he wants to show that even the monological interiority of 
transcendental consciousness also requires signs to produce meaning. By this move Derrida 
will radically expose the Western tradition of subjectivity in a way that marks a turning point 
in the trajectory of continental philosophy, which is possibly why, as Caputo comments, “he 
[Derrida] described Speech and Phenomena as the work he valued most.”435  
 
Husserl distinguishes between two modes of the sign, the indication (Anzeigen) and the 
expression (Ausdruck). In the former, meaning is contingent to an external reality that the sign 
represents, but in the latter meaning can be immediately present to consciousness to the extent 
that it is directed toward an ideal object. Signs as expressions are the closest form to pure 
communicated meaning of interior transcendental life.436 In this theory of signification 
Derrida argues that for Husserl the sign as expression is able alone to communicate the idea 
of full self-presence, but only by denying the essential nature of the sign, that is, the possibility 
of repetition. For Derrida, the very nature of the sign is that it must be repeatable in order to 
carry meaning across time, otherwise it would be a momentary occurrence that could never 
be known. The paradox and irony that Husserl’s theory establishes is that in order to make 
the distinction between full-intuited ideal meaning and empirical reality one would need the 
communicated repeatability of signs, but if this is so, then one would lose the sense of ideal 
meaning because the very nature of signs is their repeatability, which is needed in order to 
communicate that ‘ideal’ meaning.437  
 
To bring this discussion above the surface of semiotics, one can discern some initial 
consequences of Derrida’s critique and radicalization of Husserl’s phenomenology for 
subjectivity. The Cartesian declaration “I am” is instructive.438 To say ‘I am’ takes both time to 
say and requires the use of language. The “I” is not immediately present in pure self-presence, 
otherwise we would not be able to say it. Husserl wanted to distinguish between pure internal 
speech unaffected by empirical realities. Such a view of subjectivity, however, only silences 
speech and leaves it unknown (mute). According to Derrida, the notion of difference and time 
(différance) goes to the core of properly articulating the self. In order to be able to have 
                                                      
435 Ibid., pg. 131. 
436 Ibid., pp. 131-132. 
437 Ibid., pp. 132-138. 
438 Derrida is of course writing with reference to Husserl’s later work which is called Cartesian Meditations (1931), 
following René Descartes.  
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subjectivity, an “I am,” we need time to say it, and the signs we use need to be repeatable to 
secure it as a recognizable meaning. By this quasi-logic of différance, Derrida complicates the 
notion of origins and binaries. In the case of subjectivity what becomes evident is that the 
sovereign self is not the starting point, but is rather an effect of a spatial and temporal 
production. The self, according to différance, is a product of repetition, viz., “Repetition as a 
nonoriginary origin.”439 However, différance is not a new transcendental ‘in a strict Kantian 
sense,’ as we have seen above, it is at best a quasi-transcendental because insofar as it is the 
condition for meaning, it is also the condition for unmeaning, that is, meaning sans meaning 
— the il/logic of the sans. 
 
To further engage the results of Derrida’s postmodern interpretation of Husserl and to locate 
it with respect to other sources, we turn now to Caputo’s reading of ethical subjectivity in 
Against Ethics.  
 
III. Ethics sans Ethics 
 
Caputo’s early career had been spent wrestling with and critiquing various received 
paradigms of modernity. From the start he had begun with religion (with which he was most 
familiar)440 by attempting to bring to an end neo-Thomist readings of Heidegger which 
claimed to circumvent the charge of Seinsvergessenheit.441 He argued one would have to read 
Aquinas through a certain Heideggerian Meister Eckhart.442 Then from the late 80’s — 
coinciding with the rise of the French postmodernists and newly introduced philosophical as 
well as historical critiques of Heidegger’s association with the National Socialists — he began 
his long relationship with Derrida, which culminated simultaneously in a critique of 
hermeneutics and phenomenology and a more radical affirmation of hermeneutics more 
generally.443  
 
                                                      
439 Ibid., pg. 139.  
440 In his quasi-biography, Hoping Against Hope (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), Caputo tells of his early life in 
the ‘bosum of the Catholic Church,’ having been an altar boy, attending a Catholic school, and subsequently 
entering the Novitiate before joining a Catholic order called “De LaSalle Brothers” (or the Fratres Scholarum 
Christianarum F.S.C. “The Brothers of the Christian Schools”), which he left after his undergraduate studies to 
pursue academia. Reflecting on these years Caputo writes, “I had decided to leave the De LaSalle Brothers to 
pursue the life of the philosopher. But as it turned out, my religious life followed me out the door and pursued me 
the rest of my life, unless it was I who pursued it.” Pg. 104. 
441 See chapter three above. 
442 See Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (1978) 
443 See Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (1987) 
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After experimenting in the concluding chapters of Radical Hermeneutics with an ‘ethics of 
dissemination,’ coupled with his no simple departure from Heidegger in the early 90’s444 — 
an effort in part to reenergize the suppressed ‘jewish’ element in the latter’s thought — Caputo 
resolved to take on the question of ethics. If anything, these examples indicate that Caputo is 
certainly no polemicist and that his work always involves a ‘double movement’ or affirmation. 
That this is no less the case in Against Ethics, therefore, should come as no surprise. The project 
of an ethics sans ethics arrives at a point where Caputo needed to interrogate a space that his 
work up to that point had left without substantial content. The earlier delimitations of the 
mythological narrative of Being’s Anfang indicated how Heidegger had left out the thematics 
of justice and mercy in his narrow reading of the New Testament. Coupled with this, the 
influence of the postmodernists like Derrida and Lyotard — who offered resources toward 
his ‘ethics of dissemination’ — was still somewhat controversial in the intellectual climate of 
the early nineties. It followed, then, that the Heideggerian break and the Derridian embrace 
he had pursued required a thicker (ethical) description.   
 
Against Ethics can be read not only as an attempt to provide an answer in the midst of this 
historical-philosophical milieu, but also as a logical step in the context of Caputo’s own 
project. More specifically, for our purposes, the significance of Against Ethics is revealed in a 
tense distinction between two sets of postmodern sources, (heteromorphism vs. 
heteronomism) which render a synthesis (though not of a Hegelian sort) with respect to ethical 
subjectivity. In the midst of this tension, which holds together Nietzsche, Deleuze, Guattari 
on the one hand, and Levinas, Lyotard and Derrida on the other, Caputo inserts 
Kierkegaardian ‘undecidability.’ The aim of this undecidability is to keep this tension in place. 
However, as we will see below, in this publication the undecidable lapses into indecision due 
to a certain unintended and metaphysical Nietzschean-tragic arc with which Caputo frames 
his discussion. Although from the beginning it is stated that “Undecidability does not detract 
from the urgency of decision; it simply underlines the difficulty,”445 an uneasy preference for 
Nietzschean faith over Kierkegaardian faith is discerned throughout the text. Caputo goes on 
to later admit that he underplayed the Derridian undecidability between these positions.446 In 
the third and final section of the chapter, it is suggested that only a Derridian-religious 
reformulation of this argument as set out in Prayers and Tears, can adequately approximate 
not only his position on ethics but also on religious faith.   
                                                      
444 See Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (1993) 
445 Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 5. 
446 See Keith Putt, “What do I love when I love my God? An Interview with John D. Caputo” in James H. Olthuis 
(ed.) Religion with/out Religion: the prayers and tears of John D. Caputo (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 155-157. 
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I. Against Ethics 
 
Caputo tersely declares that he has had it with ethics.447 Ethical foundationalism, 
emblematically represented by Kant and contemporary Kantians, as well as ethical theories 
of value are all shortcuts. They do not take adequate account of the facticity and hermeneutic 
situatedness of life. More importantly, moral action being derived from Law produces the 
solipsistic and auto-authenticating monological self: “the law that reason obeys is reason’s 
own law, so it does not … bend its knee to anything ‘other’ (heteros) but offers its respects to 
itself (autos), like man bowing to himself in the mirror.”448 Instead, he is interested in 
obligation, which “is a kind of skandalon for ethics, which makes ethics blush, which ethics 
must reject or expel in order to maintain its good name, for ethics is ‘philosophy,’ a certain 
episteme.”449 Following Lyotard, Levinas, and Kierkegaard’s Abraham, obligation is not a 
prescription but something that ‘happens’ to us, it gives (es gibt) itself. We are always 
“necessarily structurally, on the receiving end of a command, dominated by its transcendence, 
blinded by its power.”450 Where ethics subsists in the element of autonomy, it says ‘I can’ (ich 
kann), where an ethics of obligation subsists in the element of heteronomy, it says ‘here I am’ 
(me voici). But Caputo quickly voices his reservations about an infinite transcendence; Levinas 
is “too pious,” he writes, too caught up in a description of infinity that suffocates us.451 To this 
Caputo introduces a Nietzschean ‘impiety’; the tragic disinterest of the expanding cosmos to 
the fate of mortal humanity. It is worth citing the famous text he quotes from Will to Power 
(1901) in full: 
 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed 
into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts 
invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world 
history,” but nevertheless it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, 
the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die.452 
 
                                                      
447 Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 1. 
448 Ibid., pg. 13.  
449 Ibid., pg. 5.  
450 Ibid., pg. 14. 
451 Ibid., pg. 19.  
452 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Daniel Breazeale (ed. & trans.) Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks 
of the Early 1870s (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979), pg. 79, cited in Ibid., pg. 16. 
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This becomes, as Merold Westphal notes, something of a credo for Caputo.453 We can never 
be content with ethics, not even with Levinas’s pious infinity, for when “you and I stand on 
the surface of the little star and shout, ‘racism is unjust.’ The cosmos yawns and takes another 
spin.”454 Obligation must, therefore, fend for itself without the securities of ethics or the 
infinity that surpasses totality. The problem with Caputo’s pronouncement here is that it 
comes across as a dogmatic statement, that the reality is we are all going to die and there is 
nothing beyond this reality. The more deconstructive answer would have been to say that this 
is but another interpretation that we must continue to confront. As mentioned above, this is an 
unintended consequence of the way he has structured his argument because at other times he 
seems to adopt a more agnostic stance. For example, drawing from Blanchot he associates 
obligation with the ‘disaster,’ but points out that he wants to distinguish from Blanchot by not 
talking about ‘the disaster’ of obligation in the singular, but rather of ‘disasters’, in the plural. 
On this reading, it is not the one, singular (cosmological) meta-disaster out of which obligation 
arises, but rather “concrete and actual disasters, the sort that can be measured in terms of 
failure, loss, and catastrophic destruction.” He goes further; “What is a disaster?... Is it the 
voice of God sounding through the little ones of the earth? Or is it nothing more than the 
rumble of cosmic forces…signifying nothing? I do not know. It is beyond me.”455  
 
II. Heteromorphism vs Heteronomism 
 
The drowning out of the Kierkegaardian undecidable against the back-drop of the 
Nietzschean disaster meta-narrative should be understood as a unique postmodern tension 
which — contra Kantian a priori transcendentalism and Hegelian suppression of difference — 
constitutes Caputo’s vision for ethical subjectivity. In chapter three of Against Ethics, 
“Dionysus vs. The Rabbi,”456 Caputo stages the dichotomy of postmodern sources of 
difference that attract his sympathies. They are composed, on the one hand, of the ‘eruptive 
rupture’ of energies of the ‘heteromorphosists,’ and on the other, by the ‘disruptive ruptures’ 
of something alter and foreign of the ‘heteronomologists’. Both are of equal importance, for 
both offer unique philosophies of difference. But it is clear that Caputo doesn’t want to have 
to decide between the two.457 Heteromorphism is marked by the celebration of pluralities. The 
                                                      
453 See Merold Westphal, “Review Essay” in Philosophy and Social Criticism 23.4 (1997), pg. 94.  
454 Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 17.  
455 Ibid., pg. 28.  
456 The title of the chapter is a deliberate reference to Derrida’s 1964 essay, where he distinguishes between ‘the 
Jew’ and ‘the poet.’ See Jacques Derrida, “Edmund Jabes and the Question of the Book” in Alan Bass (ed. & trans.) 
Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 77-96. 
457 Caputo notes that he is making a similar analogy here to that identified by Edith Wyschogrod, where in 
postmodernism there exists a ‘fault line’ between philosophies of difference (Derrida, Levinas, Blanchot) and 
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chief figure of this point of view, whose argument is “the opening and perhaps even defining 
gesture of poststructuralism,”458 is Derrida’s contemporary Gilles Deleuze.459 Deleuze affirms 
affirmation, that is, a philosophy of affirmation that rejects any construction of subjectivity 
that places the will under surveillance or binds it to some mode of being or action. Instead of 
a ‘reactive will’ which responds and is a function of other forces, a philosophy of affirmation 
issues out of pure willing, untethered by anything that might hold it down. “In the philosophy 
of affirmation Being, truth, and reality are nothing more than inventions of the will, nothing 
more than fictions…The active will can never suffer the pain of opposition [referring to 
Hegelian negation]; it never groans under the weight of Being.”460 The will that affirms 
nothing other than itself, indeed, affirms nothing other but itself. Being is affirmation. What it 
means ‘to be’ means to affirm affirmation or becoming. It is in this entropic subjective 
dissipation that the sense of Nieztsche’s Dionysian dance is recognized. 
 
For Caputo, and others who have correctly pointed out, this version of Nietzsche that Deleuze 
espouses is shot through with metaphysical weight. It may deny reactive forces that attempt 
to enslave the will, it may deliver an even greater plurality of voices, but these voices speak 
only insofar as the will has willed the speaking. There is in Deleuze, ultimately, a metaphysical 
slippage into a solipsism of pure unmediated act of willing. Caputo welcomes this ‘style’461 of 
Nietzsche, in as much as it resists totalizing forces through the affirmation of the differential. 
However, again, he is haunted by the more tragic Nietzschean vision — the 
“distrastronomical Nietzsche, the one for whom ‘difference’ does not mean the gay play of 
egalitarian forces”462 which tries to evade the negation of opposites, but rather the Nietzsche 
which “embraces opposition ‘tragically,’ to an ‘extreme’ that makes dialectical progress 
absurd.”463 Deleuze misunderstands Nietzsche according to Caputo, because he thinks 
Nietzsche’s objection to Hegel is that the latter conceived difference in terms of opposition, 
when in fact, it is not opposition that Nietzsche rejects, but rather its rationalization. Instead, 
Nietzsche wants to ‘aesthetically justify’ opposition, that is, to embrace the “merciless 
                                                      
philosophies of plenum (Deleuze, Guattari, Genet). See Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning 
Moral Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990). Crucially for Caputo, as the trajectory of this study will 
show, he argues that Derrida (along with Lyotard) is not so easily classified as a philosopher of difference, but 
should rather be situated in between. See Caputo’s footnote, Against Ethics, fn. 63. pg. 263. 
458 Ibid., pg. 44.  
459 Caputo draws from Deleuze’s infamous study, Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). See Gilles Deleuze, Hugh 
Tomlinson (trans.) Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002). 
460 Ibid., pg. 45.  
461 As Derrida reminds, there are indeed various ways, ‘styles’, to read Nietzsche; see Jacques Derrida, Barbara 
Harlow (trans.) Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978). 
462 Ibid., pg. 49.  
463 Ibid. 
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destruction of whatever is produced” by the Hegelian dialectic.464 On this more radicalized 
version of Nietzsche, Caputo recognizes an equally totalizing tendency of thought, similar to 
Hegel but in the opposite (negative) direction. We embrace the totality of the disaster, and 
only through brief moments of beauty (aesthetics) or divinization (Vergötternung) is the 
tragedy in this drama justified. 
 
The ecstatic, disseminative trajectory of the Deleuzian subject, which resists the ‘order of rank’ 
in favor of a more democratic and egalitarian de-divinized anarchy of forces is undermined 
not only by a too autonomic and metaphysical solipsism, but also by the tragic embrace of 
meaningless opposition or negation. To be clear: for Caputo, this first heteromorphic influence 
of ethical subjectivity 1) contributes to an affirmation of difference that rejects the fallacy of 
external forces (God, Law, etc.) that coerce and enslave. 2) Because of the ‘purity’ of will and 
act in this view, Deleuze’s Nietzsche is tempered by a more radical Nietzsche who does not 
disapprove of Hegelian dialectics as such, but rather the rationalization of difference 
conceived as opposition. 3) In response, Nietzsche is recovered in the name of a less joyous 
celebration of difference that replaces opposition by a more tragic embrace of the destructive 
effects of negation. What these positions clearly neglect, however, is a proper concern for what 
is other: “heteromorphic pluralism is in fact quietly stealing away from the other…If Deleuze 
wants difference without the opposition of the other, Nietzsche loves the battle with the 
other.”465 
 
Heteromorphic subjectivity is characterized by a phallocentric ‘discharge’, ‘overflow’ and 
‘plenitude’ from the eruptive ruptures of internal energies. Conversely, heteronomism is almost 
its exact opposite. In heteronomic subjectivity, autonomy is disrupted not internally but from 
without. Here, pace Deleuze, the subject is not God as in actus purus but rather ‘held hostage’ 
by the other, to let the other come over me and to let the other speak. Caputo formulates the 
tension in this way: 
 
The difference…is the difference between alius and alter. Alius means different in the 
sense of diversitas, discepans, dissension. Different people do different things (alii alia 
faciunt), and they do them differently (aliter). Alius is very heteromorphic. Alter, on the 
other hand, means the other one of two, the other one, with a force of singularity, not 
                                                      
464 Ibid., pg. 51. 
465 Ibid., pg. 56.  
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multiplicity, not one more among many others, but just one, just that one, over there. 
Alterity means being one-on-one with the other (der Andere).466 
 
Heteronomic subjectivity here has a clear Abrahamic veneer, insofar as it is posited under the 
law (nomos) — the law of obligation.467 In this context, it follows that the crucial influences for 
heteronomic difference are the ‘jewish-rabbinic’ figures (as Caputo calls them) of Lyotard, 
Derrida and Levinas. Levinas is central for both Lyotard and Derrida, but they are different 
in that they also respect the plurality of difference, whereas in Levinas, Caputo attributes a 
certain “neo-Neoplatonism of being-to-excess which lacks the restraint of différance.”468 
Caputo locates his own vision for ethics in between Deleuze-Nietzsche and Levinas, a 
‘Dionysiac rabbi,’ he says, but without a desire to synthesize the two into a higher unity. The 
‘jewgreek’ combination of these postmodern sources that he wants to advance for his 
description of ethical subjectivity is, therefore, an amalgamation of Lyotard and Derrida, who 
for him balance the heteromorphic and heteronomic positions of postmodern difference. 
“Deconstruction,” he writes, “is excessively heteromorphic, and not a little heteronomic.”469 
 
Given the plurality of forces that make up who we are (who am I?), and the situations that 
call upon us from the other (here I am!), how are we to act? The problem of ethical action is 
the classic problem of judgement, which is to ask the question: how one is to judge? In chapter 
five of Against Ethics, Caputo turns to Lyotard and Aristotle to set-up the problematic of 
Aristotelean phronesis. In the paradigm of phronesis the singularity of the situation (the 
event)470 “requires the discernment to see how the law is to be brought to bear upon it.”471 But 
the ‘bringing to bear of the law’ invites an application of the law that is still too Aristotelian, 
even Gadamerian Caputo notes.472 The situation which requires action but without the road 
map of a law with which to apply the action is an ‘aporia’ and recalls Derrida’s famous “Force 
                                                      
466 Ibid., pg. 60.  
467 For a discussion of the me voici (‘here I am’) which responds in the accusative to this law/obligation see 
Emmanuel Levinas, Alphons Lingis (trans.) Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981), pp. 140-152. 
468 Ibid., pg. 63. For Caputo’s critique of Levinas, inter alia, see John D. Caputo, “Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, 
Myth, and Politics” in Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), pp. 3-20, which also appears partly as chapter ten of 
Demythologizing Heidegger (1993). It also appears in Prayers and Tears, which we will encounter below.   
469 Ibid., pg. 72.  
470 We will return to the ‘event’ below. For now, we can note that in Against Ethics, Caputo is sympathetic to the 
sense of the event Lyotard offers in The Differend (1983), where the whole axiomatic of the event is presented around 
the event of Auschwitz. Here the event is searching for an idiom to present itself in the midst of suffering. See Jean-
François Lyotard, Georges Van Den Abbeele, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1988). See also, Geoffrey Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988). There is also a philosophy of events in Deleuze, see Gilles Deleuze, Mark Lester, Charles 
Stivale (trans.) and Constantin Boundas (ed.) The Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
471 Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 117.  
472 Ibid., pg. 104.  
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of Law” (1989)473 essay. Derrida distinguished between law (droit) which is deconstructible 
and justice (justice) which is undeconstructible, in order to argue that our juridical systems 
need to be constantly tested by notions of justice that cannot be assimilated to them. To act 
requires a ‘moment of decision,’ an Abrahamic ‘decision of madness’. Through Derrida’s 
reference to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, Caputo raises the importance of the category of 
the ‘singular individual’ as it is being led into the abyss of the ‘teleological suspension of the 
ethical.’474 To act is to ‘leap.’ It is to take a leap of faith into the abyss according to an absurd 
‘jewgreek’ logic. The decision may turn out to be a catastrophe — after all we do not have a 
guide — but it is not indecision. Or is it?  
 
The concept of sovereignty as it pertains to modern readings of autonomy is substantially re-
written in this postmodern account of ethical subjectivity. Here the subject is not an essence 
which abides by predetermined or self-evident laws of action. Instead, one might say that the 
subject is a complex economy of ‘active’ or ‘reactive’ forces that might take on many different 
meanings. In this type of situational ethics, we are moved, on the one hand, to be active by 
resisting the forces that constrain our continual becoming, and on the other, to be reactive to 
the other who asks us to recognize who they are!475 The Kierkegaardian move (which is 
Caputo’s move and Derrida’s) is not to be led to take a stance for either side, but to keep this 
aporia in tension. If the sheer breadth of these sources (which is still to say nothing of others 
like Descartes, Ockham,476 Arendt,477 Rabbi Moyses, Ibn Rashid478 or Augustine479) has been 
to confound any decisive position on ethics, then Caputo’s text would have achieved its 
performative affect. The text of Against Ethics is a dense cacophony of voices that illustrate 
Caputo’s point with which he began: “Undecidability does not detract from the urgency of 
decision; it simply underlines the difficulty.”480  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
473 Part of the essay was first presented at a colloquium “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” at the 
Cordoza Law School in 1989. See Jacques Derrida “Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in 
Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-67. 
474 Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 107.  
475 Ibid., pg. 67. 
476 Ibid., pg. 108. 
477 Ibid., pg. 111. 
478 Ibid., pg. 110. 
479 Ibid., pg. 121-122.  
480 Ibid., pg. 5. Emphasis added. 
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III. Anthropologia Negativa  
 
Caputo’s account of ethics described above, seems to terminate in what might be called an 
‘anthropologia negativa.’ To be sure, when Caputo discusses the apophatic with respect to 
negative theology, he means a radical negation that opens up onto the possibility of something 
unexpected. Whether there is a movement of apotheosis or not, the point is always that we 
don’t know and this non-knowing, as will become clear, is not paralyzing but impassioned.  
 
In Against Ethics, however, while Caputo wants to keep the tension in place between the 
decision and the undecidable, the effect of this ethical ignorantia becomes indecision itself. This 
can be illustrated by the literary framing of his most poetically exuberant chapter. In chapter 
eight Caputo offers eight short essays by pseudonymous authors which re-read the story of 
Abraham. Mimicking Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (1843) and Fear and Trembling (1843) the 
pseudonymous texts, he says, had been sent to him by mail and now he presents them to us 
the readers followed by his own commentary. The middle six essays are by female authors, 
Johanna de Silentio, Magdalena de la Cruz, and Rebecca Morgenstern, and introduce some 
feminist perspectives into Caputo’s ruminations.481 These authors try to invert the story from 
Sarah’s point of view, exposing what Derrida called the ‘carno-phallo-centrism’ of other 
interpreters like Heidegger, Levinas and Kierkegaard.482 While developing Derrida’s 
distinction between law and justice they also pick up on his critique of Heidegger’s Antigone 
and Heidegger’s temples mostly notably from Derrida’s Glas (1974). For our purposes, what 
is noteworthy is that these accounts emphasize the description of obligation from the 
displaced voice, the ones who suffer in Abraham’s story. But the first and the last essays by 
‘Felix Sineculpa’ (the only male voice) are meant as a Nietzschean reminder, “always [to] be 
heard in the background of the other discourses,” reminding them that “[s]uffering 
happens…there is no Evil…no injustice, no guilt (sine culpa).” And that “[s]uffering belongs 
to the violence of existence.”483 The conclusion is exemplary in this regard. Just at the moment 
when Caputo seems to have countered the negative impulse — “[n]o matter what Felix says, 
no matter what eternal thoughts have entered into his head, obligation happens”484 — he 
reverts back to indecision; “the menacing figure of Felix Sineculpa is always hovering in the 
background and regularly disturbs my sleep.”485 
                                                      
481 Ibid., pp. 139-186. 
482 Ibid., pg. 145.  
483 Ibid., pg. 138.  
484 Ibid., pg. 192. 
485 Ibid., pg. 193.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  133 
 
Ethical obligation is presented as a perspectival fact of the world — ‘it happens.’ But Nietzsche’s 
pronouncement of cosmic disaster is understood as the most fundamental ontological fact of 
the world.486 Siding exclusively with obligation (Levinas) or cosmic meaninglessness 
(Nietzsche) would render the other deceived by the ‘reality’ of the world. This is why Caputo 
means to keep them together (Derrida). The attempt to straddle the tension between these the 
two positions ultimately fails rhetorically however. In the concluding chapter of Against 
Ethics, he writes “My Dionysian rabbi seems not to want to settle down in either Athens or 
Jerusalem but, if anything, to operate a shuttle between the two.”487 Here a negative 
anthropology culminates in the inability to decide. Nietzsche wins the day.  
 
Now, as indicated above, and as the reader will expect, Caputo never intends for this to be a 
dogmatic position. But the literary effect of an anthropologia negativa does not accomplish the 
type of Derridean undecidability he is aiming for in Against Ethics. Only in Prayers and Tears 
does the turn to a properly religious dimension of deconstruction ignite a more affirmative 
poeticizing of the human condition.488  
 
IV. Religion sans Religion  
 
Around the time of Against Ethics Caputo published an essay on Michel Foucault titled, “On 
Not Knowing Who We Are.”489 There he argued that Foucault’s hermeneutics can be best 
understood as an ‘apophatic hermeneutics’ that operates “according to what Jacques Derrida 
calls the logic of the sans.”490 The disquiet for knowing, or indeed, an anthropologia negativa in 
Foucault is followed by the possibility for being otherwise — a Foucault sans Foucault that 
pushes “past a hermeneutics of refusal [of identity] to one of response and redress.”491 The 
                                                      
486 Caputo confirms that he has perhaps collapsed the distinction between the tragic and différance in Against Ethics 
and possibly in Radical Hermeneutics too. See his response to Jamie Smith in James Olthuis (ed.) Religion with/out 
Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 132-134. 
487 Ibid., pg. 233.  
488 See Derrida’s abandonment of the ethical (Levinas) in favor of the ‘structural’ commitment to the religious in 
the Kierkegaardian sense in Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 201-212. 
489 See John D. Caputo, “On Not Knowing Who We Are: Madness, Hermeneutics, and the Night of Truth in 
Foucault,” in John D. Caputo and Mark Yount (eds.) Foucault and the Critique of Institutions (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). The piece reappears as the lead essay in his follow up book More Radical 
Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 17-40. 
490 Caputo, “On Not Knowing Who We Are”, pg. 17. See also Thomas R. Flynn, who endorses and contests Caputo’s 
reading of Foucault, “Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle: Caputo as Reader of Foucault” in Mark Dooley (ed.) A 
Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo In Focus (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), pp. 175-194; For Caputo’s response, 
pp. 199.  
491 Ibid., pg. 18.  
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movement of the apophatic in Foucault that precedes the affirmation or response, directly 
links with the sense of the apophatic that Caputo elucidates in Jacques Derrida. The 
connection is not simply idiosyncratic for Caputo; in Prayers and Tears he goes further to 
suggest that the apophatic in mystical theology serves as a general model or as he calls it a 
“generalized apophaticism,” without which “we cannot trust any discourse that is not 
contaminated” by it.492 Foucault’s and Caputo’s apophatic anthropology are thus derived 
from the “wider translatability of negative theology.”493    
 
In the final section of this chapter we explore the il/logic of the sans as it pertains to the site of 
negative theology in Derrida’s ‘religion sans religion.’ The relationship of deconstruction with 
negative theology in Derrida’s ‘religion’ displays not only the first explicit contact with 
theology, but more specifically characterizes the sense in which the sovereign Religion 
(Christianity) and the sovereign God are dislodged from their site of privilege and can, thus, 
be ‘translated’ into another vision of God as Wholly Other. This movement of negative theology 
is only a partial step to the even more affirmative gestures of Derrida’s religion. In the 
following chapter, we will bring to fore some of the other important themes in Derrida’s 
religion together with Caputo’s radical theology, for it is in that deeply affirmative space 
carved out in Prayers and Tears that Caputo is able to take his project even further into his later 
radical theology. For that discussion, it will be important to see Derrida’s ‘biblical, prophetic, 
Jewish side,’ which let’s go of the discourse of the apophatic (a largely Neo-Platonic one) and 
gets to the heart of a religion without religion, and thus a radical theology. As Caputo writes, 
“Derrida’s religion is more prophetic than apophatic, more in touch with Jewish prophets 
than with Christian Neoplatonists, more messianic and more eschatological than mystical.”494 
The distinctiveness of the ‘apophatic-prophetic’ tradition gives rise to Derrida’s famous 
deployment of the apocalyptic and messianic, where there is neither a dramatic apocalypse nor 
a Messiah that finally arrives. These tropes, along with a quasi-Augustinian confession 
(circonfession), render Derrida a certain homo religiosus — one that is neither explicitly Christian 
or Jewish, nor theistic or atheistic, but nonetheless affirmative in a certain ‘prophetic’ and 
‘messianic’ sense. The passion or fervor and desire of that which comes — the event, the 
impossible — is precisely the religious kernel of Derrida’s religion sans religion. And it is here 
that Caputo claims, perhaps, a radical theology may be written which turns another corner in 
the (re)conception of sovereignty. 
                                                      
492 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 23.  
493 Ibid., pp. 55-56.  
494 Ibid., pg. xxiv. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  135 
 
I. The Apophatic 
 
The apophatic discourse of ‘negative-speaking’ has long roots in the history of Western 
thought. It features prominently in thinkers from Plato, Pseudo-Dionysus, Meister Eckhart, 
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.495 The importance of the apophatic for this discussion 
is twofold. First, for Caputo and Derrida as noted above, it acts as a kind of avant la lettre for 
deconstruction and thus points to a semiotic analogy between the two discourses. Secondly, 
if there exists a syntactical-linguistic relationship between the apophatic and deconstruction, 
to what extent are they ‘translatable’? This is to pose the question of the limits of negative 
theology for a religion sans religion. Here, the ‘negative’ of negative theology is not negative 
enough. Its ‘violent’ gesture is that it ultimately cannot refuse the temptation of predication. 
In this sense, Caputo seeks to ‘save’ (sauf) the name of God from negative theology by 
reminding us of Derrida’s formula that ‘every other is wholly other,’ and therefore every 
mention of God could also be otherwise — any other singularity whatsoever. Because 
apophatic discourse cannot recognize that meaning is a production of language itself, it 
grounds its linguistic attempts to name the unamenable in a non-linguistic reality, something 
that deconstruction confounds by the infinite platitudes of difference.  
 
The ‘wounded language’ of the apophatic tradition — its desire to name the God which it 
cannot name, what Derrida called the tout autre — is “provocatively analogous” to the 
difficulty involved in naming différance.496 Both seek the ‘impossible’ task of naming 
something which resists naming, where even the “’detours, locutions, and syntax’ in which 
Derrida strives to mark off différance will resemble, almost to the point of indistinguishability, 
the twists and turns of negative theology.”497 And yet, there is for Derrida still a world of 
difference between them. The doubt toward negative theology resides within its tendency 
toward a metaphysics of presence or what Caputo calls ‘hyperousiology.’ However, this is 
                                                      
495 For the main texts that Caputo is interested in see, Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials” in 
Jacques Derrida, Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (eds.) Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, [1987] 2008), pp. 143-195; Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.) Margins of Philosophy 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), pp. 6, 26-27; Jacques Derrida, Thomas Dutoit (ed.) On The Name 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, [1993] 1995). Some of the essays relating to negative theology from these 
volumes were first collected in an earlier volume: see Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (eds.) Derrida and Negative 
Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).  
496 Caputo, Prayers and Tears., pg. 2. The paradigmatic figure for Caputo of negative theology is Meister Eckhart, 
whom he had investigated at length with respect to Heidegger early on his career. See John D. Caputo, The Mystical 
Element in Heidegger’s Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, [1978] 1986).  
497 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 7. Caputo is quoting a famous passage often cited where Derrida directly 
distinguishes différance from negative theology. See Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pg. 6.  
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not merely a description of simple ‘presence’ or ‘onto-theo-logy.’ Contrary to kataphatic 
theology which describes God through the language of representation and conceptual 
ratiocination, hyper-ousiology leaves out “all such representational paraphernalia and parerga 
in the vestibule” and enters “into a worldless, imageless, timeless inner sanctum of the 
temple.”498 In Caputo’s in-depth study, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (1978), he 
argued that the apophatic in Meister Eckhart came uniquely close to a “religious overcoming 
of metaphysics.”499 This entailed a suspension of all operations of the mind and will in order 
to ‘let God be.’ The latter is what Eckhart meant by Gelassenheit (letting-be), and is the word 
that Heidegger famously adopted in his later work.500 But the limitation of negative theology 
in this movement of aphresis (‘a taking away’) in order to ‘let-be’, is that it does so in the name 
of a higher movement, hênosis, or mystical union with the Godhead. On this reading, Caputo 
asserts that negative theology is in fact a disguised or hidden version of an even higher (hyper) 
kataphatic theology.501  
 
The difference between negative theology and différance is that the one desires to name that 
which leaves a trace of itself in language (God), while the other is the generative matrix that 
produces names as differential effects; God, G-d, or even différance itself. Where the two 
intersect for Derrida is in the fact that both are solicited by what he calls the impossible. 
Language is ruptured and disturbed by something that wants to shake off conventional 
                                                      
498 Ibid., pg. 11.  
499 Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, pg. xviii. 
500 Ibid., pp. 118-134, 173-182 
501 According to some, like Thomas Carlson, however, Caputo is not being generous enough to the fluctuations 
and tensions of mystical theology. Indeed, when Caputo says that the ‘main work’ of Prayers and Tears is ‘to follow 
that more Jewish and religious turn’ in Derrida, there seems to be an unfair weighting against negative theology. 
For Carlson, Caputo ignores the fact that some thinkers like Pseudo-Dionysius derive their names for God not 
from a Greek metaphysic but from the Jewish scriptures themselves. Additionally, Carlson argues that on Caputo’s 
construal negation is merely a higher form of positive theologizing, whereas for someone like Pseudo-Dionysius, 
even negation is not enough, and thus there is an endless oscillation between the kataphatic and apophatic 
discourses resembling much of the ‘desire and expectation’ logic of deconstruction. See Thomas A. Carlson, 
“Caputo’s Example” in Mark Dooley (ed.) A Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo in focus (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2003), pp. 255-275. Caputo’s response follows Carlson’s contribution in this volume. His 
basic point is that when it comes down to being ‘lost’ the mystical writers cannot be said to escape hyperousiology, 
because they write in order to enter into a higher union. Negative theology “leaves the God of onto-theo-logic at 
the door precisely in order to enter into a deeper relation with the Godhead beyond all representational discourse, 
positive or negative.” See, pg. 277, original emphasis. See also Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 38-40. Additionally, 
given Caputo’s attention to detail with regard to mysticism and Meister Eckhart in particular, it seems that his 
litmus test for attempts which seek to narrate their way out of the hyperousiology critique is above all, Martin 
Heidegger and his charge of Seinvergessenheit. The ambivalence felt here with respect to Caputo’s construal of the 
relationship between negative theology and deconstruction should not be easily dismissed. Indeed, there is 
something of an admittance on Derrida’s part of a more complicated association with negative theology. In the 
first “Religion and Postmodernism” conference at Villanova, Jean-Luc Marion says to Derrida: “I think that 
orthodox theology was in fact a powerful endeavor to deconstruct the naïve metaphysics of presence used by 
Arianism. In the situation, I would say, the part of deconstruction was played by the orthodox theologians.” 
Derrida replies, “That is not surprising.” See John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), God, the Gift, and 
Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pg. 47. 
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structures of discourse. For him, this takes place as an event of language. The impossibility to 
name God or any other is possible only in virtue of différance as the quasi-transcendental. The 
failure of negative theology, by contrast, lies in the fact that it sees the impossibility to name 
the unnameable in something that is ultimately a non-linguistic ineffable Being. Différance as 
the unnameable is rather “the play which makes possible nominal effects, the relative unitary 
atomic structures that are called names.”502  
 
Caputo demonstrates, thus, how Derrida delimits negative theology in a Heideggerian appeal 
to the nature of language and by his notion of différance. The aporia of ‘hyperousiology’ is that 
in affirming a unity with a positive infinite alterity, negative theology cannot avail itself of 
language because language would corrupt this intuition, and yet, it has already availed itself 
in the affirmation. Caputo then raises the inverse question, namely, what would be the case if 
one were to avail oneself of language and at the same time affirm a positive infinite alterity? 
This is what he calls, with respect to Derrida’s debate with Levinas, ‘Absolute Heterology.’503 
The content of this debate reveals another sense of différance that is crucial for the account of 
the apophatic.  
 
Levinas’ project consists in a figure of subjectivity that also fiercely resists the modern 
conception of the ‘I’ as a self-constituted autonomy. In its place Levinas argues famously for 
a radical ethical relation with the other as the starting point for philosophy and subjectivity. 
The vulnerable face-to-face relation with the other is infinite because it breaks the totality of 
the Same that exists in thought and being. The face of the other is an irreducible transcendence 
by nature of its absolute difference. But, according to Derrida, the radicality of alterity here 
renders the ethical relation indifferent, or worse violent. The other is certainly a transcendent 
other that disrupts the economy of sameness, but for Levinas the transcendence is 
asymmetrical. With reference to Husserl, whom Derrida is defending in his essay “Violence 
and Metaphysics,” Caputo writes, “the transcendence of the other person [is] different from 
me” but “not different than me,” it is “a field of novelty and surprise within a pregiven horizon 
of expectation.”504 If we are not at least minimally in relation to that which transcends, then 
there is no relation at all, only indifference or violence. Derrida therefore detects that Levinas 
has reinstated an ethical hierarchy based on a positive metaphysical infinity, which is 
precisely what Levinas had desired to circumvent by availing himself of language. What this 
                                                      
502 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pg. 26.  
503 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 20-26. See Derrida’s famous “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought 
of Emmanuel Levinas” in Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, [1967] 2002). 
504 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 22.  
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means is that the pure and absolute Otherness Levinas desires is strictly impossible, 
simpliciter, an idealized ethics that imagines pure peace. This ‘impossibility’ is literally ‘non-
sense,’ because it is not prepared for an experience relative to our horizon of expectation.   
 
Levinas’ thought here is thus in the same league as negative theology. When he speaks of the 
Other, he means a ‘wholly,’ positively infinite Other in the singular. This is why Derrida 
repeats the syntagma, ‘every other is wholly other,’505 in order to signal that the generalized 
movement from Levinasian ethics to a particularized responsibility is fraught with conflict 
and tension. This does not mean that negative theology has nothing to say. Indeed, there is 
something affirmative in negative theology’s desire to efface the name of God that is 
generalizable; “A passion for the impossible is a matter of general concern.”506 In turning to 
Derrida’s later writings on this theme, 507 Caputo is interested in how the solicitation of the 
promise to speak — what goes under the name of ‘God’ in negative theology — is structurally 
analogous to deconstruction. That is to pose the question of ‘translatability’ by asking what 
would remain if “divested of its hyperessential voice, negative theology is driven naked into 
the desert?”508  
 
II. Translatability  
 
One way to see how this translation happens is through the Platonic paradigm of khôra, which 
receives extensive investigation in On The Name (1993).509 As we have seen, classic negative 
discourse in the Neoplatonic tradition holds out for a ‘good beyond being’ or an ‘otherwise 
than being,’ a “logic of the hyper” where the “Good nonetheless maintains at least an 
analogical community and continuity with Being and knowledge.”510 Derrida finds another 
way of reading this paradigm by re-reading Platonic cosmology. The usual understanding 
that Plato ascribed to khôra in the Timaeus according to Derrida, is that it is neither ‘form (idea) 
nor sensible thing’ but is as old as the forms. It is the place where the demiurge ‘impresses or 
                                                      
505 Ibid., pp. 205-212. 
506 Ibid., pg. 28.  
507 See Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” pp. 143-195; Derrida, “Sauf le Nom,” pp. 35-87. 
508 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 29. 
509 See Jacques Derrida, “Khôra” in On The Name (1995), pp. 89-127. 
510 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 35. Caputo includes, as alluded to, Jean-Luc Marion into this group of ‘negative 
theologians.’ See Jean-Luc Marion’s, God Without Being (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [1982] 1991). For an 
extended discussion on the relationship between Derrida and Marion see, John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the 
Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999), pp. 185-222. This volume also contains a discussion between Derrida and Marion 
moderated by Richard Kearney. For an updated and in-depth study on the relationship between Derrida and 
Marion with specific reference to their different understandings of the gift, see Jason W. Alvis, Marion and Derrida 
on The Gift and Desire: Debating the Generosity of Things (Switzerland: Springer, 2016). 
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cuts images of the intelligible paradigms.’ But it is treated ‘analogically’ in platonic 
metaphysics when it is given a role inside philosophical discourse by receiving the 
metaphorics of the ‘receptacle.’ For Derrida, pace the analogical treatment, khôra is outside of 
philosophical language; it is not a ‘good’ or an ‘evil’, neither is it a metaphor that relates to 
something, nor does it create or produce anything.  
 
By letting take place (avoir lieu), she/it [khôra] gives without giving and so 
without producing debt, even as she/it receives without incurring debt. 
Of khôra we cannot say either that she/it “exists” or that “es gibt” 
khôra…Khôra is not even a third kind, because it is not a kind, a genos, at 
all but is radically singular, as if she/it were a singular individual with a 
proper name – “Who are you, Khôra?”511 
 
In this way, khôra is like a “surname” for différance as Derrida called it,512 an imitation that 
occurs in the founding moments of Greek philosophy. What is crucial for Derrida, according 
to Caputo, is that by setting up khôra in this way negative theology would thus be inscribed 
within khôra — “the ‘spacing’ or the ‘interval’ within which things find their place.”513 Further 
still, Caputo characterizes the discourse on khôra as a ‘mirror-image’ effect of the Platonic 
‘beyond-being’ of negative theology. Both discourses mirror each other, the one more below 
(khôra) and the other more beyond (God). There is, thus, a certain undecidability which 
emerges. It is not a matter of choosing between God or khôra. Rather, it is this site of structural 
undecidability (not indecision), where when deciding between the God of negative theology, 
haunted by khôra, that we simply cannot know and thus a more genuine “movement of faith 
is made.”514  
 
Caputo and Derrida are not out to dispel the name of God, and what is left is not khôra as the 
experience of “misery, terror, loss and desolation.”515 On the contrary, there remains 
something in negative theology, something generalizable, which needs to be saved by being 
translated. Just as the good beyond being, or the God without being needs to be haunted by 
khôra, so the name of God needs to be saved from itself. This is the task Derrida sets out in 
                                                      
511 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 36. 
512 Derrida, On the Name, pg. 126. 
513 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 39. 
514 Ibid., pg. 40. 
515 This is the protest of Richard Kearney, see “Khora Or God?” in Mark Dooley (ed.) A Passion For The Impossible, 
pp. 107-122, pg. 113. See Caputo’s response which follows, “Abyssus Abyssum Invocat: A Response to Richard 
Kearney,” pp. 123-128, pg. 126. 
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Sauf le Nom (1993), one of his most explicit encounters with negative theology. Playing on the 
multiple translations of ‘sauf’ — which can mean ‘to save,’ ‘to keep safe’ and ‘safe/except’ — 
Caputo’s analysis of Derrida’s text seizes immediately upon a ‘double-bind’ in negative 
theology. Through negative theology’s negations and attempts to cross out everything 
‘safe/except’ the name of God, it sacrifices itself in order to ‘save’ the name. Negative 
theology, “dies in order to live (live on, survie hyper-live), lives without altogether avoiding 
dying.”516 The double-bind, Caputo says, is thus also a ‘double-save’, because in negative 
theology’s sacrificial attempts to name what it cannot name, it ends up saving that name. 
Derrida, however, also notices in the ‘kenotic’ movements of this ‘wounded language’, “a 
writing that bears the stigmata of its own dereliction and failure,”517 writes Steven 
Shakespeare. These Christian idioms are explicitly invoked because Derrida is pointing to an 
otherness that is contained and at the same time eludes Christian discourse. The name of God 
as the name of the ‘wholly other’ belongs and exceeds the Christian or any other ‘determinable 
faith.’ This marks the move of the translatability of negative theology. By folding apophatic 
theology back into the spacing of language, that is, by reminding it that if it were to attain full 
intuition of God all speaking would cease, deconstruction saves negative theology from itself. 
It keeps the name of God in play by inscribing it within the play, in order for it to join the play 
of other indeterminate names.  
 
In the continuous turns in Sauf le Nom the dogmatic claims of negative theology (the fullness 
of intuited meaning) cannot hold, and yet dogma remains not finally separated from 
deconstruction as it takes on a new meaning as that which impassions negative theology to 
speak. At this point we can begin to see how the idea of translatability takes on general 
significance with regard to Christianity as the “hegemonic rule of a Christo-Euro-centric 
world.”518 The question is whether the movement of excess that Derrida has identified in 
negative theology is an example of deconstruction, or whether deconstruction is an example 
of negative theology? From which ‘direction’ does translation occur? The distinctions these 
questions imply, of course, are precisely what deconstruction sets out to disturb. For one can 
never be sure which one is an example of which in virtue of the impossibility of translation 
without remainder. For instance, in one direction, why can’t we simply say that within the 
originary sovereign Christian religion we find examples of deconstruction (viz. the apophatic 
tradition)? That is, is Christianity not the ‘founding’ discourse within which deconstruction is 
                                                      
516 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 43. 
517 Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology, pg. 116. 
518 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 55.  
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‘founded’? The problem here lies in precisely the movement of excess that deconstruction 
identifies within Christianity, namely, a God that cannot finally be named. A God who, 
according to the logic of the sans, is a God of a religion without a religion; a God who is wholly 
other and, therefore, also possibly any other. Conversely, in the other direction, perhaps we 
could ask: is not deconstruction the ‘founding’ discourse of which Christianity is but an 
example? Here the problem lies — recalling Heidegger’s attempt to extract the structures of 
experience from early Christianity — in the fact that the attempt to derive or repeat the 
elemental structures of Christianity, deconstruction would necessarily be shaped by that very 
discourse and, thus, in some way dependent on it.519 The distinction between the two, 
therefore, is always destabilized as they remain irreducibly dependent on one another.  
 
The objective of this chapter has been to indicate that under the il/logic of the sans, both ethics 
and religion are lead into a via negativa. This path leads to the deconstruction of the sovereign 
autonomy of the modern subject as well as the sovereign discourse of Christianity that 
protects a God that is even ‘beyond’ or ‘otherwise’ than being. Rightly understood, however, 
the il/logic of the sans does not terminate in cosmic nihilism or an atheistic khoral wasteland. 
Rather, as we have seen, the irreducible undecidability which acts as a governing il/logic, 
unsettles these distinctions while performing their mutual dependence on one another. The 
undecidability that such an apophatics produces is not meant to result in indecision or stasis, 
but in the possibility of endless translation, of keeping things open — ‘the possibility of the 
impossible.’ If the disposition to the openness of what is ‘coming’ is not felt with enough force 
in the language of the negativa or ignorantia, Caputo will argue that the ethico-political import 
and sense of hope in Derrida’s religion is better articulated with the notion of the messianic 
and the ‘more Jewish and biblical’ influences that proliferate Derrida’s later thought.  
  
                                                      
519 See Martin Heidegger, M. Fritsch and J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei (trans.) The Phenomenology of Religious Life 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). The elements of this discussion, e.g. “founding” and “founded” 
discourses, are repeated in a number of different ways throughout Derrida’s writing, which Caputo forcefully 
exploits. We will revisit this again when we discuss the notion of the messianic. See John D. Caputo, Prayers and 
Tears, pp. 134-143. 
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Chapter Five 
From Radical Religion to Radical Theology 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
From around 1989 there appeared to be a shift to more political and religious themes in 
Derrida’s thought which have often been compared to Heidegger’s Kehre in the 1930’s. 
However, from early-on the narrow sense of writing as a paradigm always touched upon 
religious themes, inter alia, the apophatic and écriture/scripture. Furthermore, insofar as 
Derrida continued to invoke the importance of ‘the other’ in his philosophy of difference via 
Levinas, his work was always in close proximity to irreducible religious motifs associated 
with Judaism. One can hardly, therefore, speak of a rigid turn but rather, as Clayton Crockett 
has remarked in a recent study, a change in ‘motor scheme,’ from one of writing to plasticity 
following the thought of Catharine Malabou.520 While Crockett’s investigation is chiefly 
concerned with the idea of the ‘motor scheme’ in terms of a biological materialist reading of 
Derrida, he is also concerned with other possibilities that Malabou’s useful designation opens 
up. For him, what changes in Derrida is not so much a theme or perspective but rather a 
change of context and conditions that call for a more concrete engagement in the material 
realities of politics and religion.521 “If there is a turn in Derrida’s philosophy toward an explicit 
engagement with religion,” Crockett says, “it can be traced to this essay,” 522 namely, the 
famous 1989 keynote address later published as “The Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation 
of Authority.’”523 The latter was first presented at the Cordoza Law School at a point where 
deconstruction was being particularly targeted for political nihilism and irrationalism. Given 
not only other geopolitical events like the Rushdie Affair, the concomitant rise of 
fundamentalist Islam, the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, but also the 
overconfidence of anti-Marxist jeremiads in the unrestrained celebrations of political and 
economic liberalism, it should perhaps not come as a surprise, then, that Derrida would begin 
to shift his vocabulary to accommodate the rising sense of urgency for which his philosophy 
                                                      
520 Catherine Malabou, Lisabeth During (trans.) The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialect (London: 
Routledge, [1996] 2005). 
521 Clayton Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing: Political Theology and New Materialism (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2018), pp. 13-26. 
522 Ibid., pg. 15. 
523 The essay can be found in a volume published after the conference. See Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and 
David Gray Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-67. 
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needed to respond. ‘The time was certainly out of joint,’ he would say, quoting Hamlet in 
Specters of Marx (1993).524 
 
As already noted, Caputo was one of the first to recognize not only that there was a ‘positive’ 
sense in which Derrida was reflecting on a certain religion, but also that deconstruction was 
itself in some way religious. Along with “Force of Law” and Specters of Marx where Derrida 
had begun to flirt with the notion of the ‘messianic,’ Caputo carefully unpacked many of 
Derrida’s other texts and themes from the 1990’s, including “Circumfession,” “Faith and 
Knowledge,” Aporias, The Gift of Death and Archive Fever. In his analysis of these writings in 
Prayers and Tears Caputo goes to great lengths to emphasize and isolate the themes which 
constitute the provocative suggestion that in Derrida’s thinking one can discern a religion 
without religion, a desire for the wholly other that avoids the dangerous associations with 
religious dogma. What goes to the heart of deconstruction, Caputo claims, is a certain passion; 
a religious passion felt in Derrida’s prayers and tears, a translatable and substitutable passion 
for God, and therefore equally a passion for justice.  Sections two and three of this chapter, 
consequently, are dedicated to expounding three crucial religious motifs which animate and 
impassion a Derridian radical religion — the messianic, the apocalyptic and the gift.  
 
While Derrida himself would always be suspicious of the word theology and its metaphysical 
connotations, Caputo dreams in Prayers and Tears of a theology without theology: “I have in 
mind a point at which theology, opening itself to translatability, opens the wound of its own 
kenosis and suffers from its passion for the impossible.”525 What happens after Prayers and 
Tears, therefore, is nothing less than the repetition of thought we saw in chapter three, the 
culmination of which takes places in The Weakness of God (2006) and The Insistence of God (2013). 
What started out as ‘radical hermeneutics’ has now been replaced/repeated by a ‘radical 
theology.’ This theology takes its cue from a God who names an event which exceeds 
nomination, a God who is neither ‘safe’ from atheism, nor able to be ‘saved’ with the 
assurances of faith. Faith in such a ‘weak’ God, however, does not mean the end of hope, 
justice or indeed, faith itself, but is rather the condition of possibility for ‘real’ hope, ‘true’ 
justice and ‘authentic’ faith. Caputo’s radical theology and the God which it names occupy 
the remaining part of the present chapter (section four), viz. a radical theology where God 
does not exist but rather ‘insists’ in the coming event of justice and who reigns in an an-archic 
                                                      
524 Jacques Derrida, Peggy Kamuf (trans.) Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International (London: Routledge, [1993] 1994). 
525 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 61. 
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kingdom without rules. This is a God without sovereignty which nonetheless lays claim to us 
unconditionally but without a strong force, indeed, a ‘weak force’ or a power of 
powerlessness.   
 
II. The Messianic 
 
Deconstruction takes the form of a certain re-ligious re-sponsibility to 
what is coming, to what does not exist. Deconstruction turns on a certain 
pledging of itself to the future, on a certain religio that religiously observes 
its covenant with the revenant and arrivant, to what is coming back from 
the past, and to what is arriving from the past as the future. 
Deconstruction is, in that sense, a messianic religion within the limits of 
reason alone, that is, it is inhabited and structured in a messianic-religious 
way.526 
 
Caputo suggests that the much-discussed figure of the ‘messianic’ is one of the clearest 
expressions of Derrida’s quasi-religion.527 For him, it is an analogical paradigm of the Judeo-
Christian notion of the coming Messiah — the one who is ‘to come’ bringing peace and justice. 
But this paradigm remains only analogous because there is a radical difference between the 
‘determinate’ religions and the religion Caputo is pursuing. The determinate religions 
envision an actual arriving (arrivant) of the Messiah in the ‘here and now,’ whereas for Caputo 
and Derrida such an arrival forecloses the possibility of a ‘truer’ and more just arrival where 
the Messiah may or may not finally show up. In the latter, we recognize again the logic of the 
sans; a Messiah without Messiah, a ‘messianic structure’ of the Messiah’s coming that is 
denuded of its biblical forms. In the following section, it is shown that such ‘coming’ does not 
terminate in hopeless atheism, but rather, as Caputo contends, a more radically just and 
faithful/less faith. It is important for our purposes to register the centrality of this discussion; 
in particular, the relationship between the messianic and determinate messianisms. For, as we 
will see in the following chapter, much of the critical reception of Caputo’s religious reading 
of Derrida can be traced back to a misunderstanding of the messianic as that which moves 
‘beyond’ the determinate messianisms. This is the tension between abstractionism and 
                                                      
526 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
527 For a volume dedicated to the political implications of this theme, see Arthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher (eds.) 
The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic (London: Continuum, 2010). 
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particularism in deconstruction, a tension that Caputo will continue to navigate and clarify in 
his later theological writing.  
 
The particular inflections of the figure of the messianic are captured in the quotation above. 
Firstly, in keeping with deconstruction’s central object of critique — onto-theology and the 
concomitant ‘metaphysics of presence’ — the figure of the messianic represents a certain 
temporal orientation. Walter Benjamin, from whom Derrida drew much inspiration for his 
discussion of the messianic,528 memorably concluded his Theses on The Philosophy of History 
(1942) by contrasting on the one hand the sense of the future for the ‘soothsayers’ as 
“homogenous, empty time,” and on the other hand, the Jews for whom “[e]very second of 
time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter.”529 The ‘straight gate’ in this 
reading is a pregnant and expectant orientation toward the future, and deconstruction is the 
site of preparation that prepares for this future by ‘observ[ing] its covenant with the revenant 
and arrivant’ (the Messiah). While it is true that the movement here reflects a Jewish and 
Christian “dialectic of memory and hope,”530 it is also not fully the case because the Messiah 
himself cannot finally arrive. Were a determinable Jewish or Christian messianic arrival to 
occur, the potency or force in the expectation for the occurrence would not only be rendered 
impotent, but also, and as a consequence of the messianic Truth now in hand, would be unable 
to resist the short step toward virulent religious exclusivism. This is why the structural 
keeping open of the horizon of hope and expectation — which is the space that différance 
occupies — is to be understood as ‘just.’531 But to say that the Messiah ‘cannot finally arrive’ is 
not to say that he is not coming, “for it belongs” Caputo writes, “to the very structure of the 
messianic event that the Messiah is always coming, so that even if we meet him at the gates of 
Rome we will want to know when he is coming.”532 This orientation is not just shaped by its 
relation to a future, but also to a past, indeed, a memory or a ghost (revenant) that also disrupts 
the present. It is in the sense of Johann Baptist Metz’s often quoted phrase, “the dangerous 
                                                      
528 Derrida, Specters of Marx, see chapter two. 
529 See Walter Benjamin, Harry Zohn (trans.), Hannah Arendt (ed.) “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in 
Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: Schocken Books, [1955] 2007), pg. 264.   
530 This phrase is borrowed from Jayne Svenungsson, who has insightfully traced the messianic and other related 
themes in a rough genealogy of Jewish and Christian thought up to present day discussions in contemporary 
continental philosophy. See Jayne Svenungsson, Stephen Donovan (trans.) Divining History: prophetism, messianism 
and the development of the spirit (New York: Berghahn, [2014] 2016), pp. 6; 73-74; 168.  
531 See Derrida’s critical comments on Heidegger’s ‘Anaximander Fragment’ we encountered in chapter three. See 
also Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 27-34. Derrida inverts Heidegger’s understanding of justice as the Fug or 
gathering of ‘whiling’ of presence. Caputo writes, “Derrida takes the Fug as droit and the Un-fug as justice. On 
Derrida’s telling, it is only if (the) time is out of joint, if time is an un-gathering Un-fug, unhinged from the gathering 
unity of the living present, disjointed and opened up to the specter of what was not there, that justice is possible.” 
See Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 123.     
532 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 145.  
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memory of suffering,” that those generations who are not just ‘to come’ but ‘coming back from 
the past,’ continually disrupt the present.533 Memories of those gone before can neither be fully 
forgotten, nor can mourning the loss which these memories engender free us fully from their 
ghosts. And yet, these dangerous memories lead neither to nostalgia or an escapist flight from 
the present, nor to stultifying guilt such that we are left paralyzed here and now. Rather, they 
make an urgent call on us to respond.   
 
This raises, secondly, the question of messianic time as a ‘time that is out of joint’ and recalls 
the epigraph to Specters of Marx following Hamlet’s words to Horatio. In a “time [that] is out 
of joint,” Derrida reads Hamlet’s situation as one marked by the debilitating costs of 
autonomous self-reflexivity. In his essay “Time out of Joint,” Derrida suggests, referring to 
Hamlet, that “[k]nowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion; that is the doctrine 
of Hamlet.”534 The tension felt in ‘Hamlet’s doctrine’ or the “gap between thought and 
action,”535 is precisely the time of the messianic. But unlike Hamlet, who was rendered 
ontologically impotent by the ghost’s voice, the point behind Derrida’s ‘hauntology’ as he calls 
it, is precisely to let the voice of both the living and the dead speak to us and hold us 
accountable for action. There is, thus, a kind of ‘spirit,’ ghost or specter being invoked in 
Derrida’s religio; a spirit of Marxism “of a coming communist justice” that haunts, jolts and 
‘dis-joints’ the present regime of linear time. It is like a certain rabbinic propheticism that 
reminds us much of the emancipatory vitalism of liberation theology, as seen in “the spirit of 
the Jewish prophets, Amos and Isaiah.”536 This sense of disjointed time is contrasted to other 
specter(s) of dis-‘jointured’ time, the time of presence: Stalinism, the hegemony of the Free 
Market, the manipulation of the virtual, the Fukuyamist thesis of history’s end, and indeed, 
the fundamentalist Christian apocalypse of the Messiah’s immanent return to save the elect 
and condemn the wicked.   
 
                                                      
533 Caputo, Weakness of God, pp. 94-96. See Johann Baptist Metz, D. Smith (trans.) Faith in History and Society: Toward 
a Practical Fundamental Theology (New York: Seabury, 1980), pg. 91. 
534 Jacques Derrida, “Time out of Joint,” in Anselm Haverkamp and H. R. Dodge Deconstruction Is/in America: A 
New Sense of the Political (New York and London: New York University Press, 1995). This essay was first given as 
a keynote address at a conference in New York in 1993. Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster also repeat this 
claim in their book The Hamlet Doctrine (London: Verso, 2013), pg. 11. These last two references are drawn from an 
essay by Robert Vosloo who brings this reading of Derrida into conversation with the theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer in an attempt to interrogate the complexities of ethical action within the context of post-apartheid South 
Africa. See Robert Vosloo, “Time Out of Joint and Future-Orientated Memory: Engaging Dietrich Bonhoeffer in 
the Search for a Way to Deal Responsibly with the Ghosts of the Past” Religions 8. 42. (March, 2017), pp. 1-9.  
535 Vosloo, “Time Out of Joint and Future-Orientated Memory,” pg. 2. 
536 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 122. 
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Thirdly, it is because of these ghosts, where “injustice runs rampant,”537 that Derrida wants to 
offer a ‘messianic religion within the limits of reason’ — a religion without the determinable 
messianic content. With respect to the latter, it is important to note that while not yet explicit, 
Derrida’s thinking here is unmistakably engaging in a tradition of modern political thought 
— a tradition that secularizes messianic eschatology into a kind of philosophical chiliasm, 
which is traceable through Joachimite Trinitarian arrangements, through to the Hegelian 
historicization of the Absolute and its concomitant revolutionary movements of the nineteenth 
century, and finally to Carl Schmitt’s political theology as we saw in chapter two.538 Indeed, it 
is with respect to Carl Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty, in particular, that Clayton Crockett 
argues much of Derrida’s later work is in implicit dialogue.539 The importance of this 
connection for our purposes has to do with the fact that insofar as Caputo is trying to develop 
a Derridian philosophy of religion, there is also a Derridian counter political theology implied 
within Caputo’s theological schema, even if he and Derrida resist the formulation ‘political 
theology’ itself (given its Schmittian connotations) and prefer the locution “democracy to 
come.” The next chapter will engage this schema and attempt a description of a ‘radical political 
theology.’ The impetus for this description, which is the goal of this study, is taken from 
Caputo’s theological reading of Derrida and in particular radical theology’s theopoetics, which 
is the constitutive resource for such a radical political theology.  
 
In Derrida’s talk of a ‘messianic structure’ there appears to be a repetition of the Heideggerian-
Bultmannian gesture of mining ‘primitive Christianity’ (Urchristentum) for its hermeneutical 
potential — is this ‘universalizable’ derived from the determinable singular messianisms, or 
are the determinate messianisms derived from this irreducible ‘universalizable’ messianic 
structure?540 At first it would seem that it is not a matter of deciding between the two. Caputo 
frames it thus:  
 
                                                      
537 Ibid., pg. 125.  
538 It is to be noted that this political genealogy of secular modernity belongs to a reception history which has not 
gone uncontested. We have already referred to the recent work of Jayne Svenungsson, Divining History, where she 
complicates the influence of key figures like Joachim of Fiore (pp. 35-63). Though she does engage extensively with 
the German Romantics (Novalis, Schleiermacher, Schelling) she still leaves much to be desired with respect to 
Hegel — one of the key architects of secular modernity. In this regard, Graham Ward has argued that despite the 
posthumously recruited reading of Hegel’s speculative philosophy that props up the State (Löwith, Adorno, 
Kojève, Fukuyama), Hegel’s political philosophy remains deeply theocratic and therefore ‘messianic,’ insofar as 
Geist is not reducible to finite forms of government but rather refers to the realization of Christ’s rule in a Kingdom 
that is always to come. See Graham Ward, “Hegel’s Messianic Reasoning and its Theological Politics” in Arthur 
Bradley and Paul Fletcher (eds.), The Politics to Come, pp. 78-97.    
539 Clayton Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing, chapter three.  
540 See Jacques Derrida, “The Villanova Roundtable” in John D. Caputo (ed.) Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A 
Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), pp. 22-24. 
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the two possibilities are entirely compatible and complementary 
approaches that arise from alternately taking two different but compatible 
points of view…the messianic in general is the ontological ground or basis 
(the ratio essendi) of any historical messianism. But in order of learning or 
knowing, one would never have had the least idea or suspicion of the 
structure of the messianic without the help of these historical revelations, 
which are the ratio cognoscendi of the messianic.541    
 
The difficulty, Caputo announces however, lies in the fact that these possibilities are treated 
as distinct ‘entities’ and thus mimic the entire problematic of the particular-universal/fact-
essence/revelation-revealability binaries with which deconstruction tasks itself for 
interrogation. This distinction between the messianic and the concrete messianisms constitutes 
Caputo’s one “criticism, if it is one, of Derrida.”542 To be precise, respecting the difference of 
the determinable messianisms, which would mean that we cannot live divorced from history, 
context and place, forecloses the possibility of talking about a universal under which these 
particularities would be subsumed. On the other hand, without the experiences, histories and 
revelations of these messianisms, we may not have been able to speak about the messianic at 
all. So, it seems we are back where we started, with the problem being that “we are at a loss to 
describe the status of this undeterminability, this indeterminable messianic, without specific 
content, which cannot be a true or conventional or garden variety universal.”543  
 
Caputo’s discussion of this tension, which becomes his critical gloss of Derrida, is followed by 
a thought experiment carried out with respect to Heidegger’s notion of the ‘formal indication,’ 
which is just another loose, and ultimately unsatisfying way of trying to provide a ‘a certain 
pale formal structure’ to the concrete messianisms, one that respects their idiosyncratic 
nature.544 While the formal indication affirms the singular in all its singularity, it does not 
‘engage’ the singular and, thus, remains empty and lifeless — we might say that it appears as 
a “khôral, an-khôral-ite and desertifying religion”545 without the traces of its determinate 
occurrences. But, and this is the central and affirmative move of Caputo’s entire reading of 
Derrida, the messianic as a general structure cannot extricate itself of the traces of determinate 
religion — there are always tracks that remain in the desert — specifically their prophetism 
                                                      
541 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 137.  
542 See John D. Caputo, “Hoping in Hope, Hoping Against Hope” in James H. Olthuis (ed.) Religion With/Out 
Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo (London: Routlege, 2002), pp. 120-149; pg. 130. 
543 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 139. 
544 Ibid, pp. 139-143.  
545 Ibid., pg. 148. 
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and concern for the other. Here the paradox of an impossible messianic faith devoid of content, 
but which nonetheless makes use of the content of faith, is the impossibility of deconstruction 
and to which the messianic bears witness with ‘prayers and tears.’ Caputo’s reading of 
deconstruction is a quasi-phenomenological repetition of deconstruction as a religious 
experience which insists on the porosity between faith and unbelief. The “desert-like and arid, 
an-khôral, atheological messianic,” Caputo says, “enjoys a great deal of the life of the historical 
messianisms…The whole idea of ‘abstracting’ from the concrete messiahs is to intensify the 
urgency of the messianic.”546 This is what the messianic means for Derrida, the im/possibility 
of an ‘absolute-future’ that we cannot finally count on, the infamous quasi-transcendental 
possibility of the messianic in general. It is, therefore, particularly peculiar that deconstruction 
would be charged with an allergy for the particular since Derrida is himself not without his 
messianism, as Caputo points out: “the Derridean messianic does have certain determinable 
features, some of which — e.g., its being turned to the à-venir — it has borrowed from the 
prophetic.”547  
 
Deconstruction for Caputo is structured like a religion insofar as the category of the religious 
— the messianic, God, justice, the ‘to come’, the impossible — is an experience of response to 
something that itself cannot be experienced in ordinary time but only as an absolute otherness. 
What a religion without or sans religion means for Caputo’s Derrida is thus: “a religion without 
theology, a life of prayer and passion without theology’s God…For Derrida, God is not an 
object but an addressee, not a matter for theological clarification but the other end of a prayer, 
given not to cognition but to passion, neither him nor her nor it, but ‘you’ (tu).”548 In this way, 
Caputo positions Derrida as not willing to give-up on the name of God unless it has anything 
to do with orthodox Jewish or Christian theism, in which case he “rightly passes for an atheist” 
as he writes in Circumfessions.549 Rather, God names a deep calling that is also called upon (with 
prayer and tears) in the midst of life as a severance from the Truth. While Derrida avoids the 
word theology, Caputo himself, now equipped with this religious reading of Derrida and 
postmodernism, will venture into a ‘radical theology’ that he argues gets beyond the 
philosophy vs. theology debate to a more elemental faith and theology.550  
   
                                                      
546 Ibid., pp. 143-142. 
547 Ibid., pg. 142. 
548 Ibid., pg. 289. 
549 Derrida, Circonfessiosn (1991) quoted in Ibid., pg. 288. 
550 For the way in which Caputo understands this contribution to philosophy and theology which goes beyond 
their separation in modernity, see the more popular work, John D. Caputo, Philosophy and Theology (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 2006). See chapter one, fn. 58.  
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III. The Gift of Apocalypse 
 
The messianic motif that Caputo highlights in Prayers and Tears would be incomplete without 
also an account of ‘the apocalyptic’ and ‘the gift.’ Indeed, these themes straddle either side of 
his chapter on the messianic, respectively. Their importance for our analysis here is to further 
the claim that Caputo is not simply spinning the paradoxes of religious language in favor of 
a ‘back-door’ theology, but rather that there is something which this language names — a 
certain experience of the religious — that impels life toward justice and the other. Like the 
messianic, the apocalyptic and the gift share an essential dynamism which treats the second 
term of the sans neither as simple negation devolving into nihilism, nor in a mystical move 
that reaches ‘beyond’ in the manner of negative theology. Rather, as we will see, this 
paradoxicality — the ‘to come’ of the Messiah that never simply comes or the impossibility of 
the gift that is never simply given — is experienced as a rupture of sovereign thought and 
being, neither incapacitating nor paralyzing but urging and soliciting for its realization in the 
here and now.     
 
I. Apocalypse without Apocalypse 
 
As we saw above, the figure of the messianic has a temporal structure that is orientated 
toward a future (an absolute-interruptive future, yes, but also an interruption from ghosts of 
the past). This future has the status of a ‘to come,’ something coming like the Messiah. Caputo 
traces the infinition of the ‘to come’ — referred variously in French by the playful semantic 
constellations Derrida is known for (venir, à venir, viens, invention, l’avenir and événement) — in 
a number of Derrida’s texts.551 Here we examine Caputo’s reading of the 1983 essay glossing 
Kant titled, “On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy.”552  
 
Caputo indicates that Derrida — initially unaware of the allusion to John’s Apocalypse (the 
book of Revelation) with respect to the sense of the “Come!” he had been elaborating with 
respect to Maurice Blanchot — undertakes what he calls a ‘catastrophic reversal’ of the text. 
Derrida, like Kant, is no less distressed at the apocalyptic ‘mystagogues’ and the doomsday 
tails of cataclysmic destruction or triumph (whether Marxist, Fukuyamists and we may add, 
                                                      
551 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 67-112. Caputo draws upon Derrida’s Psyché: Inventions de l’autre (1980), Parages 
(1986), Politiques de’ l’amitié (1994) and D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie (1983). 
552 See Jacques Derrida, John P. Leavey, Jr. (trans.) “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy” in 
Semeia 23 (1982), pp. 63-97. The essay was first presented at the end of the 1980 Cerisy-la-Salle conference. 
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Trumpist). Unlike Kant, he is not prepared to draw a hard and fast distinction between the 
reasonableness of rational philosophy and apocalyptic thinking. For Derrida, the apocalyptic 
story John tells is riddled with confusion, “depicting a system of messages (envois) sent out 
over a complex apocalyptic postal system.”553 The source of the message of the coming 
Messiah is ambivalent; does it come from God, Jesus, an angel? Indeed, no less confusing is 
locating the recipients of this message. Historical criticism, for example, leads one to ask 
which John? Or to which community is this letter being sent? What about the Q-source? 
Nonetheless, precisely in this ‘destinerrance’ of the apocalyptic text — where does it come from, 
and to whom is it being sent? — another sense, a reversal, of the text is released: “a text is 
apocalyptic just when the confusion and profusion run wild.”554 But what does this mean?  
 
Derrida’s point is not to shy away from reason, for he would affirm the need for reason in 
order to limit any apocalyptic claim to truth, but rather, to draw attention to another sense of 
the apocalyptic that moves both beyond the finality reason assumes, as well as the 
mystification of historical apocalypticisms. Deconstruction is an apocalyptic (religious) 
discourse, but its dynamic can be associated neither with reason nor with religious dogma. It 
is an apocalypse without apocalypse. Only by this second sense of the apocalyptic describing 
an unpredictable and ungraspable future, can the invitation and summons of the “Come!” 
occur. Saying ‘come’ to the ‘in-coming’ Messiah is the happening of the present. Without the 
structural unknowability of the future apocalypse (its time and place) there would be no 
reason and no possibility to say ‘come,’ because we would already know what was coming. 
It is the impossibility of the coming Messiah, the absolute-future as an event that punctures 
‘ordinary’ presence, which itself makes possible the happening present. Paradoxically, then, 
the apocalypse is also a gift. A gift in the sense that without this apocalypse we would not 
have a happening present, a present that is not beset with idle ‘being-there’ but pregnant with 
expectation and desire. 
 
II. The Gift of Givenness 
 
The dynamic of a ‘real’ experience that escapes realism but which is also not idealism is 
sharpened when considering the theme of the gift, that is, the claim that there remains an 
experience of the gift (the gift of the coming Messiah) despite the fact that the gift itself is never 
given, and which nonetheless remains of ethical import. This thinking of the gift which 
                                                      
553 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 91.  
554 Ibid., pg. 92.  
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belongs to Derrida and which Caputo takes as an indication of theological significance (viz. a 
gift without a determinable giver, God, for example), has had a controversial reception and 
sparked vigorous debate. In order to distinguish Caputo’s thinking on the gift it will be useful 
to pick-up the discussion of this theme between deconstruction and phenomenology, 
emblematically represented by the tensions between Derrida and his former student, Jean-
Luc Marion.555  
 
Though it is certainly clear that the idea of ‘gift’ or ‘givenness’ is central to the thought of 
figures like Husserl (Gegebenheit) and Heidegger (Es gibt), it was not at all obvious that such a 
debate between phenomenology and deconstruction would have emerged had it not been for 
the empirical and practical ‘gift-theory’ developed by the French anthropologist Marcel 
Mauss.556 Mauss’s thesis was that the primordial level of human interactions was determined 
by an ‘economy’ of gift-giving which structured the social bonds of society and thus 
determined the bases for the condition of meaningful human relation.557 This theory generated 
much debate in France, sparking responses from Claude Levi-Strauss558 and Pierre 
Bourdieu.559  
 
An important implication of the thinking in these figures was the relation between the gift, 
intent, and desire. As Jason Alvis explains, the notion of desire, which became prominent in 
the French academy from the 1930’s to the 1990’s, was a far more useful category to describe 
the human condition. This became the case in the context of the ‘irrationalism’ which defined 
                                                      
555 Caputo’s full account of the nature of the gift where he unpacks Derrida’s Given Time (1992) and The Gift of Death 
(1995), can be found in chapter four of Prayers and Tears, pp. 160-229. The discussion which follows will draw 
primarily on Caputo’s critical commentary of the debate between Derrida and Marion that was staged at the first 
‘Religion and Postmodernism Conference’ held at Villanova. See John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible: On 
God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion,” in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), God, the Gift, and 
Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 185-222. Marion’s opening essay to this volume 
as well as the discussion with Derrida that follows can be found in the first two chapters respectively. Caputo has 
also outlined his reservations in other essays, see for example John D. Caputo, “The Hyperbolization of 
Phenomenology: Two Possibilities for Religion in Recent Continental Philosophy” in Kevin Hart (ed.) Experiences: 
Jean-Luc Marion (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2007), pp. 67-94. There Caputo argues that Marion’s work 
hyperbolizes Husserlian intuition (givenness), in contrast to Derrida who hyperbolizes Husserlian intention. The 
former compels one to a faith commitment where the latter leaves the option for faith open-ended. Caputo makes 
a similar argument when he distinguishes between his own ‘devilish hermeneutics’ and Marion’s ‘eucharistic 
hermeneutics’ in More Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington, Indiana University Press: 2000), pp. 201-207. See also 
Jason Alvis’s study, which appears to be the most comprehensive recent intervention on this debate: Jason Alvis, 
Marion and Derrida on The Gift and Desire: Debating the Generosity of Things (Switzerland: Springer, 2016).  
556 Alvis, Marion and Derrida on The Gift and Desire, pg. 5.  
557 See Marcel Mauss, W.D. Halls (trans.) The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: 
Routledge, [1925] 1990). 
558 See Claude Levi-Strauss, Introduction to the work of Marcel Mauss (London: Routledge, 1987). 
559 See Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique. Précédé de trois études d’ethnologie Kabyle (Genève, Paris: 
Droz, 1972). For a summary see, Jeremy F. Lane, Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 
pp. 102-105. 
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the two Great Wars and the associated inadequacy of more ‘cognitivistic’ and ‘consciousness-
centred’ philosophical approaches. Figures like Georges Bataille found desire or ‘eroticism’ to 
be the defining term which marked existence, “because of its powers to subvert and transgress 
the mastery of the ‘I’.”560 Alongside other contemporaries like Maurice Blanchot, who 
inaugurated a turn to language by distinguishing desire as being an ‘impossibility,’ and 
Jacques Lacan with the psychoanalytic relation between desire and the ‘lack’ which sustains 
it, these writers despite their differences all converged around a central point. Alves writes, 
“Lacan, Blanchot and Bataille all hold to a conception of desire that cannot be reified in an 
object, that always relates with the foreign and strange beyond the subject and its knowledge, 
and generally maintains an inherent relation with ‘the other.’”561 There is a Platonic sense in 
the relation of desire to this foreign other (eidos), Alves notes, and it is in this reading that 
Derrida still senses, on the one hand, residues of Husserlian ‘intentionality’ and Heideggerian 
‘givenness’ (es gibt) of originary being,562 and on the other, an economics of gifting which 
annuls the gift by substituting it for principled obligation.563  
 
In the debate between Marion and Derrida, then, Caputo shows that there are two key points, 
leading to a third, which drive a wedge between their positions. For Marion’s part, thinking 
the gift relates to the ‘givenness’ of phenomena in the Neo-Kantian tradition of Husserlian 
phenomenology.564 His provocative move, however, was to invert the Husserlian schema by 
arguing that ‘ideal’ objects (i.e. God), in the Kantian sense, far from having no intuitive content 
at all (givenness) — that is, we cannot ‘intend’ das Ding an sich because, by definition, it is 
infinite and therefore cannot appear to finite consciousness — in fact, exceeds intentionality 
because of the excessiveness of intuitive content or givenness. Phenomenology can give a 
‘scientific’ description of the ‘formal possibility’ of this excess, but only historical revelation 
can actually give it.565 According to this first point — the ‘hypergivenness’ of the ideal object 
— Marion’s God escapes a ‘metaphysics of presence’ not because there is no intuitive content, 
                                                      
560 Alves, Marion and Derrida on The Gift and Desire, pg. 10.  
561 Ibid., pg. 13. 
562 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 164-167. 
563 Ibid., pp. 173-177. 
564 Marion has detailed his position in a number of works. Worth noting here are Jean-Luc Marion, Thomas A. 
Carlson (trans.) God Without Being (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), Jean-Luc Marion, Jeffrey L. Kosky 
(trans.) Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness (Stanford: Stanfor University Press, 2002) and Jean-Luc 
Marion, Stephen E. Lewis (trans.) Givenness and Revelation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
565 Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible,” pg. 194. It is on this point that Caputo himself charges Marion with 
‘phenomenologizing theology.’ In trying to provide a phenomenological description for the possibility of 
revelation, Marion resorts to the language of theology and faith to bridge the gap between possibility and actuality. 
For Caputo, faith then becomes used as a hermeneutic tool, providing “an interpretative slant […] that allows the 
believer to intend something that is precisely not given.” See Caputo, “The Hyperbolization of Phenomenology,” 
pg. 87.   
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but because there is too much content, that is, the phenomena is ‘saturated’ with givenness that 
any intention/concept/idea simply cannot contain it. While Derrida would find a point of 
agreement in Marion’s attempt to subvert the transcendental conditions of modern 
subjectivity (which impose themselves on the external world of objects) he nonetheless would 
wonder if Marion has not taken Husserl too far.566 This leads to the second point. If 
hypergivenness for Marion is not the same as ‘presence,’ insofar as the intuitive content 
exceeds the intention of a metaphysical concept, this does not mean for Derrida that it is any 
less ‘hyperessential.’ The latter, Caputo writes, “is the superabundant self-presenting of God, 
the deeper, saving operation of the God beyond God, without Being, otherwise than essence, 
higher being.”567 The nature of an essence which goes beyond (hyper) is always in the service 
of a saving operation. We lose God with being in order to save him without being — this was 
Derrida’s protest against negative theology more generally. Where something is given up in 
order to gain something else one enters into an economy. This third point, the divine economy 
of the gift, appears as Derrida’s chief concern with Marion’s thinking and also the point at 
which their disagreement can be most clearly seen.  
 
III. The Gift without Givenness 
 
For Derrida, the gift of givenness in Marion’s description, becomes caught up in an economy 
of exchange, implying debts, rewards, expectations and indeed, very little faith. For Derrida, 
this cannot be the nature of a ‘true’ gift. In Radical Hermeneutics Caputo showed that in 
Derrida’s rereading of Husserl, the ‘grammatological reduction’ means that ‘monological 
interiority’ is impossible without the use of signs. Signs are needed in order not only to 
communicate the meaning of transcendental histories (like the Pythagorean theorem),568 but 
also for the interior articulation of transcendental consciousness itself.569 However, given what 
we have already discussed in chapter four regarding the nature of différance, the use of signs 
to create stability in the flux of meaning has the consequence that meaning is only ever 
obtainable by the repetition of signs, not because they refer to an ultimate transcendental 
signified. It is because the ideal object is not given that the coming to presence of the present 
is made possible at all. To put this another way, the internal consciousness of the 
phenomenological subject according to deconstruction is only made possible through a 
perversity of the meaning of phenomenology, namely, by means of that which does not appear. 
                                                      
566 Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible., pp. 192-194.  
567 Ibid., pg. 195. 
568 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 123-130. 
569 Ibid., pp. 130-138. 
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In Derrida’s words, “we recognize an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting value, 
and with it a nonlife, a nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living present, an irreducible 
non-primordiality.”570     
 
For Marion, Derrida’s accounting of the gift produces an aporetic and ‘disturbing result.’ 
Caputo summarizes Marion’s complaint thus: “if the gift appears, it is absorbed into economy; 
if it does not appear, that closes down the phenomenality of donation.”571 Derrida would 
agree with the first point but from the second he departs and distinguishes his own. For 
Derrida, the gift is never given, for as soon as it appears it is absorbed into an economy and 
therefore annuls itself as ‘gift.’ Derrida counters Marion by saying that he has not then 
eliminated the gift, but in fact has kept it safe (sauf). For Derrida, this cannot be a 
‘phenomenology of the unapparent,’ for that would make it no longer phenomenology, 
instead it is an ‘experience of the impossibility’ of the gift being given, which remains, 
nonetheless, an experience of the gift. 
 
The ‘tug of war’ between deconstruction and phenomenology, as Caputo describes it, is not 
easily resolvable and it will not be our task to arbitrate its outcome. Marion’s work is subtle, 
detailed and argued over many pages that require careful analysis. Our purpose here is that 
by distinguishing between Derrida and Marion we can bring into relief the move that Caputo 
adopts in his own religious reading of deconstruction. To bring this discussion to a close, then, 
we must make sense of what it means to have an ‘experience of the impossibility’ of the gift 
— of the gift without givenness. Caputo distinguishes between what he calls Catholic, 
Protestant and Jewish Gifts.572 Marion’s phenomenology operates in the space of the former, 
where Christ and the sacraments become the supreme examples of phenomena that are 
saturated with givenness. Derrida’s gifts, on the other hand, are more Kantian and Protestant 
and not a little Jewish either. They are Protestant and Kantian because their non-appearing 
“is to be compared to Kant’s ‘thought’ without a concept…which regulates and motivates the 
ego as it moves through conceptually determined and perceptually determined intuitions of 
ordinary experience.”573 The gift, though it cannot be ‘known’ conceptually, nonetheless 
comes to bear upon our experience insofar as we can still ‘think’ about it. The gift (i.e. God) in 
this Derridian sense, then, takes on the character of the object of faith, where ‘faith’ is not a 
passivity but an act of ‘doing the truth’ — facere veritatem to quote Augustine. “Like Kant” 
                                                      
570 Derrida, quoted in Ibid, pg. 131. 
571 Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible,” pg. 203. 
572 Ibid., pp. 208-210. 
573 Ibid., pg. 209.  
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Caputo says, “Derrida finds it necessary to deny knowledge (truth) in order to make room for 
faith and doing the truth (which corresponds in Kant to the primacy of ‘practical reason’) and 
this in order to save the gift.”574 
 
We can now understand the Jewish analogy with greater clarity. The messianic — the gift of 
the Messiah — is structurally ‘to come’ and never appears (givenness). But in such an 
indeterminate and impossible future of the Messiah’s coming, we are nonetheless moved (by 
prayers and tears) to a ‘truer’/authentic expectancy or preparation for this coming. This is the 
‘experience of the impossibility’ of the gift/Messiah and it is also the ethico-political core of 
deconstruction that Caputo argues is fundamentally a religious experience. The messianic as 
the non-coming of the Messiah is purposefully rendered, therefore, as an infinition of the ‘to-
come-ing’ of the Messiah. The former suggests that we are left despairingly without hope, 
while the latter, precisely because the Messiah’s non-coming is the condition of possibility for 
hope, invites a pregnant and vitality of the present which never grows passive, but rather 
activates “a hope, a sigh, a dream, for what is not yet and can never be given.”575  
 
There is a consistent character to this impossible gift (Derrida calls the gift “another name of 
the impossible”576) that deserves further comment. As we have been alluding to, Caputo’s 
Derridian philosophy of religion is often charged with passivity or an all too Kantian 
treatment of the gift that never makes an appearance. This point is particularly important 
because it relates to the religious and political philosophy that will be attended to (though in 
a different idiom) in the sections below and in the next chapter. In the latter case, some, like 
Caputo’s long time interlocutor, Merold Westphal, have determined that the ethical and 
political aspects of Caputo’s thinking (and likewise Derrida) have arisen more as ad hoc 
positions informed by personal-biographical preferences rather than as intrinsic features of 
deconstruction itself.577 One can partly defend Westphal in these comments, since they were 
made prior to Caputo’s publication of Prayers and Tears. However, as we have shown in 
chapter three and four of this study, it was precisely the ethical move toward the other in 
deconstruction (via Levinas) that first compelled Caputo to take his Derridian leave of 
Heidegger already in the early eighties. The debate between Caputo and Westphal is also one 
that has reached something of academic celebrity status, and just as with Marion, it will not 
                                                      
574 Ibid.  
575 Ibid., pg. 219. 
576 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 169. 
577 See James L. Marsh, John D. Caputo and Merold Wesphal (eds.) Modernity and its Discontents (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1992), pp. 119-161; pg. 125. 
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be our task to resolve it here. What is worth pointing out, however, is that their disagreement 
comes down to the nature of postmodern hermeneutics, where Westphal argues that the 
tradition of Gadamer and Ricouer is just as radical as Derrida, a position that Caputo no-doubt 
vehemently contests.578  
 
Staying with the philosophical point, then, which addresses this perceived charge of passivity, 
Caputo asks “when one desires the gift” — this gift which is ungiven — “[d]oes one succumb 
to a ‘transcendental illusion’ in which a concept…loses its empirical traction and is allowed 
to spin freely on its own in the empty air of ideality?”579 At first glance it seems that this cannot 
not be the case, for as soon as the gift enters the economics of empirical reality it annuls itself. 
However, this is not merely an illusion, it is a certain ‘quasi-transcendental illusion’ because, as 
Caputo says, “we do not make the mistake of thinking the impossible is real”580 – viz. we are 
aware that this illusion is to an extent just that, an illusion! To be in the midst of the aporia of 
the gift  is to be “on the one end, the risk of entertaining a transcendental illusion; on the other 
end, the risk of ‘entering the destructive circle.’”581 ‘Entertaining’ and ‘entering’ are two 
operations, two risks, two ‘double injunctives:’ 1) to “know how the gift annuls itself,” but 
nonetheless, 2) to “commit yourself [engage-toi] even if commitment is the destruction of the 
                                                      
578 For a recent comment on this debate see Justin Sands, Reasoning from Faith: Fundamental Theology in Merold 
Westphal’s Philosophy of Religion (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2018), pp. 203-224. Sands concedes that 
philosophically, Westphal runs into the kinds of problems Caputo raises about a delayed onto-theology. However, 
he argues that when seen with a ‘theological’ and ‘eschatological’ lens, Westphal’s project is as radical as Caputo’s 
because he “has articulated a theology that holds sin and its noetic effects as a principle for understanding the 
human condition,” namely, a condition that is always fallen and thus a continued this-worldly process of self-
transcendence. pg. 217. However, this privileging of Christian discourse is dependent on the truth of Christian 
revelation, which is for Caputo the very Gadamarian-type hermeneutics that conserves the fruits of the tradition 
without a sufficient passing through of the deconstructive critique. See Caputo’s response to Westphal in John D. 
Caputo, “Methodological Postmodernism: On Merold Westphal’s Overcoming Onto-Theology” in Faith and 
Philosophy 22.3 (July, 2005), pp. 284-296; pg. 293. See also Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 108-115. A part of this 
critique is what Caputo calls a ‘thin postmodernism,’ one in which Westphal is charged for being too Kantian in 
the sense of limiting knowledge to make room for faith. This critique extends from their disagreement with what 
is meant by ‘onto-theology’ and therefore, the character of continental philosophy’s activity of ‘overcoming.’ 
Westphal had laid his position out in Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001), where he argued that the designation of ‘onto-theology’ is a critique “directed 
toward the how rather than the what of our God-talk,” pg. 23. He expanded this argument in Transcendence and Self-
Transcendence: On God and the Soul (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004). For Caputo, Westphal’s account of 
‘transcendence’ in the latter is not a ‘decentering’ of the self, but rather a ‘recentering’ of the self on God, and this 
replays the ‘central’ term in onto-theo-logic, which is the Center that a more ‘robust postmodernism’ wants to 
destabilize. See John D. Caputo, “What Is Merold Westphal’s Critique of Ontotheology Criticizing?” in Keith B. 
Putt (ed.) Gazing Through a Prism Darkly: Reflections on Merold Westphal’s Hermeneutical Epistemology (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2009), pp. 100-115. For more of this continued debate see also Keith B. Putt, “Friends 
and Strangers/Poets and Rabbis: Negotiating a ‘Capuphalian’ Philosophy of Religion,” followed by Westphal and 
Caputo’s response in Clayton Crockett, Keith B. Putt and Jeffrey W. Robbins (eds.) The Future of Continental 
Philosophy of Religion (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 34-58. For a resource to these contemporary 
debates more generally, see Christina M. Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in Contemporary 
Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). 
579 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 170.  
580 Ibid., pg. 170. 
581 Ibid. 
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gift by the gift.”582 The impossibility of the gift without givenness is not simply impossible, it 
impassions the circulation of the economy of gift exchange just at it risks shutting down the 
economy altogether. The tension here is not resigned complacency, but rather wildly 
productive gratuity which always, structurally, risks ingratitude.  
 
At this point we can summarize the religious dimensions Caputo traces in Prayers and Tears: 
first, there is a ‘generalized apophatics’ which “repeat[s] the structure of faith in a faith 
without dogma;”583 second, an apocalyptic dimension that underscores the structural demand 
of hospitality for the in-coming Other/Messiah who never comes; third, a carrying over of 
this temporal notion into the central religious motif — the messianic (or messianicity) 
reflecting a universal structure that per impossible cannot avoid repeating the prophetic 
impulse of the singular messianisms; fourth and finally, the nature of impossibility in 
Caputo’s analysis of Derrida’s ungiven gift, stressing the importance of an ultimately anti-
phenomenological responsiveness to absence, which issues a circulation of affirmative and 
productive impulses.  
 
IV. Derrida’s Religion 
 
We have yet to attend to the final arguments of Prayers and Tears, where Caputo addresses the 
question of whether it is possible to read Derrida as a “Jewish” thinker and if deconstruction 
is therefore a ‘Jewish science.’ In a section on circumcision (the apotropaic emblem of 
separation of the Jew before a violent God, according to Derrida’s reading of Hegel) 584 Caputo 
illustrates Derrida’s concern for the ‘fact’ of the Jew in opposition to its violent ‘figuring’ in 
the history of philosophy (Hegel).585 This leads to a frank discussion about the Christian 
doctrine of the incarnation. In its Hegelian form the Jew is incapable of the incarnation because 
he/she cannot “appreciate the sensuous embodiment of the infinite.”586 Contrary to Hegel’s 
loving Christian family which is orientated toward the density of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), the 
Jewish family worships in an empty temple, “a signifier without a signified,” and is thus 
relegated to the margins for its participation in a religion of hollow legal codes which are 
unable to mediate truth.587 Consequently, it is Derrida’s “prophetic passion and distrust of 
                                                      
582 Derrida, Given Time, pg. 30, quoted in Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 171.  
583 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 57. 
584 See Jacques Derrida, John P. Leavey Jr. and Richard Rand (trans.) Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
[1974] 1986). 
585 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 234-243. 
586 Ibid., pg. 240. 
587 Ibid.  
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incarnation” which orientates him to Jesus as ‘the Jew,’ not the incarnated omnipotent and 
sovereign God.588 It is on this point about Jesus the Jew, as we will see below, that Caputo 
situates his Christology; a ‘poetics of an an-archical kingdom’ based not on a 
phenomenalization of the infinite in the classic understanding of Incarnation, but on an 
‘iconic’ incarnation that reveals God as ‘weak’ in the height/depth of a radical kenotic action.589  
 
Further pursuing Derrida’s readings of Paul Celan,590 James Joyce591 and Sigmund Freud,592 
Caputo concludes ultimately that one does not have a privileged position from which to judge 
whether or not deconstruction is a product of Derrida’s ‘Jewishness.’ If one were to conclude 
that the latter where unequivocally the case, viz. that deconstruction was the result of a ‘Jewish 
mind’ without remainder, as Yerushalmi wants to press Freud, then in virtue of the very 
characteristics of this Jewishness (openness to the future, messianicity etc.) that relate it to 
deconstruction, it would then cease to be Jewish. Rather, it would take the form of a 
terminable Judaism, boxing in this community as the unique guardians of an exclusively 
Jewish ‘archive.’ We are, therefore, returned to the same aporetic structure between 
messianism and messianicity (Jewishness and historical Judaism), and that it is the 
undecidability between them which constitutes “not a loss, but an impetus, such stuff as 
dreams and passions are made of.”593  
 
When this question of Derrida’s Jewishness and the nature of deconstruction is put forward 
in the final chapter, “Confession,” the answer is that there is no final answer, not even an 
autobiographical one. Derrida could not conceive, on the one hand, of saying that he ‘is’ 
Jewish, or on the other hand, that he ‘is’ an atheist — as if he enjoyed complete self-possession, 
self-ownership or sovereignty over himself. Thus, when he nonetheless calls himself a man of 
                                                      
588 Ibid., pg. 247. This distrust is born out of a concern for conflating what Heidegger called ‘vulgar’ time with 
messianic time. Caputo points this out with respect to Blanchot in chapter two when he writes “For Blanchot, the 
Christian dogma of the Incarnation turns on a confusion of messianic time and historical time, on a certain 
contraction of the lightness of messianic time to the grossness of the order of presence.” Pg. 80.  
589 This kenotic action is ‘radical’ because the vulnerability of God that is put on display is done so without reserve, 
that is, by not attempting to use this action ‘economically’ to exhibit a more fully divine strength. See John D. 
Caputo, “The Sense of God: A Theology of the Event with Special Reference to Christianity” in Lieven Boeve and 
Christophe Brabant (eds.) Between Philosophy and Theology: Contemporary Interpretations of Christianity (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2010), pp. 27-42; pg. 39. See also chapter two of Weakness of God (2006), which we turn to more closely 
below.  
590 Jacques Derrida, “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan” in Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (eds.), Sovereignties in 
Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 1-64. Originally published 
Jacques Derrida, Shibboleth: Pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilée, 1986). 
591 Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramaphone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce” in Derek Atridge (ed.) Acts of Literature (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 253-309.  
592 Jacques Derrida, Eric Prenowitz (trans.) Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1996). Originally published as Mal d’Archive: une impression freudienne (Paris: Galilée, 1995). 
593 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 277.  
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prayer and passion, a ‘religious’ man, he thereby situates himself in the cut (circumcision): 
“the scission between his Judaism and his non-Judaism, the partition dividing these two 
worlds.”594 Caputo emphasizes again that this is not a site of resigned ‘choosing not to choose,’ 
but instead that it invokes blood, tears, and passion, in virtue of the fact that Derrida is ‘cut 
off’ from the truth of his religious alliance. As for God, the name of God for Derrida names an 
absolute secret. It names a structural unknowability, the impossible; a name toward which he 
prays but without the security of knowing either its recipient or its final reception. Thus, 
Derrida can repeat Augustine’s confession often quoted in Caputo’s texts, “what do I love 
when I love my God?”  
 
It should be added, that in this final chapter, the irony would certainly be missed if one were 
to balk at Derrida’s self-indulgence, which Caputo communicates in a tone that borders on 
the hagiographical. For example, when he writes that Derrida’s “destiny is to keep the cut 
open,”595 or when he speaks of Derrida’s ‘resurrection’ and his ‘salvation through blood’ that 
comes not through the mark of circumcision which separates him, but from destinerrance, 
“the blood that flows from being severed from the truth.”596 The irony Caputo employs by 
portraying Derrida as the messianic figure (a savior, or the one being saved) is found precisely 
in the fact that the resurrection or renewal is repeated completely anew; viz. the ironic 
outcome that “the resurrection that comes of this cut [Derrida’s circumcision] is to deliver us 
from the hands of the One and Only Jealous God of Truth who not only spills the blood of 
those who defy his wishes but who also spills the blood of the faithful to remind them of their 
covenant.”597   
 
In these excursions through Derrida’s religion, what becomes abundantly clear is that one can 
no longer talk about the Christian or Jewish God in the same way. Indeed, these traditions 
and the God of these traditions, have been radically deconstructed and re-posited. Faith has 
taken on a different meaning: 
 
Faith is a passion for something to come, for something I know not what, 
with an unknowing, non-savoir, sans-savoir, which is such that I cannot 
say what is a translation of what. I cannot say whether God is a translation 
of “justice,” so that whenever I pray and weep over justice I am praying 
                                                      
594 Ibid., pg. 283.  
595 Ibid., pg. 306. Emphasis added. 
596 Ibid.  
597 Ibid., pg. 307.  
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and weeping over God, dreaming and desiring God, with a deep, with a 
deep abiding passion for God, by loving God, by the desire for God, by 
“my God,” is a way of dreaming of justice.”598  
 
Thematically, God, justice and the impossible, will continue to dominate Caputo’s thought in 
the subsequent decades following Prayers and Tears. Indeed, in what we might call a final 
repetition (perhaps there will be more?), Caputo takes Derrida where the latter himself will 
not go; from a ‘circumfessional’ description of God given in religious experience, to a 
‘theopoetics’ of the event ‘harbored’ in the name of God which is given in a theological 
analysis.599 Theology for Derrida still contains the theo-logic of the One — a totality of divinity 
that functions as a closed system of thought and being. With his accustomed sarcasm, Caputo 
remarks, “On this point [about theology], if I may dare to say so, Derrida is somewhat closer 
to the Bible-thumpers than the endowed chairs of religious studies.”600 Caputo’s move is to 
take this reading of Derrida, especially from the writings of the 90’s that seem to shift the 
idiom of language to religion and politics, and to complete a further shift into theology proper. 
It is in this shift where we can see a deconstructed theology emerge and the sovereign God of 
omni-power (potentia), force (kratos), and sempiternality reconfigured as ‘weak’ and 
vulnerable, and thus opening a space for experimenting with a new theo-political-poetic 
conception sovereignty. 
 
IV. Radical Theology 
 
“Between his Prayers and Tears (1997) and The Weakness of God (2006), Caputo undergoes a 
conversion of sorts, or what he describes as a coming out as a theologian.”601 As mentioned, 
Caputo’s concern with more explicit questions regarding faith and theology can be seen in the 
series of ‘edifying divertissements’ in Prayers and Tears. In an interview with Keith Putt found 
in a volume of essays that mediated on the latter, we learn from Caputo that initially he had 
set out to write a book that would “put deconstruction in service of religion,” titled God and 
Anonymity. The latter was put on hold when the chapters on Derrida and religion took on a 
life of their own to later become the manuscript for Prayers and Tears.602 The reflections on the 
                                                      
598 Ibid., pg. 338. 
599 Ibid., pg. 288-289. 
600 Ibid., pg. 289. 
601 See Crockett et al. (eds.), The Future of Continental Philosophy of Religion, pg. 5.  
602 See James H. Olthuis (ed.) Religion with/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo (London: Routledge, 
2002), pg. 157. See also Caputo’s interview with Mark Dooley, which traces this transition to theology; Ian Leask 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  162 
theological topoi found in the divertissements or “so many little sermons,”603 as he called 
them, seem to be the product of those early deliberations that culminate in The Weakness of 
God604 and later The Insistence of God (2013).605  
 
At this juncture and given the trajectory mapped in the course of this study, we are in a 
position to formally engage its ‘second axis.’ Such a ‘formal’ engagement, however, is 
somewhat artificial since we have already been implicitly exploring the event throughout 
Caputo’s work insofar as it remains deeply influenced by Derrida. Indeed, the thinking of 
‘event’ appears early Derrida’s “Signature, Event, Context,” followed by his books dedicated 
to Francis Ponge, Paul Celan and Maurice Blanchot, as well as his later more political 
writings.606 While Caputo follows Derrida607 (with the exception of also Lyotard and 
Deleuze),608 it should also be noted that there exists a long tradition of twentieth century 
continental thought that can be characterized as ‘philosophies of event,’ — stemming at least 
from Heidegger through Deleuze, Lyotard, Levinas, Blanchot, Badiou, Žižek and others. For 
Caputo’s part, as will be shown below, the series of dyadic tropes marshalled from Derrida’s 
                                                      
(ed.), “From Radical Hermeneutics to the Weakness of God: John D. Caputo in Dialogue with Mark Dooley” in 
Philosophy Today 51.2 (2007), pp. 216-226. 
603 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. xxix. 
604 Many of the themes in those sermon-like interludes in Prayers and Tears, Caputo would expand upon and 
publish in the years preceding Weakness of God. Indeed, almost two-thirds of the chapters in Weakness of God are 
acknowledged as having antecedents in previously published articles throughout the late 90’s and early 2000s. 
During these interceding years, he would also publish two popular works that serve as evidence of this increasing 
interest in theology. See John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001) and Philosophy and Theology 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2006). We mention these biographical points only to point out that at the beginning, Caputo 
never saw himself as doing ‘theology’ and that indeed it was a term he was ‘allergic’ to. Consequently, this lengthy 
‘coming-out’ process to what he now calls ‘radical theology’ attests to a deeply rooted ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ 
and which no-doubt informs what he means by ‘radical theology.’ 
605 John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013). Caputo has 
also produced a number of popular books that emphasize his theological position in more undemanding language: 
see John D. Caputo, What Would Jesus Deconstruct? The Good News of Postmodernism for the Church (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2007); John D. Caputo, Truth (Penguin: 2014); John D. Caputo, The Folly of God: A Theology of the 
Unconditional (Salem, OR: Polebridge Press, 2016). 
606 See Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.) “Signature, Event, Context” in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1984 [1972]), Richard Rand (trans.) Signéponge-Signsponge (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984), “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan” Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (eds.), Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of 
Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: 
Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003) and Jacques Derrida, 
“A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event” in Critical Inquiry 33.2. (Winter 2007), pp. 441-461.  
607 This is seen most clearly in his analysis of Derrida’s 1980 essay Psyché: Inventions de l’autre. See Captuo, Prayers 
and Tears, pg. 71-76. 
608 Acknowledging the influence of Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense (1969) Caputo writes: “In an important 
‘sense,’ The Weakness of God is inspired by Deleuze, and this Theology of the Event in my subtitle is very much a 
contribution to a ‘(theo)logic of sense.’” See Gilles Deleuze, Mark Lester (trans.), Constantin V. Boundas (ed.) The 
Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia University Press, [1969] 1990), and see Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 301; fn. 5. 
In Caputo’s earlier discussion of his theory of subjectivity in Against Ethics, he gives an account of ‘events’ (pp. 93-
98), and distinguishes them by their singularity, idiosyncratic and irreducible nature. “The subject is never an 
‘agent’ through and through. For one thing, the subject is just as often something acted upon, subjected to events.” 
Pg. 95. There, Caputo also footnotes (pg. 270, fn. 1) his indebtedness to thinking the singular and irruptive force of 
events to Deleuze as well as Lyotard, especially the latter’s last chapter of The Differend.  
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writings are ‘organized’ and recast by his own theory of ‘Name’ and ‘event,’ and subsequently 
deployed in a poetic discourse that constitutes ‘weak’ or ‘radical’ theology.609 The artificial 
formality of the second axis, then, lies in the specific iteration of the event that takes place in 
this radical theological discourse. 
 
Caputo’s critical and novel move is to develop his notion of ‘event’ in a theological account of 
deconstruction (or a deconstructive account of theology).610 For him the event functions 
analogously to the different sites or dyadic tropes of the il/logic of différance (the impossible, 
the ‘to come,’ gift, messianic, apocalyptic). It names an excess relative to contingent horizons 
of meaning. Religion and theology are but historical constructs (names) which bear witness 
to a disturbance that exceeds them. This disturbance is the event which is experienced as a call 
in the ‘name’ of God. A ‘weak’ or ‘radical theology’ is configured as a specific description, 
hermeneutics, narration, or poetics, that responds to the experience of the call of this event — 
where much depends upon the ‘how’ of the response.611 For example, as Caputo writes, “any 
theology, weak or strong, is the explication of the event that is implicit in the name of God.”612 
Accordingly, the appropriate response for a ‘theology without theology’613 is to approach the 
event with a hermeneutic of ‘weakness.’ This means understanding that the call of the event 
‘harbored’ in the name is indifferent to whether or not the ‘caller’ can be identified. Such is 
the mistake of ‘strong’ theology. The excess of the ‘event’ or the event of excess does not come 
from the ‘outside,’ from another ontological or ontic ‘source,’ or as Caputo later puts it; God 
is not what ‘exists’ but rather ‘insists.’614 The event ‘in’ the name of God (God’s insistence) is 
located on the ‘plane of immanence’ (Deleuze), which describes not an ‘infinite finitude’ but 
rather a ‘finite infinity.’ That is, the possibility of infinition in what is actually happening.615 
                                                      
609 Caputo’s use of ‘weakness’ is informed by Gianni Vattimo’s ‘Weak thought,’ see John D. Caputo and Gianni 
Vattimo, Jeffrey W. Robbins (ed.) After the Death of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). It also follows 
Derrida’s use of the phrase ‘weak force,’ after Walter Benjamin’s ‘weak messianic force’ in the famed Rogues essay. 
See Jacques Derrida, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (trans.) Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. xiv, 36. 
610 It is at this point that we may speak of a ‘postmodern theology’ according to Caputo: “On my accounting, things 
take a theological turn in postmodernism when what we mean by the event shifts to God. Or, alternately, things 
take a postmodern turn in theology when the meditation upon theos or theios, God or the divine, is shifted to events.” 
See Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics: On the Weakness of God and the Theology of the Event” in John D. Caputo 
and Gianni Vattimo, Jeffrey W. Robbins (ed.) After the Death of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 
pp. 47-88; pg. 49. 
611 “The old ‘logos’ of theology is replaced with ‘events,’ which are addressed by a poetics, not a logic. To put it in 
Paul Ricoeur’s terms, it is not a logos but an event that the mythos gives us to think.” See Caputo, The Insistence of 
God, pp. 63-64. 
612 John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006), pg. 113. 
613 Caputo borrows this phrase form Charles E. Winquist’s Surface of the Deep (Aurora, Colo: Davies Publishing 
Group, 2003), pg. 206. 
614 Caputo, The Insistence of God, pg. 14-19.  
615 “The à venir is a structure of experience and responsibility. It is not time but something going on in time. It is 
not a bad infinity but a finitely constituted but open-ended call – and in that sense not an infinite finitude but rather 
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The conclusion of this chapter will be dedicated to further exposing what Caputo means by 
his ‘theology of the event,’ as well as pointing toward the ramifications of this thinking about 
God for theology and sovereignty.  
 
I. The Quasi-Structure of ‘Name-Event’ 
 
The point of departure for Caputo’s radical theology begins with a distinction between two 
necessarily related terms that follow the parlance of deconstruction; ‘name’ and ‘event.’616 As 
already discussed in chapter three, Derridian deconstruction begins from the critique of 
logocentrism, which, through the spatialization of the inside/outside binary, extends to all 
closed systems that attempt to exclude the outside as other. When Derrida says ‘il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte,’617 he means not to eliminate the binarity of the inside/outside but rather to suggest 
that this opposition is already inscribed in the writing outside at the margins, and thus is 
subverted from the beginning. The fault of logocentrism and the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is 
to assume that binary distinctions remain fixed in their distinctiveness, whereas what Derrida 
shows is that binaries are always mutually constituting and their distinctiveness always 
unstable. The Name-Event structure follows this schema. While Caputo sees his theology of 
the event as an emphasis on the ‘event side’ of the binary (the outside, absence, impossibility, 
sans, without),618 for which he has received no small criticism,619 his intention is not to 
                                                      
a finite infinite.” See John D. Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to Radical Theology” in 
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11.2 (2011), pp. 32-124; pg. 58.  
616 There are a number of superb introductions to Caputo’s theology of the event. From Caputo himself, see 
“Spectral Hermeneutics: On the Weakness of God and the Theology of the Event” in John D. Caputo and Gianni 
Vattimo, Jeffrey W. Robbins (ed.) After the Death of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 47-88, 
also Robbins’ useful introduction to this volume, pp. 1-26; “The Sense of God: A Theology of the Event with Special 
Reference to Christianity” in Lieven Boeve and Christophe Brabant (eds.) Between Philosophy and Theology: 
Contemporary Interpretations of Christianity (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 27-41. For other introductions, which are 
generally optimistic toward Caputo’s project, see Katherine Sarah Moody, Radical Theology and Emerging 
Christianity: Deconstruction, Materialism and Religious Practices (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 61-76, and Steven 
Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009), pp. 196-200. For a more critical approach see 
Christopher Ben Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern: William Desmond and John D. Caputo 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 7-22. After introducing Caputo’s thought in the opening 
chapter, Simpson embarks in each subsequent chapter to explicate and then defend the work of William Desmond 
as an alternative to Caputo.  
617 Jacques Derrida, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (trans.), Of Grammatology, corrected edition (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, [1967] 1997), pg.158. 
618 For example, with respect to democracy (Name), Caputo says “In the ‘democracy to come,’ the ‘to come’ [Event] 
is more important than the ‘democracy.’” See Weakness of God, pg. 3.  
619 This criticism can be designated as the problem of the ‘with’ in Caputo’s ‘religion without religion,’ that is, 
whether or not a religion without religion does not seem to favor the ‘event’ of religion over its historical 
instantiations. For recent critics like Joeri Schrijvers — Between Faith and Belief: Toward a contemporary phenomenology 
of religious life (New York: SUNY Press, 2016) — Caputo’s effort to avoid a certain empiricism leads to a neglect of 
factical being-in-the-world (pg. 162). This issue has also been raised variously in another volume of essays, see 
Aaron Simmons and Stephan Minister (eds.) Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion: Toward a Religion 
With Religion (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 2012). It also goes to the heart of the titanic debate between 
Caputo and Martin Hägglund. Hägglund’s Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008) argued against Caputo by asserting that he creates too great a gap between the conditional 
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denigrate the ‘name’ but to expose it to the event which it contains or cannot see coming. 
Certain names concerning theology, indeed, theology itself — which presume to grasp the 
Truth ‘inside’ or at least to have obtained privileged access to it — are inevitably subjected to 
a ‘quasi-hermeneutical’ reduction of being (Name, God, theology) to the event going on ‘in’ 
or coming over being.620  
 
Caputo wastes no time in the opening pages of Weakness of God to set out the itinerary of this 
reduction. He argues that names as nominal unities having accumulated meaning are always 
already compromised by an indefatigable paradox, in that they simultaneously contain events 
which are in principle uncontainable. The ‘uncontainability’ of events means that names like 
‘God,’ ‘Christianity,’ or ‘democracy’ are opened up onto something that exceeds them, and 
which forces them to re-nominate themselves in an endless “nameability by other names 
equally eventful.”621 Since events ceaselessly escape nomination, names are endlessly caught 
up in ‘translating’ the event to which they are a response and, thus, are themselves not ‘literal’ 
in the sense of grasping (greifen) a concept (Begriff). Caputo calls the process of 
‘deliteralization’ of the name which tries to articulate the event it harbors ‘poetics.’ This will 
be an immensely important part of his radical theology which we will pursue further below. 
Keeping in mind Derrida’s critique of Levinas in “Writings and Difference” (1967), Caputo 
also notes that the excess of events is posited against a horizon of expectation or pre-given 
horizon of perception (Husserl) that it shocks and shatters. Opposing Levinas’ tout autre, 
which is impossible, simpliciter, Caputo follows Derrida in arguing that events refer to the 
                                                      
and unconditional, which allows him [Caputo] to circumscribe the inescapable ‘infinite finitude’ of the present – 
Derrida’s ‘radical atheism’ according to Hägglund. Accordingly, Caputo can insist on the ‘passage’ through the 
conditional to the unconditional, thus leaving ‘the with’ of a religion without religion behind. One could perhaps 
make this argument for the present work, Weakness of God, where indeed there seems to be an emphasis on ‘the 
Event’ in spite of ‘the Name.’ But Hägglund’s reading of Prayers and Tears (the object of his critique) misses the 
mark. Derrida’s repeated religious references indicate surely something more than the mere notion of ‘radical 
survival’ as Hägglund argues. Caputo has written an almost 100-page response to Hägglund’s characterization of 
deconstruction, see John D. Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to Radical Theology” in 
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11.2 (2011), pp. 32-124, to which Hägglund replied, “The Radical Evil of 
Deconstruction: A Reply to John D. Caputo,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11.2 (Spring, 2011), pp. 126-
150. The debate has been recently revisited by Neal DeRoo in a three-part essay series in the Journal for Cultural and 
Religious Theory online supplement, see Neal DeRoo, “The Dangers of Dealing With Derrida – Revisiting the 
Caputo-Hägglund Debate On The ‘Religious’ Reading of Deconstruction, Part 1.” Journal for Cultural and Religious 
Theory. http://jcrt.org/religioustheory/2018/06/26/the-dangers-of-dealing-with-derrida-revisiting-the-caputo-
hagglund-debate-on-the-religious-reading-of-deconstruction-part-1-neal-deroo/ (accessed June 28, 2018). See also 
Clayton Crockett’s critique and defense of Caputo in Crockett, Derrida after the End of Writing, pp. 33-36.   
620 Only ‘quasi-hermeneutical’ because hermeneutics wants to retrieve the more originary relation between Being 
and ‘man’ that has been alienated by modern Techniks (Heidegger), or that wants to communicate the essential 
Truth of the tradition however contingently it may be expressed (Gadamer). See chapter four of Radical 
Hermeneutics, pp. 95-119. 
621 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 3.  
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impossible, making them surprising because their incoming is relative to what we were 
expecting.622  
 
The event has both a surprising and irruptive quality. The emphasis on irruption is to 
acknowledge the sense of the event given by Deleuze. However, Caputo stresses that he does 
want to stage a battle between Deleuze and Derrida but wants ‘to run together the two senses’ 
of the event. On the Deleuzian side, the event irrupts and breaks-out (e-venire) as a virtuality 
within names. On the Derridian side, events are what we cannot see coming, interrupting the 
horizon of the name and break-in (in-venire) with surprise.623 However, whether irruptive or 
interruptive, events harbor an irreducible unforeseeability and therefore one could not say 
that what is breaking-out or breaking-in will be something ‘good.’ The event has no telos and 
does not involve an ‘essential’ unfolding but is rather constrained by the limitations of 
historical circumstance i.e. language itself or the name itself. This refers back to how Derrida 
understands the very structure of language as both promise and threat. The other of language 
is promised to us in language even before the intentional speech act.  Thus, in the 
unavoidability of speech the other that language promises us takes on a ‘messianic look’ 
which keeps the future open. But if language, Caputo tells us, “is a promise to speak to one 
another of the things themselves, to give one another meaning and truth, that is a promise 
that cannot be kept.”624 The structure of language, therefore, is both promise and threat and 
the event which is this promise is never a guarantee. On this account, we begin to see the 
religious ‘form’ of the event, in that the promise is also experienced as a kind of covenant, a 
covenant “that has been cut with us, which makes us the people of the promise, of the 
covenant, of the cut.”625    
 
Caputo maps this ‘Name-Event’ structure onto the dynamics of Christianity. He asserts that 
internal to Christianity is a ‘bipolarity’ which is “a function of the distinction between name 
and event.”626 However, where the account of ‘weak theology’ differs is that unlike classical 
theology which is always “vacillating wildly between the heights of power and depths of 
weakness” — as in the kenotic movement that ultimately is an exhibition of divine strength 
— Caputo’s aim is to allow the event to be thought all the way down. This is the possibility of 
                                                      
622 On Caputo’s reading of Derrida’s relationship to Levinas see, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 20-24. 
623 Caputo, The Insistence of God, pp. 49-50. There are limits to this Derridian-Deleuzian partnership, however. 
Caputo writes, “the collaboration collapses at that point when the event is nothing more than the actualization of 
a potency, a part of its program. The crucial point is that the ‘virtuality’ here means a purely open-ended promise 
but not a programmable predictable process of potentiality passing into actuality.” See pg. 271, fn. 14.  
624 Ibid., pg. 30.  
625 Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” pg. 52. 
626 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 8.  
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God, the “master word par excellence,” as the experience no longer of an esse subsistens, 
ontological or ontic being, indeed, untied from the order of being entirely, but rather as the 
possibility of the impossible event — God as a ‘vocative,’ ‘provactive,’ a ‘call’ or ‘weak force.’ 
Since the event remains unconditioned beyond the order of presence, its properties cannot de 
facto display any strength but only weakness through its infinity of invocations.  
 
In Weakness of God, God, religion, and theology are ‘names’ inevitably corrupted by the gears 
of power and violence, relentlessly ‘preventing the event’ through the insistence of purity 
which their discourse claims. What these ‘names’ do not adequately take account of are the 
events they are trying to nominate, and because events are beyond nomination these ‘names’ 
can only ever be approximations. Let us consider in more detail the particularity of the Name-
Event structure as it is mapped onto Christianity.  
 
II. The Death of God, Theology, and Justice 
 
The discussion above demonstrates that Caputo’s distinctive move is to identify God with the 
event. Or rather, to be more precise (so as to maintain the ‘gap’ between the ‘Name-Event’)627 
it is the event that is getting itself called ‘in’ the name of God. Everything hereafter hangs on 
the grammatological reduction, where by virtue of différance the call cannot be identified with 
a caller.628 It is the unconditionality and therefore undecidability of the event which allows 
this theology to be identified as ‘weak.’ Strong theology, conversely, cannot resist naming the 
caller of the call, which drowns out the event’s eventfulness.  
 
By identifying God with the call of the event, Caputo is both aligning his position with the 
tradition of death of God theology,629 as well as marking a clear and distinct break from it. 
Following the famous atheist critics of the nineteenth century — Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud — the metaphysical God is put to death. On this account, one can no longer believe in 
God when the gaps filled by religion are now occupied by the alternatives of science, 
                                                      
627 Caputo writes in Weakness of God: “everything turns on keeping the gap between name and the event open, on 
keeping the tension between them strong and alive, and thereby to be transported by that tension into the passion 
of life.” Pg. 298. 
628 See, Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 1-20. 
629 “Suppose we say there is at least this much to the death of God: that the God of metaphysical theology is a God 
well lost.” See, Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 23. Representatives of death of God theology to which Caputo would 
refer would include: Thomas J.J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), Harvey 
Cox’s, The Secular City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) and John Robinson’s, Honest To God (London: 
SCM Press, 1963).  
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dialectical materialism, the will to power, or psychoanalysis.630 If Christianity was crucified 
on its cross in the process of this Enlightenment secularism according to Nietzsche, then “a 
surprising thing [would] happen on the way to the death of God: Enlightenment secularism 
also got crucified on the same Cross, and that spelled the death of the death of God.”631 The 
narratives of Ricoeur’s great ‘masters of suspicion’ were deemed themselves to be but another 
case of objectivist reductionism — a mirror image of Christianity’s grand story. “These 
reductionist critiques of religion,” Caputo says, “turn out to be, on Nietzsche’s own account, 
more varieties of what Nietzsche called the ‘ascetic ideal,’ a belief in a rigorous and unbending 
order of ‘Objective Truth.’”632  
 
Despite the post-Nietzschean and Heideggerian wake of this development, Caputo still senses 
in the death of God theologies lingering assumptions of modern secularism. Thomas J.J. 
Altizer’s Gospel of Christian Atheism (1966), for example, despite having drawn from both 
Nietzsche and Hegel, seems to have “rejected the central sense that the death of God had for 
Nietzsche, which is to announce the end or withering away of the ‘ascetic ideal.’”633 What 
follows for Caputo is a classic Hegelian metaphysics of immanence based on the doctrine of 
kenosis: “In Altizer the death of God primarily meant that the absolute center had shifted its 
residence from transcendence to immanence.”634 Here Nietzsche’s ‘God is Dead’ is not dead, 
but still very much alive.  In this first instance, then, following Nietzsche and Heidegger as 
we have already seen in earlier chapters with respect to metaphysics, Caputo clearly adheres 
to a certain death of God.635 However, attempts to kill off the old God of metaphysics that 
emerge after Nietzsche’s pronouncement in the vein of Altizer still fail because they subscribe 
to a version of modernity not incredulous enough toward grand récits.  
 
If Caputo’s theology of the event is in some way an inheritor of this tradition and at the same 
time insists on invoking the name of God despite these failures, then we will need to be still 
more specific about the way in which he breaks from it, without thereby restoring God either 
                                                      
630 See, Caputo, On Religion, pg. 59.  
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid., pg. 60. 
633 Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” pg. 68. 
634 Ibid. In Altizer’s own words, “we confront the paradox that a purely Hegelian thinking is at once a pure negation 
of the transcendence of God and yet an intended realization of what faith knows as the innermost life of God, a 
life which is death, for it is the ultimate sacrifice of an actual totality of love, and nevertheless that death or 
crucifixion is resurrection, and is the resurrection of a totality which is God and world or actuality at once.” Thomas 
J.J. Altizer, “Hegel and the Christian God,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59.1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 71-
91; pg. 71. 
635 For Caputo, Jesus’ death, for example, signals the need to mediate on the event that takes place by trying “to 
think a certain death of God, the death of the ens supremum et deus omnipotens, the death of the God of power.” See 
Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” pg. 66. 
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in some kind of theurgic conjuration, or to a religious abstractionism that is materially 
insubstantial and politically paralyzed. To further distinguish Caputo’s ‘God’ of the event one 
can begin negatively by briefly observing contemporary readings of Hegel in this death of God 
tradition. As alluded to above with Altizer, the issue with Hegel in these discussions involves 
the metaphoric representation (Vorstellung) of Christianity as the becoming of Absolute Spirit. 
The divergences of these readings more particularly, then, revolve around questions of 
Incarnation, Resurrection and therefore, Christology.636  
 
In Hegel’s philosophical system the world comes to be itself through the out-pouring of the 
Spirit in a process of self-abandonment and self-negation.637 The world is the realization and 
manifestation of this self-realization of Spirit as it encounters itself as ‘other.’ This system is 
metaphorically represented in the Christian Religion where God is unknowable because he 
has negated himself in the Incarnation of the Son. The transcendent God through a first act of 
negation becomes immanent in the temporal domain of the world. Hegelian dialect requires 
that this negation itself undergo negation, a double-negation, in which the transcendent God 
through the kenotic action pours himself into the immanence of the Son, who is then crucified 
in the final act of self-abandonment. Resurrection, consequently, is interpreted as the 
realization of the Spirit in the endless dialectic of history’s consummation that reconciles 
transcendence and immanence.  
 
According to this adumbrated schema, Caputo’s dissatisfaction with Altizer becomes clearer. 
The latter has insufficiently rendered the second part of the Hegelian dialect and in a certain 
sense, his Hegel is not Hegelian enough. The shift from transcendence to immanence, even if 
described in terms of language, time, and self-consciousness, still continues to celebrate God 
on a different ontological plane. The immanent God as the embodiment of the total presence 
of difference, which Altizer’s atheist gospel proclaims, needs also to be put to death. Caputo 
assigns the honor of dismantling Altizer’s Hegelian reading of Derrida to Mark C. Taylor. His 
landmark study, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (1987),638 which is said to have “pioneered 
bringing Derrida into Theology,”639 penetrates and discharges the ‘metaphysics of kenosis’ 
found in Altizer through the disseminations of deconstruction. However, Taylor also 
                                                      
636 At this point we defer Caputo’s own reading of Hegel (treated in the next chapter), as this represents another 
moment in his thought crucial to his development of theo-poetics. 
637 G.W.F. Hegel, A.V. Miller (trans.) Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) and, Peter 
Hodgson (ed.) Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Lectures of 1827, one-volume edition, (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1988). 
638 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987). 
639 Marko Zlomislić and Neal DeRoo (eds.) Cross and Khôra: Deconstruction and Christianity in the Work of John D. 
Caputo (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2010), pg. 1, fn.1 
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disappoints according to Caputo, by way of an application that remains inadequately 
attentive to the claims deconstruction makes on us — we are called to respond to the promise.640 
The death of God cannot mean we are without faith or responsibility. In short, Taylor’s 
postmodern ‘a/theology’ which locates divinity in the immanently infinite connections, 
fluxes, and flows of never-ending networks, “hardly observes the ‘/’ in his a/theology…but 
allows the theos to dissipate into thin air; it is atheology,641 not a/theology, decisive death, not 
undecidability.”642 Following Steven Shakespeare’s analysis, we can see that in these thinkers 
the undecidability of deconstruction has here been ‘decided’ in a “sacralization of purely 
immanent flows.”643 This immanent sacralization is attributable to a certain Hegelian use of 
the incarnational trope, suggesting a total emptying out of God into writing, which, despite 
upholding a sense of the ‘newness’ of God in language, nonetheless risks reducing the 
‘otherness’ into an all-consuming totality.644  
 
The nuances of Caputo’s position with respect to death of God theology and specifically Hegel, 
can also be seen in his dialogue with Gianni Vattimo. Caputo has said that his notion of 
‘weakness’ is a ‘running together’ of Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’645 (pensiero debole), Derrida’s 
‘weak force,’ and St. Paul’s ‘weakness of God’ from the epistle to the Corinthians.646 On the 
point of weakness, both Caputo and Vattimo are in agreement that metaphysical objectivism 
and the dogmatism of confessional theology need to be tempered. For Vattimo, this begins by 
                                                      
640 Olthuis (ed.), Religion with/out Religion, pp. 158-159. 
641 Caputo essentially charges Martin Hägglund with this same ‘atheology.’ Following his critique of Hägglund 
who has, according to Caputo, fundamentally misunderstood Derrida’s conception of auto-immunity — where 
religion, contra-Hägglund, would precisely be the contamination auto-immunity embraces — he asks rhetorically, 
“if religion is the attempt to keep oneself pure [Hägglund’s position], is RA [Radical Atheism] not a radically 
atheistic ‘religion,’ which Derrida warns against under the name of the theologians of atheistic metaphysics?” See 
Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion,” pg. 122. 
642 Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” pg. 68. In Taylor’s more recent work, After God (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2007), where the Infinite occupies “the divine milieu in which everything is relative because all is related,” 
(pg. 347) one can still sense an immanent dispersion which repeats the Hegelian dialect. Even after using Derrida’s 
notion of différance to re-inforce the idea that nothing exists outside of ‘adaptive networks,’ (an attempt to resist the 
accusation that he [Taylor] is engaging in dialectical thinking) Taylor insists that deconstruction has nothing 
constructive to say. Pointing out the irony Caputo writes, “Taylor’s real disagreement with Derrida is not that 
deconstruction has nothing constructive to say, which is a red herring, but that Derrida does not privilege 
dialectical difference and Taylor continues to do so, even after any such privilege has been undone by the very 
idea of a differential network.” See John D. Caputo, “Review of After God, by Mark C. Taylor,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 72. 1 (1 March 2009), pp. 162-165; pg. 164. 
643 Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology, pg. 180. 
644 Echoes of this position are also to be found in the work of the British theologian, Don Cupitt. See Cupitt, The 
Long-Legged Fly: A Theology of Language and Desire (London: SCM, 1987).  
645 See Gianni Vattimo, Luca D’Isanto and David Webb (trans.) Belief (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 
Gianni Vattimo, Luca D’Isanto (trans.) After Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Gianni 
Vattimo, William McCuaig (trans.) A Farewell to Truth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), Gianni 
Vattimo, Peter Carravetta (trans.) Weak Thought (New York: SUNY Press, 2012). For a valuable introduction to 
Vattimo’s philosophy and its relation to theology see; Thomas G. Guarino, Vattimo and Theology (London: T&T 
Clark, 2009). 
646 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 7. 
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a weakening of metaphysical Being through Heidegger and Nietzsche (much like Caputo), 
and finds its theological paradigm in Pauline kenosis.647 
 
The latter inaugurates the ‘transcription’ of God into time and history (what Vattimo means 
by ‘secularization’), which is not simply ‘secular’ in the conventional sense, but a post-secular 
understanding of Christianity whose “theoretical resolution…is found only in the notion of 
caritas, charity.”648 For Vattimo, secularization is ‘achieved’ in the Rortian sense,649 by 
Christianity itself: “The answer is that Christianity is a stimulus, a message that sets in motion 
a tradition of thought that will eventually realize its freedom from metaphysics.”650 Although it 
is clear that Vattimo’s hermeneutics (Nietzschean and Heideggerian, but also influenced by 
Gadamer), does not subscribe to an Absolute that unfolds in the unity of history,651 it is hard 
not to hear the Hegelian tone in statements like: “the history of salvation announced by the 
Bible realizes itself in world historical events.”652 This quotation follows a chapter in his After 
Christianity that mediates on the ‘teachings’ of Joachim of Fiora. There Vattimo argues for a 
theory of secularization after the death of God as a ‘positive affirmation of divinity based on 
the idea of incarnation.’653 He accomplishes this with Fiora’s account of the three ages, the 
third age being the age of the spirit which follows the incarnation of Jesus Christ.  
 
The tendency to prioritize Christianity in this historical way elicits Caputo’s protest, not only 
for its exclusive rhetoric but more importantly for its substantive implications. Vattimo 
emphasizes that secularization is embedded within the structure of Christianity and claims 
that the recent recoveries of God in postmodern thought in terms of the wholly other (Levinas, 
                                                      
647 Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, pp. 18-19. 
648 Ibid., pg. 14. 
649 Caputo draws this comparison, which is given additional weight since Vattimo has been in recent dialogue 
Rorty: see Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo (intro.) An Ethics for Today: Finding Common Ground Between Philosophy 
and Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), and Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country (Harvard, 
MASS: Harvard University Press, 1998). For Caputo’s thoughts on Rorty see “Parisian Hermeneutics and Yankee 
Hermeneutics: The Case of Derrida and Rorty” in John D. Caputo, More Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), pp. 84-126; see also his response to Mark Dooley, which emphasizes his worry over Rorty’s 
unguarded language of ‘achieving’ one’s country, “Achieving The Impossible: Rorty’s Religion: A Response to 
Mark Dooley” in John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley (ed.) A Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo In Focus (New York: 
Suny Press, 2003), pp. 229-236. 
650 Vattimo, “Toward a Nonreligious Christianity,” in Gianni Vattimo and John D. Caputo, Jeffrey Robbins (ed.) 
After the Death of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 27-46; pg. 35. Emphasis added. 
651 Under a more ‘moderate’ reading of Hegel following Gadamer and Benedetto Croce, Vattimo writes, “It is 
certain that both the reform of dialect urged by Groce…and Gadamer’s exclusion of the absolute spirit in favor of 
the objective spirit set the experience of truth within an open horizon of projectuality that strips philosophy of any 
retrospective character.” Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, pg. 139. 
652 Vattimo, After Christianity, pg. 41. 
653 Ibid., pg. 37. 
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Derrida and Caputo) — “without any anti-Semitic implication”654 he adds — are merely 
theologies of the ‘old age’ that ignore the incarnation, with the consequence that radical 
alterity is “the same old God of metaphysics.”655 For Caputo, not only does this model of 
secularization misconstrue Levinas, where contra Vattimo it is precisely God’s transcendence 
as tout autre which is made known in the face of the other, but also, and more seriously, the 
model itself becomes a concealed supersessionism. It can have no meaning in a Jewish 
context.656 Judaism is ‘aufgehoben’ in a lineage traceable from Fiora, Schelling, Hegel, 
Feuerbach and in recent death of God theology. No matter how radical these theologies may 
be, their Christian ‘pedigree’ repeats the Hegelian gesture (which Derrida already pointed out 
in Glas) betraying a certain ‘crypro-Marcionism.’657  
 
With Taylor, Caputo agrees with the delimitation of Hegel vis-à-vis Altizer, but re-emphasizes 
deconstruction’s ethico-religious claims. With Vattimo, he also wants to affirm the 
Heideggerian and Nietzschean impulse that ‘weakens’ being, but resists the theory of 
secularization that maintains Christianity as its exclusive framework. The nuances of these 
positions allow us to see what is at stake in the debate about Caputo’s postmodern theology. 
On the one hand, following Taylor, the postmodern gesture seems to collapse into its own 
disseminative totality without the ethical experience of the other. On the other hand, from 
Vattimo’s point of view, Caputo’s ethical reading of deconstruction which responds to this 
totality, devolves into a two world Augustinianism between name/profane and 
event/sacred. This is why Vattimo advocates for Hegelian dialectic (albeit in a weakened 
mode) which has its roots in Joachim of Fiora. For, it is only on the Christian model of kenosis 
that God is emptied and inscribed into human history as the movement of the ‘age of spirit.’ 
The latter is the secularization of Christianity and the embodiment of hospitality and 
neighborly love (not the estrangement and alienation of Judaism) into the pluralism and non-
authoritarianism of tolerant democratic institutions. Caputo’s task, then, is to show how his 
                                                      
654 It is not insignificant that Vattimo feels obligated to disavow anti-Jewish sentiments in light of the strong defense 
he mounts for his, albeit ‘weakened,’ democratic, and progressive version of Christian history. This need to declare 
sympathy for the Jewish tradition, however, seems to more effectively imply the shortfall of the tradition itself — 
its inability to recognize Judaism as an end with its own intrinsic value. Even if the historic animosity is 
undoubtedly lessened by Vattimo, the Jewish tradition, nonetheless, always becomes but a stage in a higher 
universalism that takes its point of departure from the Christian framework.  
655 Ibid., pg. 38. 
656 Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” pg. 78. 
657 See Simon Critchley, Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (London: Verso, 2012), pg. 195. 
Critchley identifies this Marcionism in recent readings of Paul by thinkers on the radical left. The figures of Giorgio 
Agamben, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek in particular. Incidentally, Caputo also has these thinkers in mind: “So 
difficult is it for this schema to stay clear of this implication of supersessionism that it even shows up in completely 
secular, atheistic neo-Marxists like Žižek and Badiou when they start singing the praises of love and grace in Saint 
Paul over the Law, which is death.” Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” pg. 81.   
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distinctly postmodern approach to theology avoids the exclusivism that we have seen in 
thinkers like Vattimo, and at the same time responds to the criticism of an effervescent two-
worlds theology with no material substrate. This will be explored below and taken up again 
in greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
Unlike the Hegelian system, where the Christian religion through the Incarnation, 
Crucifixion, and Resurrection, describes the actual process of becoming of Absolute Spirit, 
Caputo’s Christology of the Christian religion is figurative.658 That is, events are not governed 
by the logic of Hegelian dialect, they cut across “the distinctions among various confessions, 
and even across the distinction between the confessional faiths and secular unbelief.”659 What 
is important to remember about the Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection, therefore, is 
that they do not communicate one ‘controlling event’ which can be pre- (or retroactively) 
determined. But rather, ‘events’ are what is open-endedly happening within these moments. 
Caputo’s radical theology resists being reduced to an exclusivist position because it views 
religion and all of its constitutive ‘names’ as contingent and deconstructible, inscribed as they 
are within the desert space of ‘khoral’ différance. When Caputo approaches Christianity — for 
this is the factical reality from where he speaks — he has no intention of sourcing or giving 
expression to a higher truth or secularizing goal, but rather seeks to give voice to the ‘events’ 
that are astir within it. His Christology (a postmodern theologia crucis)660 could be summoned-
up in this way: “In the Christian tradition, the force of the event that calls to us and overtakes 
us in the name of God arises crucially from the cross, where all the lines of force in Christianity 
intersect (cross).”661 
 
                                                      
658 Caputo writes, “religion is an allegory or a parable of the event, that religion tells a story of our existence which 
reflects all the movements and operations of the event. That is why religious texts so often take the form not of 
philosophical treatises but of ‘fiction’ in the strictly literary sense of that word – of narratives, parables and 
allegories.” See Caputo, “The Sense of God,” pg. 32. 
659 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 4.  
660 Ibid., pg. 41: “In the end, I am just proposing a theology of the cross.” See also Caputo, “Spectral Hermeneutics,” 
pg. 66. Another aspect of a ‘postmodern’ theology of the cross must take into account Caputo’s views of Jesus more 
generally. In his writing, Caputo avoids any sort of orthodox high Christology, revelation or the miraculous. This 
seems to have been drawn from his reading of the New Testament scholar, John Dominic Crossan and the Jesus 
Seminar under the Westar Institute. On this view, Jesus (Caputo hardly ever refers to ‘Christ’) was a monotheistic 
Jew who proclaimed an exemplary message and did not consider himself to be that message. In dialogue with 
Keith Putt, Putt questions whether adherence to this historical-critical view is not to ‘abandon your post and 
become a modernist.’ Caputo’s reply is that postmodernity for him is not an abandonment of modernity, but a 
passing through it. He accepts historical-critical scholarship, “I think that thus far we should all be modern, 
otherwise we risk lapsing into some kind of fundamentalism.” However, postmodernity does not stop there, which 
is why he goes on to say that what the New Testament offers us is a ‘poetics’ not a divine logic. See, Olthuis (ed.) 
Religion with/out Religion, pg. 166. For Caputo’s specific references to Crossan, see Weakness of God, pg. 30; pg. 319, 
fn. 7; pg. 322, 322, fn. 1, 14. 
661 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 42. 
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After the metaphysical God is ‘crossed out by the cross,’ Caputo says, we are left with “God’s 
mark…upon an executed man.”662 The scene of Jesus crucified anticipates neither a deferred 
salvific moment in which the strength and power of God are more fully on display, nor does 
it suggest that Jesus was simply ‘holding back’ his power to adopt only the appearance (dokein) 
of crucifixion. Jesus’ death, instead, is a very real, brutal, and tortured execution that 
accordingly gives way to a different sense of divinity; “the genuine divinity of Jesus is 
revealed in his distance from the request of magic, in his helplessness, his cry of abandonment, 
and above all, in the words of forgiveness he utters.”663 The force or ‘strength’ of the event 
that one finds in the name of ‘God,’ emerges from the weakness of Jesus death on the cross, 
the weakness of God’s ikon, as Paul says. But this weakness is not valorized. It is a call for 
justice in the midst of the dominant powers of suppression: 
 
The weak force of God is embodied in the broken body on the cross, which 
has thereby been broken loose from being and broken out upon the open 
plane of the powerlessness of God. The power of God is not pagan violence, 
brute power, or vulgar magic; it is the power of powerlessness, the power 
of the call, the power of protest that rises up from innocent suffering, and 
finally, the power to suffer-with (sym-pathos) innocent suffering, which is 
perhaps the central Christian symbol.664 
 
The event as the powerless power of the crucifixion is a force that lays claim on us 
unconditionally without metaphysical authority. In answer, then, to the line of critique that 
suggests the event is an operation beyond space and time (metaphysics), Caputo is here a 
definitive materialist in the sense that he does not think there are ‘two worlds.’665 The event 
that stirs and cries out in the name of God at Calvary is an event of the world and “calls across 
epochs…cries out from every corpse created by every cruel and unjust power.”666 This is why 
Caputo later resists the language of transcendence, because it invokes a confusion over the 
transcendent-immanent binary. Rather, he talks of God’s ‘insistence’ in the world. 667 This 
                                                      
662 Ibid. 
663 Ibid, pg. 43. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion,” pg. 50. 
666 Ibid., pg. 44.  
667 Ibid., pg. 45. “Indeed, rather than speaking of God’s transcendence at all, it might be better to speak of God’s 
in-scendence (incendiary inscendence!) or ‘insistence’ in the world.” Caputo makes this comment after the 
concluding section of the previous chapter titled, “The Transcendence of God.” One can see already here a growing 
dissatisfaction with this language of transcendence. Caputo’s project of ‘poetics’ begun in Weakness of God is an 
attempt to go beyond the binarity of philosophical and theological discourse, and which is further carried out in 
Insistence of God for the reason that Caputo has not quite escaped a Kantian philosophy of religion. This will be 
explored in the next chapter.  
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insisting event of the world of which God is but a name does not ‘do’ anything in terms of 
causal agency, but rather is the condition of restless, the insisting ‘force’ in the face of unjust 
systems. If this force is an insistence, then we are the ones called to bring it into existence: to 
respond in names, words, and deeds.  
 
In the Insistence of God Caputo makes deliberate the interchangeability of God with justice. 
Derrida writes in the first part of his famous “Force of Law” essay:  
 
’Perhaps’ –– one must [il faut] always say perhaps for justice. There is an 
avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some 
event is possible which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, 
anticipations and so forth. Justice, as the experience of absolute alterity, is 
unpresentable, but it is the chance of the event and the condition of 
history.668  
 
Caputo quotes this text and substitutes the word justice for God.669 God is justice and justice 
is God, both to the extent that they are the ‘chance of the event;’ that which ‘exceeds 
calculation’ and in virtue of which history is made possible precisely by that which makes it 
impossible, namely a coming future; justice or God. God, like justice, is but a name for the 
event; a name for a weak force without force that calls and solicits us and lays claim on us. 
Radical theology, for Caputo, while it concedes the endless chain of substitutions, nonetheless 
distinguishes Christianity as a unique example of the dramatization of the event in the figure 
of Jesus. Jesus, the ikon of God, enacts and performs the Kingdom of God not only in his 
ministry but also in his death as a carnal expression of the event of God’s weakness. “The 
weakness of God, the event that is harbored in the name of God, of Jesus, is the weak force or 
force without force that greets the offender with forgiveness, the enemy with love, the 
uninvited visitor with hospitality, all of which are profoundly, deeply, divinely, 
impossible.”670 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
668 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Gil Anidjar (ed.) Acts of Religion 
(London: Routledge, 2010), pg. 257. 
669 Caputo, The Insistence of God, pg. 9. 
670 Caputo, “The Sense of God,” pg. 40.  
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III. God without Sovereignty 
 
Before turning to the theological-political implications and potentials of Caputo’s postmodern 
theology — how such a theology might cultivate a theo-poetic discourse capable of 
contributing to a ‘radical political theology’ — it is imperative, by way of conclusion to the 
present chapter, that we address in no uncertain terms how God is conceived with respect to 
sovereignty. If we are to follow Caputo in affirming the ‘essential’ religious nature of 
deconstruction as this chapter has explained, and subsequently treat a political theology with 
the resources of radical theology’s theopoetics, then anterior to this investigation must be the 
critique of religious origins viz. the passage from the sovereign God to the God without 
sovereignty. Implicit to the object of this critique, therefore, is the Schmittian claim that 
political theology is underpinned by sovereignty; sovereignty understood as the capacity to 
decide on the exception and to make an exception of oneself (chapter two). Theologically, this 
capacity derives its meaning from God. Following Derrida, Caputo affirms this ‘unavowed 
theologism’ that coheres in the modern western ‘machine of political theology,’671 which 
deconstructs by way of a radical theology. The reader will note certain stages of this study 
have already sought variously to articulate this deconstruction viz. metaphysics (chapter 
three), religion and ethics (chapter four), and now theology (chapter five). Sovereignty is the 
notion which links these stages together, as the unchallenged premise that informs the 
analogy, as old as Plato’s Republic, between soul, state and universe. More precisely, this 
analogy is the symbiotic relationship between the sovereignty of God, the sovereignty of the 
state, its ruler or ‘the people,’ and finally the sovereignty of the self.672   
 
The sovereign God, for Caputo, lies on the side of ‘strong’ theology and religion. The discourse 
on God, he says, “is a discourse on the master word par excellence, the Lord of history and the 
master of the universe, the royal power omnipotent.”673 Provoking further, he asks, “is not 
God the dream of power aplenty, of omnitude and plenitude and plenipotentiarity, of 
exnihilatory and annihilatory power…Can one imagine a more permanent presence or a more 
prestigious ousia or a more powerful parousia than the ‘God’ under whose protection the 
religious powers that be huddle for protection?”674 Caputo goes on to name a series of classical 
                                                      
671 See Robert Esposito, Zakiya Hanafi (trans.) Two: The Machine of Political Theology and the Place of Thought (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2015). 
672 See John D. Caputo, “Without Sovereignty, Without Being: Unconditionality, The Coming God and Derrida’s 
Democracy To Come,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 4.3 (August 2003), pp.9-26; pg. 10. See also, John 
D. Caputo, “Beyond Sovereignty: Many Nations Under The Weakness Of God,” in Soundings: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal 89.1-2 (2006), pp. 21-35; pg. 26-27. 
673 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 32. 
674 Ibid. 
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attributes which, for him, follow from the model of a sovereign God and provide a paradigm 
for terrestrial sovereignty: God is the Lord of History, the arche, the timeless principium, the 
governor of the ordo universi, the prima causa, the nomen innominabile of negative theology, the 
puritas essendi, the analogia fidei or analogia entis, the summum ens, the Platonic Good beyond 
being, in short, the summation of what Kierkegaard called the God of ‘rouged theology.’675 
God is here beset by conditions: conditions imposed by sovereign imperial theology, which is 
itself supposedly without conditions when it comes to God’s revelation of himself.676 Even 
when we say, as does negative theology, that it is idolatrous to assign conditions to God, it is 
nonetheless a condition to say God is unconditional, and so we remain trapped by the 
blackmail and the implied force that will ensue if God’s alterity is compromised.677  
 
                                                      
675 Ibid., pp. 32-39. 
676 Caputo, “The Sense of God,” pg. 27. 
677 Ibid. pg. 28. It is quite clear from the cynical breadth of what Caputo considers to be ‘strong’ theology, that he 
has in mind all theology that expresses a metaphysics of the unity of the One. Apart from those thinkers already 
alluded to who fall into this category, like the negative theology of Jean-Luc Marion or even some of the death of 
God theologies, Caputo would also assign this ‘strong’ theology to particularly pernicious types of Christian 
Neoplatonism, depicted by figures like John Milbank and the school of Radical Orthodoxy. While this may be clear 
enough — given not only the obvious metaphysical tone found in the language of analogical participation, but also 
the now well established antagonism between Radical Orthodoxy’s agenda and what it considers as the nihilism 
of postmodernism — one might still ask about the status of other confessional theologies that also have strong 
traditions of resisting power. Or what about Trinitarian theology that in virtue of the perichoretic relations within 
the Godhead resist easy reductions to simplistic unity? Admittedly, Caputo’s theological writings are 
conspicuously silent with regard to productive interactions with confessional theology and theology in general, 
which attempts a more dynamic understanding of the nature of God. Although this is not the direct concern of the 
current study, and indeed, may be a cite for further investigation, one can still offer a few responses. On an initial 
and somewhat unimaginative level, but no less important, one can say with regard to confessional theology that 
this is simply not Caputo’s direct concern. He has never thought of himself as a professional theologian even if he 
is willing to accept the more recent designation of ‘radical theologian.’ As we have seen, he is more interested in 
‘radicalizing’ confessional theology, taking it where it does not want to go. This attitude is better understood, 
however, not in the sense of disdain but perhaps more clumsily as an attitude of mild disinterest. Indeed, in The 
Insistence of God he talks of radical theology as the ‘becoming-radical of confessional theology’ and that he is ‘not 
saying anything that confessional theologians would not in a certain way already know.’ (pg.61) The relationship 
between radical theology and confessional theology, in fact, mimes the ‘Event-Name’ structure: radical theology 
‘insists’ and confessional theology ‘exists,’ and it is not a matter of choosing between the two. This connects with 
the underlying philosophical reason for Caputo’s seeming disinterest in confessional theology as such. Namely, 
that he would consider them on the one hand, either too wound-up in metaphysical claims that his modern 
sensibilities would find intolerable, or on the other, they would be too attached to modern claims insufferable for 
the sensibilities of a postmodernist. In both cases, confessional theology does not survive the critique of Caputo’s 
primary influences; Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. Thus, despite the very intricate and complex arguments in 
Trinitarian theology, for example, Caputo would still consign these to the conclave of speculative metaphysics. A 
part of the burden of the next chapter, however, will be to argue that Caputo’s radical theology is not nearly as 
disdainful of confessional theology as it has sometimes been made out to be. 
For Caputo’s most direct engagement with the school of Radical Orthodoxy see The Insistence of God, pp. 
136-164, where he charges John Milbank’s Augustinian-Thomist preference for an analogical interpretation of 
postmodernity as the disturbing practice of the “vintage violence of theological imperialism,” pg. 161. See also his 
response to Radical Orthodoxy specifically directed at Graham Ward in Caputo, “What Do I Love When I Love 
My God? Deconstruction and Radical Orthodoxy,” in John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.) 
Questioning God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 291-317. For a critical appraisal of Radical 
Orthodoxy inspired by deconstruction, see Steven Shakespeare, Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction (London: 
SPCK, 2007) and Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley (eds.) Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern 
Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
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To think of God outside these sets of conditional claims and somehow to avoid the sovereign 
force which they imply sounds impossible. Indeed, perhaps this is something only one can 
dream of, and yet, this is precisely what Caputo asks us to do, to dream and imagine of an 
‘unconditionality without force.’ That is, a sovereign God who does not rule over a kingdom 
with rules — except of course, for the “rule of the unruly, of the weak and the foolish”678 — 
but a God who is sovereign, without strength, power, and might. A God who ‘rules’ according 
to the quasi-rule of the undeconstructible and unconditional event, “which of itself lacks force 
or worldly power, lacks an army or an armature, the material means to enforce its will, that 
is, to forcibly bring about what it is calling for.”679 What can follow from a God who does not 
have authority or sovereignty, whose kingdom does not have an army to enforce the law? Is 
this not a kingdom of total chaos and anarchy? ‘No,’ Caputo would say, or rather, ‘not quite.’ 
The event of the kingdom, or what Caputo calls the ‘Kingdom of différance,’680 is not simply 
the logical opposite of the kingdom of a sovereign ruler, it is the possibility of the impossible 
kingdom, where radical theology names the activity which seeks to describe this kingdom’s 
disruptive forces, the events that are taking place there, of which God is but a name. For 
Caputo, the New Testament, and especially the sayings of Jesus, his life and ministry, are 
supreme exemplars of this kingdom, what he calls the ‘an-archic’ or ‘sacred anarchy’ of the 
kingdom of God. In a series of deconstructive interpretations of the scriptures, which are 
meant to be read not as logical prose but as expressions of the prioritization of the impossible, 
Caputo shows how to replace the logic of sovereignty by a poetics that rightly testifies to the 
foolishness that the Christian kerygma is for the world, as it is expressed in the life and ministry 
of Jesus of Nazareth. 681  
 
God without sovereignty, therefore, is a God re-conceived according to the force of God’s 
withdrawal from the plane of being to the order of the event. The order of the event, however, 
is not an ‘other worldly’ locality that does not affect human experience, it is the condition of 
im/possibility for experience itself, because it resists the resistance to the event and thus 
‘prepares’ for the event’s coming. In reading Caputo’s radical theology, the danger and 
mistake that is often made is to read it according to conventional theological terminology. 
This error produces the undesirable outcome that his theology is rendered too ‘idealistic’ and 
lacking ‘material’ content. Indeed, the effect of his writing can leave one wondering what 
exactly ‘is’ going on in radical theology. There is a sense in which the circular repetition of the 
                                                      
678 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 27. 
679 Ibid., pg. 29. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ibid., pp. 125-282.  
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text in Weakness of God creates a momentum of the words and sentences that seem to slip and 
slide into each other, leaving their meaning hanging on to what preceded, while at the same 
time calling and desiring more meaning and content. This kind of hybrid writing is, no doubt, 
Caputo’s performance of deconstructive theology and its achievement is the invention of a 
theo-poetic discourse. It seems here, as Caputo calls it, the ‘hermeneutical key’ is to be found 
not only for the practice of radical theology in general, but in particular the construction of a 
‘theo-political-poetic’ conception of sovereignty, or what will be called a radical political 
theology.  
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Chapter Six 
The Event of Sovereignty 
 
 
Sovereignty is the object which eludes us all, which nobody has seized and 
which nobody can seize for this reason: we cannot possess it, like an object, 
but are doomed to seek it. 
 
- Georges Bataille682 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this final chapter, we return to the political nature of sovereignty with which this study 
began. If much of Caputo’s radical theology as we have seen, has Derrida’s later work in the 
background with its particular critique of sovereignty in the context of twenty-first century 
politics, then another stage in our argument will be to include a discussion that clarifies this 
specific Derridian contribution. Section two of this chapter entails revisiting the Rogues essay 
encountered in chapter one — Derrida’s most explicit engagement with sovereignty — as well 
as other relevant writings including, inter alia, The Politics of Friendship (1994)683 and the well-
known “Force of Law” (1993) essay.684 Far from a comprehensive engagement with what are 
already massively over-interpreted texts, the more precise concern of this section will be to 
develop Derrida’s thinking on sovereignty with particular interest to Carl Schmitt. Recalling 
remarks from chapter two, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, the definition of sovereignty and 
political theology, are arguably the defining moments of interest for political, legal and a 
number of continental philosophers. In the latter case, this has become particularly relevant 
for those who find Schmitt’s critique incisive for elaborating the conceits of liberal democracy. 
His decisionistic preferences, broadly speaking, have also re-introduced the possibility of a 
materialistic transcendence into the political realm. It is perhaps not surprising then, given 
the overtly theological character of Schmitt’s thinking on sovereignty and politics, that he 
                                                      
682 Georges Bataille, Alastair Hamilton (trans.) Evil and Literature (London: Calder and Boyers, 1973), pp. 193-194. 
683 Jacques Derrida, George Collins (trans.) The Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 2005). 
684 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Gil Anidjar (ed.) Acts of Religion 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 230-300. 
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would raise both the curiosity and critique of many theologians and philosophers. Derrida 
falls into a category that affirms much of Schmitt’s depiction of sovereignty, while at the same 
time exposing it to its own deconstruction and offering an alternative in the form of a 
sovereign or ‘god to come.’ 
 
Section three, however, takes into consideration that Derrida’s contribution and interest in 
sovereignty remains just one among many, and thus will need to be distinguished from other 
contemporary scholarship, particularly those who have been critical of the ‘postmodern’ 
viability of the political. In this regard, we turn to a group of left-leaning continental 
philosophers who are united with Schmitt’s rejection of liberalism and parliamentary 
democracy. These thinkers, including Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek, are 
critical of the type of postmodernism they assign to Derrida, calling out its liberal prejudices 
and anti-materialist rhetoric as unable to break from the deadlock of postmodern irony that 
supposedly re-instantiates the logic of Late-Capitalism. Following the lexicon employed in 
this study, these philosophers develop their own theories of ‘event’ that involve distinctly 
capitalized responses to contemporary politics, namely, subjective fidelity to the ‘Truth’ of the 
event (Badiou), faith in ‘pure’ violence (Agamben), and the ‘Event’ which occurs in an 
‘absolute present’ (Žižek).  
 
Despite the trenchant and valuable critiques that they mount against liberal economy and the 
inefficiencies of democratic politics, their whole-sale rejection of liberal democracy as such 
offers little in terms of alternatives, and perhaps worse, reveals potentially violent 
instantiations of the event in the present. Drawing on the work of the theologian Jayne 
Svenungsson, these limitations will be clarified by arguing that they characterize an 
unguarded resonance of the Schmittian desire for presence — a ‘politics of presence’ that 
echoes the sentiments expressed in chapter two. However, notwithstanding the cynical 
elements in Badiou, Agamben and Žižek, and given what now appears as the unambiguous 
prognosis of democracy’s crisis, the polemical engagement with these thinkers is not meant 
to be a final word on the efficacy of their thought for our contemporary political climate. It 
serves rather to expose the stakes of the materialist vision of sovereignty. The series of 
questions that their critique of postmodernism raises, therefore, would be if Derrida’s 
sovereignty without sovereignty and his dream of a ‘god to come’ does indeed terminate in an 
endless deferral without substantive effect on the workings of daily politics? Is the event not 
a postponement of justice which keeps the destitute in a position of subjugation while the 
apparatus of globalized capitalism continues unchecked? Are we not trapped in the circular 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  182 
logic of difference, unable to effect genuine change to our political and economic systems? By 
speaking of sovereignty and the event, do we not insinuate an idealist binary whereby the 
event becomes a fantastical illusion that passes us by — a ‘to come’ that we dare not approach 
lest its totalitarian consequences consume us? Whether or not Derrida has himself achieved a 
materialist rendering of politics is an ongoing source of dissensus and remains outside the 
scope of this study. But to the extent that Caputo is an interpreter of Derrida and thus a 
contributor to this debate, it is hoped that we have shown thus far, at least preliminarily in 
Caputo’s religious reading of deconstruction, that Derrida does not reject matter or the 
material world, but in fact that it is deconstruction which makes matter really matter. The 
event for Derrida is not an occurrence ‘in’ time, Caputo would say, because it is the structure 
of time itself. It constitutes this structure in virtue of which something is always irreducibly 
outstanding — ‘ahead’ or still ‘coming.’ The event, therefore, is not an idealization of time 
toward which we asymptotically move, but rather an intensification of time in the material 
present.685 
 
Nonetheless, Caputo will have registered some of the doubts and complaints not only of 
Derrida, but also of his own religious formulation of a ‘religion without religion’ culminating 
in Weakness of God (2006). Section four will attend to a series of ‘external’ movements in the 
field of philosophy, as well as some ‘internal’ tensions emerging in Caputo’s work that lead 
him in the follow-up book, The Insistence of God (2013), not so much to a revision of the core 
theses of Weakness of God, but rather a re-formulation of its argument designed to more visibly 
state a material orientation of radical theology’s theopoetics. The crucial development that 
makes this move discernable is Caputo’s further elaboration of theopoetics alongside a 
‘newfound Hegelianism,’ arising from a critical view of Kantian-postmodern philosophy of 
religion.  
 
At this point, the study draws to a conclusion in two final movements. First, in taking up the 
developments of this re-casted theopoetics, a poetic prescription or itinerary of the ‘three pills’ 
of radical theology will be presented. These three pills of theopoetics constitute the 
‘pharmaceuticals’ of a radical theology and thus provide the cure/poison (pharmakon)686 for 
thinking ‘theopoetically’ about sovereignty. It is here that the ‘constructive’ proposal set out 
                                                      
685 Perhaps Caputo’s most succinct outline of this reading of Derrida is to be found in his short essay, “Temporal 
Transcendence: The Very Idea of à venir in Derrida,” in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.) Transcendence 
and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), pp. 188-203. 
686 Jacques Derrida, Barbara Johnson (trans.) “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1981). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  183 
in the introduction of this study bears its fruit, namely, that the theopoetics of a radical 
theology does indeed offer the resources to think a radical political theology. However, 
following arguments developed by Johann Meylahn, it will also be noted that this constructive 
proposal or prescription of radical theopoetics cannot itself be reduced to a simple 
thematization, lest theopoetics become a ‘third-way’ solution. In the second and final 
movement we turn to Derrida’s reading of Paul Celan from his last seminars collected in 
Sovereignty and the Beast (2001-2002).687 There we find Derrida dreaming of a “more majestic 
or otherwise majestic, more sovereign and otherwise sovereign…majesty of poetry.” Celan’s 
poetry, he says, “prepare[s] perhaps some poetic revolution in the political revolution,”688 
which is what we are arguing is the virtue of a radical political theology. This is the dream of 
Caputo’s theopoetics of a God without sovereignty, which articulates a poetic revolution of 
sovereignty altogether — a revolution of theology’s ‘unavowed theologism.’  
 
At this conclusion, which is always and only tentative, we might say that this study will have 
hoped to have moved beyond the guiding paradigm of the two dividing axes, ‘sovereignty 
and the event’ to the preferred locution of the ‘event of sovereignty.’ The sliding signification of 
‘the event of sovereignty’ is driven by the deliberate sense of ambiguity in the use of the 
double genitive. As in Derrida’s “Force of Law” essay, where he says the “law [le droit] is both 
threatening and threatened by itself,” a “threat of law” is a “[d]ouble genitive: it both comes 
from law and threatens law,”689 so too is the ‘event of sovereignty.’ It comes both from 
sovereignty (the always immanent possibility of its force), and is visited upon sovereignty 
(the impossible possibility of its arrival). Here re-surfaces the leitmotif of ‘threat’ and ‘ruin’ — 
the ‘ruins of sovereignty.’ Indeed, a few paragraphs after having referred to the necessary 
‘iterability of law’s foundation’ and, thus, the deconstruction between founding and 
preserving violence, Derrida declares: 
 
Ruin is not a negative thing…One cannot love a monument, a work of 
architecture, an institution as such except in an experience itself 
precarious in its fragility; it has not always been there, it will not always 
be there, it is finite. And for this reason one loves it as mortal, through its 
birth and its death, through one’s own birth and death, through the ghost 
                                                      
687 Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington (trans.), Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet and Ginette Michaud (eds.) 
The Beast and The Sovereign (Chicago: Chicago University Press, [2009] 2011). 
688 Ibid., pp. 272-273. 
689 Derrida, “Force of Law,” pp. 275-276. 
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or the silhouette of its ruin, one’s own ruin — which it already is, therefore, 
or already prefigures.690 
 
The love for this monument of sovereignty that we are all ‘doomed to seek’ as Bataille 
remarks, ‘eludes us all.’ It has not always been there and will not always be there, because it 
is fragile and ruined from the start. And it is precisely for this reason — this loss and this ruin 
— that we desire and love it all the more in its mortality, through its own birth and death and 
silhouette of its ruin.  
 
II. Sovereignty without Sovereignty 
 
If Derrida’s deconstruction of sovereignty involves a polemical engagement with Schmitt, 
then it is worth considering the context from which it emerges before examining this 
deconstruction. This context is historically related to the end of communism, new 
fundamentalist Islam, the rise of immigration into Europe, and the perceived triumph of 
liberal democracy. It brought to the fore in Derrida’s thinking the more explicit articulation of 
themes relating to religion, politics, and faith, which he began discussing in the late 80’s and 
90’s.691 Along with other thinkers around this time (Vattimo and Trías), Derrida’s interest in 
religion was of course not inclined toward a desire for metaphysics of which the century of 
the death of God had been deprived, but rather was orientated toward religious resources 
capable of offering alternatives that could both avoid the violence of metaphysics and the 
devastating utopianisms of the twentieth century. The impact of religion and especially its 
Christian manifestation, while not an overt feature of public life in the twentieth century, was 
felt, nonetheless, in its secularized dialectic-historical interpretation. Hence, while the 
achievements of Enlightenment reason were to be recognized, one could not simply do away 
with religion. Derrida, therefore, affirmed that our common (Western European) culture is 
inescapably Christian and ‘Latinized,’ a universal form of religion, which he called 
‘globolatinzation.’692  
 
                                                      
690 Ibid., pg. 278. 
691 One could cite the famous Capri seminar held in 1994 as symbolic of this shift in thinking. In the introductory 
comments to the volume published after that seminar in 1996, Vattimo says that the thematic of religion 
represented a ‘spirit of the times.’ See Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.) Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998), pg. vii. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer’s contextualizing remarks which appear at the conclusion of this 
volume, pp. 200-211. 
692 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Gil 
Anidjar (ed.) Acts of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2010), pg. 67. 
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It is in the context of this religious legacy that Derrida believes (following Schmitt) the concept 
of sovereignty has been bequeathed.693 Here sovereignty uniquely evinces the coincidence of 
the Christian religion and Western political history. Echoing Schmitt, Derrida says that so 
many “fundamental concepts that often permit us to isolate or to pretend to isolate the political 
— restricting ourselves to this particular circumspection — remain religious or in any case 
theologico-political.”694 Following this comment in “Faith and Knowledge,” he immediately 
cites Schmitt as an example of how “in one of the most rigorous attempts to isolate in its purity 
the sphere of the political…Carl Schmitt was obliged to acknowledge that the ostensibly 
purely political categories to which he resorted were the product of a theologico-political 
secularization.”695 He goes on to claim that so many of our concepts associated with 
democracy, “including those of the sovereign state, of the citizen-subject, of public and private 
space, etc., still entails that is religious, inherited in truth from a determinate religious 
stratum.”696 Even though Derrida suggests, along with Schmitt, that our contemporary 
political and legal notions are ineluctably entangled with the ontotheological foundations of 
Christianity, he also wants to re-read this history and to expose it to its own (im)possibilities. 
Indeed, Derrida’s polemical engagement with Schmitt’s political theology is not to destroy 
these foundations, but rather to dismantle and deconstruct them by problematizing the notion 
of ‘foundation’ as such — a ‘mystical’ foundation, as he will call it in “Force of Law.” As will 
be argued below, if read in tandem with Caputo, Derrida’s disassemblage of Schmitt’s 
political theology of sovereignty suggests the possibility of a ‘radical political theology’ and 
‘perhaps’ a ‘poetic revolution’ of sovereignty altogether.697 
 
I. The Friend-Enemy Deconstruction 
 
Derrida’s interest in the theologico-political and sovereignty in his later work is 
unambiguously tied to the thought of Carl Schmitt. As Michael Nass observes, “What interests 
                                                      
693 The religious significance of modern concepts is of course not limited to sovereignty for Derrida. To cite only 
two other examples: of religious tolerance, he writes, “The word ‘tolerance’ is first of all marked by a religious war 
between Christians, or between Christians and non-Christians. Tolerance is a Christian virtue…Though I clearly 
prefer shows of tolerance to shows of intolerance, nonetheless still have certain reservations about the word 
‘tolerance’ and the discourse it organizes. It is a discourse with religious roots.” See Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy 
In A Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2003), 
pp. 126-127. Another politically implicated concept that is deeply linked with Christianity is the death penalty, as 
Derrida makes clear in his 1999-2000 and 2000-1 seminars. See Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington, Marc Crépon 
and Thomas Dutoit (eds.) and Peggy Kamuf (trans.) The Death Penalty: Volume I (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2014). 
694 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” pg. 63. 
695 Ibid. 
696 Ibid., pg. 64. 
697 Derrida, The Beast and The Sovereign, pp. 272-273; we will return to this idea of ‘poetic revolution.’  
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Derrida about Schmitt is his claim that sovereignty is always related to the sovereign 
exception…that this relationship between sovereignty and exceptionality is inextricable—
even in modern democracies—from the theological notion of a sovereign God.”698 If there 
were any doubts about the importance Derrida assigns to Schmitt’s conjunction of sovereignty 
and theology, whether or not one agrees with the way it has been diagnosed, these doubts are 
surely allayed by the comments made in his interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco in For What 
Tomorrow…: 
 
Without this category of exception, we cannot understand the concept of 
sovereignty. Today, the great question is indeed, everywhere, that of 
sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, under its 
own name or another, literally or figuratively, this concept has a 
theological origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority 
or of this power was transferred to the monarch, said to have a ‘divine 
right.’ Sovereignty was then delegated to the people, in the form of a 
democracy, or to the nation, with the same theological attributes as those 
attributed to the king and to God.699 
 
Derrida’s first unambiguous engagement with Schmitt appears in Politics of Friendship, where 
he addresses one of the central claims necessary for upholding the latter’s definition of the 
political, namely, the morally exacting decision on the exception as well as the ability to decide 
on the distinction between friend and enemy. To briefly recap: we saw in chapter two how 
Schmitt’s philosophy of history provided the metaphysical context for his political theology. 
It was argued that Schmitt deploys the distinctly Christian trope of the katechon, so as to 
defend the priority of the decision in the political moment that maintains order over and 
against chaos. Such a theologization of history underscores the urgency which inspires 
Schmitt’s political theology and motivates the desire to pursue a functional analogy between 
theological and political phenomena. The state, as the embodiment of the sovereign, displays 
its monopoly on all political decision-making by exerting the extra-ordinary quality of this 
sovereign authority, that is, by definition its ability to decide on the exception to the law. The 
quasi-theological role of a sovereign God (paralleled by ‘the miracle’ which interrupts the 
natural order) that the state now assumes is legitimized by this transgressive act and further 
authorizes the state to decide its friends and enemies. It is to this notion of sovereignty as tied 
                                                      
698 Michael Naas, Derrida From Now On (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pg. 65. 
699 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jeff Fort (trans.) For What Tomorrow…A Dialogue (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 91-92; quoted in Ibid. 
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to the possibility of the political decision and the ‘concrete determination’ between friends 
and enemies that Derrida problematizes in his discussion with Schmitt in The Politics of 
Friendship.  
 
The Politics of Friendship is a long meditation on friendship, democracy and the political, 
organized around an apostrophe attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius and 
apocryphally quoted by Montaigne, “O my friends, there is no friend!”700 Along with an 
interrogation of the predominance of male sexual difference — the phallogocentrism of the 
brother and the political concept of fraternity — Derrida devotes much of the book to 
Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction. Forced as we are to condense a powerful reading, 
Derrida’s argument with respect to Schmitt is that he operates under a “fundamentally 
Christian politics” made possible by a “Christian metaphysics of subjectivity.”701 Accordingly, 
underlying this metaphysics is “an instance of the subject, a classic free and willful subject.”702 
As we have seen with Caputo (i.e. the categories of the heteronomic and heteromorphic), in 
virtue of the fact that “the adequation between the concept, the name, and the event [can] 
never be assured,”703 this autonomous actively deciding subject is always exposed to its other. 
The subject of Schmittian decisionism for Derrida, is in fact “incapable of accounting for the 
slightest decision,” because while, “Certainly the decision makes the event…it also neutralizes 
this happening that must surprise both the freedom and the will of every subject.”704 Derrida 
does not want to disavow the decision, but rather wants to recast it under the customary 
influence of Levinas, by what he calls the ‘passive decision:’ he writes, “the passive decision, 
condition of the event, is always in me, structurally, another event, a rending decision as the 
decision of the other.”705 Schmitt’s Christian subject, which decides on the sovereign exception 
and the determination of the friend and enemy, is unable to account for this ‘passive decision’ 
because it does not recognize that “the decision is not only always exceptional,” but also that 
“it makes an exception of/for me.”706  
 
                                                      
700 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, pp. 1-2; pg. 177. Of course, the obscure provenance of the phrase is a part of 
Derrida’s reading that wants to complicate the classical axiomatic of friendship. For Caputo’s commentary on this 
text see, “Who Is Derrida’s Zarathustra? Of Fraternity, Friendship, and a Democracy to Come,” in Research in 
Phenomenology 29 (1999), pp. 184-198. 
701 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, pg. 84, 243. 
702 Ibid., pg. 68. 
703 Ibid., pg. 66.  
704 Ibid., pg. 68. 
705 Ibid.  
706 Ibid., pg. 69. 
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The ‘passive decision’ as an aporia of deconstruction means that sovereignty is not negated 
— we do not experience sheer passivity according to Derrida. This experience of exception, 
“the supposed norm of all decision, exonerates from no responsibility.” We are still held to be 
responsible, “responsible for myself before the other…and also responsible for the other before 
the other.”707 This notion of responsibility is not merely a moral exhortation but is rather a 
structural feature of Derrida’s philosophy (via Levinas) that is constitutive of subjectivity as 
such. As Clayton Crockett suggests, following the Indian philosopher Saitya Brata Das, “The 
true, messianic exception [in contrast to Schmitt’s exceptionality of the sovereign with respect 
to law] is the general case of exception that makes us responsible as subjects for an other.”708 
And crucially, “This exceptionality both constitutes and ruins responsibility because it makes 
us responsible, but also makes us irresponsible, because we can never do justice to the other, 
not even to ourselves as other.”709 Beyond the aporia of a ‘responsible irresponsibility,’ the 
initial value of Derrida’s reading here is the incisive way in which the determination of political 
distinctions effects the process of subjectification.   
 
Derrida goes on to relate the impact of this questionable subjective determination between the 
friend and enemy to another opposition, the public and private. For Schmitt, “the 
disappearance of the enemy would be the death knell of the political as such.”710 The 
distinction between friend-enemy, however, is not so much a matter of ‘political difference’ 
as it is of “determined opposition.”711 This determination of the enemy has always been, 
according to Schmitt, a ‘public’ estimation of hostility (hostis) opposed to private enmity 
(inimicus), where the latter would be politically meaningless. Schmitt argues that: 
 
The enemy can only be an ensemble of grouped individuals, confronting 
an ensemble of the same nature, engaged in at least a virtual struggle, that 
is, one that is effectively possible (Feind ist nur eine wenigstens eventuall, d.h. 
der realen Möglichkeit nach kämpfende Gesamtheit von Menschen die einer 
ebensolchen Gesamtheit gegenübersteht).712 
 
                                                      
707 Ibid. 
708 Clayton Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing: Political Theology and New Materialism (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2018), pg. 50. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Derrida, Politics of Friendship, pg. 84. 
711 Ibid., pg. 85. Emphasis added. 
712 Ibid., pg. 86. This is Derrida’s modified quotation from The Concept of the Political, pg. 28. 
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Derrida finds in this passage a movement from ‘possibility to eventuality,’ that “rushes into 
place…the tank is replenished in the present…by allegation of presence.”713 This due to the 
appearance of the present participle (kamfende) between a minimal eventuality of struggle and 
its real possibility (reale Möglichkeit) and suggests “as soon as war is possible, it is taking 
place.”714 According to Derrida, Schmitt does not account for the criterion of this distinction 
between “the quasi-transcendental modality of the possible and the historico-factual modality 
of the eventual,” he thereby deduces the concept of the enemy in an ‘a prior fashion:’ “[a]s 
soon as war is possible-eventual, the enemy is present.”715 The outcome of this reduction is 
that Schmitt thinks he is able to purify the concept of political conflict —of all personal affect, 
love or feeling, that is, the private — and construe it as that which is properly public. The 
“totally pure experience of the friend-enemy in its political essence,” he writes, is deduced 
from the antithesis of friendship which is not private enmity but rather public hostility.716 
Here Derrida registers the collapse of Schmitt’s discourse. It is unable to maintain the border 
between public and private and, thus, avoid the contamination of friend with enemy. Schmitt 
wants to defend the political, and in order or to do so one must not lose sight of ‘who’ the 
enemy is. But nothing stops (not even the historic appeal Schmitt makes to the tradition of 
Plato, which Derrida dismantles at length)717 the “possibility of semantic slippage and 
inversion,” where instead of hostility toward the enemy, we have hostility — “a war without 
hatred” — toward the friend. Friend becomes enemy and private becomes public. And 
conversely, “I can, in privacy, love my enemy,” and so the public becomes private.718 It is 
against the threat of this ruinous self-contamination, Derrida says, that Schmitt defends his 
discourse, “walls itself up, reconstructs itself unendingly against what is to come.”719   
 
The root behind Derrida’s critique of Schmitt’s concept of the political is a disquiet over what 
appears as a ‘phenomenological procedure’ and an ‘eidetic reduction,’720 which manifests 
itself in the supposed achievement of the eidos of the political —the purity of the concept in a 
“Platonic dream.”721 Derrida argues that the difference between private and public (and all of 
Schmitt’s other Platonic attempts at justification, inter alia: pólemos/stásis, inimicus/hostis) can 
never be found, at least not concretely. As a result:  
                                                      
713 Ibid. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Ibid., pg. 87. 
717 Ibid., pg. 89-106. 
718 Ibid., pg. 88. 
719 Ibid. 
720 Ibid., pg. 87. 
721 Ibid., pg. 116. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  190 
 
the purity of pólemos or the enemy, whereby Schmitt would define the 
political, remains unattainable. The concept of the political undoubtedly 
corresponds, as concept, to what the ideal discourse can want to state most 
rigorously on the ideality of the political. But no politics has ever been 
adequate to its concept. No political event can be correctly described or 
defined with recourse to these concepts. And this inadequation is not 
accidental, since politics is essentially a prâxis, as Schmitt himself always 
implies.722 
 
Derrida, thus, identifies the contradiction in Schmitt’s thought: on the one hand, Schmitt 
pursues the meaning of the political in its ‘adequation’ to conceptual ideality, and on the other 
hand, he himself recognizes that determination needs to be at the same time, concrete and in 
‘praxis,’ in its ‘polemical sense.’ But, as we have just seen, he fails to maintain the polemical 
distinction: “pólemos remains…naturally and irreducibly blurred.”723 And yet, for all these 
paradoxes, Schmitt will go to great lengths to preserve the “impure purity of the political as 
such, of the properly political…And that this ‘as such’ should dissipate our doubts concerning 
what ‘friend and ‘enemy’ mean.”724 Here our doubts must disappear “not so much relative to 
the meaning of friendship or hostility but, above all, relative to who the friend and enemy are,” 
that is, the matter of ‘practical identification.’725  
 
In the end, the practice of identification of self and other (the enemy) and the concrete 
determination of ‘who’ the enemy is — regardless of ‘what’ the enemy could ‘mean’ in its 
essence — in Schmitt’s ‘politico-logico’ discourse (a discourse whose subject is dominated by 
the traits of sovereign ethical autarky and autonomy) situates his politics of enmity under the 
‘canonical concept’ of friendship: the natal-natural-national fraternity of the male bond 
dominating the Western canon with remarkable ubiquity. Schmitt’s political order requires 
the threat of annihilation of the other to maintain peace. The sphere in which this existential 
threat and upright (phallic) hostility of war is to be maintained is, unsurprisingly, occupied by 
male figures; soldiers, men at war, comrades, brothers in arms, to which Derrida rightly asks: 
“What about the sister?”726 Indeed, there is “not a woman in sight.” You would look “in vain 
for the figure of a woman, a feminine silhouette, and the slightest allusion to sexual difference” 
                                                      
722 Ibid., pg. 114. 
723 Ibid., pg. 115. 
724 Ibid., pg. 116. 
725 Ibid. 
726 Ibid., pg. 96. 
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in Schmitt’s ‘logic of fraternization.’727 Politics of Friendship exposes Schmitt’s male-centric 
Kampf’s philosophy — and indeed, the entire enclosed circle of democratic politics open only 
to the fraternities of brotherhood — to a “feminized, effete Kampflosigkeit,” Caputo writes, “a 
state and culture lacking political definition that would make a real man blush.”728 For 
Derrida’s part, the politics of friendship is not about the ever present threat of the annihilation 
of the other, but rather of the affirmation of the other, so that when we hear ‘O my friends, there 
are no friends,’ we hear the vocative, the call to us who are friends in mutuality of community 
that there is another concept of friendship. A concept that is open ended, which does not annul 
friendship or community, but puts them at risk with this “impossible axiomatic which remains 
to be thought.”729  
 
II.  Between Law and Justice 
 
As has been argued throughout this study, Caputo’s reading of Derrida is one that operates 
on a fundamental optimism or faith about deconstruction, or rather, that deconstruction ‘is’ a 
certain faith or optimism. Deconstruction is not a dissolution of concepts (like the subject, 
friendship, community, sovereignty, the decision, the political, or God) but is rather a re-
orientation that occurs from within (‘events which they contain’) exposing them to the 
possibility of something wholly other. This possibility is ‘perhaps impossible,’ not because the 
dream of an X without X is a realm of perfectability toward which we are asymptotically 
approaching, but because this is the very futural ‘to come-structure’ of the present itself. This 
‘essential’ optimism or faith in a dream about something a venir with respect to sovereignty, 
the political, and Carl Schmitt, which we have just seen in The Politics of Friendship, is perhaps 
nowhere more clearly articulated than in Derrida’s later works, “Force of Law” and Rogues. 
 
Like so many of Derrida’s political-legal texts, “Force of Law” has evoked much commentary. 
The purpose of our interest, as Gil Anidjar writes in his brief introduction to this essay is that 
“Carl Schmitt’s argument…is furthered that law (loi and droit, Gesetz and Recht)—the 
juridical—constitutes the site where the complex history of the theologico-political comes to 
the fore.”730 We will focus on the first part of the essay, where we will see Schmitt’s personalist 
                                                      
727 Ibid., pp. 155-156. Derrida’s full quotation is worth repeating: “Yes, but men, men and more men, over centuries 
of war, and costumes, hats, uniforms, soutanes, warriors, colonels, generals, partisans, strategists, politicians, 
professors, political theoreticians, theologians. In vain would you look for a figure of a woman, feminine silhouette, 
and the slightest allusion to sexual difference.” 
728 Caputo, “Who Is Derrida’s Zarathustra?”, pp. 194-195. 
729 Ibid., pg. 187. 
730 Jacques Derrida, Gil Anidjar (ed.) Acts of Religion, pg. 228.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  192 
view of the sovereign subject and the necessity of the decision, disrupted by Derrida’s aporia 
of undecidability referred to in the opposition between law and justice. 
 
The distinction between law and justice that Derrida formulates in this essay replays the now 
recognizable opposition between generality and singularity, between the representational 
edifice of the legal system and the irreducible justice that is owed to the other.731 One would 
miss the radical force of Derrida’s claims in ‘Force of Law’ if one were to reduce this opposition 
to a simple priority for the singular at the expense of the general. 732 Law may be the ‘element 
of calculation’ and, therefore, is not justice, but “it is just that there be law.”733 The aporetic 
tension between law and justice is supported in the following passage: 
 
An address is always singular, idiomatic, and justice, as law [droit], seems 
always to suppose the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal 
imperative. How to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern 
singularity, individuals, groups, irreplaceable existences, the other or 
myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value, or the 
imperative of justice that necessarily have a general form, even if this 
generality prescribes a singular application.734 
 
The paradox Derrida is communicating here involves, on the one hand, the necessity of law to 
relate to the other in the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of the situation (otherwise it could not 
be said to exercise itself in the name of justice) and on the other, the necessity of justice to take 
on the general form of law in order for it to be ‘en-forced’ or actualized. Evidently, Derrida is 
not contending that a possible experience of justice is a pure event, or a pure instance of justice 
around which the law congeals to establish its representative system. On the contrary, as 
Derrida has been saying since his earliest writing, the pure event or originary act of justice is 
always already inscribed within an iteration or repetition, and thus, the distinction between 
law and justice is not so much an opposition as it is a mutual contamination. Justice, for 
Derrida, does not simply come to rest in the back-and-forth of this tension, rather, its mutual 
contamination is the requirement of “the very experience of the aporia,” which is what he 
                                                      
731 “…between justice (infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and 
heterotropic) and the exercise of justice as law or right [droit], legitimacy, legality, stabilizable and statutory, 
calculable, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions.” Ibid., pg. 250. 
732 This is apparently often the case in legal scholarship where liberal readers of this text, whether sympathetic or 
critical of Derrida’s thought, oversimplify his emphasis on singularity. See Jacques de Ville, Jacques Derrida: Law as 
Absolute Hospitality (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 141-153.  
733 Derrida, “Force of Law”, pg. 244. 
734 Ibid., pg. 245. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  193 
means by the mystical foundation of authority.735 This foundation is not to be understood as a 
synthesis of these oppositions, indeed, it is rather a non-foundational “differential of force…of 
force as différance or force of différance,”736 what we might call the ‘weak force.’ (‘Weakness’ 
here does not intend to re-instantiate the weak vs. strong binary. It is better understood as the 
differential forces that makes this binarity possible. Below it will be argued that this locution 
of ‘weakness’ is ultimately confused by readers of Caputo, because it brings to mind the 
opposition just mentioned. This is why Caputo somewhat departs from this language in 
Insistence of God.)  
 
The ‘mystical’ foundation of authority once again alludes implicitly to Schmitt’s conception of 
an ultimately Christian subjectivity — insofar as it is an autonomous, self-positing sovereign 
that makes an exception of itself. In discussion with Montaigne and Pascal, Derrida points 
toward the ‘fictional’ (and thus mystical) foundation of laws; laws are extended a credit and 
belief not because they are just, but simply because they are laws.737 The implication being that 
in the absence of natural law, the self-positing anchoring of the modern Christian subject738 
that creates positive laws, has its foundation not in itself, but in the fiction or faith entangled 
within this self-positing. At this point we can see the emergence of the ‘new concept’ — an 
‘originary’ faith or fictional law (the ‘law of law’) which precedes the distinction between 
faith/fiction and knowledge/fact. Derrida had memorably explored this in ‘Faith and 
Knowledge,’739 and Caputo described it as Derrida’s quasi-messianic ‘Ankhôral Religion’: 
 
Religion as a universal messianicity despoiled of all messianism, as faith 
without dogma advancing in the risk of absolute night, is the foundation 
of the law, the law of the law, the origin of institution and constitution, the 
performative event which does not belong to the whole that it founds or 
inaugurates, which Derrida elsewhere called the ‘mystical force’ of law.740  
 
                                                      
735 Ibid., pg. 244. 
736 Ibid., pp. 234-235. 
737 Montaigne writes, “Lawes are now maintained in credit, not because they are just, but because they are lawes. 
It is the mystical foundation of their authority; they have none other.” Ibid., pp. 240-241. 
738 Schmitt is in fact a liberal thinker here according to Heidegger. See Laurence Paul Hemming, “Heidegger’s 
claim ‘Carl Schmitt thinks as a Liberal,’” in Journal for Cultural Research 20.3 (2016), pp. 286-294. “It is through its 
self-unfolding self-assertion (and so not out of how it itself is unfolded) that the friend/enemy distinction appears. 
The state is not brought into being, but rather, like the subject of which it is the absolute (self-)realization, posits 
itself.” Pg. 289. 
739 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” pp. 42-101. For a close reading of this text see Michael Naas’, Miracle and 
Machine: Jacques Derrida and the Two Sources of Religion, Science, and the Media (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2012).  
740 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 154-156; pg. 155. 
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What would a faith without dogma ‘advancing in the risk of absolute night’ mean? This brings 
us back to the nature of the decision and the ‘experience of aporia.’ How does one confront 
decision/judging justly with respect to law without devolving into Schmittian decisionism on 
the one hand, or paralytic indecision on the other? Derrida introduces three aporias in a legal 
context: the first ‘Epokhē of the Rule’ or ‘aporia of suspension,’ the second aporia of ‘The 
Haunting of the Undecidability’ and finally, ‘The Urgency That Obstructs the Horizon of 
Knowledge.’  
 
The first aporia states that for a judge to judge justly, it is never simply the application of a 
norm to a situation, the law must be ‘suspended’ to address the case’s specificity and then 
provide a ‘fresh judgement.’ At the same time, for a judgement to be just and ‘responsible’ it 
cannot destroy the law but must be regulated by it. Hence, in the aporia the judgement is just 
when the law’s regulatory rule is preserved precisely by its suspension or deregulation.741 We 
might describe the approach in this aporia as more pragmatic, especially when seen with 
respect to the second aporia.  
 
In the second aporia, ‘The Haunting of the Undecidability,’ Derrida again replays the 
‘oscillation’ between the generality of law and norms (“respect for equality and universal 
right”) and the singularity of the idiosyncratic (“the always heterogeneous and unique 
singularity of the unsubsumable example”).742 However, the ‘undecidable’ here, contrary to 
the negligibility of reserved oscillation — what critics perceive as indecision or relativism — 
is the experience or ‘the test and ordeal’ of being delivered over to this ‘impossible decision.’ 
Even if the “test and ordeal of the undecidable [has been] passed…the decision has again 
followed a rule…it is no longer presently just, fully just.”743 The italics here signal that the just 
judgement is always inscribed by the undecidable and, therefore, strictly no decision is ever 
‘fully’ just. Thus, Caputo remarks, “far from undermining decision…’undecidability’ is what 
assures that judging will be judging, and not merely mechanical operation. Undecidability is 
the condition of im/possibility of decision.”744 The undecidability of justice, which is neither 
present nor absent, ‘hovers over the decision, before, during and after’ like a ghost or specter. 
In virtue of justice being an infinite idea, “infinite because it is irreducible,” and “irreducible 
because it is owed to the other,” it demands to be made felt in the present — which is at the 
                                                      
741 Derrida, “Force of Law”, pg. 251. 
742 Ibid., pg. 252. 
743 Ibid., pg. 253. 
744 Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 104.  
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same time the risk of injustice.745 This is why Derrida insists on the ‘quasi-messianic’ since 
messianicity as a ‘form’ invokes a Kantian horizon that precisely places a limit on justice. The 
third aporia is, thus, aptly described as ‘The Urgency That Obstructs the Horizon of 
Knowledge.’ A decision must be made in “a finite moment of urgency and precipitation.” It 
has no assurances of any regulative idea of justice and, therefore, “the instant of decision is a 
madness, says Kierkegaard.”746    
 
The pursuit of justice for Derrida does not imply that our desire is fueled by a certain lack of 
the ideal of justice. This kind of positive absolute of justice is precisely what is deconstructed 
in virtue of its exposure to time. Rather, justice for Derrida, “justice in itself, if such a thing 
exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible,”747 it is undeconstructible. Caputo makes 
an important remark in response to Hägglund’s ‘abridgement’ of deconstruction referring to 
the line we have just read from ‘Force of Law’:  
 
he [Derrida] said this not because justice is synonymous with differánce, 
which it is not, but because justice is never constructed but is rather always 
calling for construction (in laws) and therefore also in the very same voice 
calling for the deconstruction of any law that is in fact constructed, which 
is how justice brings its weak force to bear upon the real force of law.748 
 
Caputo does say, however, before this passage that there certainly is a sense of the 
undeconstructible with reference to differánce, insofar as it is the condition under which any 
construction takes place. But justice as undeconstructible goes beyond this descriptive sense 
of deconstruction, that is, the sense in which it mainly describes the instability of law with 
respect to justice. Justice as undeconstructible is ‘the weak force of a call’ and a ‘promise of an 
event,’ which is not pure ideal as Hägglund protests, for that would be another condition or 
description of justice. It is rather, an unconditional-undeconstructible justice, “an 
unconditional but dangerous demand, a pure promise which cannot be insulated from a pure 
threat.”749 If we read the structure of this promise/threat in the context of hospitality, the 
danger here does not ‘describe’ merely the “violent exposure” of what may be knocking at our 
door, but rather, a ‘hyperbolic ultra-ethical injunction’ which is meant to “actualize our ‘desire’ 
                                                      
745 Derrida, “Force of Law”, pg. 254. 
746 Ibid., pg. 255. 
747 Ibid., pg. 243. 
748 Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion,” pg. 68. See also pg. 123, fn. 135. 
749 Ibid., pg. 69. 
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for unconditional hospitality and to do so ‘in the name of the unconditional.’”750 The same then 
is true for law: an undeconstructible ‘idea’ of justice deconstructs law and calls us to make laws 
that are more just, because justice — the ‘very idea’ — does not exist, and because laws do 
exist.  
 
It should be clear from this reading how Derrida’s deconstruction of law and justice severely 
problematizes Schmitt’s theory. Schmitt’s logic of the friend-enemy distinction and the 
sovereign decision to decide allows no space for questioning. If the sovereign indivisible 
decision were subject to contestation, that is, if the decision by the sovereign was not final and 
absolute, then there would be no certainty about the enemy. Political ‘killing’ would be 
indistinguishable from murder, for example. As he writes in Political Theology the sovereign 
decision “frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute.”751 If this 
absolutism is questioned, then the power of the sovereign is divisible and undermined. At 
stake, for Schmitt, is that questioning is ultimately depoliticizing. For Derrida, Schmitt’s 
emphasis on decision is not of itself a problem, he does not deny the necessity of decision, but 
rather that the sovereign decision Schmitt advocates, in fact, is not a decision as such. It assumes 
‘concrete’ identification or knowledge that leaves the distinction between friend and enemy a 
matter of programmability. Schmitt would bemoan Derrida’s notion of ‘undecidability’ as a 
form of political nihilism. But on the contrary, as we have seen Derrida is “confirming—but 
not by way of deploring the fact, as Schmitt does—an essential and necessary 
depoliticization.”752 This depoliticization, Derrida says, is not ‘neuter or negative indifference,’ 
but through it “one would seek to think, interpret and implement another politics, another 
democracy.”753 
 
III. Sovereignty, Autoimmunity, and the Democracy to Come 
 
To conclude this section, we return to Derrida’s Rogues essay that presents some of his clearest 
formulations of sovereignty and a ‘deconstructive politics.’ From what we have already seen, 
Derrida argues that the antithesis of the political “dwells within the political, and politicizes, 
the political.”754 This negative moment of ‘depoliticization,’ contrary to Schmitt, is constitutive 
of the political as such, and is what Derrida calls the specter of a ‘democracy to come.’755 While 
                                                      
750 Ibid., pg. 76. 
751 Schmitt, Political Theology, pg. 12.  
752 Derrida, Politics of Friendship, pg. 104 
753 Ibid. 
754 Ibid., pg. 138. 
755 Ibid., pg. 104. 
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he also explores this syntagm in Specters of Marx and Politics of Friendship, the virtue of Rogues 
lies in the fact that the discussion is contextualized directly in relation to (current) challenges 
faced by democratic politics and sovereignty. The latter is not only a direct reference to 
Schmitt,756 but also to the entire ‘ancien régime,’ Caputo says, of “monarchies and aristocracies 
and oligarchies and the old ontotheologies, all of which rely upon some version of a 
completely classical schema of God the Father, ‘of the theological idea of sovereignty.’”757 In 
the following discussion, then, we explore one of the governing principles in Rogues, namely, 
sovereignty’s autoimmunity — the ‘biologistic’ trope that symbolizes the constitutive self-
compromise of democracy in order to protect and sustain itself.758 After demonstrating this 
‘auto-immune logic’ with respect to sovereignty and democracy, Derrida concludes his essay 
with comments similar to those quoted above from For What Tomorrow…. In these final 
passages of Rogues, he affirms once again the theological filiation between democracy and 
sovereignty, and suggests whether or not a ‘democracy to come’ might not also be translated 
to ‘a god to come.’759  
 
At this point, Derrida’s comments can be interpreted as offering an alternative to Schmittian 
political theology. It is suggested that this alternative is what Caputo has cultivated in what 
we are calling here a ‘radical political theology,’ and which is theologically distinguished by 
the development of his notions of ‘theopoetics.’ It will be argued that his re-casted version of 
‘theopoetics,’ which can be read alongside certain gestures made in Derrida’s final seminar 
Sovereignty and the Beast, potentially articulates a ‘poetic revolution’ of sovereignty all together.  
 
Rogues was written in the winter and summer of 2002 in the aftermath of 9/11 and so also 
predates the anticipation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this context, Derrida refers to 
the ‘rogue state’ not only as the nations who are demonized as ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah states’760 by 
the U.S., but that it is also belongs to the U.S. itself who employs this rhetoric to mask its own 
rogue status in its violations of international law and diplomacy. Given our discussion thus 
far, we can anticipate that Derrida will take this a step further by arguing that this logic of a 
self-contained foreign nation-state ‘enemy’ no longer functions, or at least not in the way that 
                                                      
756 Derrida, Rogues, pg. 141. 
757 John D. Caputo, “Without Sovereignty, Without Being: Unconditionality, The Coming God and Derrida’s 
Democracy To Come,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 4.3 (Aug, 2003), pp. 9-26; pp. 10-11. 
758 For helpful commentaries on this concept in Derrida’s thought see, Hägglund’s chapter “The Autoimmunity of 
Democracy,” in Radical Atheism, pp. 164-205; Michael Naas, “One Nation…Indivisible,” in Derrida From Now On 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 122-146, and Samir Haddad, Derrida and the Inheritance of 
Democracy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 54-64. 
759 Derrida, Rogues, pg. 110, 114. 
760 Derrida, Rogues, pg. 69.  
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it did during the cold war, and indeed, that threats to democracy are less apparent and more 
nebulous. On the one hand, these threats are more difficult to locate — one thinks about the 
opacity of terror organizations, or equally, the monolithic yet just as ambiguous ‘trans-state’ 
or ‘non-state’ actors that characterize global geo-politics and corporate neoliberalism — and 
on the other, they operate in plain sight, paradigmatically employed by the state itself to 
ensure its survival: the steps taken to secure democratic principles by the suspension of these 
very democratic principles761 — what Derrida calls the ‘suicide of democracy’ or the 
‘autoimmune suicide.’762  
 
To inquire into the particular quality or rhetorical force of ‘autoimmunity’ one must first 
consider the value of the autos to which it relates. The autos and the series of prefixed words it 
appears alongside all invoke the ‘self-same’ circularity of sovereignty: the ipse, the ‘I can’, the 
property and power (kratos/cracy) of the self which belongs to itself and returns to itself, “that 
gives itself its own law, its force of law, its self-representation, the sovereign and 
reappropriating gathering of the self in the simultaneity of an assemblage or assembly.”763 The 
autos of auto-nomos, autonomy, and the tradition of democracy from Plato and Aristotle, 
including the concepts of freedom, equality, the people etc. — all cannot be thought separately 
from the autos or ipseity, as the conjunction of self and sovereignty in the homogeneity of the 
same circular One.764 The autos as the axiomatic which structures a certain sovereign 
subjectivity and democracy is anchored in a ‘trope of a theological figure’(God). Consequently, 
it remains “incompatible with, even finally clashes with, another truth of the democratic, 
namely, the truth of the other, heterogeneity, the heteronomic and the dissymmetric, 
disseminal multiplicity, the anonymous ‘anyone,’ the ‘no matter who,’ the indeterminate ‘each 
one.’”765 
 
Hence, in order for sovereignty ‘to be,’ Derrida agrees it must be an indivisible and 
unshareable unity, and must occur “as silent as it is instantaneous, without any thickness of 
                                                      
761 An example can be seen in Derrida’s native Algeria, where the democratically elected government temporarily 
suspended the democratic voting process when it became clear that a theocratic regime would win a majority and, 
thus, permanently end democracy. The other clear example Derrida has in mind were the measures taken by the 
U.S. Supreme court to restrict certain democratic freedoms after 9/11 under the pretext of protecting those same 
democratic freedoms. Ibid, pp. 35; 39-40. Even though these might represent extreme cases, as Derrida has shown 
elsewhere, the very foundations of democracy itself follow this autoimmune logic. See for example, Derrida’s 1976 
essay “Declarations of Independence” in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 46-54.  
762 Derrida, Rogues, pg. 33.  
763 Ibid., pg. 11.  
764 Ibid., pg. 14-15. 
765 Ibid. 
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time.”766 However, at this point sovereignty begins to reveal its autoimmunity. In order to 
maintain itself over time or to distribute itself in space it will necessarily need to justify and 
defend itself against the other of language and law: 
 
To confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason 
for it, is already to compromise its deciding exceptionality, to subject it to 
rules, to a code of law, to some general law, to concepts. It is thus to divide 
it…to turn sovereignty against itself, to compromise its immunity. This 
happens as soon as one speaks of it in order to give it or find in it some 
sense or meaning. But since this happens all the time, pure sovereignty 
does not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, 
by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the process of 
autoimmunizing itself, of betraying itself by betraying the democracy that 
nonetheless can never do without it.767 
 
Sovereignty must be silent but cannot avoid speaking in order to protect itself, and so protects 
itself precisely by compromising itself. The ‘constitutive autoimmunity’ of sovereignty, 
therefore, can be expressed as a kind of aporia of deconstruction. It is a ‘double-bind’ that we 
are now quite familiar with, as indeed, Derrida comments: “I could thus without much 
difficulty…inscribe the category of the autoimmune into the series of both older and more 
recent discourses on the double bind and the aporia.”768 If sovereignty suffers its own 
autoimmunity so does the concept of democracy, which unlike other forms of government, is 
exemplary for Derrida because it has an “autoimmune necessity inscribed right onto [à même] 
democracy, right onto the concept of a democracy without concept, a democracy devoid of 
sameness and ipseity.”769 One of the ways that Derrida consolidates this necessary 
autoimmunity is to approach the perennial problem of the democratic tradition, namely, the 
relation between freedom and equality. The basic paradox in democracy is that ‘the people’ 
(demos) are free to act (kratos) how they want, while at the same time this action must be 
sanctioned by this ‘people.’ Consequently, there is a necessary limit placed on freedom in 
order to constitute a plurality of ‘the people’ — that is, by those who share in the equality of 
this freedom. To be a free people is to be equal, and this requires the placing of a limit on being 
free. Derrida then introduces measurability to describe this aporia, aligning equality with the 
                                                      
766 Ibid., pg. 10.  
767 Ibid., pg. 101. 
768 Ibid., pg. 35. 
769 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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calculable homogeneity of a unit or group, and freedom with the incalculable heterogeneous 
power to act.770 As is always the case with this aporetic structure, it is not that one takes 
preference over the other, but rather that both contradictory positions mutually compromise 
each other and are necessary for the constitution of democracy. Given this “semantic abyss”771 
of democracy, Derrida can claim that: 
 
There is no absolute paradigm, whether constitutive or constitutional, no 
absolutely intelligible idea, no eidos, no idea of democracy. And so, in the 
final analysis, no democratic ideal. For, even if there were one, and 
wherever there would be one, this ‘there is’ would remain aporetic, under 
a double or autoimmune constraint.772 
 
The crucial point about the ‘autoimmune constraint’ inherent to the ‘idea’ of democracy is not 
that the undecidable practices of democracy (emphasizing either freedom or equality) do not 
attain the ‘perfect’ ideal or equilibrium, but rather that without this autoimmunity these 
practices don’t ‘get going.’ Autoimmunity is the condition of im/possibility for either more 
inclusive notions of equality (the demos) and the exercise of freedoms/rights (cracy), or the 
reverse, the unequal distribution of power to the few and the restriction of rights or freedoms. 
Derrida’s futural democracy ‘to come’ oscillates between a “hyperbolic essence”773 of 
‘perfectibility’ and an “autoimmune pervertibility,”774 a “nondialectizable antimony that risks 
paralyzing and thus calls for the event of the interruptive decision.”775 The autoimmunity of 
democracy ‘is’ the democracy ‘to come,’ in the sense that it remains revisable and always open 
to change, and yet, because this change is always ‘to come’ (unforeseeable, undecidable, 
incalculable), it is always a “perilous transaction” which “must thus invent, each time, in a 
singular situation, its own law and norm, that is, a maxim that welcomes each time the event 
to come.”776 As Michael Naas comments further: 
 
Autoimmunity is the very condition of the unconditionality of the event; 
it is what opens the autos, what opens us, to time, space, language, and the 
other. Without autoimmunity, without some compromise in the forces of 
identity that form and sustain — that seem to form and sustain — the autos, 
                                                      
770 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
771 Ibid., pg. 72. 
772 Ibid., pg. 37. 
773 Ibid., pg. 41. 
774 Ibid., pg. 34.  
775 Ibid., pg. 35. 
776 Ibid., pg. 150-151. 
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there would be no relation to anything beyond the self. And since the self 
cannot return to itself and thus be itself without this openness, without 
some alterity, autoimmunity — like deconstruction —is the case.777 
 
In the section following this passage, Naas makes two important points about autoimmunity 
that should be highlighted before our discussion returns to Caputo. First, he says that the 
advantage of autoimmunity as a deconstructive trope is that it can be understood “as What 
Happens,” as opposed to the often-cited misunderstandings of deconstruction as a ‘method’ 
to be ‘applied.’ For Derrida, deconstruction is always underway in texts and discourses, and 
with autoimmunity it becomes clear that this is also ‘what happens’ to institutions, nations, 
sovereignty etc. — “in every autos that tries to maintain its sovereignty…by immunizing itself 
against the other.”778 “Hence,” Naas continues, “autoimmunity is not opposed to immunity but 
is, as it were, secreted by it, it is a self-destructive ‘force’ produced by the immunizing gesture 
itself, a weak force that undoes the force or power of sovereignty.”779 Secondly, following from 
this  ‘natural’ gesture (secretion) of autoimmunity as that which ‘happens,’ Naas suggests 
further that Derrida’s use of this theme from the ‘life sciences’ is far from a clever Derridianism, 
but rather allows him to “rethink the notion of physis…and the notion of life,” and that “[t]he 
generalization and reinscription of autoimmunity allows him to pose questions of nature and 
life otherwise.”780  
 
This emphasis on the ‘material’ or ‘natural’ thematic in Derrida’s thought was not new to 
Rogues. As Samir Haddad has illustrated, its first substantial appearance was made in “Faith 
and Knowledge” (1994)781 and, thus, coincides with the general political and religious tones of 
Derrida’s later writing. In “Faith and Knowledge” the figure of autoimmunity was used to 
describe how attempts to indemnify faith or religion against knowledge or science would lead 
to the necessary supplements of knowledge or science to faith or religion, and at the same time 
that an originary faith was always at work in all knowledge or science. Again, following Naas, 
and important for us here, is the contention that it was no coincidence that Derrida would 
develop this biological figure in the context of a discourse on religion, for it is in such a context 
that life itself is at stake. The notion of autoimmunity in “Faith and Knowledge” Naas says, 
                                                      
777 Nass, Derrida From Now On, pg. 139.  
778 Ibid., pg. 140.  
779 Ibid. 
780 Ibid., pg. 141. 
781 Haddad, Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy, pg. 54-65. See also Haddad’s “Reading Derrida Reading 
Derrida: Deconstruction as Self-Inheritance,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14.4 (2006), pp. 505-520, as 
well as Naas, Derrida From Now On, pp. 128-132. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  202 
“gets deployed in a text on life, on living on and salvation, on religion’s sacrifice of life for 
something greater than life, and thus on the spectral, phantasmatic character of sovereignty 
and spectralizing messianicy that interrupts that phantasm.”782 The ordeal of the autoimmune  
in the sense that the body must compromise its immunity in order for it not to reject a newly 
grafted organ, for example, is a perilous opening of the body/self/democracy, but precisely 
to ensure its survival, that is, to give it a chance at life. This will be important to bear in mind 
when it is argued below that radical theology’s theopoetics does not ignore, but is in fact 
deeply concerned for the material political conditions of present-day life.     
 
In a final rogue-ish move at the end of the first essay in Rogues, Derrida makes a remarkable 
and dramatic reflection after these investigations into autoimmunity, democracy, and 
sovereignty. He states that “in preparing for this lecture, I often asked myself whether 
everything that seems to link the democracy to come to the specter…might not lead back or 
be reducible to some unavowed theologism.” He goes on to say that he does not mean the 
figures of sovereignty in the western canon (the Abrahamic God, monarchy, or the ‘people of 
gods’ in democracy), but rather “on account of the to-come, I asked myself whether this did 
not resemble what someone in whom we have never suspected the slightest hint of 
democratism said one day of the god who alone could still save us.” Heidegger’s infamous 
comments from the Der Spiegel interview to which Derrida is referring, are interpreted here as 
a spectral ‘god to come,’ and for the very specific reason that ultimately, for Derrida, it is God 
the sovereign which remains the anchor of all sovereignty. What remains to be thought, then, 
is this ‘god to come.’ A God without sovereignty as an unconditional event. A God ‘to-come,’ 
who is expressed not by the logic of the autos but by a ‘poetics of the call.’ A God ‘to-come’ 
who would no longer serve a Schmittian political theology but would rather be in service of a 
‘radical political theology.’ A radical political theology around a sovereignty without 
sovereignty, which would not defer the political but reaffirm it in all its materiality and cosmic 
weight. It is, therefore, unsurprising that all of Derrida’s last works after Rogues would reflect 
on these themes: materiality/animality and the political-theological specter of sovereignty.783  
 
                                                      
782 Naas, Derrida From Now On, pg. 131. 
783 In addition to The Beast and the Sovereign volumes we have already mentioned, see also Jacques Derrida, David 
Wills (trans.) and Marie-Louise Mallet (ed.) The Animal That Therefore I Am (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington, Marc Crépon and Thomas Dutoit (eds.) and Peggy Kamuf (trans.) 
The Death Penalty: Volume I (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014) and Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington 
and Marc Crépon (eds.) and Elizabeth Rottenberg (trans.) The Death Penalty Volume II (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2017).  
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III. Theological Materialisms: Badiou, Agamben, Žižek 
 
If we are to defend the claim that Caputo’s religious reading of Derrida — and a radical 
political theology of the event or the ‘event of sovereignty,’ which is articulated through the 
discursive resources of a ‘theopoetics’ — offers a sufficient hermeneutical account of ‘the 
material,’ neither collapsing into a concealed desire for concretization in the present, nor 
denigrating the present at the expense of what is ‘to come,’ then it will be necessary for us to 
distinguish Derrida and Caputo’s position from other attempts to ‘materialize’ the event. 
Perhaps the three figures who have most vigorously taken up the task of this materialist turn 
in continental philosophy are Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek and Giorgio Agamben. United in 
their abhorrence of capitalism as well as outspoken anti-Liberal posture, they are critical of 
and reproach thinkers like Derrida for being tied to an anti-essentialist rhetoric whose future 
never actually ‘breaks into’ the particularity of history. For them, Derrida’s ‘democracy to 
come’ only reinstates the logic of capitalism, and so as Žižek has famously quipped, 
‘democracy is not to come, but to go.’784 Given the scope of their respective corpora, the vast 
secondary literature concerned with their work, and the distinctiveness of each of their 
approaches, we limit our discussion by following a critical reading presented by Jayne 
Svenungsson, which accords with the position we are developing here. To remind the reader, 
the critical discussion below is not presented as a final word on these thinkers’ positions, but 
rather is being used to distinguish and clarify Caputo’s religious reading of Derrida.   
 
Svenungsson’s recently translated monograph Divining History (2016),785 inspired by Karl 
Löwith’s classic study, Meaning in History (1949), explores the ways in which Jewish and 
Christian conceptions of history have influenced the development of modern political 
thought.786 Examining the themese of prophetism, messianism and spirit, deployed in five 
historical epochs — viz. the biblical-textual tradition, medieval theology, German 
Romanticism, twentieth century ideology critique and current twenty-first century political-
philosophical radicalism — Svenungsson argues for the enduring, albeit complex, value of this 
biblical legacy. In contrast to modern political theology (Schmitt), she explores a ‘theopolitical’ 
                                                      
784 Slavoj Žižek, John Milbank, Creston Davis (ed.) The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2009), pg. 255.  
785 Jayne Svenungsson, Stephen Donovan (trans.) Divining History: Prophetism, Messianism, and the Development of 
Spirit (New York: Berghahn, 2016) 
786 Svenungsson holds the chair of Systematic Theology at Lund University in Sweden. Apart from this recent 
monograph she has also co-edited a number of important volumes, including Elani Namali, Jayne Svenungsson 
and Alana M. Vincent (eds.) Jewish Thought, Utopia, and Revolution (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014) and an important 
volume on Martin Heidegger, see Mårten Björk and Jayne Svenungsson (eds.) Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and the 
Future of Theology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
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understanding of prophetic justice which refuses reduction into the present political order. 
Similarly, she reads the messianic as a ‘restorative’ figure opposed to an ‘apocalyptic’ one, 
where justice is understood as an ongoing task rather than an ‘irruption’ into the present, and 
finally she opts for a Derridian ‘spectral’ and ‘haunting’ understanding of spirit, contrasted to 
many of the ‘coercive dialectical schemas’ of the twentieth century.787 In her final chapter she 
takes up a critical assessment of Badiou, Žižek and Agamben, illustrating their own distinctive 
applications of these motifs. A significant part of this assessment resides in the ‘decisionist 
elements’ she discerns in parts of their thinking, and therefore a ‘neo-Schmittian’ alliance with 
a number of theological concepts (grace rather than law, spirit rather than letter etc.), which 
lead to the revival of certain apocalyptic, antinomian and authoritarian qualities. By 
distinguishing her own (and Derrida’s) position from these tendencies, she makes a 
compelling case for the continued, yet qualified, importance of the historico-theological 
tradition for contemporary political and philosophical debates. We turn now to briefly 
consider Svenungsson’s handling of these thinkers, respectively.  
 
I. Alain Badiou  
 
Alain Badiou’s hugely influential neo-Marxist philosophy of event is set in the context of the 
depoliticizing cultural logic of late capitalism. Capitalism and cultural relativism go hand-in-
hand for Badiou; the multiculturalism of present day democracy allows the former to 
encourage the proliferation of identity in order to commodify and profit off it, while the latter 
welcomes capital in support of its struggle for recognition. A recent example of this can be 
seen in the Nike advertising campaign that decided to support the American football player, 
Colin Kaepernick. In order to boost sales, Nike endorsed Kaepernick’s protest against racial 
discrimination in the National Football League, thereby appearing as champions ‘for minority 
groups,’ when of course, giant brands like Nike themselves are a part of the very machine 
which creates the economic conditions that disenfranchise these minorities.788 This 
exploitation occurs for any perceived minority for Badiou: “For every new identity there is a 
special magazine, for every new oppressed group a new ‘free’ radio station—in short, for every 
new subculture a new body of consumers.”789 
 
                                                      
787 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. xiii. 
788 Marc Bain, “Nike’s Kaepernick ad is what happens when capitalism and activism collide,” Quartz. 29 September 
2018. Accessed: 1 October 2018. https://qz.com/1400583/modern-corporate-social-activism-looks-like-nikes-
kaepernick-ad/   
789 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 154. 
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Although not the first intervention (considering Jacob Taubes’ posthumously published study 
on the apostle Paul which had already appeared in 1993)790 Badiou’s contribution to the 
unexpected ‘turn to Paul’ appeared both innovative and persuasive. In Saint Paul: The 
Foundation of Universalism (1997),791 Badiou, an avowed atheist with no interest in the religious 
value of Paul whatsoever, finds the perfect ‘revolutionary prototype’ capable of breaking out 
of the deadlock of contemporary politics. Paul’s significance lies in his articulation of a 
‘universal singularity:’ a proclamation of truth (the risen Christ) available to all individual 
subjects, but without the predicate of this or that community (neither Jew nor Gentile, master 
or slave, male or female). On the one hand, a subject’s new identity which is now expressed in 
‘fidelity’ to this revolutionary event marks a radical break with the legal and economic 
abstractions of capitalism (for Paul, the Roman Empire), and on the other hand, undermines 
restrictive identity groupings (Jewish priority based on revealed law) in the assumption of a 
more universal identity (to be a ‘Christian’).  
 
For Svenungsson, Badiou’s reading of Paul relies on a certain apocalyptic reading of the 
messianic event, reanimating “an implicit anti-Jewish dialectic that counterposes law to 
grace.”792 Despite the fact that historical scholarship has for a long while dismissed the claim 
that Paul’s radicalism is motivated by a desire to shed his Jewish faith, Badiou is nonetheless 
committed to construing the law not as an extension of grace, but as a prevention of the 
messianic event.793 For Badiou, the details of these historical debates are not his concern and, 
thus, the messianic theme in his reading of Paul is to be understood as symptomatic of the 
broader goals and patterns within his philosophy.  
 
                                                      
790 Jacob Taubes, Dana Hollander (trans.), Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann (eds.) The Political Theology of Paul 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). This work also gave particular inspiration to Agamben’s commentary 
on Paul’s letter to the Romans, first published in Italian in 2000. See Giorgio Agamben, Patricia Dailey (trans.), The 
Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Another 
important component to this resurgence of interest in Paul, was also given by Heidegger’s early 1920s lectures on 
the phenomenology of religious life published in 1995 in the sixtieth volume of the Gesamtausgabe. See 
Svenungsson’s introductory essay on the philosophical and theological significance of Heidegger’s early interest 
in Paul: “Introduction: Heidegger and Theology after the Black Notebooks” in Jayne Svenungsson and Mårtin 
Björk (eds.) Heidegger’s Black Notebooks and the Future of Theology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 1-22. 
791 Alain Badiou, Ray Brassier (trans.) Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). For a condensed outline of Badiou’s approach to Paul, see Alain Badiou, “St. Paul Founder of the 
Universal Subject” in John D. Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff (eds.) St. Paul among the Philosophers (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 27-38. 
792 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 157. 
793 Ibid., pp. 156-157. 
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In his magnum opus, Being and Event (1988),794 Badiou invokes set theory to define the 
multiplicity of singularities which constitute being. These singularities are often grouped 
together in the ‘state of the situation.’ The ‘event’ for Badiou is that which breaks the structure 
of the situation to reveal ‘the truth of the situation.’ While the event is strictly a ‘happening’ of 
truth (the ‘truth event’) which is disruptive to the present order, it still requires the subject 
(understood here not as an ‘individual’ but as the political collective, ‘the people’) to recognize 
this truth and to commit to it in fidelity. While the political tone of Badiou’s work 
unmistakably aligns with a revolutionary praxis aimed at a ‘true’ politics beyond the State, it 
would be a caricature to conclude that this discloses a simple return to Marxism.795 As 
Svenungsson points out, Badiou stays clear of dialectical materialism and the idea of the 
political being grounded on a rational or philosophical basis. Rather, “politics is about events 
that take place without originating in existing structures.” A true politics requires a subject 
and a corresponding truth-event, which is “an act by which a people declares itself a political 
subject and remains faithful to that declaration.”796 
 
Badiou’s fascination with rupture and irruption, his frequent use of terms like ‘terror,’ 
‘discipline,’ and ‘grace’— in short, the revolutionary event that reconfigures the coordinates 
of the system — leads according to Svenungsson, to a paradoxical neglect of the material in 
the ‘situated’ ethics he supposedly defends. Simon Critchley describes the context for this 
neglect of material conditions with reference to a kind of ‘formalism’ in his philosophy. That 
is, the event requires a situation (an ‘evental site’), but it does not ‘belong’ to the situation. The 
material conditions for politics are elided because they are not a sufficient condition for the 
event.797 The structure of Pauline messianism that Badiou advocates in the proclamation of 
Christ is unable to reconcile the fact that this event “is deeply rooted in the stories, traditions 
and divine promises which characterized Hellenistic Judaism.”798  
 
Invoking the critiques of Eric Marty and Daniel Bensaïd (and we can also add Critchley to this 
list), Svenungsson concludes that Badiou reduces politics to the spectacular voluntarist 
moment of the subject, where all mediating political concerns are denounced as mundane and 
                                                      
794 Alain Badiou, Oliver Feltham (trans.) Being and Event (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). For an accessible 
introduction to Badiou’s thought see his book interview with Fabian Tarby and Louise Burchill (trans.) Philosophy 
and the Event (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
795 On this point, Simon Critchley has argued that Badiou should be read as a Rousseauist rather than ‘Second 
International’ Marxism or Leninism, owing much to the influence of his teach Louis Althusser. See Critchley, Faith 
of the Faithless, pp. 26-27; 93-102. 
796 Svenungsson, Diving History, pg. 160.  
797 Critchley, Faith of the Faithless, pg. 96. 
798 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 161. 
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profane. At this point, the decisionistic element becomes apparent, as Badiou is lead 
ineluctably back to theology: “its jumble of graces, miracles, revelations, repentances, and 
pardons.”799 In a somewhat ironic gesture then, Badiou, haled for his defense of communism, 
fails the Marxist tradition by departing from it in a most fundamental respect: “where Marx 
united the dream of messianic justice with a deep respect for the complexity of material reality, 
Badiou has nowhere succeeded in connecting messianism and materialism; event and history; 
the moment of revolt and the practice that ensures the permanence of peace.”800 By contrast — 
and this is a part of Badiou’s problem, especially when seen in light of his controversial talk 
about the predicate “Jew” — in deriding philosophies of difference and conceiving them in 
substantialist terms, Badiou confuses particularism with a genuine sense of social-differential 
relations, which thinkers like Derrida are especially sensitive to. In short, Badiou’s materialist 
messianism forgets the material and “bodies disappear” in his ‘idealistic historiography.’801 
 
II. Giorgio Agamben 
 
If Badiou’s philosophy ends up negligent toward the material, then Giorgio Agamben is 
perhaps the philosopher associated with the ‘turn to Paul’ who has most occupied himself 
with matter and bodies, as evinced in the title of his famous Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life (1995).802 In his contribution to this new Pauline ‘moment,’803 The Time That Remains,804 
Agamben is also concerned with the radicality of Paul’s proclamation. Together with Badiou 
he is interested in the space created by the suspension of law where there is no longer Greek 
or Jew. But for Agamben, the significance of this suspension does not offer an abstract 
universal identity like that suggested by Badiou, but rather, a more complex picture of identity 
that is transformed by being inscribed into a new distinction, namely, between ‘flesh’ and 
‘spirit.’805 Paul’s emphasis on being called (vocatio) to new life in the ‘spirit’ does not dissolve 
difference but radicalizes it, demonstrating that identity is always contingent. This claim, 
which would be much closer to Derrida, indicates that the essentialization of difference (the 
excess of identity politics), would itself deconstruct precisely in virtue of difference. “In a 
                                                      
799 Ibid., pg. 164, Svenungsson is quoting Bensaïd.  
800 Ibid., pg. 164. 
801 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
802 Giorgio Agamben, Daniel Heller-Roazen (trans.) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995).  
803 See John Milbank, Creston Davis, Slavoj Žižek and Catherine Pickstock, Paul’s New Moment: Continental 
Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2010).  
804 Giorgio Agamben, Patricia Dailey (trans.) The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).  
805 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 170. 
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nutshell,” Svenungsson concludes, “a good analysis of social and racial oppression” for 
Agamben, “needs more difference, not less”806 —  unlike Badiou, in the manner in which he 
treats anti-Semitism, for example.807   
 
Agamben’s difference with Badiou really comes to the fore, however, in his reading of 
messianic time, and also distinguishes itself from Derrida’s reading in the ‘Force of Law’ essay. 
Agamben avoids the apocalyptic sense of the messianic that Badiou identifies in Paul, and 
instead understands ‘the time that remains’ through a Benjaminian lens. This understanding 
of time does not view the expectation of the Messiah’s return in the ‘vulgarity’ of chronological 
time, but rather, in a way quite similar to Derrida, considers it as another modality of time that 
transforms from within. However, as Svenungsson rightly points out, Agamben presents this 
argument along a line that re-establishes a polarization between law and grace.  
 
Recalling Schmitt for a moment, with whom Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ is in 
conversation, Schmitt attempted in Political Theology to locate the state of exception within the 
juridical order. This paradox of ‘lawless violence’ or ‘mythic violence’ where the boundary 
between law and violence becomes indistinguishable, is symptomatic of what Agamben 
famously asserted in his analysis of Schmitt, namely, that the state of exception now “tends to 
increasingly appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics.”808 In 
his polemic with Schmitt, Benjamin’s response to this tendency results in repeated returns to 
the messianic notion of ‘divine’ or ‘pure revolutionary violence,’809 residing outside of the law 
precisely in order to abolish it. This challenge to law, for Agamben, is not understood as a 
move toward anarchy or ‘lawlessness’ but rather to ‘another use of law’ — a ‘higher justice.’810 
And it is here that Agamben identifies Paul as a prototypical figure, because Paul sees that the 
only way to escape the predicament of law and sin (Rom. 7:7-8) is through Christ, who calls 
us not abolish the moral life (law of works) but to a higher law, the ‘law of faith’ (grace). 
                                                      
806 Ibid., pg. 171.  
807 See Alain Badiou, Steve Corcoran (trans.) “Uses of the Word Jew” in Polemics (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 155-
254. 
808 Giorgio Agamben, Kevin Attell (trans.) State of Exception (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), pg. 2; pp. 
11-22. 
809 For example, in ‘Critique of Violence’ published in 1921, Benjamin writes, “But if the existence of violence 
outside the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes the proof that revolutionary violence, the 
highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and by what means.” See Walter Benjamin, 
Edmund Jephcott (trans.) “Critique of Violence” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1978), pp. 277-300; pg. 300. And later in his Theses on history, he refers to the task of 
bringing about a more radical ‘state of exception’, a “real state of emergency” in order to “improve our position in 
the struggle against Fascism.” See Walter Benjamin, Harry Zohn (trans.) “Theses On The Philosophy of History” 
in Illuminations (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), pg. 257. 
810 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 175. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  209 
Svenungsson admits that Agamben does present a complex picture of Paul’s relationship with 
the law, but his reading “nonetheless results in a polarizing schema in which law — in the 
sense of regulations, decrees and acts — is counterposed to a general promise of justice that 
lies hidden within law itself. Ultimately, the true purpose of the law seems to be to dissolve 
itself in its positive form.”811  
 
This approach to law has been confirmed by Simon Critchley in what he calls a ‘crypto-
Marcionism’ in contemporary readings of Paul.812 He specifically identifies Agamben and 
Badiou (as well as Heidegger) as a part of this ‘ultra-Paulinism.’ For Critchley, Agamben’s 
flirtations with the antinomian elements of Paul serve only to radicalize the ‘distinction 
between law and life,’ where the latter must be identified with the ‘Messianic order of 
redemption.’813 But for Critchley, and therefore in agreement with Svenungsson, this in fact is 
Maricionism and not Paul.814 For Agamben following Benjamin, the zealous quest for ‘purity’ 
outside the law (‘pure’ right, ‘pure’ language and ‘pure’ violence)815 leaves neither the space 
for law to be constituted as a good in itself, nor even for a consideration of the progressive 
legal-judicial developments that have taken place in the twentieth century.816 This is why in 
Svenungsson’s analysis, which accords with our own discussion above, Derrida’s reading in 
‘Force of Law’ is preferable. As in the first part of ‘Force of Law’ where there is a structural 
undecidability between law and justice, and thus no ‘pure’ realm of justice, in the second part, 
which deals with Benjamin, there can be no ‘pure divine’ violence beyond the implied violence 
of founding and preservation of law. To use Benjamin’s language, Derrida would say that we 
cannot ultimately distinguish between ‘mythic’ and ‘divine’ violence.817 
 
III. Slavoj Žižek 
 
Both Badiou and Agamben’s philosophical approaches converge in a bipartite view of the 
messianic: a suspension of the law to make way for universalism and a higher law beyond 
law. For the last figure in Svenungsson’s analysis, Slavoj Žižek, what both these thinkers fail 
                                                      
811 Ibid., pg. 176. 
812 Critchley, Faith of the faithless, pp. 195-202.  
813 Ibid., pg. 200. 
814 For Critchley, the law is essential to faith for Paul, for without it there would be no knowledge of sin, and 
therefore freedom would mean nothing. Ibid., pp. 203-206.   
815 Agamben, State of Exception, pg. 88: “We will have then before us a ‘pure’ right, in the sense in which Benjamin 
speaks of a ‘pure’ language and a ‘pure’ violence. To a word that does not bind, that neither commands nor 
prohibits anything, but says only itself, would correspond an action as pure means, which shows only itself, 
without any relation to an end.” 
816 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 177.  
817 Derrida, “Force of Law”, pp. 258-298. 
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to notice is that their respective schemes (law vs. event which inaugurates the universal in 
Badiou and law vs. a ‘pure’ revolutionary violence in Agamben) do not ultimately break free 
from the binding of law. Invoking Lacanian psychoanalysis, Žižek reproaches Badiou for 
having missed Lacan’s point, “that what is illusory is the very belief that we can shake off the 
law by simply suspending it.”818 The break with law that Badiou reads in Paul is in fact the 
‘law of the break with law.’ This relation to law, which is conceived once again as a hindrance 
to a true universalism, is also assigned to Agamben, who for Žižek has internalized the ‘higher 
law’ of grace (the Lacanian ‘big Other’) into the “hyperbolic law of the superego.”819 The true 
universalism of Paul (Žižek wants to preserve this thought from Badiou) is only possible for 
Žižek when not only is the law suspended (Badiou) or counterposed to grace (Agamben), but 
also when the hyperbolic law of the superego, which both these positions represent, is itself 
rejected or negated. In short, a radical break with law requires another break, a double 
negation that is accomplished through Žižek’s dialectical-Hegelian reading of Christianity.820  
 
Žižek’s ‘Hegelian trope’ reveals a movement away from the messianic (the anti-dialectic) seen 
in Badiou and Agamben, to the pneumatic or spirit: from a bipartite to a tripartite structure 
that is only preserved in the ‘perverse core’ of Christianity. God the transcendent Father 
becomes alienated from himself in Christ’s abandonment (the elimination of the ‘big Other’), 
followed by our alienation from God in Christ’s death (there is no ‘saving grace’, higher law, 
or hyperbolic superego). Father is sublimated into the Son, who is sublimated into Spirit.821 In 
response to what would be an immediate objection, that this Spirit is the Absolute in which all 
reality is grounded, Žižek argues that the more radical implication of the double negation is 
that the Spirit takes up its place precisely as an expression not of infinite being but of finite 
human existence, what he calls the ‘fighting collective.’822  
                                                      
818 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 180. For Žižek’s reading of Badiou see Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The 
Absent Center of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 127-170; especially his disagreement with him over 
Lacan, pp. 162-167.  
819 Svenungsson, Divining History., pg. 181.  
820 Žižek elaborates his reading in a number of texts. See for example Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and The Dwarf: The 
Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003); Slavoj Žižek, “The Fear of Four Words: A Modest 
Plea for the Hegelian Reading of Christianity” in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, Creston Davis (ed.) The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009), pp. 24-109; Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile 
Absolute or, Why is the Christian Legacy worth fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000). For a concise introduction to Žižek’s 
thought with respect to Christianity, see Adam Kotsko, Žižek and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2008). 
821 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 182. 
822 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, pg. 130. We should note here the convergence of Caputo’s position with that of 
Žižek’s notion of the fighting collective. The important difference is that even if the fighting collective (Spirit) is 
conceived as a virtuality with its status as a subjective presupposition, that is, a subjectivity in which we recognize 
ourselves but as a fiction, then Caputo would argue that these subjective presuppositions are themselves responses 
to the event. The problem with Žižek’s virtuality, for Caputo, is that it is “too much taken with subjective events.” 
Echoing Svenungsson deep concern, Caputo writes, “The event is not the decisiveness of the decision, but the insistence 
of what calls for existence in a decision, which is the decision of the other in me.”  See Caputo, The Insistence of God, pg. 
144; pp. 136-164. See also John D. Caputo, “The Perversity of the Absolute, the Perverse Core of Hegel, and the 
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Despite distancing himself from the “stereotyping formula that connects Judaism with 
reactionary particularism (the law) and Christianity with emancipatory universalism 
(grace),”823 Žižek is still adamant that Judaism is ultimately unable to enact the double 
negation. He develops a nuanced account of diaspora Judaism where he argues the universal 
impulse is already anticipated, but it is only Christianity that this is later fulfilled. The more 
pressing issue for Žižek lies in the fact that Judaism does not expose the ‘ghost’ of its silent 
God; the Jewish people remain silent and faithful adherents to an impotent God as their source 
of vitality in the diaspora. But this means the Jewish people always remain a closed 
community. Pauline Christianity, on the contrary, reveals that the true ‘child of Abraham’ is 
the Christian.824 It is through Christ’s death that the ghost is revealed — God is alienated not 
only from us, but also from himself — and thus constitutes a new identity, a new community 
of ‘chosen people.’  
 
What concerns Svenungsson and others is an emerging vision of Christian superiority and 
supersessionism that becomes apparent in Žižek’s critique of Judaism and defensive bulwark 
of the Christian legacy.825 Žižek’s attempt to locate his radical universalism in the excluded 
‘Remainder,’ echoing Badiou’s ‘universal singularity,’ also fails for Svenungsson because this 
‘remainder’ is an ‘empty figure.’ She makes this argument by observing that for Žižek, as well 
as his recent collaborator John Milbank, the truths of their respective versions of the Christian 
legacy (dialectical materialism and theological realism) are more important than the 
recognition that Christian truth inevitably takes on different meanings in different contexts. 
What this means for Svenungsson’s reading of Žižek is that he has reduced Christianity — or 
for him its political significance (the source of an emancipatory universalist project located in 
                                                      
Possibility of Radical Theology” in Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett and Creston Davis (eds.) Hegel and the Infinite: 
Religion Politics and Dialectic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 47-66; pp. 56-58. And also, Katherine 
Sarah Moody, Radical Theology and Emerging Christianity: Deconstruction, Materialism and Religious Practices 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2015) where she clarifies the similarities and differences between Caputo and Žižek. See pp. 
67-75 for Žižek’s misreading of Caputo and pp. 79-82 for their differences.  
823 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 183. 
824 Ibid. Svenungsson references Žižek’s contrast of Job and Christ in their respective encounters with the silent 
God. The difference between them is that in the story of Job, the alienated relationship with God is finally accepted 
(there is no ‘big Other’), while for the crucified Christ, the son of God not only accepts God’s silence, but in his 
death alienates God from himself. There is neither the ‘big Other’, nor the ‘spectral narrative’ of God’s impotence 
that the Jewish community secretly remains faithful to. Christianity exposes this secret. Žižek, The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, pg. 127. See also Kotsko, Žižek and Theology, pp. 88-96, where he traces the development of Žižek’s thinking 
of Judaism.  
825 Svenungsson, Divining History, pp. 184-186. See also, Ola Sigurdson, Theology and Marxism in Eagleton and Žižek: 
A Conspiracy of Hope (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 104-107. It is also in light of this saving of the 
Christian legacy, as the only way in which to counter the sinister logic of capitalism and secular modernity, that 
the unexpected alliance Žižek’s dialectical materialism and the theological realism of Radical Orthodoxy is to be 
understood. This encounter can be followed in Creston Davis (ed.), The Monstrosity of Christ.  
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that which has been excluded from this universality) — to a principal that ignores the very 
subjects of ‘the Remainder.’ Svenungsson resolves by concluding: 
 
Had he [Žižek] instead taken an interest in the real subjects of ‘the 
Remainder’ — people of differing cultural backgrounds with potentially 
conflicting ideological, political and religious conceptions of freedom and 
justice — he would have been forced to concede the complexity and 
nuance that necessarily characterizes any responsible discussion of 
universal emancipation.826 
 
In a similar way to Badiou, then, Žižek’s dialectical materialism ends up eliding the very 
material it purports to emancipate. He “may be full of revolutionary pathos,” Svenungsson 
notes, “but disappointment awaits any reader of Žižek’s writings looking for substantial 
reflection upon the concrete conditions of possibility for the revolutionary project.”827 
Mediations of this kind are doomed to fail, as he argues in his polemic with Simon Critchley, 
because the revolutionary event occurs in an ‘absolute present.’ The absolute present is not the 
pseudo-activity of reactive liberal politics, but something more like Benjaminian ‘divine 
violence’.828  But as Critchley argues, Žižek wants to have his cake and eat too. On the one 
hand, the lack of concrete (material) interventions in Žižek’s philosophy — what he calls 
‘subtractive politics’ — are due to his conviction that any such interventions are immediately 
locked into ideological fantasy and, thus, we are to be like Melville’s passive Bartleby — do 
nothing, ‘I would prefer not to.’829 On the other hand, we must dream of divine violence, “a 
cataclysmic, purifying violence of the sovereign ethical deed.”830 Hence, with a teasing tone, 
Critchley writes, “For Žižek is, I think, a Slovenian Hamlet: utterly paralyzed but dreaming of 
an avenging act for which, finally, he lacks the courage.”831 
 
Svenungsson’s analysis of Žižek concludes by re-emphasizing the tripartite Hegelian structure 
that governs the ‘spirit’ motif in the background of his work. This motif, which does not 
represent a higher Aufhebung, is rather the tension between the passivity of the ‘not to do’ and 
the ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’ — a vision of politics not outside of the State 
(Badiou and Agamben) but one that recaptures it. As mentioned, this revolutionary violence 
                                                      
826 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 187. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Critchley, Faith of the Faithless, pp. 210-213. 
829 Ibid., pg. 212. 
830 Ibid. 
831 Ibid., pp. 212-213. 
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is supposed to be articulated from ‘the Remainder,’ with the precondition that it renders 
invisible the very subjects it represents in order guarantee its universal potential. With this 
conclusion, Svenungsson brings together what worries her about all three of these figures, 
namely, that in their effort to break with contemporary liberal and day-to-day democratic 
politics they end up concealing a desire for ‘pure violence’, ‘the moment’ and ‘decision’. 
Referring to Karl Löwith’s essay published in 1935, “The Occasional Decisionism of Carl 
Schmitt,” Svenungsson identifies a structural parallel with these thinkers and Schmitt’s 
‘decision.’ While with differing political goals in mind, these thinkers are all united in resisting 
stultifying politics and, thus, along with Schmitt do not attribute any “progressive force to 
existing judicial and political structures.”832 And so Schmitt’s political theology re-emerges as 
evidenced by the expressly theological language these thinkers deploy: we might say a quasi-
renaissance of the ‘politics of presence,’ or a “quasi-theologically legitimated worship of the 
present and the moment.”833 The question this study is pressing to answer is whether one can 
move beyond this Schmittian political theology? And if so, what would such a ‘beyond’ look 
like or entail? The thesis being pursued here is that Caputo’s theopoetics constitutes the 
discursive site of a radical political theology that circumvents these extra-theological forces. 
 
IV. The Theopoetics Of Radical Political Theology 
 
In the first section of this chapter we discussed Derrida’s proximity to Carl Schmitt and 
elaborated his deconstruction of sovereignty. That analysis concluded with the dream or 
promise of a sovereignty without sovereignty as a condition of a ‘god to come’ and thus a 
‘radical political theology.’ The latter entailed the consideration that Derrida’s later work 
began to point toward a growing emphasis on the political and ‘the material,’ as seen in his 
notion of ‘autoimmunity.’ This concern, which would underpin a radical political theology, 
raised the question of other broadly (quasi) theological attempts to ‘materialize’ the event in 
contemporary philosophy. Through a reading of Badiou, Agamben and Žižek, assisted 
predominantly by the analysis of Jayne Svenungsson, Schmitt’s shadow was shown to be cast 
over their respective projects in their effort to break with the chronic ossification of liberal 
democratic politics. In various ways, they disclose a ‘desire for presence’ through 
authoritarian and exclusivist gestures, which not only jeopardizes the successes of progressive 
democratic political-legal reform but also at the expense of the particular or material.  
                                                      
832 Svenungsson, Divining History, pg. 193. 
833 Ibid., pg. 195.  
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If these thinkers chastise Derrida and ‘postmodern thought’ as forever entrapped in deferral 
of the ‘democracy to come,’ then their own solutions combined with the rejection of 
democracy as such, don’t elicit much confidence. Their theological materialism, in this sense, 
is not material enough, for it cares very little for the particularities that democracy aims to 
protect. The question can now be asked, whether John Caputo’s radical theology offers a less 
hostile alternative to the injustices that democracy does indeed continue to perpetuate, and 
furthermore, if this alternative does not also lapse into a neglect for the material. In what 
follows, it is argued that Caputo’s later radical theology does, or at least makes significant steps 
toward, accomplishing this goal through his re-worked or re-casted notion of theopoetics.  
 
The basic argument is that Caputo’s later work evinces a ‘turn to the material’ or what 
Katherine Moody has called, Caputo’s ‘hyper-realist materialism.’834 This turn is not so much 
a revision of his early theological production but rather a reformulation that seeks to 
reemphasize a radical theology deeply invested in particular empirical reality all the while 
not lapsing into empiricism. The key conceptual development in this ‘turn’ is the pre-
methodological hermeneutics of theopoetics. If theopoetics forms the hermeneutical reference 
point for Caputo’s radical theology, then it is via this hermeneutic that we can return to the 
notion of sovereignty. As will be argued, a re-casted theopoetics, which receives further 
elaboration in The Insistence of God, renders the possibility of what Derrida calls a ‘poetic 
revolution’ of sovereignty — an ‘event of sovereignty’ — and therefore inaugurates a 
‘political-poetic revolution,’ which finally points us toward a truly ‘radical political theology.’  
 
I. The ‘Poetics’ of Theo-poetics 
 
Behind Caputo’s ‘weak’ theology in Weakness of God is what he calls a ‘theo-poetics of the 
event’835 or a ‘poetics of the impossible.’836 Theo-poetics is the attempt to ‘speak’ about the 
event that is unfolding in the name of God, or better, “the evocative discourse that articulates 
the event.”837 It is what Johann Meylahn calls, “God-talk after the death of God.”838 But 
                                                      
834 Moody, Radical Theology and Emerging Christianity, pg. 27. See, pp. 93-104 for Moody’s account of Caputo’s 
‘hyper-realist materialism,’ which is congenial to this study. 
835 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 74.  
836 Ibid., pp. 102-109.  
837 Ibid., pg. 103.  
838 See Johann-Albrecht Meylahn, The limits and possibilities of post-metaphysical God-talk: A conversation between 
Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida, Studies in Philosophical Theology 52 (Leuven: Peeters, 2013).  
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whither this turn to ‘poetics’ (poiesis)? Perhaps a brief word is required on this ancient ‘other’ 
of philosophy and its reception in modernity.  
 
It is well known that since Plato’s tenth book of the Republic, the poets (the imitators and 
sophists) have been construed as the enemies of virtue unfit for Socrates’ city and, therefore, 
banished for being the purveyors of images, imitations, and appeals to the baser emotions that 
confound the search for truth, knowledge, and ethical wisdom. Poetry is philosophy’s other; 
the Platonic distinction between reality and appearance variously repeated all the way down 
into the history of the metaphysics, epistemology and ontology of Western thought — what 
Socrates called the ‘ancient quarrel.’ But is it not also true that Socrates had regretted this 
banishment, inviting the poets back to the city?  
 
Then let this be our defense — now that we’ve returned to the topic of 
poetry — that, in view of its nature, we had reason to banish it from the 
city earlier, for our argument compelled us to do so. But in case we are 
charged with a certain harshness and lack of sophistication, let’s also tell 
poetry that there is an ancient quarrel between it and philosophy…if the 
poetry that aims at pleasure and limitation has any argument to bring 
forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at 
least should admit it, for we are aware of the charm it exercises.839 
 
The re-admission of poetry back into ‘the city’ has been the pre-occupation of much twentieth 
century philosophy. Influentially, Martin Heidegger argued that the Platonic model of what it 
means ‘to be’ that plagues Western thought, led to the forgetfulness of being as such and 
consequently dispensed a ‘technological’ and ‘functionalist’ view of ourselves and the 
world.840 Against the Platonic technological tradition, he argued for a return to poetry.841 If 
Being, he writes, “as the element of thinking, is abandoned by the technical interpretation of 
thinking” and it’s ‘Occidental logic’ sanctions this interpretation, then “the liberation of 
language from grammar into a more original essential framework is reserved for thought and 
poetic creation.”842 The poem (Trakl’s A Winter Evening, in this case) is ‘pure speaking’ for 
                                                      
839 Plato, G.M. Grubbe (trans.), rev. C.D.C Reeve, “Republic” in John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (eds.) Plato: 
The Complete Works (Indiana: Hackett, 1997), pg. 607b.  
840 See Martin Heidegger, William Lovitt (trans.), “The Question Concerning Technology” in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, [1954] 1977), pp. 3-35. 
841 See Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 148-168; pg. 148. 
842 See Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in David Farrell Krell (ed.) Basic Writings of Heidegger (New York: 
Harper Collins, [1947] 1993), pp. 217-265; pp. 218, 219. Emphasis added.  
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Heidegger, it is not an utterance in the traditional understanding of language that 
communicates inner expression but rather it is language itself that ‘speaks,’ summoning into 
presence ‘thing’ and ‘world’ (the fourfold, Geviert). In the text of a poem a ‘world’ is created, 
where ‘things carry out world’ and where ‘things’ are called into nearness and given presence. 
‘World’ needs ‘things’ to ‘carry’ (gebären) it, just as ‘world’ grants ‘things’ their presence. It is 
this intimate separation between ‘world’ and ‘thing’ which is called ‘dif-ferrence’ (Ereignis).843  
 
Heidegger’s later thought, which became increasingly more mythical and entangled with 
poetic reflections, announced the ‘linguistic turn’ in continental philosophy. And it was in this 
context that the possibility of Heidegger’s ‘last God’ came to the fore.844 As discussed in 
chapter three, Heidegger’s obsession with removing the layers of conceptual and 
representational thinking in the later writings, lead him further into mysticism and the 
language of ‘letting be’ (Gelassenheit). Being is not something to be grasped but something that 
is ‘granted’ by language. “Thoughts come to us; we do not think them up. Thinking is a gift or 
a grace, an event that overtakes us, an address that is visited upon us.”845 Gift, grace, event, 
visitation — these themes in Heidegger’s later writing would attract both Catholic and 
Protestant luminaries, from Lotz to Rahner, and Bultmann to Ott, respectively. But the real 
problem was not that Heidegger was undoubtedly transferring Christian categories to Greek 
texts, and thus opening up possibilities for Christian theologians, but rather that he was 
attempting to Hellenize them in such a way so as to “decontaminate” them of their “Jewish 
and Christian impurities.”846 And so here, (theo)poetics became the essentialization of mytho-
poetics (and then mytho-theo-politics) of Greek pagan gods, which sought to eliminate the 
Hebraic myth of justice. The perverse consequence847 of which is that Heidegger’s thought 
suffers from any tangible response to suffering or vulnerable bodies.848 The text from which 
Heidegger’s gods emerged received an exclusive context, or foundational myth, instead of 
                                                      
843 See Martin Heidegger, Albert Hofstadter (trans.) “Language” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper 
Perennial, [1971] 2001), pp. 187-208. See Caputo’s discussion which has been covered in chapter to in Heidegger and 
Aquinas, pp. 147-153, as well as Meylahn, The limits and possibilities of post-metaphysical God-talk, pp. 66-75. 
844 Meylahn, The limits and possibilities of post-metaphysical God-talk, pp. 75-77. 
845 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pg. 179.  
846 Ibid., pg. 181.  
847 The perversity of this logic culminates, Caputo notes, in Heidegger’s scandalous comparison of food-industry 
Technik to the gas chambers of the Nazis. See Caputo, Against Ethics, pg. 164. 
848 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pg. 128. Moreover, “[t]he victim has no voice in the call of Being, cannot 
speak, cannot be heard…Victims have been robbed of their voice, do not have the means to register a protest on 
their own behalf about the damage that has been done to them. Victims do not make their appearance on the 
register of Being.” Ibid., pp. 144-145. See also John D. Caputo, “Thinking, Poetry and Pain” in The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 28 (1989), Supplement, pp. 155-181. 
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remaining within the unthought element (a-lethia) which grants the epoch in which Greek 
thought took place.849   
 
After Heidegger, a great many predominantly French intellectuals (from Paul Ricoeur, Gilles 
Deleuze, Philip Lacoue-Labarthe, Michel Foucault, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida), 
attempted to go further than Heidegger to avoid getting caught up in his deepening of the 
hermeneutic project. For Caputo, it was Derrida who remained most faithful to the ‘flux.’ He 
turned Heidegger’s ‘onto-hermeneutics’ — which attempted to ‘arrest the play’ of 
interpretation in the dream of a more originary ‘closeness’ and ‘belonging together’ between 
‘Man’ and ‘Being’ — on itself, viz. he allowed the ‘play of thinking’ (Spiel des Denkens) to use 
Heidegger’s own phrase, to remain in play. Poetics, in the Derridian sense, departs from the 
deep meditative theopoetics of the German Schwarzwald, to a poetics that affirms that there is 
no transcendental signified and no originary epoch of Being to which ‘man’ must be restored 
— there is only play.850  
 
If theopoetics is not a ‘meditative’ nostalgia for the great Greek Anfang, then, as illustrated in 
chapter four, poetics passes through the crucible of a ‘poetics of obligation,’ the step that 
Heidegger’s thought was incapable of making. In Caputo’s deconstructive analysis, Against 
Ethics, we learned that poeticizing a ‘hyperbolic’ ethics does not involve the poetry of Love or 
of Christian Sittlichkeit (Hegel), but points to a paradoxical poetry of the beauty of ugliness. 
Obligation comes over us in the form of the ugly Abrahamic Other to disrupt Kantian 
autonomy and the beauty of harmonia in the Hegelian family of Love.851 Thus, the 
deconstructive concern is not to renounce poetry but to ‘poeticize differently.’ In the context 
of Against Ethics, it was noted that Caputo’s poeticizing discourse — the interplay between 
heteromorphism and heteronomism — winds up rhetorically prioritizing a tragic-Nietzschean 
arc, with the effect that obligation to the other is construed as a hierarchical force that must be 
‘actively’ resisted for the sake of ‘becoming’ (Deleuze). It was suggested that the properly 
‘affirmative’ stance of poeticizing is better understood when placed in the context of the 
                                                      
849 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 22-23. 
850 “The other [interpretation], which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond 
man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics 
or of ontotheology — in other words, throughout his entire history — has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring 
foundation, the origin and end of play.” See Jacques Derrida, Alan Bass (trans.) “Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, [1978] 2001), pp. 369-370. 
851 Caputo, Against Ethics, pp. 10-12. The ‘ugly’ Abrahamic Other is a reference to Hegel’s early writings on 
Christianity, see G.W.F. Hegel, T.M. Knox (trans.) “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate” in G.W.F. Hegel, T.M. 
Knox, Early Theological Writings (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, [1971] 1996), pp. 182-301. 
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human condition as itself deconstructed, that is, not merely a question of ethics and 
judgement, but the very nature of deconstructive faith, religion and God (theos). 
 
The commitment to ‘every other as wholly other’ is the structural possibility of ‘the religious’ 
for Derrida, and thus a ‘poetics of the human condition’852 is like the cries, tears, prayers and 
passions of a certain faith. In chapter five, this faith deconstructed Christianity and the faith of 
determinable religion in favor of a ‘religion without religion.’ Taken as a repetition of the ‘non-
dogmatic doublet of dogma,’ faith becomes severed from the Truth — a blind faith where 
“faith is the only recourse for the blind.”853 We saw most forcefully via the messianic, 
apocalyptic, and the gift, that Caputo interprets deconstruction as fundamentally affirmative 
insofar as the structural inaccessibility (of the coming Messiah, the Gift, the Secret etc.) is 
precisely the condition by which faith gets underway. That is, the impossible — another name 
for God (theos), democracy, the event, messianic — is the quasi-transcendental condition for 
the possible, and it is this experience (a religious experience) which is experienced in an 
impassioned ‘productive’ way. Through prayers and tears, Derrida and Caputo call upon the 
impossible ‘to come’ just as they are called upon by the impossible to prepare for its coming. 
They are in a continual search of a “certain God,” “a God whose name [they are] constantly 
seeking.”854  
 
In Weakness of God, theopoetics follows this fundamental affirmation of the impossible 
(God/event).855 As the primary discourse which ‘articulates the event’ it has to do with a 
double gesture that begins by scandalizing the logic of theo-logy, delimiting its normative 
propositions and addressing itself to — while also being addressed by — the call of the other. 
This scandal proceeds from the implied ‘hermeneutic pre-understanding’ (the ‘hermeneutic 
situation’) of the call’s unknown provenance. The event of the name of God undergoes a 
radical phenomenological reduction (epoche) where its phenomenality resides precisely in the 
indeterminacy of the caller.856 The self-concealment of the caller (being/God) is the un-
concealment of this refusal, which is constitutive of the call as such and a “part of its positive 
                                                      
852 Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion”, pg. 38. 
853 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 311. 
854 Ibid., pg. 286. 
855 Caputo, Weakness of God, pp. 101-112. 
856 See Martin Heidegger, John Macquirre and Edward Robinson (trans.) Being and Time (London: Blackwell, [1962] 
2016), pg. 319, §57. “The peculiar indefiniteness of the caller and the impossibility of making more definite what 
this caller is, are not just nothing; they are distinctive for it in a positive way.” 
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phenomenal makeup, a positive function of its weak force, and a permanent feature of our 
anarchic and weakened theological condition.”857  
 
In its second gesture, this scandal for theology becomes the ‘symbolic space’ in which ‘the 
possibility for something life-transforming’ can take place.858 Paradigmatically, the symbolic 
space that gives life to this scandal is the “constellation of idioms, strategies, stories, 
arguments, tropes, paradigms, and metaphors” found in the New Testament narratives of the 
kingdom of God. Caputo writes of the kingdom that “the paradoxes usually take the form of 
reversals: the last shall be first; the insiders are out; sinners are preferred; the stranger is the 
neighbor; enemies are to be loved; and, as a general rule, a generally unruly rule, the 
impossible is possible.”859 The Scriptures, therefore, also undergo a reduction (epoche) in that 
they are not communicants of divine truth or the object of historical-scientific study only, but 
they are also events of a call. Truth is to be found in the poetic truth of the event which calls; 
“it wants to become true, to make itself true, to make itself come true, to be transformed into truth, 
so that its truth is a species of truth as facere veritatem.”860  
 
The kingdom of God as the site of symbolic space poeticizes the impossible not for the sake of 
aesthetic flare, but as a way to “give voice to the call that contradicts the world.”861 Importantly, 
and this point is consistently misread, the call or event, while it exceeds the world remains 
supremely concerned with the world. The reason for this is that theopoetics is not a discourse 
articulating another place or time (the ‘where’ or the ‘when’ of the event of the kingdom, for 
if it were, it would be akin to a two-worlds Augustinianism), it rather asks the question ‘how’ 
the event is to be negotiated between world and kingdom? Caputo makes this abundantly clear: 
                                                      
857 Ibid., pp. 113-116; pg. 114. Naturally, the terms ‘hermeneutics’ and ‘phenomenology’ as presented here are to 
be read through Caputo’s previous radicalization of them through Derrida in Radical Hermeneutics. For example, 
when he speaks of the ‘phenomenological reduction’ he assumes Derrida’s critique in the preface to Husserl’s “The 
Origin of Geometry,” what Caputo calls the ‘grammatological’ or ‘semiological’ reduction that renders not only 
meaning as a constituted effect, but also the self-presence of consciousness as itself an effect of the iterability of 
signs. See Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 120-152.  
858 Ibid., pg. 104.  
859 Ibid., pg. 106. 
860 Ibid., pp. 117-121; pg. 118.  
861 Ibid., pg. 107. As David Miller contends, the ‘aesthetic’ ornamentation of theological language should be rightly 
understood as ‘theopoetry’ and not as theopoetics. However, Miller seems to imply that since Caputo wants to be 
‘done with the death of God’ his nourishment of a new sense of God is theopoetry. This is, of course, to completely 
misunderstand how Caputo reads the death of God and the possibility of God as an event. A theopoetics of the 
event does not refer to “an extant religious faith or knowledge,” on the contrary, it proceeds exactly from a 
delimitation of such faith and knowledge. Caputo would broadly agree, however, with the ‘Four marks’ of 
theopoetics with which Miller concludes his article. See David L. Miller, “Theopoetry or Theopoetics,” in Cross 
Currents 60. 1 (March, 2010), pp. 6-23. See also Caputo’s footnote on Miller’s article, Insistence of God, pg. 272, fn. 4. 
See also Johann Meylahn’s discussion, which follows Miller’s, in the short step from theopoetry to theopolitics. 
Meylahn has the dangers of Heidegger’s Greek Anfang in mind as noted above. See Meylahn, The limits and 
possibilities of post-metaphysical God-talk, pp. 301-310. 
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“the logic of the world and the poetics of the kingdom do not describe two different places…or 
this world and the other one behind the clouds, except poetically, differentiating two different 
orders of signification that contend with each other in the only existing world we know.”862 
Thus, in the ‘an-archic’ kingdom of God “logic and passion, truth and justice, concepts and 
desire, strategies and prayers, astute points and mad stories,” are tensions which cannot be 
broken. The point, rather, is “to settle into and deploy them, negotiating the distance between 
them.”863  
 
Caputo advocates for a ‘hyper-realism’ — interpreted as an intensification of faith (‘existential 
magnification’) — by means of the reduction from the logos of the divine being to the 
theopoetics of the call.864 This promissory note (indeed, nothing more than just a note, and thus 
the point at which re-formulation will be required) of hyper-realism promises neither a new 
postmodern version of ‘theological realism,’865 nor an ‘anti-realism’ frolicking in the fields of 
metaphor and disseminative play without any ethical bearing. It is rather the ‘beyond real’ or 
‘not yet real’ of an urgent call/claim that is made upon us and that we pray and hope for. In 
short, theopoetics is the language given to an existential hyper-realism, an event of God. The 
name of God is ‘saved’ by not being kept ‘safe’ from the event. And in this saving is the 
impossible possibility of theopoetics, lodging “me more deeply than ever in the heated rush 
of existence, the booming, bussing confusion of everyday life, by exposing me to being’s 
restless heart, attuned to life’s expectant, open-ended momentum.”866  
 
II. The ‘Theos’ of Theo-poetics 
 
In the conclusion of this study, it will be argued that for not unrelated reasons Caputo re-
formulates his account of ‘theopoetics’ in Weakness of God to a re-casted Hegelian ‘theopoetics’ 
in the Insistence of God. He does not detract his argument in Weakness of God, but senses the 
need to recast it in light of that which calls, ‘the materiality’ of the event. Caputo has displayed 
an acute sensitivity to this tension between idealism and empiricism in deconstruction — we 
                                                      
862 Ibid. 
863 Ibid., pg. 108. 
864 Ibid., pg. 121. 
865 This is Žižek’s complaint: in Caputo’s reading of the death of God “the field is thereby open for the (re)assertion 
of the true abyss of Divinity as a Spectral Promise.” Although, as Caputo has pointed out, it seems Žižek has not 
read these passages of Weakness of God but is instead referring to his abridged version of this argument in the 
dialogue with Vattimo (After the death of God) and his book for a popular audience, On Religion. See Slavoj Žižek, 
“Dialectical clarity versus the misty conceit of paradox” in The Monstrosity of Christ, pp. 234-306; pg. 260 and 
Caputo, Insistence of God, pp. 147-154. Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 123. 
866 Ibid., pg. 121. 
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have just seen in Weakness of God this sensitivity provoking the discussion of a ‘hyper-realism.’ 
Nonetheless, a number of parallel developments, some external and others internal to his 
thought, have led to his quasi-reappraisal of the material in the Insistence of God. We attend to 
the ‘external’ developments first before remarking on the ‘internal’ developments, which have 
to do with the ‘theos’ of theo-poetics, that is, the status of determinable or indeterminable 
theology in a theology of the event.  
 
Beginning externally, then, since the late 80’s and mid-90’s when Derrida’s work was in the 
heat of its political, religious and biological overtones,867 there was a growing awareness that 
he was departing from deconstruction ‘as writing,’ by re-writing it into another ‘motor 
scheme,’ as Clayton Crockett comments following Catherine Malabou.868 Alongside this broad 
shift in the way deconstruction was being written (and read) in terms of its political and 
biological significance, there came Malabou’s ground-breaking doctoral thesis on Hegel, later 
published as The Future of Hegel (1996).869 There was something of a common cause in the 
Académie française of Derrida’s generation, which could quite easily be identified as an anti-
Hegelianism (among the likes of Levinas, Lyotard and Deleuze). But when Malabou’s book 
appeared with the thesis that there is an event in Hegel (she calls this ‘explosive plasticity,’ 
that which has the capacity to give and receive form), along with Derrida’s more sympathetic 
tone toward Hegel in the preface — although ultimately still weary of ‘Hegel’s future’ — there 
was a discernable sea-change.870  
 
Coinciding with the latter was a general mood that the textual focus of hermeneutic 
philosophy was drawing its limits and that a more ‘material’ or ‘carnal’ approach was 
necessary. The recently edited volume by Richard Kearney and Brian Treanor, Carnal 
Hermeneutics (2015), is emblematic in this regard. In his opening essay, Kearney remarks with 
reference to the orientations of Gadamer, Riceour and Derrida, that “hermeneutics 
increasingly engaged with structural linguistics and deconstruction.” And that “textuality 
                                                      
867 We refer the reader again to the works of Clayton Crockett and Michael Naas, who have taken up the task of 
consolidating Derrida’s continued significance: see Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing (2018), and Naas, 
Derrida From Now On (2008).   
868 Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing, pp. 1-2. 
869 Catherine Malabou, Lisabeth During (trans.) The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialect (London: 
Routledge, [1996] 2005). 
870 See Jacques Derrida, Joseph D. Cohen (trans.) “A time for farewells: Heidegger (read by) Hegel (read by) 
Malabou” in Ibid., pp. vii-xlvii. For recent comments made in this vein, see the interview with Creston Davis, 
“zizek, hegelian theology after lacan, and philosophical crisis”, interviewed by Richard Marshall. 3:AM Magazine, 
28 Sep 2018. Accessed at: https://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/zizek-hegelian-theology-after-lacan-and-
philosophical-crisis/ 
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swallowed the body and turned it into écriture.”871 Despite the fact that hermeneutics never 
ceased to be phenomenological, Kearney continues, “there is no denying the linguistic turn to 
the text was often construed as a turning away from the flesh —in practice if not in principle.”872 
Since hermeneutics is not just about text but also about body, and therefore body is about text, 
it is not surprising that this volume of Kearney’s emphasizes a number of phenomenological 
voices to bridge the gap between hermeneutics and phenomenology.873 In accordance with this 
critique as we have seen above, a first wave of materialist projects which deride the 
postmodern as a flaccid play of signifiers (Žižek and Badiou), also signaled a new second wave 
of materialism. Largely in the wake of Badiou, this wave turns away from phenomenology to 
a new ‘Speculative Realism’ or ‘New Materialism,’ as it is also sometimes called. This 
movement is spear-headed by Quentin Meillassoux and a cluster of thinkers associated with 
‘Object Orientated Ontology.’874 
 
Through the combination of these external movements in continental philosophy along with 
tensions ‘internal’ to Caputo’s own work after Weakness of God, it cannot be denied that 
Insistence of God can be partially read as a response to these conditions.875 Before turning to the 
actual discussions Caputo takes up in this text, some internal debates that have occurred in 
the intervening years since Weakness of God are also worth mentioning, since they too have 
contributed to his revised notion of theopoetics. In this respect, a volume of essays emerged 
titled Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion (2012), which seems to have its finger 
on the pulse of concerns being raised here.876 The essence of this volume’s critique has to do 
with the il/logic of the sans discussed in chapter four, or the problem of the ‘with’ that Joeri 
                                                      
871 See Richard Kearney and Brian Treanor (eds.) Carnal Hermeneutics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 
pg. 16.  
872 Ibid., pg. 17. Original emphasis.  
873 In this context, it is also telling that one of Derrida’s last published books, On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy (2000), 
returns to the thought of Nancy and the tradition of touch since Aristotle as a whole, and which includes Derrida’s 
own relationship with phenomenology and the material. See Jacques Derrida, Christine Irizarry (trans.) On 
Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, [2000] 2005). This book was much anticipated since 
its genesis as an article, which first appeared in English a year after the French version in 1992. See Jacques Derrida, 
Peggy Kamuf (trans.) “Le toucher” in Paragraph 16. 2 (1993), pp. 122-157. For a comprehensive review of this book 
see Michael Naas, “In and Out of Touch: Derrida’s ‘Le toucher’” in Research in Phenomenology 31 (2001), pp. 258-
265. 
874 See John D. Caputo, “Continental Philosophy of Religion: Then, Now, and Tomorrow” in Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 26. 2 (2012), pp. 1-24; pp. 15-16. See Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier (trans.) After Finitude: An Essay 
on the Necessity of Contingency (London: Continuum, [2006] 2008). See Crockett’s discussion of this movement in 
relation to Derrida: Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing, pp. 74-92.  
875 Although we will not attend to all these discussions below, we can note here that The Insistence of God contains 
extended engagements with many thinkers of this ‘materialist turn,’ (including, Catherine Malabou, Slavoj Žižek 
and Quentin Meillassoux) revealing at least the pressing nature of their concerns on his thought.  
876 See J. Aaron Simmons and Stephen Minister (eds.) Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion: Toward 
A Religion With Religion (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2012).   
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Schrijvers has also recently commented on.877 Schrijvers’ unease echoes that of the contribution 
made by Stephen Minister in the above volume, who says that “[m]y primary concern is not 
that ‘religion without religion’ is a bad idea, but that Caputo’s ‘religion without religion’ seems 
to emphasize the ‘without’ more than the ‘religion.’878 Similarly, Schrijvers 
phenomenologically informed criticism over the status of the material is also evident in this 
announcement found in his recent book, Between Faith and Belief (2016):  
 
When I state that Caputo’s stress on the movement of the event, of the how 
of the infinition, is a bit of a stretch, I mean that this movement of the 
‘beyond’ in Caputo sometimes seems to occur at the expense of finite 
historical constructions in which it nevertheless takes place. This is not to 
say that there is a disdain for the empirical in Caputo, but surely there is 
somewhat of a neglect of factical being-in-the-world.879  
 
Caputo’s response to these and other objections are published at the end of Reexamining 
Deconstruction, over eighty pages which recount his approach to hermeneutics and radical 
theology and which foreground a number of points revisited in The Insistence of God. The critics 
in this volume wonder if Caputo’s ‘religion without religion’ does not countersign any truth in 
religious traditions. For Caputo, this is a category mistake because it treats religious truth as a 
propositional, where for him religious truth is found in the response these traditions make to 
                                                      
877 The problem of the ‘with’ is not altogether a recent development, but rather a re-surfacing in light of Caputo’s 
move to a more theological register. Clarifying this issue is precisely the goal of an earlier volume of essays that 
was reflecting on Caputo’s religious reading of Derrida: see James H. Olthuis (ed.) Religion With/Out Religion: The 
Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo (London: Routlege, 2002), particularly David Goicoechea’s essay “Caputo’s 
Derrida,” pp. 80-95 and Caputo’s response, “Hoping in hope, hoping against hope: a response,” pp. 120-149. See 
also Kevin Hart’s reservations about the ‘without’ in his essay “Without” in Marko Zlomislić and Neal DeRoo 
(eds.) Cross and Khôra: Deconstruction and Christianity in the work of John D. Caputo (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 
2010.), pp. 80-108. Another reason why this debate is not altogether new is because, in fact, it goes back to the claim 
made by Radical Orthodoxy that Derrida’s deconstruction promotes an ontology of violence which ‘denigrates the 
particular.’ See James K.A. Smith, “The Logic of Incarnation: Towards a Catholic Postmodernism” in Neal DeRoo 
and Brian Lightbody (eds.) The Logic of the Incarnation: James K.A. Smith’s Critique of Postmodern Religion (Eugene, 
Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2009), pp. 8-9; and John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pg. 311.   
878 Ibid., pg. 77.  
879 See Joeri Schrijvers, Between Faith and Belief: Toward A Contemporary Phenomenology of Religious Life (New York: 
SUNY Press, 2016), pg. 162. It is important to note that Schrijvers’ criticism of Caputo is somewhat narrowly 
construed. It makes no reference to Insistence of God, and predominantly draws on the essay at the end of 
Reexamining Deconstruction: see John D. Caputo, “On Not Settling for an Abridged Edition of Postmodernism: 
Radical Hermeneutics as Radical Theology” in Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion, pp. 271-353. 
Justin Sands concurs with this narrow reading of Caputo as well as some of the other authors treated in this 
volume. See Justin Sands, Review of “Between Faith and Belief: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of 
Religious Life” in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2018), pp. 118-122. Parenthetically, Caputo’s essay 
is probably the closest abridged version of his thought to date and contains a number of fascinating biographical 
kernels, which, as far as this author is aware, were previously not in print. For example, defending himself against 
Simmons assertion that he does not take propositional truth seriously, he speaks of his most earliest intellectual 
development as a student under the mathematical logician, Hugues Leblanc, a former student of the analytic 
philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine at Harvard, pg. 394, fn. 6. 
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the ‘truth of the event.’880 In making these claims, the contributors are worried that Caputo’s 
theology of the event is ‘too thin’ and leaves no room for determinate forms of Christianity. 
Since these positions argue from the point of view of determinate faith (largely evangelical), 
which they agree should be delimited and made contingent (on Postmodern-Kantian 
grounds), they end up misconstruing Derrida’s distinction between belief (croyance) and faith 
(foi), that is, the distinction between theism and atheism. Caputo’s religious reading of Derrida 
is precisely the affirmative disturbance of this distinction. He does not deny religious 
traditions — we are always inevitably caught up in a certain ‘world-disclosure’ (croyance) — 
but his point is that these disclosures are not themselves the deposits of religious truth, they 
are historical effects of a “deeper, more elusive, more uncertain and unsafe ‘faith’ (foi).”881 The 
real ‘problem’ seems to be at the level of discourse and a certain ‘whimsy’ in Caputo’s 
language of theopoetics. Consider the following formulations in Weakness of God:  
 
A logic addresses real or possible occurrences in the world, while a poetics 
addresses the event of being addressed, not by what actually is but by 
what is promising.882 
 
And a few pages later,  
 
the logic of the world is a calculus, an economy, a heartless system of 
accounting or of balanced payments, where scores are always being 
settled. In the logic of the world, nothing is for free and nobody gets off 
scot-free. By the same token, in the logic of the world, everything is for 
sale, everything has a price, and nothing is sacred.883 
 
In these quotations, there is a sense of opposition between world and kingdom, another binary 
in which the world seems to come out second best. However, one only needs to read but a few 
lines further in both cases to see that Caputo does not mean to denigrate the world, “they 
[world and kingdom] do not describe two different places…they describe, not two different 
‘wheres,’ but two different ‘hows,’ whose differences must be negotiated in the one and only 
world we know.”884 Indeed, the second part of Weakness of God is an entire attempt to engage 
the ‘world-disclosure’ of the New Testament in order to ‘feel’ for the events that are contained 
                                                      
880 Caputo, “On Not Settling,” pp. 277-278. 
881 Ibid., pg. 275. 
882 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 103. 
883 Ibid., pg. 107. 
884 Ibid.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  225 
in these extraordinary narratives. The criticism of the without or sans in Caputo’s religion, 
supposedly at the expense of material factical being-in-the-world, is at root a misreading of 
what Caputo calls the ‘second order discourse’ of theopoetics or ‘weak theology.’ The second 
order discourse of theopoetics seemingly does not take into account the fact that “the first 
order discourse of confessional theologies inevitably forms, informs, and deforms the second-
order discourse.”885 In making this claim, these critics treat Caputo’s theology of event not as 
a ‘how’ of religious discourse, but as the nihilistic inversion of metaphysical Augustinianism 
— a ‘what’ of religious discourse that is without any content.  Caputo then introduces a third 
order of discourse to clear this confusion. The first order we have mentioned is the level of 
‘what-discourse’ we see in determinate religion, the second is the ‘meta-discursive’ theory of 
deconstruction in Prayers and Tears (the ‘how’), and the third, which is taking place in Weakness 
of God, is a different kind of ‘what’, that is, a ‘constructive’ repetition of Christianity; ‘doing 
deconstruction’ and ‘doing theopoetics.’886 Caputo even goes as far as calling this ‘constructive 
theology’ — but with scare quotes. It is the mutual intertwining of the constructive phases of a 
‘theopoetics’ and the dominant first order theology which is lost on these critics. But this 
confusion we are suggesting is also a product of a residual Kantian version of postmodernism 
still evident in Weakness of God. 
 
Indeed, how else does one explain Caputo’s open admission that he will shock his friends “by 
declaring [himself] a born-again Hegelian.”887 His reason for this, he writes, “the event is an 
event of truth. The insistence of the event may also be called its insistent ‘truth’…It is at this 
point—truth—that I call upon the approach to religion and religious truth taken by Hegel.”888 
                                                      
885 Caputo, “On Not Settling,” pg. 286. On this point, Caputo has even criticized Derrida, namely, that the ‘pure 
messianic’ must almost always be another messianism Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pp. 139-143. Caputo uses 
Heidegger’s notion of the ‘formal indication’ to move beyond the universal vs. particular impasse. See the 
discussion of the messianic-messianism distinction in chapter five, section II. 
886 Caputo, “On Not Settling,” pp. 304-306. 
887 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 87. In this line Clayton Crockett, B. Keith Putt and Jeffrey Robbins, remark in their 
introduction to The Future of Continental Philosophy of Religion, that “whereas Caputo’s phenomenological reading 
of a religion without religion took its lead from a Kantian reading of Derrida wherein faith and knowledge are 
opposed, Caputo now announces a turn from Kant to Hegel.” I do not believe that Caputo would accept the claim 
that is implied here, namely, that he understands faith and knowledge to be simply opposed. However, his turn 
to ‘heretical-Hegelianism’ is a not so subtle admission that this is the way his reading of Derrida may have been 
construed.  The turn to Hegel is partially an attempt to remedy this situation. See Clayton Crockett, B. Keith Putt 
and Jeffrey Robbins (eds.) The Future of Continental Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2014), pg. 5. It should also be noted that his reflections on Hegel which occur in a more sympathetic mode appear 
only after Weakness of God. See for example, John D. Caputo, “The Perversity of the Absolute, the Perverse Core of 
Hegel, and the Possibility of Radical Theology,” in Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett and Creston Davis (eds.) Hegel 
and the Infinite: Religion Politics and Dialectic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 47-66; John D. 
Caputo, “Is Continental Philosophy of Religion Dead?” in Clayton Crockett, B. Keith Putt and Jeffrey Robbins, 
Future of Continental Philosophy of Religion, pp. 21-33, and John D. Caputo, “Theopoetics as Heretical Hegelianism” 
in Crosscurrents 64. 4 (Dec 2014), pp. 509-534.  
888 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 87. 
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The ‘truth’ of the event, the making ‘true’ (facere veritatem) appears throughout Caputo’s 
corpus, so it is not precisely accurate that his concern here is truth per se. It is rather, the 
emphasis on the insistence of this truth which he means to foreground. For our purposes, this 
is why his move to a certain ‘heretical-Hegelianism’ is important, because it gives Caputo the 
means to articulate and recast theopoetics that bears greater fruit with respect to the 
materiality of the event, and therefore, the basis for a truly radical political theology of 
sovereignty.  
 
III. The Three Pills of Theopoetics 
 
The aim of the first of these two final sections, will be to account for the repetition of 
theopoetics occurring in The Insistence of God. By observing this repetition, we at the same time 
offer ‘three pills’ of theopoetics,889 which constitute the hermeneutical status and thus 
‘systematic’ contribution of a radical theology for this study. In the second section, by way of 
conclusion, we connect this pharmaceutical itinerary of theopoetics to the ‘poetic revolution’ 
suggested by Derrida’s reading of Paul Celan in The Beast and The Sovereign. This poetic 
revolution, which is found in the context of a political revolution (the French revolution), 
moves ‘beyond or outside political majesty,’ beyond the classic sovereign, and thus 
inaugurates a ‘second revolution’; a radical-political-theological revolution of sovereignty. 
What follows below, therefore, will affirm the thesis set out at the beginning of this study, 
namely, that the theopoetics of Caputo’s radical theology provides the discursive resources with 
which to re-conceive the sovereignty of God as well as the discourse which mediates it. As we 
will see, the three pills of theopoetics, however, will not be a ‘program to be followed,’ because 
a part of what constitutes radical theology’s theopoetics is precisely the resistance to such 
programmability.   
 
1.  God 
 
In The Insistence of God, Caputo opens with a ‘theology of perhaps’. The language of perhaps 
(peut-être) borrowed from Derrida can also be translated as ‘may-be,’ and thus could signal a 
version of a ‘God who may be.’890 However, Caputo is quick to clarify that ‘perhaps’ is almost 
                                                      
889 Ibid., pg. 19. We are directly following Caputo’s scheme of the ‘three pills,’ as he calls them, which in fact 
structure the book’s three-part divisions. However, our focus in the context of this chapter will be to pay attention 
to the revisions that take place after Weakness of God and which are directed into a discourse of deconstructive 
materialism.  
890 The echo here is that of Richard Kearney. See, Richard Kearney, The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion 
(Bloomington: Indiana, 2001); and Caputo’s critical distinction of his own project from Kearney’s: John D. Caputo, 
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exactly interchangeable with his notion of the ‘event’ developed in Weakness of God.891 “My 
‘perhaps,’ ‘maybe,’ peut-être cuts deeply into the name of God so much that the name (of) ‘God’ 
takes place in the very element of the peut-être itself, of the ‘event’ of the promise which is no 
less a threat, of the maybe which is also maybe not.”892  This very slight semantic shift to “the 
very being of may-being, the very être of the peut-être,”893 allows Caputo to draw his theology 
away from a potentially too sublime alterity of the event. This is why he can now write, “[t]o 
think ‘perhaps’ is to follow the tracks of a more radical possibilizing of the weak force.”894 The 
shift is subtle and almost unrecognizable, since the perhaps remains inscribed in khôral 
difference,895 but the effect creates a closer ‘proximity’ to materiality that was previously 
missing in Weakness of God.  
 
Evidence of this (and also the first pill of a radical theology) is the increasing prominence 
placed on the intertwining (chiasmic) relationship between existence and insistence, and 
therefore, on human responsibility, hospitality, and the material.896 While insistence is like the 
call of the event of an unidentifiable caller, where a response is only truly responsible when it 
is enacted not by coercion but by a ‘weak force,’ it is nonetheless still the case that such a 
response to insistence, the existence of insistence, can either be resisted or turn out to be a 
disaster. Existence and insistence are indissolubly linked by the tension emerging in the 
chiasmic structure.897 When Caputo says that “God needs us to be God, and we need God to 
be human,”898 he does not thereby imply a metaphysical panentheism. The bringing of the 
insistence of God into existence as the mark of human responsibility is always haunted by the 
‘perhaps’ — the possibility of the promise/threat that this existence brings.899 Proximity to 
                                                      
“God, Perhaps: The Diacritical Hermeneutics of God in the Work of Richard Kearney,” in Cynthia Willet and 
Leanord Lawlor (eds.) “Philosophical Thresholds: Crossings of Life and World,” SPEP supplement, Philosophy 
Today 55 (2011), pp. 56-65.  
891 Caputo, Insistence of God, pp. 4-14. Caputo restates, almost verbatim, the same locutions from Weakness of God 
but replaces the event with perhaps. For example, the ‘weak force of the event’ becomes ‘the weak force of perhaps’ 
(pg. 4); the ‘event which haunts ontology’ becomes ‘the haunting specter of perhaps’ (pg. 5); ‘the event as the 
experience of the impossible’ becomes ‘perhaps as the experience of the impossible’ (pg. 11). 
892 Ibid., pg. 12. 
893 Ibid., pg. 13. 
894 Ibid., pg. 6. Emphasis added. 
895 Ibid., pp.12-13. 
896 Richard Kearney has also noticed this shift when he writes in conversation with Catherine Keller, “I think Jack 
(Caputo) seems to be softening the trauma of deconstructive violence in his renewed emphasis on hospitality and 
possibility in The Insistence of God.” See Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmermann (eds.) Reimagining The Sacred: 
Richard Kearney Debates God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), pg. 66. The language of insistence is 
adapted from Hélène Cixous, Derrida’s life-long friend and collaborator; see Hèlène Cixous, Peggy Kamuf (trans.) 
Insister of Jacques Derrida (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
897 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 29. Caputo is drawing on Ponty’s use of ‘chiasm.’ See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Alphonso Lingis (trans.) The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969). 
898 Caputo, The Insistence of God, pg. 14. 
899 Ibid., pp. 14-18. 
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materiality is achieved by a semiotic adjustment not by an alteration of the logic of 
deconstruction, to which Caputo remains faithful to the end.  
 
The chiasm that consists of insistence and existence in this first pill of radical theology can also 
be thought of as the postmodern prayer of theopoetics.900 Insistence is God’s call or prayer in 
the mood of the modus irrealis, “a grammatological slippage from the indicative to the 
subjunctive mood.”901 Where the irrealis does not mean ‘un-real,’ but rather a ‘non-reality’ (or 
hyper-real) restless for becoming real. Like God’s praying and calling, we pray to God by 
calling for ‘God knows what,’ responding to the call by prayer: “Our prayers are our response. 
God’s praying and our praying, God’s calling and our responding, God’s tears and ours, 
belong together, are bound together, like a problem and a solution.”902 By the time we take the 
third pill of theopoetics, this first pill — the postmodern prayer of perhaps that arises out of 
the chiasm between insistence and existence — will take on a cosmic function. In order to 
continue to soften the shock of alterity in the call’s residual Kantianism and the too subjectivist 
anthropocentricism this structure might imply, the prayer of theopoetics becomes more like a 
song or poem that is sung to the world, and thus, a still deeper religious affirmation for the 
world and its carnal materiality.903  
 
Here we already see that the subjunctive mood for Caputo, following Derrida, is a modality 
of transcendence occurring within the immanent structures of language, text, existence. This is 
not a non-realist position, but is more in accordance with what Wessel Stoker calls a 
transcendence as alterity.904 The chiasm of insistence and existence ‘tightens’ the distinction 
between the undeconstructible event which conditions the structures and strictures of 
existence. Therefore, while such a radical contingency — subjunctive/middle voice over the 
indicative/active — is interpreted as the religious ‘spirit’ of deconstruction, this does not mean 
it is a postmodern reiteration of the noumenal transcendental. Its infinity lies not “with the 
infinity of Christian Neo-Platonism but with the infinity of grammatology, the infinity of an 
in-finitive, open-ended while endlessly contracted and determined in the finitude of the 
moment.”905  
 
                                                      
900 Ibid., pp. 31-35. 
901 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
902 Ibid., pg. 31. 
903 Ibid., pp. 176-179. 
904 Wessel Stoker, “Culture and Transcendence: a typology” in Willie van der Merwe and Wessel Stoker (eds.), 
Culture and Transcendence: A Typology of Transcendence, Studies in Philosophical Theology, 50 (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 
pp. 5-30. 
905 Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion,” pg. 60. 
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Significantly, The Insistence of God does not spend time dwelling on the ‘an-archic kingdom,’ 
as was the case in the readings of the biblical narratives given in Weakness of God. However, to 
foreground the volume’s underlying problematic (the status of the material in a radical 
theology), Caputo ends the first part of Insistence of God with a radicalized reading of 
hospitality in the story of Mary and Martha taken from Luke 10:38-42. Following the cue from 
Meister Eckhart, who famously reversed the traditional reading that took Mary’s 
contemplative spirit (vita contemplativa) as superior to Martha’s mundane activity (vita activa), 
Caputo argues that Martha is emblematic for the hospitality she shows in attending to Jesus’ 
physical needs. Whereas Mary contemplates God’s insistence, Martha realizes that the 
presence of Jesus as the insistence of God requires a deed. “There is a realism and materialism 
in Martha that is missing from Mary’s beautiful immaterialism that is never made real,” 
Caputo writes, “and Jesus secretly prefers her materialism. Martha’s world is real and existing, 
while Mary’s world is world-less, free from the cares of the world, an inexistent 
worldlessness.”906  
 
In the first pill of theopoetics, then, we have a model of an ‘ethics of obligation’ similar to what 
Caputo has argued elsewhere.907 Theopoetics has to do with a radical hospitality, indeed, a 
‘hosti-pitality,’908 which means ‘the decision of the other in me,’ an always dangerous decision 
when the offering of hospitality to the stranger could turn out to be hostile. While Caputo will 
later criticize the human subjectivism that is still latent in Martha’s ‘hospitable agency,’ in 
favor of widening the scope of theopoetics material implications, what is important at this 
stage is the attention drawn to Martha’s response to the material conditions of Jesus’ carnal 
particularity. Indeed, the great scandal of Martha and the poetics of radical theology is to 
recognize Jesus fully in his carnal fleshly existence and to act in response to its finitude. The 
insistence of God which occurs in the weakness of flesh, as opposed to the phallic uprightness 
of the agent-body is the locus of the call to affirm life in all its fleshly failings.909  
 
2.  Theology 
 
If the first pill of radical theology’s theopoetics is to re-affirm or revise the responsibility and 
the material proximity involved in saying or praying ‘God, perhaps,’ then the second pill of 
                                                      
906 Ibid., pg. 45. 
907 See Caputo, Against Ethics.  
908 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 40, and Jacques Derrida, “Hostipitality,” in Acts of Religion, pp. 360-362. 
909 Ibid., pg. 46. See also Caputo’s discussion of ‘jewgreek’ bodies from which this discussion has its genesis: 
Caputo, Against Ethics, pp. 194-219.  
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theopoetics addresses the implications this will have at the meta-discursive level, at the level 
of theology as an order of discourse vis-à-vis confessional theologies. Since the latter is only 
illustrative of the effects of ‘taking the pill’ as it were, the more important consideration resides 
in the theoretical adjustments that Caputo makes in his approach to theopoetics. Here, the in-
habitation of a ‘weak theology’ that was performed in Weakness of God, is tempered by a move 
to Hegel that mounts a more robust critique of an ‘abridged postmodernism’ and its neo-
Kantian dualism. The second pill of radical theology’s theopoetics, therefore, offers a more 
enhanced or stronger ‘dosage’ of theopoetics itself. 
 
In Weakness of God, Caputo writes, “I wire the coming of the kingdom together with the in-
coming of the tout autre or the out-coming of the event in deconstruction. Then I run for cover 
to find a safe place from which to view the sparks it gives off.”910 Never short of comic imagery, 
Caputo is here describing the consequences that a ‘sacred anarchy’ of the kingdom will have 
on ‘strong’ confessional theology — it will send sparks flying! But this accustomed humor 
elides the tension between confessional theology and radical theology that must consist in the 
chiasm of existence and insistence. In short, we might ask with seriousness: to where exactly 
does Caputo run for cover? In The Insistence of God he is far less opaque, and makes the obvious 
Heideggerian point that we may only speak aus der Erfahrung of religious experience, we are 
not abstracted from our factical being-in-the-world.911 He now says in a tone markedly different 
to that found in Weakness of God, “I start with confessional theology while trying to expose it, 
to expose myself, to its own excess, to hold us all open to the event.”912 Radical theology for 
Caputo derives from confessional theology, or confessional theology ‘yields’ radical theology, 
not only when the latter repeats by distorting and deforming, but also when the former 
responds to what insists. While his ‘ultimate subject matter’ is radical theology, he says that it 
“might be more properly described as the becoming-radical of confessional theology.”913  
 
The decisive move of The Insistence of God, and of a re-casted theopoetics we are tracking here, 
is the revision Caputo makes of his reading of Hegel.914 Following Kierkegaard’s ruthless 
                                                      
910 Caputo, Weakness of God, pg. 110.  
911 Caputo, Insistence of God, pp. 59-60. 
912 Ibid., pg. 60. Consistent with the argument being made in this chapter, concerning Caputo’s self-awareness over 
the emphasis placed on the ‘without’ and the need to temper this language, he writes, “the most precise way to 
describe religion without religion is to redescribe it as religion with/out religion, inside and outside religion and to 
situate oneself on the slash between them, and the best way to describe radical theology is in terms of the becoming 
radical of confessional theology.” Ibid., pg. 96. 
913 Ibid., pg. 61; pp. 68-74.  
914 Caputo makes this concession in a footnote: “I have too often in the past been content with criticizing the part 
of Hegel that I reject. Here I work out the part of Hegel I accept and that I now realize is central to my project and 
to all radical theological work.” Ibid., pg. 274 fn. 1. 
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critique and Derrida’s reservations predominantly taken from Glas, Caputo has always been 
wary of Hegel and the totalizing nature of his system. But in The Insistence of God he ‘drops a 
bomb.’915 By returning to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1827),916 he claims to 
find the genesis of radical theology. For Caputo, Kant’s reduction of ‘rational theology’ to 
ethics and ‘revealed theology’ to superstition, is repeated in a postmodern Kantian form of 
philosophy of religion.917 It uses postmodern theory to ‘apologize’ Christianity in the face of 
modern atheistic dogmatism on the one hand, and on the other, puts it to work as an exercise 
in ‘epistemological humility,’ “not that there is no God but that we are not God.”918 To this 
extent, Caputo even concurs with the analysis made by Quentin Meillassoux,919 that this form 
of postmodern Kantian philosophy of religion is a kind of ‘soft fideism,’ content with 
surrendering its claim to metaphysical defenses of faith in exchange for an epistemologically 
limited and contingent belief in God. This is to repeat Kant’s famous statement, albeit in a 
postmodern fashion, where he says he has ‘found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to 
make room for faith.’ Our argument here is that Caputo recognizes in his own reading of 
Derrida, at least in Weakness of God, a reflection of a certain postmodern Kantianism, especially 
when the event is construed as an absolute heterology that has little purchase with existing 
forms of everyday life. He thus argues for another version of philosophy of religion that has 
its roots in Hegel.  
 
What Hegel accomplishes, according to Caputo, is a philosophy of religion that takes ‘revealed 
theology’ seriously by arguing that its truth-content should be understood as an imaginative 
and figurative Vorstellung, a theopoetics of truth that is still ‘becoming true.’ Caputo interprets 
Vorstellung as “a world-picture, a world-praxis, a world-formation, a world-creation, an event 
of poiesis, of the creative and recreative.”920 The sensuous and superstitious doctrines of 
Christianity like the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection and Ascension, are not to be 
discarded, because like art, they receive their higher form of truth in a narratival presentation 
(Vorstellung/theopoetics) and not a literal reading.921 Religion for Hegel occupies the middle 
term between art and philosophy. In religion as Vorstellung, the Concept — the Absolute as an 
                                                      
915 Crockett, Derrida After The End of Writing, pg. 105. 
916 G. W. F. Hegel, Peter C. Hodgson (ed.) Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Lectures of 1827, One Volume 
Edition (Berkley: University of California University Press, 1988). 
917 Caputo, Insistence of God, pp. 87-88; 98-103. 
918 Ibid., pg. 99. 
919 See Meillassoux, After Finitude, pp. 28-49. See also, Quentin Meillassoux, “Excerpts from L’Inexistence Divine,” 
in Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 
pp. 231-232. 
920 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 94. 
921 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
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und für sich — is getting itself re-presented in figural form on its way to full self-conscious 
thought (philosophy). In this manner, Caputo determines that Hegel has invented radical 
theology, because contrary to the traditional schema that subordinates rational 
theology/reason to revealed theology/faith, Hegel’s distinction between Vorstellung and 
Begriff is not one of region (two-worlds or realms) but a distinction in terms of ‘degree of 
clarity.’922 By the latter he means that Hegel has reduced these oppositions to the point where 
faith (revealed theology) is now a part of the process of obtaining this-worldly-meaning.  
 
According to Caputo, Hegel thinks the possibility of God after the death of God by elaborating 
the movement of Spirit within immanence. In its postmodern version, revelation as 
interruption does not occur from another world, but as the tout autre which breaks into this 
world to reveal another world: “a world disclosure, another way the world itself opens up.”923 
However, the postmodern Hegelianism Caputo is defending is read ‘heretically’ or 
‘perversely.’924 As we saw in the previous chapter, Caputo rejects the synthesis of the Absolute 
in which the truth of religious Vorstellung is on its way to total self-conscious thought, and 
which only philosophy is said to consummate. Caputo’s replaces Begriff with the event, he 
‘decapitates’ the Concept — a ‘headless Hegelianism’ he calls it — and substitutes it for the 
event that is going on in religion.  
 
The more robust form of theopoetics Caputo develops now becomes clearer in the distinction 
between the Kantian and Hegelian versions of philosophy of religion. In the former, 
theopoetics is accepted as a description of religion as Vorstellung, but only insofar as it treats 
religion (confessional theology) as historically contingent in order to keep our focus on God, 
and thus avoiding the idolatry of worshipping historical constructs. Caputo affirms this, but 
his heretical Hegelianism goes further. Religion as Vorstellung goes all the way down: “it is not 
merely the case that religion is a Vorstellung of God, but that ‘God’ too is a Vorstellung.”925 On 
this reading, Vorstellung is a theopoetics of the event. But unlike Weakness of God, theopoetics 
in this Hegelian mode is given distinct context in the material conditions (life-world, 
imaginative creation, and praxis) in which the event is getting itself called. Caputo assures that 
while this is epistemological to the extent that it draws the limits of what we can know, it is 
                                                      
922 Ibid., pg. 91. 
923 Ibid., pg. 93. 
924 See Caputo in “The Perversity of the Absolute, the Perverse Core of Hegel, and the Possibility of Radical 
Theology.” Playing off the language of Žižek, Caputo affirms the first žižekian sense of ‘perversity’ in Christianity 
as the death of the metaphysical God, and then repeats Žižek by perverting the ‘Core of Hegel,’ that is, halting the 
Absolute by treating it as an event that one cannot see coming. 
925 Ibid., pg. 102. 
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also more than epistemology and neither is it a newly raised ontology or metaphysics. This 
theopoetics is a ‘thoroughgoing post-phenomenology’ that has altered the Husserlian 
subjectivist transcendental field, and opened up a quasi-transcendental anonymity that 
accords with what Merleau-Ponty would call a ‘poetics of embodiment.’926  
 
For this second pill of theopoetics, Caputo goes on to distinguish his Hegelianism by striking 
up similarities and differences between two other notable accounts we have already 
mentioned: that of Catherine Malabou and Slavoj Žižek, and to a lesser degree, John Milbank. 
Since we have already attended to Žižek, and because Milbank appears less prominently in 
this text, we shall limit these remarks to Malabou.927 Indeed, in this regard Caputo has also 
said, “I think that continental philosophers must look to new models, to people like Catherine 
Malabou, whose work represents something genuinely continental but importantly new.”928  
 
Caputo’s position on Hegel is ultimately one of repetition, that is, Hegel can only be taken so 
far before his thought needs to be delimited. But in Malabou’s ground-breaking work, The 
Future of Hegel, she claims there is a genuine event in Hegel. Contrary to Heidegger, who thinks 
Hegel’s Spirit does not respect contingency and hence closes off the future, Malabou argues 
under the concept of ‘plasticity’ that the movement of Spirit is not ‘static’ necessitarian process, 
but rather a dynamic (Tätigkeit) activity. This is important for Malabou’s understanding of 
Hegel’s impact for theology. Through this dynamic activity, what she calls the “process of 
substance’s auto-differentiation,”929 Hegel has invented process theology and the ‘death of 
God.’ God gives himself at a distance in space and time emblematically in the figure 
(Vorstellung) of Christ and as the ‘becoming accidental of the essential.’930 Therefore, God is no 
longer alienated by atemporality, but rather is seen in the auto-transforming process of himself 
in time.  
 
What Malabou calls ‘Speculative Hermeneutics’ — which we might call her version of 
theopoetics — is the “art of interpreting historical forms of life as forms of the life of the Spirit, 
seeing how the outlines of the Absolute emerge from the materials of multiplicity and 
                                                      
926 Ibid., pp. 111-112. 
927 An earlier version of the arguments put forward in The Insistence of God concerning Malabou can be found at 
John D. Caputo, “Voir Venier: How Far Plasticity Can Be Stretched,” in Tyler Williams and Jarrod Abbott (eds.) 
“Plastique: The Dynamics of Catherine Malabou,” special issue, theory@buffalo 16 (2012), pp. 102-123. 
928 See John D. Caputo and T. Wilson Dickinson, “Education as Event: A Conversation with John D. Caputo” in 
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 12. 2 (Fall 2012), pg.41. 
929 Malabou, The Future of Hegel, pg. 54. 
930 Caputo, The Insistence of God, pg. 122. 
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contingency.”931 Through the emergence of these historical forms of life, as ‘absolute’ 
contingent events of facticity ‘within the bosom of necessity,’ facticity itself becomes necessary. 
This reminds Caputo of Heideggerian Schicksal (fate), in that we cannot question the origins of 
Being’s destiny other than what we have received and only after it has been given. This 
necessity of inherited contingency means that the future is always left open. However, it is at 
this point that Caputo will register his concerns and distinguish his own position. According 
to Caputo, if Malabou’s events appear to us contingently, taking us by surprise, this ‘evental’ 
status is ultimately undermined if we retroactively declare that they were necessary. “If 
‘eventually’ the Spirit can see these unforseeables coming, this undoes the ‘event,’” he writes. 
And “[h]owever unaccountable Hegel’s ‘perhaps,’ we know in advance that ‘perhaps’ will 
always have been enlisted in the service of ‘must be.’ Nothing in history can be protected from 
the destination of Spirit.” 932 
 
In the final analysis, Caputo follows Derrida by asking ‘how far can plasticity be stretched?’ 
How plastic, really, is the Spirit when for all the interplay between contingency and necessity 
— which is certainly a more welcomed reading of Hegel Caputo admires — it nonetheless 
seems to be un-phased by its contingent unfolding. The reason for this, Caputo argues, is that 
Spirit on Malabou’s account is not subjected enough to a more radical contingency. There is no 
possibility of a catastrophic explosion of the plastic Spirit itself, it remains only infinitely 
malleable. The explosive does not exist in Hegel according to Caputo, and thus the event is 
prevented from taking place: ‘Speculative Hermeneutics’ is not radical hermeneutics.933 The 
events that Malabou identifies in Hegel are events to the extent that they represent 
contingencies and empirical actualities of Spirit, but they cease being events in the radical 
sense at precisely the moment when their appearance is no longer a breach of the horizon of 
expectation.934 Malabou’s theopoetics differs from Caputo’s in that her adieu to God — what 
throughout her text she refers to as the voir venir (‘see what is coming’) — is only a goodbye to 
a certain God (à Dieu) of finite, and therefore, infinitely repeatable formations. But this adieu is 
not a goodbye to the infinite Spirit itself. Adieu to God is really just an au revoir or voir re-venir 
(re-coming). Without the radical sense of theopoetics of ‘perhaps’ there is no future for Hegel 
nor a future for God, because the condition of possibility of a future, and thus the possibility 
                                                      
931 Ibid., pg. 123. 
932 Ibid., pg. 125. 
933 Ibid., pg. 127. 
934 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
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for a present formation (particularities, empirical materiality, factical life) is the im/possibility 
of the ‘to come,’ the perhaps or perhaps not.935  
 
And yet, if Caputo has his doubts about how far plasticity can be stretched, it is equally true 
that Malabou’s plasticity has stretched Caputo’s theopoetics. At the end, Caputo must also 
follow Derrida in saying that ‘I do not know anymore’ between these choices of the accidental 
and the essential.936 It is not a matter of choosing between the Spirit and its necessary 
contingency, affirming ‘pure’ accident or essence, but about a theopoetics of perhaps which 
undoes this dialect and where, more importantly, such a theopoetics itself is also only, perhaps.  
  
3. The Real 
  
If the first two pills of this pharmaceutical itinerary have been 1) to re-formulate the status of 
a theopoetics of the event in terms of a ‘material’ chiasmic relationship between insistence and 
existence, and 2) to have deepened theopoetics by stretching it to its limits through a post- or 
‘heretical’ Hegelianism, then this final pill of theopoetics will be to incorporate this material 
emphasis not by a deepening, but by a widening of its scope.937 As we have argued throughout, 
these two pills do not constitute anything wholly new for Caputo, but rather a reformulation 
or recasting of his preceding theological work, which may have harbored an implicit residual 
Kantianism. As such, we might say that they are still motivated by an essentially (radical) 
theological humanism.938 This humanism, albeit inflected in Caputo’s own creative way, is still 
the project of moving beyond our modern condition. It is the passage — after having read our 
hermeneutics, phenomenology and deconstruction — through and beyond the God of 
metaphysics. It is about the relationship between us and God. Between our responsibility 
(materialism) and God’s prayers, his insistence and solicitation without force (idealism). While 
no theological reflection worthy of the name can do without a theological anthropology, it is 
something totally different for anthropology to become anthropocentric. Caputo suspects the 
                                                      
935 For a reading of Malabou that challenges Caputo directly, see Clayton Crockett, Derrida After the End of Writing, 
pp. 106-108. Crockett writes, “Spirit is this errancy and waste, that [for Malabou’s Hegel] it is not a circular process 
of Spirit becoming itself but an originary metamorphic change that that we call Spirit afterward, in hindsight. It’s 
not that Spirit cannot die or that there is any limit to what can happen to Spirit by accident; it’s that whatever 
happens can only be affirmed or imagined to be Spirit essentially so long as there is subjectivity to think it.” Pg. 
107. The issue here for Crockett, seems to be on the one hand terminological, since for him Spirit is just the name 
we retroactively assign to metaphoric change and contingency. On the other hand, understood in this way — that 
metaphoric change is the essence of form — the problem then becomes that Caputo and Derrida’s event threatens 
“to swallow up form and induce passivity into philosophy.” 
936 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 134. 
937 Ibid., pg. 174. 
938 Ibid., pg. 167. 
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latter, and therefore, in a truly novel development (or repetition) he forces theopoetics to 
account for the cosmic dimension, the non-human, and the non-living. The theopoetics of the 
insistence of God becomes the cosmo-theopoetics of the insistence of the world: the event of 
the world, its promise and its threat in a cosmic gesture of chance or grace. In this way, 
following the model of Martha, Caputo will formulate cosmo-theopoetics as yet a more radical 
‘realism’ and ‘religious materialism.’939 
 
Turning on the distinction between the humanities and the sciences, Caputo says that cosmo-
theopoetics “embraces an ever-wider intertwining of the human and the non-human,” and 
“recognizes the broader reach of ‘insistence.’”940 In this sense, quite literally, tout autre est tout 
autre, whether non-human or non-living, and thus “we must brace ourselves for a wider and 
more welcoming hospitality.”941 If it is true that the difference between ‘us’ and the ‘world’ 
cannot be so easily separated — since, on the one hand, we too are ‘world’ in the sense of 
cosmic materiality (cosmic dust), and on the other, we ‘constitute worlds’ in the Heideggerian 
sense — then cosmo-theopoetics is the song, or poem, that responds not to another world, but 
one that ‘sings the world.’942 The latter is another way ‘God’ and therefore radical theology 
comes to us, as an insistent call of the world/God dramatically expanding the range of 
‘religious materialism.’ Caputo writes, “religion, on my account, is all about deeds and bodies, 
about ‘carnal’ life, about the elemental conditions of carnality — about food and nourshiment, 
about sickness and health, about birth and death, about children and old age.”943 
 
To situate the ‘cosmic’ in cosmo-theopoetics, Caputo argues that continental philosophy has 
for too long followed in the footsteps of Heidegger’s mantra that ‘science does not think.’944 By 
delimiting scientific reason, a new wave of ‘warrior realists’ accuses continental (specifically 
those of the ‘theological turn’) and analytic philosophers, for not taking radical contingency 
seriously enough, leading to an epistemological fideism, and thus, the door wide open for 
                                                      
939 Ibid., pg. 170. Behind the thoughts of this final pill for Caputo is Derrida’s later work on animality. In particular, 
the disruption of the binary between human and non-human, a sovereign and a beast, and therefore also raising 
the question of ‘post-humanism.’ See Jacques Derrida, David Wills (trans.) and Marie-Louise Mallet (ed.) The 
Animal That Therefore I Am (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). Caputo has also recently attempted to 
engage the ‘post-human’: See John D. Caputo, “The Spectre of the Post-Human” in Hermeneutics: Facts and 
Interpretation in the Age of Information (St Ives: Pelican, 2018), pp. 245-272, and John D. Caputo, “On The Wings of 
Angels: Posthumanism and Info-Technology,” in Jeffrey McCurrey (ed.) The Twenty-Sixth Annual Symposium of The 
Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center (Pittsburgh: The Simon Silverman Phenomenology Centre Duquesne 
University, 2011), pp. 8-28. 
940 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 174. 
941 Ibid. 
942 A phrase borrowed from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ibid., pp. 95, 97; pp. 174-175. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Alphonso Lingis (trans.) The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968). 
943 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 178. 
944 Ibid., pg. 186. 
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God’s return. This is part of the argument of Quentin Meillassoux mentioned above, and the 
part with which Caputo broadly agrees.945 In response to the realists’ complaint, Caputo 
implores his continental colleagues to take the ‘objectivity’ of physics seriously, where 
objectivity is understood on ‘strictly phenomenological grounds’ as if “we were dead or had 
never been born.”946 If the latest physics, as the study of the real, has the most complete theory 
of everything, ‘perhaps,’ which is that we are moving toward entropic dissipation, then 
theopoetics must be re-inscribed into this cosmic voyage. Cosmo-theopoetics is the description 
of how we are to respond while we are alive, in the midst of the ‘objective’ (as if we were dead) 
claim of astrophysics: that the universe will, perhaps, terminate in cosmic destruction.       
 
By qualifying ‘objectivity’ as a phenomenological category, Caputo clearly draws a distinction 
between himself and this form of realism, which has also emerged as the self-styled school of 
Object-Orientated Ontology (OOO). In a swift but systematic critique, Caputo uncovers what 
is ultimately a straw-man underlying their central criticism; that all post-Kantian philosophy 
is a form of ‘correlationism.’ The Kantian catastrophe for the speculative realism of OOO is 
philosophy’s obsession with mediation. This follows from the focus on transcendental 
conditions for knowledge at the expense of any access to the real (objects). Husserl is important 
in this context because he spoke of ‘correlational analysis,’ and attempted a reversal of Kantian 
transcendentalism by turning to the phenomena themselves as they appear to consciousness. 
While Husserl’s language, Caputo admits, may have been unguarded in its flirtation with 
idealism and excessive cognivitism (most clearly flagged by the hermeneutic tradition after 
Heidegger) he argues that correlation “itself is simply a law of direct proportions about 
knowing and the known.” Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour and the example of scientific 
inquiry, correlation simply means that ‘constructing’ a scientific account through a complexity 
of tools and a scientific community, makes scientific objects ‘more real,’ it does not relativize 
science: ‘the more construction, the more reality.’947 Demonizing correlation implies that 
objects fall from the sky, not that objects are made more real when subjectivity is supposedly 
stripped away (if this where even possible). Paradoxically, then, speculative realism looks 
                                                      
945 Ibid., pp. 185-189. 
946 Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
947 Ibid., pp. 200-201. From arguments drawing on Derrida’s early work on phenomenology, Caputo is still critical 
of correlation’s ‘binarity’: “The limitation of the word is to suggest a merely two-sided (and implicitly dualistic) 
relation between ‘consciousness’ and ‘reality,’ which is testimony not to metaphysical idealism but to Husserl’s 
excessive cognitivism and his residual privileging of the paradigm of thinking as ‘looking at’ (an-schauen), which 
is what Latour calls the pure ‘gaze.’ That is why, following Derrida, I like to emphasize the middle voice, something 
that is ‘getting itself done’.” Pg. 204. 
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more like a renewed subjectivism948 or theology of rupture,949 and ultimately self-destructs by 
“denying our access to reality in order to preserve the reality of the real.”950   
 
Caputo’s cosmo-theopoetics wants to maintain the integrity of science, not in the interest of 
vulgar realism, but on phenomenological grounds for the reason that despite physics offering 
the best provisional account of the cosmos as entropic dissipation, it alone is insufficient to 
account for the intertwining chiasmic relationship between human reality and the non-human. 
The chiasmic nature of cosmo-theopoetics (which is Caputo’s version of ‘correlation’ that 
avoids the subject-object binary) means not that we denigrate the world of ‘objects’ (the 
material) by an excessive subjectivist reduction, but that we are objects a part of the world and 
who are capable of reflecting on it. If cosmo-theopoetics elicits something different to fideism, 
and if it is to take the new cosmology seriously, then what is this difference precisely? This is 
the question of a radical theology in the context of the new cosmology: the ever-increasing 
likelihood of cosmic death, perhaps.  
 
What is the meaning of the meantime? What are we to make of this time, the time of cosmic 
death, the time ‘as if we were dead?’ There is a Pauline analogy here from the Corinthian 
passage (7:25-31) where time is passing away and we are to live hos me (as if not), but with the 
crucial difference that cosmic death supplies new meaning not in terms of temporal facticity 
— a specific time in life — but cosmic facticity, where life itself is passing away, “die Welt, the 
world we live in, the world of all life.”951 This is nihilism, but not simple materialist nihilism 
that is allowed to run amok by reducing life to death. For Caputo, nihilism or impermanence 
is the condition for life itself. It is an intensification that can be called ‘grace’ —  a ‘nihilism of 
grace.’ And this is ultimately a theo-poetical materialism, not because we are going to be saved 
from death but because death is the condition for life. The comso-theopoetics of radical 
theology embraces faith in life (the promise) just as it cannot guarantee un-faith or safety from 
cosmic death (threat). “This is faith in the promise/threat.”952 Life and the world are an event 
insofar as they are passing away, eventually or perhaps. They are the insistence in the chiasm 
where existence is our response — which is faith in more life, perhaps. The perhaps is the may-
being of more life, which means even though life may be passing away, anywhere where there 
is life there is still the chance for more.   
                                                      
948 See Thomas Lemke, “Materialism without matter: the recurrence of subjectivism in object-orientated ontology” 
in Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory 18. 2 (2017), pp. 133-152. 
949 Caputo, Insistence of God, pg. 201. 
950 Ibid., pp. 206-210 
951 Ibid., pg. 225. 
952 Ibid., pg. 229. 
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The challenge set out at the beginning of this section was whether or not the ‘theopoetics of 
radical political theology’ was sufficient, on the one hand, to dispel the charge of abstracted 
Kantian transcendentalism and an idealistic play of sublime alterity, while simultaneously on 
the other hand, to resist the temptation to devolve into particularism or empiricism. With 
regard to the latter, we saw that the ‘poetics’ of theopoetics, certainly does not end up in 
particularism, insofar as poetics is not a discourse that speaks for something particular, a Being, 
entity, God, or transcendental signified, but rather lets ‘language speak’ in its context without 
being limited to that context, since this context (e.g. Greek Anfang) is but a construction and 
therefore not originary or essential. Theopoetics participates in the disseminative drift of 
différance. It is not a participation in a grand narrative of theopoetry or theopolitics as David 
Miller has noted,953 but neither is the participation or ‘play’ arbitrary or frivolous; it arises out 
of the structural obligation toward the other which has left its trace in language. Theopoetry 
and theopolitics — whether read as the rise of religious fundamentalisms or the techno-
scientific logic of global capitalism — are universalisms that seek to reduce the Other to the 
same, as Levinas would say. The desire for imperialistic knowledge whether from the left or 
the right of the political spectrum, presenting the way of truth in the midst of political 
challenges, is deeply haunted by the theopoetics of radical theology. 
 
The accomplishment of theopoetics in this regard is less controversial, as even the ‘light’ 
version of postmodernism would affirm certain epistemological limits to truth. However, to 
meet the former challenge of resisting distantiated or sublime alterity (the problem of the 
‘without’) is more difficult. Here we saw that the ‘theos’ of theopoetics can often be 
misunderstood in terms of locality and place — ‘where’ is God? Does the event of God occur 
in a movement ‘beyond’ at the expense of finite historical constructions in which it 
nevertheless takes place? On the contrary, the event does not raise the question ‘where’ but 
‘how’? To ask ‘where’ is to operate in the order of existence, but to ask ‘how’ is to shift to the 
order of insistence, where truth is not ‘found,’ but created (facere veritatem) in existence. The 
event calls (insists) just as it is being called upon (existence).  
 
In this recasting of theopoetics, we have demonstrated that Caputo sharply dismisses any 
Kantian transcendentalism that might be read into a weak theology. Instead, we have shown 
through the ‘identification’ or ‘thematization’ above of the three pills of theopoetics, that 
                                                      
953 See David L. Miller, “Theopoetry or Theopoetics,” in Cross Currents 60. 1 (March, 2010), pp. 6-23. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  240 
Caputo is deeply concerned with materiality. The event does not ‘suspend’ the material in the 
sense of holding it up, nor does it make an exception of materiality in favor of some ‘beyond.’ 
The event, which goes by the name of God, is constitutive of material reality even as it exceeds 
it. Such excess, however, does not make a ‘scandal of particularity,’954 because Caputo affirms, 
for example, that radical theology derives from confessional theology, or the messianic is not 
possible without concrete messianisms. The excess of the event in radical theology is an 
inevitability of spacing and a structural condition of difference, such ‘archi-violence’ is not 
ethical violence against the particular, but the constitutive risk of what we cannot see coming.  
 
IV. Avoiding the Third-Way of Theopoetics? 
 
If, in the ‘thematization’ or ‘identification’ of the three pills of theopoetics, we have presented 
the resources of a radical theology that circumvents the ambitions of a ‘politics of presence’ 
while also not denigrating the particular, then should we not prescribe these pills as 
‘treatment’ for our communities? Will such a regimen of medicaments not give us the ‘god 
without sovereignty’ that we have been looking for? Does radical theology’s theopoetics not 
provide an answer to Richard Kearney’s question, “how do we build a politics of 
practice…[h]ow do we do the good, justice, hospitality? What is to be done?”955 A tentative 
answer lies in the use of the scare quotes around ‘thematization’ and ‘identification,’ and what 
Johann Meylahn calls the unavoidable trap of reducing theopoetics to a ‘third way.’956  
 
In his study, The limits and possibilities of post-metaphysical God-talk, Meylahn suggests 
theopoetics as an exemplary narrative between theopoetry and theopolitics.957 He reads 
theopoetics through the incarnate Word, where Christ’s crucifixion is the result of the 
incarnation as the Word becoming flesh (writing/différance): “because of the disruption and 
deconstruction this writing causes in the text or context and thereby challenges the powers 
that be.”958 The crucifixion of Christ by the powers that be is the attempt to arrest the play of 
différance, to stop the questioning of certainty that ‘the certainty of uncertainty’ brings with the 
                                                      
954 James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2004), pp. 59, 116. 
955 Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmerman (eds.) Reimagining the Sacred: Richard Kearney Debates God (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016), pg. 66. Although these specific questions arose in the dialogue with Catherine 
Keller in this volume, Kearney is explicitly referencing Caputo and his ‘deconstructionist friends.’  
956 The discussion here follows closely Johann Meylahn’s closing remarks in The limits and possibilities of post-
metaphysical God-talk. 
957 Ibid., pp. 310-321. 
958 Ibid., pg. 317. 
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incarnated Christ as writing/différance. Meylahn’s Christo-poetics959 or theopoetics, echoes the 
itinerary of theopoetics being pursued with respect to Caputo’s radical theology.960 Meylahn 
cautions, however, that even ‘Jewish-Christian’ and not least ‘Western and Lutheran’ God-talk 
may need to be further disturbed lest it begin to consider itself the next ‘best way.’ He goes on 
to present the ‘Eastern other’ as the Byzantine holy fool to enact this disturbance. There are 
two paths of disturbance to postmodern theopoetics: one is a ‘third-way’ between wisdom and 
folly, the tradition of negative theology or mōrosophia,961 and the other is the Byzantine holy 
fools known as the salos, the ‘the fools for Christ.’962  
 
Mōrosophia develops into a kind of marginal orthodoxy, Meylahn says, with a genos of 
identifiable features that can be traced from Socrates to Erasmus. It’s path to wisdom is not 
through the logos or mythos but in a different order of knowledge and illumination (sapientia) 
which embraces ignorance or folly. This way (orthos) to wisdom was not reserved for a select 
few, but communicated and passed on; disciples could learn this path of illumination toward 
apotheosis through principles and techniques. In dialogue with Peter Phan, who argues for 
mōrosophia as a way to wisdom in postmodernity, Meylahn intimates that mōrosophia is not 
so far removed from theopoetics, but still falls into the trap of reducing the other to the Same 
in its production of a way with a method and distinct telos.963 In contrast, Meylahn argues that 
mōrosophia needs to be re-inscribed back into the text. He offers the Byzantine other: ‘the fools 
of Christ’ (salos) who deconstruct any attempt at orthodoxy. These holy fools are more radical 
because they challenged the congealment of the monastic tradition of the first desert radicals 
(who themselves had challenged the traditions of the institutional church), by living ascetically 
against asceticism.964  
 
The crucial characteristic of the salos is that they don’t have disciples because they have no 
‘way’ to be followed. If they had a way (orthos), this would lead either to ‘vainglory’ because 
                                                      
959 See Johann Meylahn, “Postfoundational practical theology as public Christology” in Verbum et Ecclesia 35. 2 
(2014), Art. #875, 11 pages. Accessed at: http://dx.doi.org/10/4102/ve.v35i2.875.  
960 “Theopoetics, which is without author, meaning, order or finality, remains open for the unknown, unthought 
and impossible other always still to come within the text.” Meylahn, The limits and possibilities of post-metaphysical 
God-talk, pg. 321. 
961 Ibid., pp. 325-331. 
962 Ibid., pp. 331-344.  
963 Ibid., pp. 328-331. See Peter Phan, “The wisdom of Holy Fools in Postmodernity,” in Theological Studies 62., pp. 
730-752. 
964 “The holy fools claimed and exposed the madness (folly) of the desert fathers and mothers as a form of vainglory 
(kind-of-orthopraxis) and the only way they could deconstruct that was to pretend madness by deconstructing 
anything that ever tried to rise up to be the signified, thus often doing things against the law, taking on guilt for 
things they did not do, physically and verbally abusing people who sought their counsel and all this so that they 
would not be lifted high as the new master (wisdom) or new truth of the way. Their spiritual devotion was purely 
secret and any public activity was designed to keep the secret secret.” Ibid, pg. 334. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  242 
it could be attributed to themselves, or if they attributed this way to God it would become 
idolatry, which is what the negative theology of the early monastics was trying to resist. 
Instead, the salos realizing this double bind, had to deny the possibility of holiness and keep 
concealed their ‘unholy-holiness’ from others lest it become a program to be followed. The 
logical conclusion is that they had to pretend to be mad, the ‘madness’ or the possible 
impossibility of truly welcoming radical alterity. Thus, Meylahn concludes, the “holy madness 
of the salos is not a way because it gives way to the other and thus any construction of the 
same is transgressed (deconstructed).”965  
 
The salos’ attempt to radicalize the Pauline theological motif of living ‘as if not,’ in absolute 
humility and dependence on grace alone, even by making a mockery of such an attempt, is 
structurally impossible — there is no pure gift as Derrida would say. Despite this 
impossibility, Meylahn says that they continue to “seek to live différance, to deconstruct what 
is (the Same) with what is other.”966  
 
What Meylahn’s discussion illustrates for our purposes, is that the three pills of theopoetics of 
radical theology cannot be reduced to a formulaic application. In this respect, we should heed 
the fact that radical theopoetics are ‘pills’ and not ‘pillars’ — they are like the Derridian 
supplement or pharmakon that could also be the cause of death. Treatment is also the source of 
a risk/threat, or the possibility of cosmic destruction, perhaps. And yet, just as the salos seek 
to ‘live’ the impossibility of radical self-denial, Meylahn says that we “can identify four 
characteristics of the salos and thereby reduce them to a kind-of-theme as one is obliged to 
do.”967 Therefore, while theopoetics can neither simply be a program or a prescription to be 
taken for a cure — though it will certainly go a long way in providing the resources for 
thinking sovereignty otherwise — it is nonetheless, something that we ‘live’ and are ‘obliged 
to do.’ We will never cease negotiating the aporia between the ‘thematization’ (identification) 
of theopoetics with its traces of Christian pedigree, and the impossibility of the coming event 
which may not be theopoetics at all. Meylahn describes this negotiation as a “mad poetical 
dance…a theopoetical foolish dance…that creates and dissimulates itself as it goes along.”968  
Theopoetics is like the ‘mad poetical dance’ of a radical political theology, and it may just be 
the stuff of a poetical-political revolution of sovereignty, perhaps.  
 
                                                      
965 Ibid., pg. 340 
966 Ibid., pg. 343. Emphasis added. 
967 Ibid. 
968 Ibid., pg. 344. 
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V. A Conclusion: ‘The King is Dead — Long Live the King!’ 
 
The well-known epanalepsis, ‘The King is dead, long live the King!’ (‘Le roi est mort, vive le 
roi!’), which most likely originated in the early sixteenth century at the interment of the French 
King, Louis XII,969 was a funeral ceremonial rite performed to secure the public perpetuity of 
the sovereign, while simultaneously announcing the death of the old monarch. The phrase 
captures the problematic set out in the opening of this study, which recalls Lacan’s gesture to 
the disgruntled students, that once the old sovereign/master is gone, it will soon be replaced 
by another — ‘long live the King!’ This was the important move made in Carl Schmitt’s theory 
of the political, and which we have seen at work throughout the loci of Caputo’s oeuvre: the 
sovereign autonomous ethical subject, the sovereign discourse of religion/theology, and the 
sovereign omnipotent God as the ‘thesis’ of theogony that provides the structure for these other 
sovereigns. The old God (King/sovereign/master) of metaphysics may have perished, but he 
still lives on, “[o]ne has simply changed sovereigns,” Derrida says, “[t]he sovereignty of the 
people or of the nation merely inaugurates a new form of the same fundamental structure.”970  
 
But there has been another way to read this ‘Long live the King.’ It goes by various names and 
is signaled in what we have been calling ‘the event’ or the event of sovereignty. At the conclusion 
of a study, which can only be tentative, it will be suggested that Caputo’s radical theology of 
the event — and the discursive resources of theopoetics we have traced above — is (perhaps) 
the milieu or ‘preparation’ in which to affect a radical ‘poetical-political’ revolution of 
sovereignty. This will be argued by demonstrating how Derrida’s reading of Paul Celan’s 
poetry in The Beast and the Sovereign attempts just such a revolution.971 Derrida finds in Celan’s 
use of poetry (Dichtung)972 a ‘majesty’ which exceeds that of the classical sovereign and is itself 
always open to question. This reading mirrors and confirms the thesis set out in the 
                                                      
969 See Ernst Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press [1957] 2016), pp. 410-412. Kantorowicz suggests that earlier versions can be traced back to the 
succession of King Henry VI in 1422, then still only an infant, pp. 410-411.  
970 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, pg. 282. 
971 This reading will be restricted to the relevant sections in The Beast and the Sovereign, as it consists neither in a 
comprehensive reading of Celan nor of Derrida’s understanding of poetry. The reader should note, however, 
Derrida’s important book dedicated to Celan, wherein many of the themes encountered below are already present. 
See Jacques Derrida, Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (eds.) Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2005). See especially, “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing,” pp. 65-96 and 
“Majesties,” pp. 108-134. See also Paul Celan’s speech on which Derrida’s comment are based; Paul Celan, Jerry 
Glenn (trans.) “The Meridian” in Ibid., pp. 173-185. Some of the insights in this section are drawn from Patrick 
McLane, “Sovereignty without Mastery” in Societies 3 (Dec, 2012), pp. 1-15. 
972 Jerry Glenn translates Dichtung as ‘literature,’ but it can also be translated as ‘poetry,’ as Rosemary Waldrop 
does, see Paul Celan, Rosemary Waldrop (trans.) “The Meridian” in Collected Prose (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
pp. 37-55.  
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introduction of this study, namely, that the theopoetics of radical theology in the work of John 
Caputo, offers the resources and therefore the locus for a radical political theology, because it 
understands itself to be a “poetic revolution in the political revolution,” which is always 
“signed by the repetition of the ‘perhaps’s’ and the ‘who knows.’”973  
 
The Beast and the Sovereign (2001-02)974 is a complex work that draws on many of Derrida’s 
previously published material, and interacts with a diverse range of themes and an equally 
plural group of thinkers; from Aristotle to Rousseau, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Schmitt, Lacan, 
Celan, Heidegger, Valéry, Deleuze, Marin, Foucault and Agamben. At a basic level, as the 
volume’s title suggests, Derrida wants to disturb the distinction between sovereign man and 
the beastly animal. One way he accomplishes this is by arguing that the sovereign master 
makes himself out to be ‘responsible,’ while the enemy is ‘reactive’ and driven by animal 
instinct. The latter is why Hobbes refers to man as a ‘wolf’ in the state of nature, following 
which, a sovereign power is needed to restrain man’s predatory beastly passions.975 It is also 
why he draws on Rousseau’s ‘werewolf’ from the Confessions, ‘loup-garou,’ which also means 
‘outlaw,’ someone who is outside of the law.976 But Derrida argues that this status of sovereign 
responsibility becomes reactive (beastly) precisely through its insistent, mechanical-
instinctual claim to be responsible.977 The sovereign suspends its own law in order to be 
sovereign and, therefore, becomes the beast or the out-law (or the ‘rogue’ state as we saw 
above.) Derrida wishes to pursue forms of thinking that would reveal this slippage 
(impossibility) between responsibility and reactivity, sovereign and beast, in order to be more 
responsible: “having doubts about responsibility, decision, one’s own being-ethical, can be, 
or so it seems to me, and ought to perhaps remain, the indefeasible essence of ethics, of 
decision, and of responsibility.”978  
 
Derrida traces a form of thinking in the poetics of Paul Celan, which undermines the classical 
notion of sovereignty and posits a new ‘poetic majesty.’ In the eight and tenth sessions of The 
Beast and the Sovereign, he follows the comments Celan makes in his “The Meridian” speech 
                                                      
973 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, pg. 273. 
974 We will reference only the first volume of The Beast and the Sovereign here. This inaugural volume is a complete 
transcription of thirteen sessions Derrida gave in Paris between December 12, 2001 and March 27, 2002 and is part 
of a larger English translation project to posthumously publish all of Derrida’s seminars.  
975 Ibid., pp. 11, 92.  
976 Ibid., pp. 63-64. This logic plays out in the othering of humans who are regarded more like animals and must 
therefore be mastered. Judith Butler traces this logic in the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, who are “likened to caged 
and restrained animals.” See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 
2004), pg. 73. 
977 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, pg. 120. 
978 Ibid., pg. 119.  
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on the occasion of receiving a prize in memory of Georg Büchner.979 Celan discusses the 
difficulties of separating art from the mechanical-like robotics of syntax and aesthetic 
conventions; it is like the Medusa’s head which turns things into stone.980 Referring to 
Büchner’s play, Danton’s Death, Celan suggests a moment wherein poetry transcends this 
mechanical art. This moment is what interests Derrida. The scene plays out in the context of 
the French Revolution, where the revolutionary terror are guillotining Dantonists. Before 
Camille Desmoulins is about to be executed, his wife Lucile Duplessis, cries out ‘Long live the 
King!’ and is then led away presumably to her own execution. Celan notes that this expression 
is not an oath to the monarch (they are Dantonists after all), but “a tribute to the majesty of 
the absurd,” which is, “I believe…poetry.” In speaking of the ‘majesty’ accorded to poetry and 
not to the classical sovereign, Derrida writes: 
 
Celan’s gesture in resorting to the word ‘majesty’ — and this is what 
matters most to me here, at least in the context of this seminar — is a 
gesture that consists in placing one majesty above another, and thus 
upping the ante with respect to sovereignty. An upping that attempts to 
change the meaning of majesty or sovereignty, to make its meaning 
mutate, while keeping the old word…There is the sovereign majesty of 
the sovereign, the King, and there is, more majestic or differently majestic, 
more sovereign or differently, the majesty of poetry, or the majesty of the 
absurd insofar as it bears witness to the presence of the human.981 
 
This alternate form of sovereign poetics, paradoxically, in a Dantonist’s pronouncement of 
‘Long live the King!’ is the renouncement of the mechanical understanding of art, of its logic, 
syntax and linguistic conventions, and thus mirrors theopoetics. The latter is the case, insofar 
as theopoetics is not a logic of the discourse of God, but a poetics of the event going on in the 
name of God. There is a further point Derrida wishes to make, however, which reiterates the 
non-avoidance of the ‘third way’ of theopoetics. Before the text just quoted above, Derrida 
draws our attention to Celan’s ‘I believe…’ “This ‘I believe’… seems to imply,” he says, “’I 
believe where, I believe because, it is absurd, credo quia absurdum.’”982 Celan’s attempt to ‘up 
the ante’ in this new poetics of sovereignty is qualified by his own faith in the possibility of 
the absurdity of Lucile’s pronouncement. In other words, Celan’s poetics is an admission (‘I 
                                                      
979 Ibid., pp. 216-220; pp. 225-235 and pp. 259-273. 
980 Celan, Jerry Glenn (trans.), “The Meridian,” in Derrida, Sovereignties in Questions, pg. 176. 
981 Ibid., pg. 230. 
982 Ibid. 
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believe’) that Lucile’s ‘Long Live the King!’ is a counterstatement that always retains the 
possibility that it is not, that it could also be a renouncement of the revolution. Thus, Celan’s 
majesty of poetry or poetics of sovereignty, just as in radical theology’s theopoetics, is itself 
an act of faith, a wager, for it is always at risk of poetic convention or thematic identification.  
 
This act of faith is what Derrida calls in the tenth session the ‘division,’ ‘parting’ and 
‘dissociation’ of the present in the “majesty of the poetic present.”983 Poetic sovereignty or 
theopoetics involves a ‘double division.’ On the one hand the distinction is made between the 
sovereign majesty and the majesty of poetry, or we could say sovereignty and theopoetics.984 
And on the other hand, the majesty of poetry or theopoetics is itself divided between its own 
presence and “the other present, the present of the other to whom the poem makes a present 
of its time, thus in a Mitsprechen, letting the time of the other, its own time.”985 The poetic 
majesty of the ‘Absurd’ which makes present the present of the other, Celan calls ‘stepping 
outside the human’ (ein Hinaustreten aus dem Menschlichen). This movement or Weg, which is 
unheimlich, is the encounter with the Other; the encounter “to come from the horizon of the 
distant and the foreign.”986 The encounter with the other is always inscribed in the modality 
of ‘perhaps’ (‘I believe’), since this path of poetry “is less something that is than an event, the 
coming of an event that happens [arrive].”987  
 
What is seen here are two senses of the poetic vision that can be described as two revolutions. 
The first is the poetic revolution encountered in the ambiguity of the counterstatement, ‘Long 
Live the King!’ This poetics is another form of sovereign majesty, one not unlike the 
theopoetics we have argued for in this chapter. It transcends the mechanization of theo-logic 
and therefore political sovereignty/majesty through the majesty of the Absurd (the event), 
and bears witness to ‘the presence of the human.’ The second sense is a ‘revolution in the 
revolution,’ where the poetic majesty of the Absurd itself encounters the Other, and which is 
no longer a counterstatement nor majestic word, “but a terrifying silence, an arrest that strikes 
speech dumb.”988 This is the radical theopoetics of the perhaps, which does not reduce the 
temporality of the other, but which is an “improbable poetry (‘who knows’) but a poetry to 
take one’s breath away and turn it.”989 Derrida says that this revolution “perhaps prepares 
                                                      
983 Ibid., pg. 260. 
984 Ibid., pg. 259. 
985 Ibid., pg. 260. 
986 Ibid., pg. 269.  
987 Ibid., pg. 267. 
988 Ibid., pg. 270. 
989 Ibid., pg. 272. 
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some poetic revolution in the political revolution” and which we are suggesting is the site of 
a radical political theology. For a radical political theology thinks the event of sovereignty 
(political revolution), as the theopoetics of a god to come, which is itself a wager on this 
discourse and therefore radically exposed to the other and infinitely open to question (poetic 
revolution). The theopoetics of radical political theology, therefore, perhaps prepares the 
inauguration of the political revolution of sovereignty by means of a radical poetic revolution. 
We can say then that radical political theology is the ‘poetical-political revolution’ of 
sovereignty as such. The King is dead, indeed. ‘Long Live the King!’ 
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Postscript 
 
As a philosophical-theological reflection on the political-theological concept of sovereignty, 
this study has concluded by trying to think John D. Caputo’s radical theology as a contribution 
to a radical political theology. To this extent, it did not treat a ‘praxis’ of radical political 
theology. Instead, it strategically offered the resources of radical theology descriptively rather 
than prescriptively, that is, as “a work of thought that thinks the structural possibility”990 of a 
radical political theology. Chapter six sought to emphasize that to think this structural 
possibility of a radical political theology one does not inhabit a ‘pure messianic’ space, but 
rather that such a possibility must always emerge from “the lushness of the colors of concrete 
life,” and “the oases of the living faiths of historical revelations.”991 The latter was taken up 
with respect to the question of the status of determinate religion or the ‘with’ in a religion 
without religion. It was then demonstrated that Caputo does not denigrate the material, 
determinate, or confessional forms of concrete life, but rather that the religious impulse in 
radical theology reminds these particular beliefs, practices and actions, that they are always 
haunted by an undecidability of being determined otherwise. This allayed the charge that 
Caputo (or Derrida) are guilty of being ‘against’ institutions, concrete beliefs, or confessional 
religion. Indeed, Caputo would argue that to think the structural possibility of a religion 
without religion (the event) one would need a horizon of expectation relative to the event 
which breaches it. Thus, religion without religion might be thought of less as a disturbance of 
determinate religion, than as the disturbance already going on in determinate religion 
(insistence).  
 
It is in light of these conclusions that one should interpret questions of ‘praxis’ or a ‘politics of 
practice.’ Indeed, insofar as this study is theological, one might go further to say that the 
church — as arguably the political manifestation of Christianity — in the view of radical 
theology, can be understood by a certain ‘weak’ ecclesiology. It should be clear that such an 
ecclesiology would be ‘weak’ or ‘radical,’ because it would always remain infinitely open to 
its Other. To be precise, this does not thereby imply that Caputo’s radical theology imposes a 
competing ecclesiology, “a rival body of beliefs” (croyances), one that is to be inhabited or 
around which a church might form. It is rather a theopoetics; a contingent discourse which 
gives linguistic existence to the events being called within confessional churches. However, 
                                                      
990 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, pg. 195. 
991 John D. Caputo, “Only as Hauntology is Religion without Religion Possible” in Marko Zlomislić and Neal 
DeRoo (eds.) Cross and Khôra, pp. 112-113. See chapter five where we have clarified the important messianic-
messianism distinction.  
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the pragmatic sense of ‘weakness’ here might require further attention, for up until now the 
activity of a radical theology has been carried out as a ‘high-level’ discourse of philosophical 
and theological reflection. Is not the weakness or limitation of a radical political theology, 
then, the fact that we do not yet know how it ought to be ‘carried out?’ In a slightly different 
sense, one might ask how we are to ‘ingest’ the three pills of radical theology’s theopoetics?  
 
In this regard, it should be noted that Caputo has made a number of attempts to address his 
thought to a ‘public’ audience, both those with and without religious faith.992 Furthermore, he 
also regularly engages in podcasts and webinar sessions, as well as public speaking and 
preaching engagements at local churches. Caputo’s public activity, therefore, could be said to 
be an example of what an attempt to expose what is already going on in determinate religion, 
might look like.993 It follows that such public engagements would influence these 
communities’ own self-reflections as to what it means to be a ‘community without 
community.’994 Such communities, upon self-reflection would, therefore, engage a ‘praxis’ of 
being both open to the Other (‘theo-praxis’)995 and of being active critics of those formations 
that would block the Other’s access.996 To use an ‘inelegant,’ as she calls it, but nonetheless 
felicitous phrase from Katherine Sarah Moody, this would be a “religion without religion 
within religion.”997 And thus, the discursive form of radical theological reflection becomes 
inscribed within the ‘activity’ or expressive acts of a community.  
 
Yet, as Moody has further pointed out, we still do not have a sense of what it might entail to 
‘practice’ or to ‘learn to live’ this religion without religion within religion. She wonders 
whether there might be “specific religious practices — discursive, communicative or 
expressive acts — that prime participants to learn to live in a dis/associative space between 
                                                      
992 See John D. Caputo, What Would Jesus Deconstruct: The Good News of Postmodernism for the Church (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2007); John D. Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001) and John D. Caputo, The Folly of 
God: A Theology of the Unconditional (Salem: Polebridge Press, 2016).  
993 Caputo will continue to expand this project of exposing the deconstructive elements already at work within 
Christianity in 2019, with a forthcoming publication, Cross and Cosmos: A Theology of Difficult Glory (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2019), where he will interrogate Martin Luther’s theology of the cross.  
994 Caputo speaks about a two-fold movement of historical association (our confessional community, or any ‘life-
world’ in which we find ourselves), and messianic dissociation, ‘which prevents these names from freezing over.’ 
Katherine Sarah Moody writes that these two movements should be understood “within one two-fold moment. 
Historical association and messianic dissociation are made together in what might be called one moment 
dis/association.” See Caputo, “What Do I Love When I Love My God,” pp. 303-305 quoted in Moody, Radical Theology 
and Emerging Christianity, pg. 134.  
995 Caputo, What Would Jesus Deconstruct, pp. 118-128. 
996 Caputo has always remained critical of the Christian Right and its alignment with political ambitions of the 
Republican Party for example. This was the target of much of his criticism in What Would Jesus Deconstruct, see pp. 
89-116. Moreover, in this political line, Caputo will also be contributing to a new critical volume edited by Jeffrey 
W. Robbins and Clayton Crockett, Doing Theology in the Age of Trump: A Critical Report on Christian Nationalism 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2018). 
997 Moody, Radical Theology and Emerging Christianity, pg. 123. 
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their theism and its ‘others,’ including atheism?” And what “might an a/theistic response to 
the event look like in the context of religious community?”998 We could also ask, alternatively, 
what ‘radical rituals,’ ‘radical liturgies’ or ‘radical symbolic acts’ might cultivate a critical 
disposition toward our reliance on the normative status of our religious beliefs? To this end 
Caputo has pointed to the ‘postmodern liturgy’ of Peter Rollins and his Ikon collective in 
Belfast,999 which also identifies with the ‘Emerging Church Movement.’1000 In her study, 
Radical Theology and Emerging Christianity (2015), Moody employs the radical theologies of 
Žižek and Caputo to evaluate the ‘emerging ir/religious practices’ in the work of Rollins and 
Kester Brewin, and identifies three ‘emerging’ areas that might constitute “concrete religious 
and potentially political practices.”1001 Moody’s critical insight is to suggest that these areas 
— ‘faithful betrayal,’ ‘transformative art’ and ‘suspended space’ — if read through Caputo’s 
‘religion without religion’ and Žižek’s ‘fighting collective,’ neither simply embellish or 
contemporize stale worship or liturgy,1002 nor do they contribute to the ‘debt economy’ of 
neoliberalism wherein subjects are required “to become active entrepreneurs of the self,” who 
continually have to create, produce, and market every aspect of life for consumption. Rather, 
through the continual practices of identity suspension that is cultivated by Rollins and 
Brewin’s radical liturgies, there is not an assimilation to this economic and political order, but 
a ‘contestation’ of the “disciplinary apparatus of neoliberal capitalism.”1003 Moody 
recommends that further research would need to be conducted to empirically verify her claim 
that the discursive practices, or radical liturgies in the ‘a/theistic imaginaries’ of the Emerging 
Church Movement, do indeed yield positive transformation to social, economic and political 
orders. In her final paragraph, she also asks about the need for further investigation into the 
deconstructive theology of Caputo (as well as Žižek) “precisely as [a] political theolog[y],” to 
which the radical political theology argued for in this study, commends itself as a modest 
contribution.  
 
 
 
   
                                                      
998 Ibid., pg. 136. Emphasis added. 
999 Caputo, What Would Jesus Deconstruct, pp. 129-134. See Peter Rollins, How (Not) to Speak of God, (Orleans, MA: 
Paraclete, 2006). 
1000 For the most comprehensive sociological study of the Emerging Church Movement (ECM) see Gerardo Martí 
and Gladys Ganiel, The Deconstructed Church: Understanding Emerging Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
1001 Moody, Radical Theology and Emerging Christianity, pg. 27. 
1002 Ibid., pp. 226-238. 
1003 Ibid., pg. 237. 
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